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This dissertation investigates literary representations of the scene of viewership 
in Victorian literature in order to interrogate how the narrative rendering of the 
“aesthetic encounter” brings to the fore the social and material realities of such 
moments that contemporary philosophical treatises on the subject often overlook, 
obscure, or repress.  I am interested in the ways in which the scene or environment of 
the aesthetic encounter—be it in a private gallery or public museum space—structures 
power relations grounded in notions of taste, cultivation, and civility.  Because the 
nineteenth-century philosophical aesthetic treatise does not avow the material 
conditions of viewing art, the narrative representation of such moments is particularly 
important in revealing that aesthetic experience is not and cannot be an intensely 
private moment, but is rather one that is thoroughly social and highly performative.  
Narrating the scene of aesthetic encounter in the nineteenth century was part of a 
larger cultural effort to represent sociality, to comprehend the vast network of 
circumstances and contingencies that determines one’s relation to and perspective on 
the world and the other people in it.  Depicting individual subjectivities in the act of 
aesthetic experience, writers such as Charlotte Brontë, George Eliot, Walter Pater, 
Nathaniel Hawthorne, and Henry James demystify the ideologies at work—and the 
ideologies being naturalized—in the viewing of paintings, the contemplation of 
sculpture, and in the admiration of cameos and antique coins. Throughout the 
dissertation I argue for renewed attention to how the increasingly experimental 
representations of the aesthetic encounter found in nineteenth-century literature 
rendered viewership an inherently self-conscious performance, paving the way for the 
novelistic portraits of artists as young men that were to dominate the literary landscape 
of the early twentieth century.  
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INTRODUCTION.  
Cultured “States” and the Scene of the Aesthetic Encounter 
Though the British Museum itself was established in 1753, it was not until 
seventy years later that plans were made to build a separate gallery for its works of art, 
a space separate from the stuffed penguins, topographical maps, and Egyptian 
antiquities with which they had previously vied for attention.  Yet, this “fit space” 
ultimately proved unnecessary, owing to the founding of the National Gallery only one 
year later (1824), and by 1838, the latter institution was housed in its own, specially-
designed building in Trafalgar Square.  The former site of the King’s Mews, or the 
Royal Stables, Trafalgar Square was chosen for the site of the National Gallery 
because it was (in the words of Sir Robert Peel) “in the very gangway of London,” its 
central location ensuring that it could be most easily accessed by people from all 
social classes.  Renovated and expanded over the course of the century, the National 
Gallery remained in Trafalgar Square, a testament to its intended function, not simply 
as a monument to culture but also as a space devoted to the facilitation of acculturating 
experiences.  As one Parliamentarian put it in 1857, “the existence of the pictures is 
not the end purpose of the collection, but the means only to give the people an 
ennobling enjoyment: to purify their tastes and wean them from polluting and 
debasing habits.”1   
A point of departure for many compelling studies of modern museum culture, 
the timely relocation of the first national art collection from the crowded periphery to 
the symbolic epicenter of London at the commencement of Victoria’s reign is often 
read as foreshadowing the proliferation in the nineteenth century of public spaces 
                                                 
1 This quote is attributed to Lord Justice Coleridge of the 1857 Parliamentary Commission, and is here 
taken from “The Perpetual Present,” by Neil MacGregor in Oxford Today: The University Magazine 
(vol 15, no. 1, 2002): <http://www.oxfordtoday.ox.ac.uk/2002-03/v15n1/04.shtml> 
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designed specifically for the appreciation of art.  The founding of the National Gallery 
figures not as a beginning but as a culmination of sorts, in the developments that this 
study traces.  The construction of the National Gallery merely concretized and 
institutionalized a series of ideas, investments, and attitudes of a culture already 
engaged with aesthetic philosophy.  Through exposure to works of Continental and 
Romantic thought of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, works like 
Friedrich Schiller’s On the Aesthetic Education of Man, Victorian Britain had already 
invested in a belief that aesthetic experience possessed a civilizing function, offering a 
means of refining “that faculty which connects Man with the world” and of 
regenerating an age whose “great idol” was “Utility.”2  Considered from this angle, the 
nation’s first public art museum stands as a spatialization of the dominant conceptions 
of the period about the experience of art.  Its central location speaks to the cumulative 
cultural capital attached to aesthetic knowledge; its exclusiveness content-wise to a 
growing ideological distance between art objects and other kinds of cultural artifacts; 
and its internal structuring to the complex, specific, and highly mediated nature of the 
encounter between viewer and object.   
The Victorian investment in aesthetic experience as “an ennobling enjoyment,” 
one that should be encouraged precisely because it “purif[ies]” the taste by 
“wean[ing]” the individual away from various unsavory “habits,” helps to explain the 
founding of museums, the proliferation of treatises and guidebooks to aid the viewer 
in navigating these new spaces, and the rise to prominence enjoyed by such sages of 
culture as Samuel Taylor Coleridge, John Ruskin, Walter Pater, and Oscar Wilde.  
Yet, especially when considering these more tangible effects of the century’s 
preoccupation with the realm of the aesthetic, it seems worth asking, what was its 
affect?  In other words, how did the cultural obsession with such experiences shape 
                                                 
2 Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education of Man, trans. Reginald Snell (New Haven: Yale UP, 
1954) 69, 26.   
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how experience generally was felt, perceived, and understood, both in the moment and 
afterwards?  Henry James, in his unfinished and posthumously published memoir The 
Middle Years, poses a similar question, answering it for himself in the process: 
Could one in those days feel anything with force, whether for pleasure or for 
pain, without feeling it as an immense little act or event of life, and as therefore 
taking place on a scene and in circumstances scarce at all to be separated from 
its own sense and impact?—so that to recover it is to recover the whole 
medium, the material pressure of things, and find it most marked for 
preservation as an aspect, even, distinguishable, a “composition.”3 
“Those days” of which James is speaking are, in essence, the last third of the 
nineteenth century, when as a young man he traveled from America to Europe to 
immerse himself in the art culture of which he was to become one of its most gifted 
chroniclers.  Describing the hey-day of Victorian aestheticism from the distance of 
half a century, James’s recollection of his aesthetic apprenticeship strives to locate his 
own experiences within a larger cultural movement, underscoring how he felt his own 
“little act or event of life” to be illuminated and enlarged by virtue of its unfolding in 
the midst of “a scene and in circumstances” that seemed almost designed to engender 
moments of sensory impact.  As this reminiscence suggests, the charm of those days is 
attributable to how the pervasive interest in aesthetics created a heady atmosphere 
which lent to potentially “anything” that generated a strong emotional response a kind 
of luster, a perceptible beauty.  Even if art culture provided the impetus for this new-
found sensitivity, its effect extended beyond an appreciation for celebrated artifacts, 
heightening the viewer’s awareness of his own perceptual faculties.  The milieu of an 
England enlivened by a communal preoccupation with art thus becomes itself a 
picturesque backdrop against which the viewer’s own aesthetic experiences are 
“immense” performances worth viewing in their own right, worth thinking about as 
experiences. 
                                                 
3 Henry James, The Middle Years (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1917) 51-52. 
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If one is capable of calling to mind the sensations and impressions felt at such 
moments, James contends, one might also “recover the whole medium, the material 
pressure of things” that shaped and preserved those moments themselves as 
“aspect[s]“ or “composition[s].”  Yet, in what form are those impressions to be 
recovered?  How can the “material pressure of things” be conveyed so as to 
communicate the inherently aesthetic and compositional quality to someone outside of 
the moment?  James gives the reader a clue as to the sorts of epistemological frames 
that are not up to the task with another rhetorical question, asking how one could “not 
recognize that to live through the extravagant youth of the aesthetic era . . . was to 
seem privileged to such immensities as history would find left to her to record but with 
bated breath?”4  Seen from the vantage point of the future, the “youth of the aesthetic 
era” presents—to James’s mind—a challenge to “history,” which can only approach 
its “immensities” with “bated breath.”  The problem, it is implied, lies in history’s 
(theoretically) objective perspective.  In order to create a “record” of a particular 
period, the historian must stand outside of the temporal flow of history, assuming a 
distanced and distancing perspective in relation to events he is trying to organize and 
contain.  When faced, though, with an era that James sees as defined by its 
extravagance, by a tendency to exceed or otherwise stray beyond prescribed 
boundaries, historicizing projects cannot but fail to capture the essence of “the whole 
medium,” which is to be found not in the events but in the participants’ impressions of 
them.   
James critiques historical efforts to “recover” the aesthetic era because, to his 
mind, fiction offers the best means of conveying the intensity of such moments, 
especially when such moments are part of a near-distant past in which one lived, felt, 
and saw intensely.  In the preface to The Aspern Papers, James describes his “delight” 
                                                 
4 The Middle Years 50. 
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as a novelist “in a palpable imaginable visitable past—in the nearer distances and the 
clearer mysteries, the marks and signs of a world we may reach over to as by making a 
long arm we grasp an object at the other end of our own table.”5  In fiction, the past 
can be imaginatively (re)visited, the “marks and signs” of this lost world conjured up 
by the author through the narrativization of events.  Not bounded by the same pledge 
to objectivity, the author of fiction also has the freedom to recover a historical period 
by focalizing a particular milieu through the subjective impressions of various 
characters.  In this way, the extravagant materiality of a historical period itself 
obsessed with artistic materials can be “recognized” narratively, in the affective 
responses they evoke in the “privileged” fictional spectator.   
James’s meditations on this topic are pertinent to this dissertation project for a 
number of reasons.  For one thing, James himself is just the sort of author that this 
passage from The Middle Years calls for.  In his early novel, The Portrait of a Lady, 
his heroine Isabel Archer, like James himself, travels to Europe in search of the same 
sort of aesthetic apprenticeship, immersing herself in art culture both in England and 
on the Continent.  Yet, James, unlike Isabel, went to Europe not simply to gain first-
hand experience of the aesthetic era then in bloom but also to learn how to write about 
it.  He spent his own “extravagant youth” in honing a critical and literary sensibility 
devoted to the representation of perceptual experiences with beautiful objects, first as 
a drama and art critic and later as a novelist.  James, though, is the last author on 
whom this dissertation focuses, and his argument in The Middle Years mostly 
confirms what his early novel and the fiction of earlier authors suggest: that the 
nineteenth-century preoccupation with aesthetics left a discernible impression on the 
literature of the period in that literature’s commitment to representing subjectivities in 
the act of contemplation and, conversely, that prose narratives emerged during that 
                                                 
5 Henry James, The Turn of the Screw and The Aspern Papers, ed. Anthony Curtis (New York: Penguin 
Classics, 1986) 31. 
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period as the primary means of rendering intelligible the experience of the aesthetic 
that was so profoundly affecting to Victorian culture. 
If the central tenets of nineteenth-century aestheticism can be said to have been 
articulated in critical texts such as Ruskin’s Modern Painters, the Pre-Raphaelite 
Brotherhood’s periodical The Germ, and Pater’s The Renaissance, the narrativized 
representation of the aesthetic encounter in contemporary fiction put theory into 
practice, revealing the intensely self-conscious and indeed performative reality 
underlying the transcendent experiential ideal associated with aesthetic observation.  
Contextualizing such aesthetic moments—relocating them from the rarified environs 
of philosophical abstraction to a particular historically-determined milieu—these 
narratives strove to illuminate the external and internal impulses that, amidst the 
rancorous scientific and religious debates of the day, drove people towards a mode of 
experience that promised some reconciliation of body and spirit, ape and essence.  
Still, as this project aims to demonstrate, the search for some form of psychic integrity 
is only one part of the allure of the narrative modeling of aesthetic experience. 
Victorian authors also returned to the scene of the aesthetic encounter because it 
provided a vehicle for representing sociality, for evoking that “material pressure of 
things” to which James referred, the vast network of circumstances and contingencies 
that determines one’s relation to and perspective on the world and the other people in 
it.   
The narrative modeling of aesthetic experience that this dissertation undertakes 
to explore is crucially tied to Gerard Genette’s notion of the aesthetic relation, which 
“consists in an emotional response (of appreciation) to an attentional object, whatever 
it might be, considered with regard to its aspect.”6  For Genette, the term “aesthetic” is 
applicable only in the moment when the viewing subject is engaged in appreciating the 
                                                 
6 Gerard Gennette, The Aesthetic Relation, trans. G.M. Goshgarian (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1999) 222. 
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physical aspect of a particular object.  Moreover, even in this moment, neither the 
viewer nor the object itself is deemed “aesthetic”; it is only the relation between them, 
a bond as transitory as it is irreproducible.  Genette’s aesthetic relation allows us to 
(re)theorize and (re)interpret an experience that is all too often understood as 
proceeding from the existence of an objectively and intrinsically meaningful art object 
(the fetishization of a painting, for instance) or from that of a uniquely endowed 
viewing subject (the cult status of the connoisseur or aesthete) by redirecting our 
attention to the performance of viewing itself.  If Genette’s aesthetic relation narrows 
our focus in one direction, by limiting the idea of the aesthetic only to the moment in 
which perceptual appreciation is occurring, it broadens our potential scope of inquiry 
by encouraging the consideration not of viewers and objects but also of the 
specificities of the situation in which this relation takes place.  Also, in stressing the 
temporality of the aesthetic, the fact that it is grounded in a particular context 
consisting of a scene, a setting, and a specific viewer located in a social and historical 
milieu, Genette’s aesthetic relation raises the question of what precedes, surrounds, 
and follows such moments of experience.   
At the same time, using the aesthetic relation as a foundational concept 
disqualifies, for the purposes of this project, at least, certain types of literature that are 
typically associated with aesthetic matters.  Ekphrastic poetry, for example, which 
attempts to describe in language a visual work of art, falls outside the boundaries of 
this study because it claims to focus exclusively on the representation of the object.  
Similarly, the künstlerroman, the artist-novel (such as Goethe’s The Sorrows of Young 
Werther), and its cousin, the aesthete-novel (Wilde’s The Picture of Dorian Gray), 
subordinate aesthetic experience to narratives that chart the formation and 
development of the mind and the sensibilities of their respective subjects.  The texts 
that figure in this dissertation differ in their primary focus on the experience of the 
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aesthetic.  This common interest reflects a broader cultural preoccupation with 
navigating the extravagant materiality of the period—a materiality that can be (and has 
been, in various critical studies) linked to the explosion of industry, particularly the 
mass marketing of consumer goods; to scientific and technological advancement; to 
the expansion of a global economy that facilitated the procurement of materials and 
the distribution of products; and to urbanization and the concomitant population shift 
to various, fast-growing centers of industry.  If these developments engendered 
widespread feelings of alienation and anomie for which aesthetic experience was the 
prescribed remedy, this situation also made aestheticism a kind of industry.  Yet, I am 
less interested in aestheticism’s attempts to obscure its connections to the material 
culture which was its necessary precondition than I am in exploring how the cultural 
sensitivity to the pressures of materiality made its way into the literature of the period 
in the form of the aesthetic encounter.  Linking nineteenth-century authors as diverse 
as Charlotte Brontë, Nathaniel Hawthorne, Walter Pater, George Eliot, and, of course, 
Henry James, their various representations of aesthetic experience provide a means of 
recognizing the web of relations that connect the individual to society, a web of 
relations that can be made visible by narrativizing the process by which the individual 
engages with a vast symbolic economy in the contemplation of the art object. 
Representing the encounter between viewer and object, as that encounter 
unfolds within framing spaces such as museums, galleries, and ruins, these narratives 
all strive, in different ways and to different ends, to convey the social dynamics that 
underwrite individual aesthetic experiences.  These social dynamics are partially 
constituted by the cultural and economic factors that determine the vantage-point of a 
particular viewer, such as that viewer’s class or race or gender.  Nevertheless, the 
aesthetic encounter in these texts is ultimately a social occurrence because the 
individual’s aesthetic experience takes place within these framing spaces and thus is 
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itself a narratable phenomenon.  These narratives of aesthetic experience complicate 
what in aesthetic theory is typically figured as a private dyadic relation by locating 
that relation in the public arena, amidst spaces created for viewership and peopled 
with other viewers, who are themselves potential witnesses to the individual’s 
engagement with the art object.  By stripping away the privacy that philosophy grants 
to its hypothetical viewer, the authors of these narratives reveal the self-conscious, 
highly performative nature of aesthetic experience, its social aspect, its 
compositionality.  All formally experimental, the narrative representations of the 
aesthetic encounter I consider here depict the viewer’s experience with the art object 
and the aesthetic culture in which it is situated as a moment that is revelatory of that 
viewer’s unconscious or conscious engagement with various cultural practices, norms, 
and values.   
Though these encounters all suggest that aesthetic experience discloses some 
form of otherwise elusive interiority in the viewer, the interiority intimated in the 
private act of contemplation nevertheless is shown to have a social component, being 
both “interpretable” (insofar as it can be analyzed by others in observance) and 
“interpretive” (as the unique form of viewership practiced by the individual indicates 
how that individual understands and challenges the sorts of social scripts that inform 
such moments).  That being said, even if these narratives posit a social function for 
aesthetic experience, the idea of interiority on display for the scrutiny of others should 
not be confused with the Shaftesburian ideal of sensus communis.  These narratives 
offer no rapturous dissolution of the boundaries between individual consciousnesses, 
no mythic melding of discrete perspectives into some communal or sympathetic 
sensory experience.  Instead, the narrative of the aesthetic encounter typically puts on 
display a web of relations: between things, between the viewer and the object, the 
viewer and other viewers, the viewer and the scene of viewership.  Plotting out these 
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relations, these narratives attempt to chart something so ephemeral and yet so 
immense as the coming-together of sensibilities, preferences, choices, and 
circumstances in an inimitable quasi-chemical reaction to determine the form and 
outcome of aesthetic experience.  Goethe attributed the strange alchemy of such 
moments to the workings of what he called “elective affinities” (die 
Wahlverwandtschaften).  Though Goethe applied the term more specifically to the 
passions, to the ways in which combinations of internal and external forces act upon 
individuals, governing love and other human relations, this dissertation aims to situate 
the aesthetic firmly within the realm of the social, and thus, argues that the study of 
the sociality of the aesthetic encounter, as it is depicted in nineteenth-century prose 
narratives, contributes a crucial dimension to that same history of aesthetics that would 
culminate in such cultural revolutions as that implied by the founding of the National 
Gallery. 
*    *    *    *    *    *    * 
Before offering chapter summaries of these longer prose narratives and of my 
analyses of how their authors employed the aesthetic encounter in various explorations 
of the social dynamics that structure and are revealed by such moments of viewership, 
I would first provide a reading of two scenes of aesthetic encounter, in order to 
delineate the common narrative framework out of which these scenes emerge.  These 
two scenes are taken from poetic narratives, the first being an excerpt from Book I of 
Elizabeth Barrett Browning’s epic verse-novel Aurora Leigh (1856) and the second 
being Robert Browning’s dramatic monologue “My Last Duchess” (1842).  Given the 
fact that the body of this dissertation is exclusively concerned with novels and short 
pieces of prose fiction, using poetry to exemplify this narrative framework might seem 
counter-intuitive.  However, these texts align themselves with the works later to be 
discussed in that they endeavor to situate the perspectives of their respective speaking 
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subjectivities socially through that speaker’s engagement with an art object.  Also, 
when read in conjunction, the differences between the two speakers (one a Victorian 
poetess looking back on an experience that proved formative to the development of 
her imagination, the other a widowed, Renaissance-era Duke showing off the portrait 
of his late wife to an envoy of the father of his next one) reveal the social dynamics 
that structure the aesthetic encounter, rendering it a performance of a particular 
sensibility.   
In each instance, the strange tale of how the art object came to be painted 
provides the motivation to speech, which in turn prompts both speakers to offer stories 
of their own aesthetic development—narrating through their descriptions of a portrait 
the construction of their identities as viewers.  For both speakers, their aesthetic 
perspectives replicate the defining features of their social positions, those of grieving 
daughter and frustrated husband.  Taken together, Browning’s dramatic monologue 
stands as an illuminating complement to the scene in his wife’s verse-novel, as both 
speakers condense into a single speech a series of discrete impressions of one portrait.  
But whereas Barrett Browning intimates that diversity of perspective is articulated 
over time, through experience and multiple aesthetic encounters, Browning’s Duke 
suggests the possible contemporaneity of divergent aesthetic perspectives.  
Notwithstanding this difference, in both poems an encounter with a painting exposes 
the intricate web of contingencies that predetermines a particular viewer’s experience 
of a specific art object and shows the eye to be anything but “innocent.”  In this 
relatively focused comparison of two of the Brownings’ most famous “men and 
women,” a comparison that foregrounds the dynamic of gender, I look to the rhetorical 
strategies employed by these two speakers in order to trace the basic outline of the 
aesthetic encounter, setting the stage for my subsequent analyses of this moment as it 
is depicted within the broader frame of the prose narrative. 
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More than a decade before the publication of Aurora Leigh, Elizabeth Barrett 
Browning, in a letter to the novelist Mary Russell Mitford, recounts an exchange 
between herself and her sister Arabella that underscores one of the central questions of 
the aesthetic encounter, the question of how the same art object can provoke such 
vastly dissimilar responses in different viewers.  She describes her sister’s visit to the 
shared studio space of “Mr. Haydon & Mr. Lucas,” where Arabella views a singularly 
unimpressive fresco of the angel Uriel, a “captivat[ing]” portrait of the children of a 
Mr. Talfourd, and, finally, 
the lovely portrait of Lady Burlington—most lovely--& which so little 
impressed her with the sense of sadness, that she quite started when I told her 
of the circumstances related to it—“Taken after death!—Why it looks so 
youthful & smiling & full of life!”— 
How differently the light falls on different minds!—Your friend, whose letter 
you sent me, [could] even see the parting pitying look!—and I hope she is 
right.7 
What fascinates the poet about her sister’s experience of John Lucas’s painting is her 
lack of impressionability as to its tragic subtext.  A mourning portrait, the picture of 
Lady Burlington was painted in commemoration after her death, a circumstance that 
Barrett Browning feels must be somehow visible in the painting itself, in spite of the 
fact that its subject is represented as “full of life.”  That one of Mary Russell Mitford’s 
friends claimed to have “see[n] that parting pitying look” of a departing soul whereas 
Arabella Barrett only saw a “youthful [woman] smiling” points to a familiar 
interpretive crux.  How do we account for the differences between one impression of 
an art object and another?  Is one viewer simply more capable of recognizing an 
objective truth hidden from less discerning spectators, or, is the discrepancy evidence 
                                                 
7 Elizabeth Barrett Browning, “To Mary Russell Mitford” ([13] October 1841), Letter 116 of The 
Letters of Elizabeth Barrett Browning to Mary Russell Mitford, 1836-1854, ed. Meredith B. Raymond 
and Mary Rose Sullivan, Vol. 1 (Waco, TX:  Armstrong Browning Library of Baylor University, 1983) 
287. 
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of the absolute relativity of aesthetic impressions and judgments?  To echo Barrett 
Browning, how does one begin to understand “how differently the light falls on 
different minds”? 
For Barrett Browning, as her phrase suggests, the answer lies in the province of 
the viewer, when in the moment of aesthetic encounter the light falls just so and 
illuminates not a portrait, but a particular subjectivity in the act of contemplation.  In 
other words, it is the perceptual performance--the dynamic process by which the 
viewing subject engages with an art object—that seems potentially revelatory of the 
mysterious origins and enigmatic nature of aesthetic impressions.  Barrett Browning 
pursues this possibility more than a decade later, when she recreates the circumstances 
of her sister’s aesthetic encounter in Aurora Leigh.8  Certain details are, of course, 
altered.  Most importantly, instead of a casual viewer’s brief glance at a painting of a 
woman of fashion, the moment is reimagined as a child’s protracted scrutiny of the 
portrait of her mother.  That being said, the story and description of the painting itself, 
its almost palpable aura of sadness and strangeness, answers to how Barrett Browning 
imagined the earlier experience in her letter: 
The painter drew it after she was dead, 
And when the face was finished, throat and hands, 
Her cameriera carried him, in hate 
Of the English-fashioned shroud, the last brocade 
She dressed in at the Pitti ; ‘he should paint 
No sadder thing than that,’ she swore, ‘to wrong 
Her poor signora.’ Therefore very strange 
The effect was.  I, a little child, would crouch 
For hours upon the floor with knees drawn up, 
And gaze across them, half in terror, half 
In adoration, at the picture there,  
[ . . . ] That way went my thoughts 
When wandering beyond sight.  And as I grew 
                                                 
8 See note 1.128 in Aurora Leigh, edited by Margaret Reynolds, (Athens, OH: Ohio UP, 1999) 590.  I 
am indebted to Reynolds for her mention of this letter to Mary Mitford and her noting of the “similar 
circumstances” behind the portrait of Lady Burlington and that of Aurora’s mother.   
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In years, I mixed, confused, unconsciously, 
Whatever I last read or heard or dreamed, 
[ . . . ]With still that face . . . which did not therefore change, 
But kept the mystic level of all forms 
[ . . . ] All which images, 
Concentred on the picture, glassed themselves 
Before my meditative childhood, as  
The incoherencies of change and death 
Are represented fully, mixed and merged, 
In the smooth fair mystery of perpetual Life.—9 
Although the mourning portrait is intended for remembrance—committing to canvas 
the likeness of a person whose physical body has since been committed to the earth—
Barrett Browning’s word-picture substitutes for an ekphrastic description of the 
mother’s features a more impressionistic rendering of the “very strange effect” that 
this unchanging face had on the developing imagination of its most devoted viewer, 
her daughter.  Affording the reader not sight (of the art object) but rather insight (into 
the mind of the speaker-observer), this opening passage of Aurora Leigh offers up a 
condensed narrative of its heroine’s formative years mostly through this story of her 
aesthetic education, an education given not at her mother’s knee, but through her 
portrait.   
It is an intriguingly reversed process: instead of enumerating for the reader 
those books, remarks, and dreams that colored and altered Aurora’s impression of her 
mother’s picture, Barrett Browning instead gestures towards those determining, if 
random, factors through her heroine’s changing perception of the same art object over 
time. 10  As an image continually “glassed” before her, Aurora’s mother’s portrait 
                                                 
9 Elizabeth Barrett Browning, Aurora Leigh, ed. Margaret Reynolds (Athens, OH: Ohio UP, 1999) First 
Book: 128-138, 145-148, 151-152, 168-173.  All subsequent citations are to this edition. 
10 In some ways, Barrett Browning’s representation of her heroine’s aesthetic meditation invites 
comparisons to Schiller’s conception of the “aesthetic state.”  For Schiller, in the “aesthetic state,” a 
state “out of time,” the mind is not forced to situate itself in one of two oppositional modes of being—
that of “feeling” and of “thought”—what we might label the subjective and the objective perspectives or 
what Schiller elsewhere calls the state of being either a “person” (the private self) or an “individual” 
(the social self).  Unanchored from either of these determining contexts, Schiller argues, the aesthetic 
state allows for an otherwise impossible freedom and an unparalleled “capacity for humanity.”  Without 
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functions as reflection of her own “meditative childhood.”  By communicating the 
story of that childhood through a history of subjective impressions, Barrett Browning 
would seem to suggest that the development of Aurora’s unique perspective can itself 
be the subject of observation and narration, as that perspective is reflected in aesthetic 
encounters. 
In “My Last Duchess,” the represented perspective of Browning’s Duke could 
not be farther away, socially or morally, from that of Barrett Browning’s Aurora 
Leigh.  Yet, the fundamental differences in their subject positions render all the more 
significant the points of correspondence between their utterances.  In both cases, the 
speaker’s avowed motivation is to explain the circumstances behind the picture, the 
story of how it came into being, but the real intention behind their speeches is to grasp 
the painting’s curious hold over them.  As each poem recounts not a single instance 
but rather a history of viewing, they read like anatomies of a repetition compulsion, a 
poetic dissection of an obsession that demands the speakers’ continual return to a 
painting of a dead woman.  In “My Last Duchess,” though the ostensible occasion is a 
visit from the envoy of the father of his next wife-to-be, the Duke does not consider 
this silent agent’s reaction in and of itself, but rather in relation to the reactions of 
previous viewers: 
 . . . for never read 
Strangers like you that pictured countenance 
The depth and passion of its earnest glance, 
But to myself they turned (since none puts by 
The curtain I have drawn for you, but I) 
And seemed as they would ask me, if they durst 
How such a glance came there . . . (6-12)11 
                                                                                                                                            
entering into Schiller’s philosophical project of culture formation, Barrett Browning’s depiction of 
Aurora in her own aesthetic state also represents this moment as capable of somehow bridging the gap 
between her character’s subjective and objective identities.  See Friedrich Schiller’s Letters Upon the 
Aesthetic Education of Man, Letters XXI–XXII. 
11 Robert Browning, Robert Browning’s Poetry, ed. James F. Loucks and Andrew M. Stauffer, 2nd ed. 
(New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2007) 83.  All subsequent citations are to this edition. 
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Like Barrett Browning’s Aurora, for whom the visible “awe” of her nursemaid and the 
“melancholy eyes” of her father continually direct her own gaze towards her mother’s 
portrait, Browning’s Duke is motivated by the inquiring glances of his pre-selected 
audiences to repeatedly (re)view the “pictured countenance” of his dead wife.  And 
also like Aurora, the Duke locates a large part of the picture’s fascination in its strange 
status as a signifier without a living signified.  As he says by way of an introduction, 
“That’s my last Duchess painted on the wall, / Looking as if she were alive. I call / 
That piece a wonder, now” (1-3).  The comma that Browning places before the “now” 
underscores the temporality of his aesthetic relation to the portrait.  Prior to that point, 
the correspondence between the representation and the object represented was total 
and, thus, unremarkable; “now,” the Duke implies, the painting evokes his wonder, not 
only because of the technical skill it displays, but also because this technical skill 
serves to create an alternate reality of sorts, depicting his dead wife “looking as if she 
were alive” (emphasis mine).  Though the painting has not itself changed, how the 
Duke sees it has.  In the absence of a living model, the lifelike nature of the copy takes 
on a rather uncanny significance and the process by which it came to be—“Fra 
Pandolf’s hands / Worked busily a day, and there she stands”—is retrospectively 
imbued with a touch of the mystical or even mythic (the living woman turned into an 
art object, a reversal of the Pygmalion story).   
Aurora Leigh’s recollection of her mother’s portrait is also colored with 
elements of the fantastical, and as with the Duke, it is partially the circumstances of 
the painting’s composition that render it such a compelling and unnerving object.  As 
Aurora states, “[t]he painter drew it after she was dead,” and even then, it was a two-
part process, with the face, throat and hands painted first—presumably while the 
corpse was still on display—and an Italian brocade gown filled in at some later point.  
Though it is unclear just when Aurora learned of the way in which the portrait was 
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painted, the description of how her child-self perceived the image of her mother still 
replicates the disjunction within the painting process; to her eyes, the relation between 
her mother’s exposed body and the posthumously-added clothing is a dipolar one, with 
“That swan-like supernatural white life / Just sailing upward from the red stiff silk / 
Which seemed to have no part in it nor power / To keep it from quite breaking out of 
bounds” (I: 139-142). Coded into Aurora’s description, it would seem, is a partially 
obscured symbolism that, like the Duke’s, gestures towards the “wonder” of 
representing what is no longer physically present.  White life and red dress, the 
oppositional energies ascribed to these components of the image put them in a relation 
to one another analogous to the Christian conception of the relation between the two 
components of man—the soul and the body.  In fact, the process by which Aurora’s 
mother’s portrait was painted has precedent in Emmanuel Swedenborg’s “The 
Interaction Between the Body and the Soul” (1769), in which he makes the following 
analogy: “The spiritual clothes itself with the natural, as a man clothes himself with a 
garment.”12  Elizabeth Barrett Browning, herself a devoted Swedenborgian, has 
literalized Swedenborg’s analogy in Aurora’s description of her mother’s portrait. 13  
With the mother’s body (her face, throat, and hands) symbolizing what in her is 
“spiritual” and her garment symbolizing what is “natural,” the inherent volatility of the 
image (as Barrett Browning depicts it) can be understood in terms of the possibilities 
and limitations of representation.  Though Aurora literally sees the figure of her 
mother reanimated within the boundaries of the picture frame, her perception is 
                                                 
12 Interestingly, Pater directly refers to this same analogy in Appreciations, vol. 5 in The Works of 
Walter Pater (London: Macmillan, 1901), in his discussion of Dante Gabriel Rossetti’s House of Life 
sonnet sequence:  “The dwelling-place in which one finds oneself by chance or destiny, yet can partly 
fashion for oneself; never properly one’s own at all, if it be changed too lightly; in which every object 
has its associations…grown now to be a kind of raiment to one’s body, as the body, according to 
Swedenborg, is but the raiment of the soul—under that image the whole of Rossetti’s work might count 
as a House of Life, of which he is but the ‘Interpreter.’ And it is a “haunted” house” (214). 
13 Barrett Browning’s letters attest to a deep and abiding interest in Swedenborg.  See Richard Line’s 
"Swedenborgian Ideas in the Poetry of Elizabeth Barrett Browning and Robert Browning,” Journal of 
the Swedenborg Society 3 (2004): 23-44. 
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colored by the fact that she knows that what she sees is no longer true.  The uneasy 
balance between what Aurora sees and what Aurora knows is figured in her perception 
of her mother’s portrait as a dangerously unstable conjoining of parts, the quasi-
spiritual component of the figure (“the supernatural white life”) straining to “sail[] 
away” from the material component (“the red stiff silk”) in an attempt to get beyond 
the “bounds” of the phenomenal world and of representability.   
Aurora finds the representation of her mother unsettling precisely because it 
seems to gesture towards something that is unrepresentable, a spiritual or supernatural 
element that is only just containable within the limits of the frame.  The portrait’s 
“very strange effect” in turn generates a compulsive need to look, a need rooted “half 
in terror, half / In admiration.”  As a process of perception, Aurora’s viewing of her 
mother’s image seems structurally more like an experience of the sublime than the 
beautiful.  Both terror and admiration are, according to Edmund Burke, feelings 
associated with the former, as is “astonishment,” “that state of the soul, in which all its 
motions are suspended, with some degree of horror . . . [and] the mind is so entirely 
filled with its object that it cannot entertain any other, nor by consequence reason on 
that object which employs it.”14  Burke’s description of astonishment—a “passion” 
that he argues is “caused by the great and sublime in nature”—corresponds quite 
closely to Aurora’s recollection of her own state of mind upon viewing her mother’s 
portrait.  In her words, “as I grew / In years, I mixed, confused, unconsciously, / 
Whatever I last read or heard or dreamed, / Abhorrent, admirable, beautiful, / 
Pathetical, or ghastly, or grotesque, / With still that face . . . which did not therefore 
change, / But kept the mystic level of all forms” (146-152).  The image of “that 
face”—already the point of intersection between the spiritual and the material—
becomes for Aurora the revelatory, embodied form for every new sensation or 
                                                 
14 Edmund Burke, A Philosophical Enquiry into the Sublime and the Beautiful, Part II, Section I, ed. 
David Womersley (London: Penguin Books, 1998) 101 
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impression.  An unchanging object whose subjective significance is always changing, 
its fascination and its horror are grounded in its overwhelming surplus of meaning, in 
the idea that, viewed from a particular vantage point, it can mean almost anything and, 
in theory, everything at once.  Considered in retrospect, Aurora’s aesthetic awakening 
is portrayed as a sort of natural process of sedimentation, in which the art object 
gradually comes into significance through the build-up of various, often contradictory 
associations.  Barrett Browning conveys the uneven (if inexorable) nature of the 
process through the syntax of Aurora’s description.  A mixture of syndetic, asyndetic, 
and polysyndetic coordinations, this list of all the things Aurora reads into her 
mother’s picture condenses into a few lines what would have been a long sequence of 
experiences.  The syntactical proximity between terms as well as the emphasis put on 
the grammatical bonds between them underscores the intricate interconnections 
between the ideas and impressions that informed Aurora’s perception of her mother’s 
portrait.  More broadly, it suggests that Barrett Browning saw the aesthetic relation of 
female viewer to feminine art object as potentially something of an open channel, in 
which flows a seemingly endless series of “images that yet fresh images beget,” the 
sheer abundance of which is always threatening to overwhelm and to compromise the 
boundary between the perceiving consciousness and the object on display.  
While Browning’s Duke also associates the portrait of his dead wife with a 
host of disparate memories, in his experience a painting conveys meaning not as an 
opening up of potentialities but rather as a foreclosing of them.  The Duke’s pleasure 
in the portrait is, in fact, directly linked to his conception of the picture frame as both a 
representational and semantic means of confinement.  This confinement, he assures his 
silent guest, was necessary precisely because, when a living woman, the Duchess’s 
enigmatic expression was evocative of too many things: 
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 . . . Sir, ‘t was not 
Her husband’s presence only, called that spot 
Of joy into the Duchess’s cheek . . .  
 . . . She had 
A heart—how shall I say?—too soon made glad, 
Too easily impressed; she liked what e’er 
She looked on, and her looks went everywhere. 
Sir, ‘t was all one! My favor at her breast, 
The dropping of the daylight in the West, 
The bough of cherries some officious fool 
Broke in the orchard for her, the white mule 
She rode with round the terrace—all and each (13-29) 
Offended that “‘t was not / Her husband’s presence only, called that spot / Of joy into 
the Duchess’s cheek,” the Duke represents her responsiveness to different stimuli as a 
kind of indiscretion verging on unfaithfulness. The twisted logic behind this argument 
hinges on the double-meaning that Browning’s speaker exploits in his many references 
to the Duchess’s “looks.”  Even in his opening description of the Duchess “painted on 
the wall, / Looking as if she were alive,” the Duke’s ambiguous phrasing supports two 
different interpretations: the Duchess could be “looking” lifelike (to a viewer) or she 
could be lifelike in that she is represented in the act of ”looking” (at the viewer).  In 
the Duke’s argument, these two ways for a woman “to look” are invariably and 
deliberately conflated.  Like all of Browning’s ingenious casuists, the Duke is not only 
describing a situation, he is defending his particular way of viewing the world, which 
erases the distinction between “looking” as a subjective act and “looking” as an 
objective, observable phenomenon.   
Looking at his wife’s portrait, the Duke locates the primary aesthetic value of 
“that pictured countenance” specifically in “the depth and passion of its earnest 
glance” (6-7).  As he tells his guest, it is this look that captures the attention of 
“strangers like you,” who wonder “how such a glance came there” (12).  It is a 
question—one might observe—that the silent auditor should have asked of himself.  
After all, the Duke’s reference to previous “strangers”—each of whom stood in the 
 21 
spot of this guest—implies that this moment of display is anything but a whim.  
Rather, it is a scripted encounter between viewer and art object, and it is one of the 
Duke’s own fashioning.  More specifically, it is an aesthetic encounter that 
exemplifies what Michael Fried calls the “theatrical relation” between the viewer and 
the art object: a staged confrontation in which the beholder finds his own glance 
returned by the represented figure.15  Yet, what makes this moment even more 
theatrical is that it has been arranged by and for the Duke, whose voyeuristic pleasure 
in watching it unfold (again and again) turns the act of viewing itself into a spectacle, 
a spectacle that continually confirms for him his control over this symbolic economy 
of glances.   
The Duke’s lack of control over the “looks” of the living woman points to 
“how such a glance” as the Duchess’s ended up framed on a wall.  In life, the Duchess 
had autonomy over her glances, an autonomy which the Duke felt was dangerously 
undiscriminating: “she liked whate’er / She looked on, and her looks went 
everywhere” (23-24).  This promiscuity of the female gaze menaces the Duke because 
it threatens to turn against him those very powers with which his own gendered theory 
of aesthetics invested it.  It is his relentless aestheticization of the Duchess’s “looks”—
his tendency to see her “glance” as an object of beauty in itself, prized primarily 
because it retroactively confirms the value of what evokes it—that creates the crisis of 
referentiality he refers to when he complains that to her “’t was all one!”  When her 
“looks”—in which he feels a proprietary interest and which he views as a projection 
and embodiment of his own worth—can be freely bestowed, then to his mind, her 
equanimity of feeling and expression when contemplating the gift of “his favor at her 
breast,” when looking at a sunset, when receiving a bough of cherries, or when riding 
                                                 
15 Michael Fried, Absorption and Theatricality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988) xii. 
 22 
her mule conjoins these various impressions as objects of similar value.16  By allowing 
“all and each” to “draw from her alike” the same response, the Duchess unwittingly 
aligns the Duke’s person and his “nine-hundred-years-old name” with these lesser 
objects, a degradation that seems to him a form of infidelity.  The Duke’s 
interpretation suggests the degree to which he feels himself the master not just of his 
wife’s physical body but also of its symbolic potential.  His “disgust” at her 
unrestrained responsiveness is motivated by an egotism murderous in its willingness 
to inflict violence to achieve its ends and monstrous in its fundamental belief that the 
world exists merely to reflect and substantiate its own system of beliefs.   
Of course, just what actually happened to the Duke’s “last Duchess” remains 
tantalizingly obscure; Browning’s speaker only tells his guest that, choosing “[n]ever 
to stoop,” he handled the situation thus neatly:  “I gave commands; / Then all smiles 
stopped together. There she stands / As if alive” (45-47).  In the small space between 
concluding his narrative and redirecting his guest’s attention to the portrait itself, the 
Duke perpetrates on the level of language the act of violence that the reader can never 
be sure he committed in reality.  Shifting the focus back from the (once?) living 
original to her lifelike copy, he simulates the process by which he contained the 
dangerously unstable signifier that was his wife within the confines of the frame.  
Literally transformed into an aesthetic object, she is stripped of all past associations 
and, as an item in Duke’s collection, she now exists in a manner acceptable to him: as 
a testament to his personal and monetary value as well as his exquisite taste in art.  
Also, by sequestering the representation of the Duchess behind a curtain except for 
those instances in which he chooses to unveil her, the Duke is able to control her 
                                                 
16 Browning communicates here the force of his speaker’s disgust through the disjunction between the 
line breaks and the syntactical breaks, and in the end rhyming of “fool” and “mule,” underscoring the 
absurdity of the comparison (as the speaker sees it).  Also, the fact that he considers natural phenomena, 
such as “the dropping of the daylight in the West” to be of less importance than himself aligns him with 
an aesthete more along the lines of a Gilbert Osmond than an Edmund Burke. 
 23 
glance in a way that formerly eluded him.  The Duchess’ looks no longer go 
everywhere; she is now neither to look nor be looked on, except by his express 
arrangement.  Safely mounted on the wall, the Duchess is the pure projection of the 
Duke’s imagined superiority, and her enigmatic glance—finally, for him, channeled in 
the one, right direction—the reflection of how he sees himself.   
An allegory of a particular kind of aestheticism, “My Last Duchess” depicts 
the aesthetic relation (as understood by the poem’s speaker) as an extended campaign 
for dominance; the Duke plays the role of aesthete-as-sadist, a viewer whose pleasure 
in the art object is located mostly in his ruthless suppression of all meanings 
potentially contradictory to his own interpretation.  That the Duke’s aestheticizing 
gaze is not confined simply to the world of art makes his particular mode of perception 
all the more sinister, and the implied parallels between the behaviors of the Duke-as-
art lover and the Duke-as-husband suggest that degree to which the former role is also 
(albeit in a different way) gendered.17  The Duke exemplifies a certain masculinist 
ideal of viewership, one in which the viewer strives to prove himself through his 
ability to contain and situate the disruptive feminine art object in such a way that it 
serves as the refined manifestation of the system of values on which his superiority of 
vision depends.  “My Last Duchess” attests to the brute force of the Duke’s perceptual 
performance, but it is a force—as the cynically dismissive tone of the portrait never 
fails to remind us—that comes at the expense of the aesthetic object itself.  
Barrett Browning’s Aurora Leigh offers the reader a very different model of 
aesthetic reception, but, I would argue, her representation of Aurora’s formative 
engagement with her mother’s portrait nevertheless shares with Browning’s poem its 
anxious preoccupation with the way in which the art object has the potential to gaze 
                                                 
17 One more example of the conflation between aesthetic and social registers: the Duke’s final 
comments to his guest, when he asserts that “[t]he Count your master’s known munificence” is not his 
primary goal in courting his new bride-to-be; rather it is “his daughter’s fair self, as I avowed / At 
starting, is my object” (49-52, emphasis mine). 
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back at the viewer.  The difference, though, lies in the source of anxiety.  Whereas the 
Duke is unnerved by the painting’s ability to possess a meaning other than the one he 
gave it, Aurora is reluctantly attracted to its ability to bestow meaning, particularly on 
the viewer.  As previously mentioned, Aurora’s description of her mother’s portrait is 
comprised of a rapidly proliferating list of associations, the painting being a reflection 
of whatever she “last read or heard or dreamed” (147).  The form of the list itself 
reflects Aurora’s mental development, as the way in which she sees the painting 
becomes increasingly sophisticated over the course of the passage, presumably as she 
grows older.  She begins by associating the painting with sensations (of the 
“Abhorrent, admirable, beautiful, / Pathetical, or ghastly, or grotesque”); then abstract 
emotions (“Hates, fears, and admirations”); then imaginary and magical creatures 
(“Ghost, fiend, and angel, fairy, witch, and sprite”); and finally, a series of 
mythological and literary figures:  
A dauntless Muse who eyes a dreadful Fate, 
A loving Psyche who loses sight of Love, 
A still Medusa with mild milky brows 
All curdled and all clothed upon with snakes. (153-158) 
The structure of these lines signals a very specific moment in the development of 
Aurora’s aesthetic faculties.  This anaphoric sequence—the only one in the entire 
list—offers three distinct imaginative interpretations of the same image, all 
syntactically parallel to one other.  They are also thematically analogous, in that each 
casts the mother as a figure from Greek mythology: a dauntless Muse, a loving 
Psyche, and a still Medusa.  The image of the mother thus is imbued with an aura of 
the supernatural, associated with a lost, mythical world, to which, by virtue of her 
name, Aurora is also linked.  There is yet one more important similarity; in all three of 
these mythological scenarios, Aurora imagines the figure in the painting engaged in 
the same activity that she is: looking.  In the first two cases, this looking is made 
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explicit; the mother is imagined both as a Muse “eye[ing]” one of the Fates and 
Psyche “los[ing] sight” Love.  In the third, though the chosen object of the gaze is not 
named, Aurora’s identification of her mother with Medusa locates the image’s power 
in its transformative “look” (i.e. appearance).  Whether goddess, princess, or monster, 
the mother is described not simply as looking; she is looking at (or for) something.   
However, since the portrait does not include the object of mother’s gaze, 
Aurora’s descriptive tableaus do not directly correspond to the painting she herself is 
viewing.  In fact, her readings of the portrait only make sense, one realizes, if they are 
understood to represent not the painted image itself but rather the relation between the 
painted image and another figure located somewhere beyond the frame.  By virtue of 
being placed opposite the picture, the position of this other figure is, by default, 
occupied by the viewer herself. Thus, Aurora, while viewing her mother’s portrait and 
imagining the represented figure as these three different types of female viewers, is 
simultaneously placing herself in the role of the feminized viewed object.  Moreover, 
the mythological scenarios that she reads into the painting all depict the represented 
gaze that binds subject to object as volatile and symbolically charged.  In the first 
verbal picture, in which Aurora imagines her mother as a “dauntless Muse who eyes a 
dreadful Fate,” the act of “eye[ing]” is invested with a certain confrontational energy.  
The mother-as-Muse (the anthropomorphized embodiment of a particular form of 
artistic expression) is deemed dauntless for looking upon a dreadful Fate (the similarly 
anthropomorphized embodiment of destiny), whose place is currently filled by her 
daughter.  When Aurora next transforms her mother into “a loving Psyche who loses 
sight of Love,” she also draws attention to the ocular tie that binds them; Psyche, 
etymologically the personification of the soul or animating “breeze” that enlivens the 
material world, is visually searching to reconnect with “Love” or Eros, the 
personification of bodily desire.  The soul’s relation to the body is thus conflated with 
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the painted image’s relation to its viewer, the bond between them a mutual reflection 
of a desire for reunion.18  And, finally, when Aurora envisions her mother as Medusa, 
whose apotropaic visage demands that the viewer not face her directly, she creates a 
situation in which the act of viewing is itself bound up with the danger of literal 
objectification.  To see in her mother’s image a mythological monster “with mild 
milky brows / All curdled and all clothed upon with snakes” and to violate the 
prohibition against viewing it in an unmediated fashion, Aurora places herself in the 
role of Medusa’s victim who, as the recipient of her deadly gaze, will be turned into a 
piece of statuary.   
Though the list of Aurora’s imaginative encounters with her mother’s picture 
continues beyond the Medusa image and includes comparisons to the Virgin Mary and 
Keats’s Lamia, it is in these first three analogies that Barrett Browning distills what is 
essential and defining about her speaker’s burgeoning aesthetic sensibility.  Aurora 
shares with Browning’s Duke an obsession with the significatory potential of the 
aesthetic object’s represented and representing gaze, but she exemplifies a very 
different process of perception in the form that this obsession takes.  Whereas 
Browning depicted the Duke’s engagement with his wife’s portrait as an extensive 
effort to impose a single perspective (and a single meaning) on the aesthetic object, 
Barrett Browning demonstrates through Aurora’s meditation on her mother’s portrait a 
conception of the aesthetic relation as a concatenation of reciprocal, replicating and, 
mutually-defining glances.  It is with the first three mythic tableaus that she makes 
explicit this conception, using anaphora to link together and to underscore the parallel 
nature of these scenarios.  Aurora reads into each one a mini-allegory, one which 
involves archetypal feminine figures often associated with various generative and 
                                                 
18 That in the actual myth, Eros remains un-seeable until Psyche has gone through a series of trials in 
order to prove herself worthy of viewing him adds an interesting dimension to this line, one that could 
be explored further. 
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destructive energies that influence emotions, perception, and artistic production.  
These symbolic scenes all hinge upon an imagined moment of visual confrontation, a 
meeting-of-glances that promises (or threatens) to be in some way transformative.   
By attributing the power of sight to the mythic female characters with which 
she associates her mother’s image, Aurora creates a situation that destabilizes the 
characteristic dynamic between subject and object.  Rather than an act of projection 
(in which the aesthetic relation is defined by the subject gazing upon the object), 
Aurora imagines instead an act of reflection, in which the painted image also looks 
back at the viewer, a viewer who is as much defined by the represented gaze as she 
defines it and who, in looking, also sees a reflection of herself.  This alternative mode 
of aesthetic perception, as it is here outlined in Aurora’s formative experience with her 
mother’s portrait, contrasts with the one offered in Browning’s “My Last Duchess.”  
Yet, like “My Last Duchess,” Aurora Leigh acknowledges the seminal role of gender 
in the experience of viewership, and it strives to represent the way in which the 
gendering of aesthetic categories predetermines the female viewer’s relation to the art 
object.  As the final lines of Aurora’s description suggest, her extended experience of 
her mother’s portrait can be boiled down to an ongoing process of mirroring, in which 
all the “images” of different archetypal feminine figures encountered in what she “last 
read or heard or dreamed” “[c]oncentred on the picture, glassed themselves / Before 
[her] meditative childhood” (169-170).  The mother’s portrait becomes a composite 
image of multiple viewings and multiple associations, in which Aurora sees reflected a 
variety of potential and contradictory models.  By continually reimagining the same 
represented female figure in a variety of different archetypal roles, Aurora’s 
monologue reproduces, in the form of an individual narrative, a cultural history 
characterized by the ongoing embodiment of various energies, sensations and ideas in 
a host of more-or-less interchangeable feminine forms.  The outcome of this 
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experiment is that Barrett Browning maps out for the reader—significantly, from a 
feminine perspective—the circuitous route by which personal and cultural experiences 
come to inform and to shape even the most uninformed of aesthetic impressions.  
Offsetting this blueprint for female viewership with Browning’s masculine model, it is 
now possible to begin to interrogate the complicated social and gender dynamics that 
underpin nineteenth-century narrative representations of aesthetic experience, in which 
the viewer is no longer just a voice and a disembodied perspective, but also an actor in 
a drama, performing the act of perception for the scrutiny of other characters and also 
for the reader.  
*    *    *    *    *    *    * 
In his “Soliloquy, or Advice to an Author,” the Earl of Shaftesbury describes 
the soliloquy as “the business of self-dissection,” a form of expression whose origin 
can be traced back to ancient Greece, to “that celebrated Delphic inscription, 
‘Recognize yourself!’ which is as much as to say, ‘Divide yourself!’ or ‘Be two!’”19  
Though the narrativized aesthetic encounter is unlike the dramatic soliloquy insofar as 
the characters involved are rarely moved to deliver crafted, self-revealing speeches, 
both are scenes that function as interludes or pauses in the action, temporarily 
unsettling the objective flow of events by focusing on a character’s subjective 
reflections.  Though the fictional viewer in the scene of aesthetic encounter does not 
always directly acknowledge the presence of an audience, that character, like the 
soliloquizer, is nevertheless involved in the “business of self-dissection,” scrutinizing 
not just the object of art but also the sensory response that the object has evoked.  
Thus, the aesthetic encounter also involves an act of self-division and self-recognition, 
in which the viewer becomes conscious of him- or herself in and through the 
performance of aesthetic contemplation.   
                                                 
19 Anthony Ashley Cooper Shaftesbury (Earl of), Characteristics of Men. Manners, Opinions, Times, 
ed. John M. Robinson, vol. 1 (London: Grant Richards, 1900) 72, 77. 
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This dissertation considers a variety of such narrative moments, with the 
intention of exploring what such moments tell us about nineteenth-century projects of 
culture-formation.  The first three chapters take as their organizing paradigm the role 
that social conventions of gender played in theories and narratives of aesthetic 
experience.  As feminist critics such as Caroline Korsmeyer have noted, the typical 
figuration of the subject-object relation in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century aesthetic 
philosophy was that of the masculine viewer to the feminized art object.  The 
“feminine” was also often invoked as the manifestation or embodiment of androcentric 
ideas or principles, such as the female body standing in for the male spirit or soul.  In 
chapter one, I read Algernon Swinburne’s Note on Charlotte Brontë with an eye 
towards how these gendered aesthetic concepts underlie and inform his assessment of 
female “genius,” as it is embodied in the twin forms of Charlotte Brontë and George 
Eliot.  In chapters two and three, I then consider how Brontë and Eliot, in their novels 
Villette and Middlemarch, anticipate and challenge the objectifying masculine gaze in 
their fictional representations of aesthetic encounters involving female viewers that 
take place in the symbolically-charged space of the museum.  In each case, I am 
interested in the representation of museum or gallery space and the way in which these 
female authors use its aestheticizing function (aestheticizing insofar as it is a space 
that is constructed for acts of perception and judgment) in order to illuminate and 
interrogate the gendered dynamics of viewership.  The museum—a public space 
created for private acts of contemplation and valuation—proves to be a fertile ground 
in both of these texts for the staging of both aesthetic and social encounters and for the 
juxtaposition and complication of these homologous relations.   
The second section of the dissertation develops this interest in the social scene 
of viewership but expands the focus beyond the space of the museum and uses other 
analytic lenses besides that of gender.  Considering the relation between aesthetics and 
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sociality more broadly, these chapters look not at sections of novels but at entire 
works, bringing to the fore questions of genre, in particular the question of how the 
narrativizing of aesthetic experience impacted the form and structure of these texts and 
the representational methods used by their authors.  In chapter four, I take as my 
subject a collection of short narrative sketches that in its very title announces a 
preoccupation with art culture and its effects:  Walter Pater’s Imaginary Portraits.  
Fascinated with the transitoriness and insubstantiality of aesthetic experience, the 
Portraits all are dreams of space, both of actual spaces that inspire in the subject 
strong sensations and of imaginary spaces created by the mind as outlets for various 
fancies, desires, and memories.  They are also allegories of aesthetic development, 
personal and cultural coming-of-age stories that strive to ground and to map certain 
sensations by linking them to previous sensations that are, in turn, connected to the 
place in which they were first felt and consciously registered.  I argue that the 
prototype for the sensitive and doomed youth that populate the Imaginary Portraits is 
a young Samuel Taylor Coleridge, the subject of Pater’s first published essay.  For 
Pater, Coleridge was a harbinger and conduit for the Romantic revival of interest in 
the idea of animate and animating Nature, one in whom “the old Greek conception like 
some seed has taken root and sprung up anew.”  Similarly, the subjects of the Portraits 
are all young men in whom an aesthetic awakening coincides with the flowering of 
their respective cultures, and in these narratives Pater explores the relation between 
internal and external landscapes in order to suggest the various ways in which 
aesthetic subjects can function as mediums or instruments for cultural rebirth through 
the often tragic spectacle of their perceptual performances. 
Chapters five and six provide yet another angle on Victorian art culture, a 
transatlantic view as it were, in that both concern American authors whose narratives 
exchange “the coldness, the thinness, the blankness” of their native country for “the 
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richer, denser, warmer European spectacle.”20  Taking the aesthetic encounter 
“abroad,” I read Nathaniel Hawthorne’s The Marble Faun and Henry James’s The 
Portrait of a Lady as examples of the long reach of aestheticism in the nineteenth 
century.  Both novels are concerned with the intricate web of unspoken bonds and 
secret allegiances that connect a quartet of art-loving expatriates in Rome, and in each, 
aesthetic encounters with aspects of the Roman spectacle serve to elicit visceral 
responses that double as unwilling disclosures, bringing to the surface truths that the 
characters would rather keep hidden.  In The Marble Faun, art functions as a kind of 
hieroglyphic writing.  The major mysteries that propel the plot find their always-
partial revelation in works of art as they are seen and created by the novel’s major 
characters.  For Hawthorne, every act of aesthetic perception has immediate and long-
term social ramifications, in the form of complicity, through which the shared 
experience of art provokes viewers to understand themselves as moral agents, even as 
they are mere observers.   
Though not as strictly concerned with art works as Hawthorne’s novel, James’s 
The Portrait of a Lady shares with its predecessor an obsession with “how things 
look”—which can mean both what one sees and how one is seen.  James’s novel, 
though, replaces the statues, paintings and drawings that, in previous texts, serve as the 
necessary prerequisites for the narrativizing of aesthetic experience with something no 
less carefully sculpted and shaded: the social context in which viewership takes place.  
The Portrait of a Lady represents culture as an art in itself, a matrix of social forms 
and values that, in special moments, can be evaluated as though it were a precious 
artifact.  Introducing my reading of the novel with an analysis of James’s 1877 review 
of the paintings of Pre-Raphaelite Edward Burne-Jones and his 1908 Preface to The 
Portrait of a Lady, I use these two texts to frame (both thematically and temporally) 
                                                 
20 Henry James, Hawthorne (Ithaca: Cornell UP, [1967]) 34. 
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the novel, highlighting how James shifts the focus of the aesthetic encounter from 
what the character sees to the aesthetic qualities of that character’s act of seeing.  In 
his heroine’s application of the interpretative strategies usually utilized in the 
contemplation of art objects to every-day scenes in which she is both an actor and an 
audience, James draws attention to the aesthetic qualities of the social scripts that 
govern nineteenth-century culture.  This change in emphasis—from the social aspect 
of aesthetic encounters to the aesthetic aspect of social encounters—offers an 
intriguing opportunity for considering the central issues of this dissertation from yet 
another perspective, as James evaluates the aesthetic era with the critical eye of one 
whose youthful apprenticeship in the period’s “immensities” has given him the means 
of turning the self-reflexivity of the aesthetic encounter back on itself, exposing the 
situatedness of this mode of literary representation within the cultural milieu which 
gave it birth.  
As a means of joining the beginning and end of this dissertation, I conclude 
this introduction with another passage from The Middle Years, an anecdote James tells 
concerning an especially memorable visit to the National Gallery shortly after his 
arrival in England.  Standing before Titian’s Bacchus and Ariadne, James finds 
himself in close proximity to one of the more controversial of the period’s literary 
personalities, the irrepressibly perverse Algernon Swinburne: 
What a composition, for instance again I am capable at this hour of exclaiming, 
the conditions of felicity in which I became aware, one afternoon during a 
renewed gape before the Bacchus and Ariadne, first that a little gentleman 
beside me and talking with the greatest vivacity to another gentleman was 
extremely remarkable, second that he had the largest and most chevelu [hairy] 
auburn head I had ever seen perched on a scarce perceptible body, third that I 
held some scrap of a clue to his identity, which couldn’t fail to be eminent, 
fourth that this tag of association was with nothing less than a small 
photograph sent me westward across the sea a few months earlier, and fifth 
that the sitter for the photograph had been the author of Atalanta in Calydon 
and Poems and Ballads!  I thrilled, it perfectly comes back to me, with the 
prodigy of circumstance that I should be admiring Titian in the same breath 
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with Mr. Swinburne—that is in the same breath in which he admired Titian 
and in which I also admired him, the whole constituting on the spot between 
us, for appreciation, that is for mine, a fact of intercourse, such a fact as could 
stamp and colour the whole passage ineffaceably, and this even though the 
more illustrious party to it had within the minute turned off and left me shaken.  
I was shaken, but I was satisfied—that was the point; I didn’t ask more to 
interweave another touch in my pattern, and as I once more gather in the 
impression, I am struck with my having deserved truly as many of the like as 
possible.21 
This passage provides a vivid example of what, in the texts studied in this dissertation, 
I call the scene of aesthetic encounter.  More to the point, James’s anecdote works to 
anatomize this moment, explaining what gave it such a deep “stamp” and a vivid 
“colour” by listing the “conditions of felicity” that made it possible for him to be 
“aware” of it.  First, there is the significance of the painting itself; among the most 
celebrated of the National Gallery’s acquisitions, the Bacchus and Ariadne is 
mentioned by Ruskin in Modern Painter as his second most-valued object in the 
collection.  Though James does not describe the painting, the scene it depicts—the 
abandoned Ariadne approached by Bacchus and a troop of satyrs, maenads, and, 
memorably, a pair of leopards—presents an implicit but identifiable (to a properly 
acculturated reader) analogue to the scene in which James is involved, as he is too is 
receiving a visitation of sorts by the closest thing to a Dionysian figure that Victorian 
England had to offer.  Much in the same spirit of Foucault’s Las Meninas, Titian’s 
painting in James’s anecdote is presented as an “entire picture . . . looking out at a 
scene for which it is itself a scene.”22  Then, there is the chain of circumstances that 
leads to James recognizing the identity of his viewing partner; the “little gentleman” 
next to him is himself remarkable, owing to his wild red hair, and, this detail drawing 
his attention, James is able to compare the figure before him to a photograph of the 
poet he had previously been sent, that photograph having been in demand because of 
                                                 
21 The Middle Years 51-52. 
22 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things (London: Routledge, 2002) 15. 
 34 
the notoriety that followed the publication of Swinburne’s “Poems and Ballads.”  And, 
finally, there is the “thrill” that this experience generates in the young James, a thrill 
stemming from the “prodigy of circumstance” that finds him “admiring Titian in the 
same breath with Mr. Swinburne—that is in the same breath in which he admired 
Titian and in which [James] also admired him.”   
Though James remains vague on the nature of this “thrill,” he does convey that 
that emotional charge he receives is rooted in a sense of intimacy, in the awareness 
that he and Swinburne are admiring Titian in the same breath, this shared visual 
relation “constituting on the spot between [them], for appreciation . . . a fact of 
intercourse.”  A moment alive with erotic, aspirational, even potentially rivalrous 
impulses, James’s interaction with Swinburne depends on the mediation of the 
Bacchus and Ariadne, which functions as a focal point and a site of projection.  The 
painting is the literal “spot” in which their directed gazes converge, but, for James, it 
also offers an imaginary space in which there exists the possibility of wordless 
connection with another person.  That Swinburne remains unconscious of his own 
involvement in this “fact of intercourse” does not lessen its impact for James, as his 
thrill does not depend on public acknowledgment.  Rather, it is James’s private 
satisfaction in the aesthetic qualities of his encounter, the compositionality of the 
scene, that makes it valuable to him.  Also, one speculates, that James knows himself 
to be alone in his “appreciation” might even have been part of the thrill, as it signals 
his own responsiveness to such moments, proving the existence of aesthetic faculties 
on par with those of the eminent Swinburne.  In any case, as his concluding flourish 
suggests, his younger self’s ability to aesthetically appreciate not just the painting but 
the social circumstances of the scene, offers, to his mind, proof of a receptive 
sensibility, one that “deserved truly as many of the like [impressions] as possible.” 
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From the retrospective viewpoint of the autobiographer, James “gather[s] in” 
the various strands of his past “impression” and weaves them into a narrative 
“pattern,” a pattern that reveals the social aspect of aesthetic observation.  James’s 
anecdote shares with the other works studied in this dissertation an insistence that one 
of the most crucial features of aesthetic experience is the way in which it makes the 
individual more aware of his society, more discerning of the values and beliefs on 
which it is founded, and more sympathetic towards its other members.  By 
narrativizing the aesthetic encounter, the authors of these texts strive to represent the 
acculturating process which, in the nineteenth century, offered one small but important 
consolation in a world unsettled by numerous economic, social, and epistemological 
upheavals.  In and through aesthetic observation, the individual can recapture the 
feeling of being part of a harmonious, organic whole, bound to a particular milieu and 
the other people in it through a network of relations otherwise too subtle to be 
apprehended.  The tireless pursuit of this experience in Victorian culture and literature 
speaks to the pervasive perception of its necessity and to a wide-spread belief that, as 
Walter Pater says in the Conclusion to The Renaissance, “[n]ot to discriminate every 
moment some passionate attitude in those about us, and in the brilliance of their gifts 
some tragic dividing of forces on their ways in, is on this short night of frost and sun, 
to sleep before evening.”23 
                                                 
23 The Renaissance 85-86. 
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CHAPTER 1.  
“No Living English or Female Writer”:  Gender in the Critical Reception of the 
Fiction of Charlotte Brontë and George Eliot 
How might gender affect narratives of aesthetic encounter?  In subsequent 
chapters, I will look at novels by Charlotte Brontë as well as George Eliot, with an eye 
towards how the representation of characters acting and interacting in museums and 
galleries (spaces designated for perceptual contemplation) allow the authors to stage 
and subvert the implicit gendering of such experiences.  Here, however, I begin by 
analyzing a piece of criticism that compares Brontë and Eliot, as authors as well as 
women, with the intention of exploring how the language of aesthetics employs certain 
gendered binaries in its formulation of hierarchies of taste and judgment, binaries that 
put the female author as much on display as the works she creates. 
In 1877, a panegyric entitled “A Note on Charlotte Brontë” tasks itself with 
defending what it sees as Brontë’s rightful place among the select cadre of women 
writers who “for England [are] of highest female fame.”  Lest that designation seem 
too elevated or too broad, the author goes on to qualify his statement: 
But, without putting in a claim for the author of ‘Jane Eyre’ as qualified to 
ascend the height on which a minority of not overwise admirers would fain 
enthrone a demigoddess of more dubious divinity than hers, I must take leave 
to reiterate my conviction that no living English or female writer can rationally 
be held her equal in what I cannot but regard as the highest and the rarest 
quality which supplies the hardest and the surest proof of a great and absolute 
genius for the painting and the handling of human characters in mutual relation 
and reaction. (12)24 
That the author of this essay is the pre-Raphaelite Algernon Swinburne might come as 
something of a surprise, not because of its style, which is every bit as highly-wrought 
                                                 
24 Algernon Swinburne, A Note on Charlotte Brontë (London: Chatto & Windus, 1877).  All subsequent 
citations are to this edition. 
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and alliterative as the most devoted of Swinburne’s fans could wish, but because of the 
comparative meagerness of the laurels it demands for (and grants) its subject.  Though 
typically not an artist or critic given to narrow specifications, Swinburne’s support of 
Brontë is markedly circumscribed. Brontë is not an “absolute genius” but rather an 
absolute genius of a very particular sort.  Moreover, her genius is proof not simply of 
itself but also of the falsity of the genius often attributed to that “demigoddess of a 
more dubious divinity than hers”—George Eliot.   
It is this secondary goal of Swinburne’s analysis of Charlotte Brontë to which I 
seek to draw attention.  This early assertion is only the first in a series of comparisons 
that pit Brontë against Eliot in order to challenge those who would place Eliot on the 
level of Shakespeare.  Swinburne’s aim is not to replace Eliot with Brontë but instead 
to show how Brontë’s genius “for the painting and the handling of human characters 
in mutual relation and reaction” is “in this single point” equal to Shakespeare’s and 
how, as there is “no living English or female writer” who is Brontë’s equal in this 
respect, George Eliot cannot possibly be considered part of the exalted company in 
which some would group her (17).  It is also worth noting that when Swinburne 
compares Brontë to all “living English or female writer[s],” he syntactically draws a 
line in the sand that traces through the rest of the essay.  The antithesis that results 
from the inclusion of one seemingly inoffensive “or”—“living English” or “female”—
creates a two-tiered system of evaluation: in one category all living English writers 
(Swinburne limiting himself to one side of the Atlantic), in the other all female 
writers, presumably both the living and the dead.  What is strange about this 
distinction is that, for Swinburne’s purposes, it is an ostensibly unnecessary one.  
George Eliot fits into both categories, being both a living English and a female author.  
But, if we consider that by belonging to each group, Eliot is, in fact, doubly excluded, 
it becomes clear how these systems of categorization can work to unseat those that it 
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might seem to place.  Eliot, in straddling the divide, is put in a liminal position, both 
everywhere and nowhere, a part of both strata but fully included in neither. 
Clearly framing his “Note” as a reevaluation of Brontë, Swinburne contributes 
to an ongoing debate about women writers and, in the process, underscores the 
prominence of gender in shaping Victorian aesthetics and literary evaluation.  But “A 
Note on Charlotte Brontë” does not announce itself as being concerned with the issue 
of gender.  Swinburne claims simply “to express in turn his own agreement” with the 
claim that Brontë’s work is the product of “exceptional intellectual power.”  Yet, for 
Swinburne, the excellence of Brontë’s writing evidences more than itself; it also 
provides a necessary contrast to the work of “some few at least among the female 
immortals of whom the happy present hour is so more than seasonally prolific” (3). 
Jane Eyre and Villette, he goes on to say, will continue “to be read with delight and 
wonder and re-read with reverence and admiration, when darkness everlasting has 
long since fallen upon all human memory of their cheap scientific, their vulgar erotic, 
and their voluminous domestic schools.”  Swinburne’s distinction here—between 
Charlotte Brontë, a woman who writes literature, and her unnamed rivals, women who 
write women’s literature—implies that only by abandoning the generic “schools” that 
cater to predominantly female writers and readers can the authoress aspire to lasting 
literary fame. 
 George Eliot satirized these same “schools” in the 1856 Westminster Review 
article “Silly Novels by Lady Novelists.”  In Eliot’s case, though, her condemnation of 
this novelistic “genus with many species” emphasizes how the models of feminine 
behavior celebrated in these texts are both unrealistic and unnatural, particularly in 
their insistence on the correlation between the heroine’s outward and inward 
attributes: “[h]er eyes and her wit are both dazzling; her nose and her morals are alike 
free from any tendency to irregularity; she has a superb contralto and a superb 
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intellect; she is perfectly well-dressed and perfectly religious; she dances like a sylph, 
and reads the Bible in the original tongues” (442).25  Eliot condemns these novels by 
women for women as tools of social indoctrination, encouraging their female readers 
to participate in their own objectification by promoting the idea that their attainments 
are only valuable as objects of admiration.  More perniciously, these productions of 
“feminine fatuity” only reassures those men who mistake socially-constructed 
conventions of the gender for natural characteristics of the sex, and justify them in 
believing the female mind “too shallow and feeble a soil to bear much tillage . . . only 
fit for the very lightest crops” (442).  In other words, these texts create the gendered 
frames by which they are later judged, and by offering a shallow and artificial picture 
of the female imagination at work, they perpetuate the myth that woman’s scope of 
observation is itself innately superficial. 
Eliot thus anticipates the sort of critique that Swinburne makes twenty-odd 
years later in his dismissal of those “female immortals” and their preposterous 
“schools.”  Swinburne’s argument does borrow that gendering frame that Eliot sees 
these texts as providing, even in the language that it employs.  Though nothing that he 
says is explicitly about femininity, what makes his above-mentioned comparison 
gendered is that it persistently elides the distinction between the authors themselves 
and the works they produce, using images and rhetorical flourishes that evoke the 
bodies of the authors, who, in this instance, all happen to be female.  From its opening 
description (which rather ironically employs the gardening metaphor that Eliot 
imagined male critics using), in which women writers are compared to a bumper crop 
                                                 
25 George Eliot, “Silly Novels by Lady-Novelists,” Westminster Review LXVI (October 1856).  One 
should also note that Eliot’s critique has as much to do with class as it does with gender.  Dismissing 
these novels as by “Lady-Novelists,” she makes the argument that these women write not because of 
talent or financial necessity but from vanity and an excess of leisure time.  The worlds that they depict 
are therefore representative of their sheltered lifestyle:  “The fair writers have evidently never talked to 
a tradesman except from a carriage window; they have no notion of the working-classes except as 
‘dependents’; they think five hundred a-year a miserable pittance.” 
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of questionable merit, growing wild in the overly fertile soil of an increasingly 
“literate”—as opposed to “literary”—public, this critique borrows from and reinforces 
certain conventional ideas of femininity and images associated with the feminine.  At 
the same time, it also polices the boundary between masculine and feminine through a 
complex strategy of objectification.  Swinburne addresses both the women to whom he 
is comparing Charlotte Brontë and their works from a distanced and distinctly 
masculine perspective.  His mock-heroic depiction of them as “female immortals” 
blessing “the happy present hour” mimics the courtship language of a devoted swain, 
presumably to suggest that those who would give them such praise are similarly 
impartial.   
And when their clay feet are revealed through Brontë’s superiority (their 
immortality proven to be mortal, all too mortal), Swinburne shifts tactics and openly 
belittles their efforts in fiction by using subtly gendered insinuations.  Each of these 
adjectives serves a particular function, revealing what might otherwise be mistaken to 
be authentically scientific, erotic or domestic as only a showy imitation of the real 
thing.  Feminine attempts at “scientific” prose are deemed “cheap,” “erotic” prose 
“vulgar,” and “domestic” prose “voluminous.”  “Cheap,” “erotic,” and “vulgar” are 
not intrinsically gendered terms, but there is a world of difference between calling a 
man and a woman “cheap.”  A man who is “cheap” is reluctant to spend money; a 
“cheap” woman is a sub-par commodity, dressing and acting in way that justifies her 
being held in little regard by society.  Taken together, Swinburne’s pronouncements 
on these “schools” of literature read like condemnations of women exposing 
themselves in public, suggesting that they are rendering themselves the objects of 
ridicule by ignoring the boundaries between masculine and feminine spheres of 
influence.  On the one hand, by making two qualities deemed properly feminine 
defining features of particular types of women’s fiction, they are represented as 
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transforming those supposedly inherent qualities into excessive and tasteless 
performances, of domesticity and sensuousness, respectively.  At the same time, their 
attempts to display competence in prose that incorporates the masculine realm of 
science are seen as contemptibly substandard.  In both cases, the standards by which 
Swinburne assesses these literary schools are revealed to be bound up with normative 
ideas of gender.   
In Swinburne’s judgments of Brontë, Eliot, and their cohort, gender does not 
simply influence but also infiltrates and, ultimately, skews his argument, revealing 
how the literary and aesthetic criticism of the period was built on a foundation of what 
philosopher Carolyn Korsmeyer calls “gendered concept[s].”  Korsmeyer defines a 
“gendered concept” as  
Some basic term used in philosophy and art theory [which appears] to be 
generic or neutral; that is, it appears to refer to general human nature or to 
artists without regard to whether they are male or female.  However, a 
gendered concept is one where there is a hidden skew in connotation or import, 
such that the idea in question pertains most centrally to males, or in certain 
cases to females. (3)26 
Perhaps the most fundamental of these gendered concepts is the relation between the 
viewer and the object being perceived—to use the terminology of Gerard Genette, “the 
aesthetic relation.”27  That the “aesthetic relation” can be productively read in terms of 
gender is something that critics like Laura Mulvey have argued for through their work 
on the visual arts and the “male gaze.”  To summarize their claims, the history of 
Western art is organized around the idea of a masculine viewership, and whether the 
ideal object of contemplation is nature (Kant) or the art object (Hegel), that object is, 
                                                 
26 Carolyn Korsmeyer, Gender and Aesthetics: An Introduction (New York: Routledge, 2004). 
27 To call it the aesthetic relation obviously prioritizes this one aspect of aesthetic theory over all others.  
But, when one considers that with Kant and Burke, aesthetics became something of a subjectivist 
enterprise (focusing primarily on the sensations of the observer), placing the emphasis on the relation 
between the subject and object signals the shift from aesthetics as a theoretical science of taste to an 
experimental science of experience. 
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by virtue of the desiring gaze of its intended audience, feminized.  Of course, their 
arguments are so suggestive precisely because that they are founded on large, 
generalizing claims, and the critical framework their work provides can, at times, 
obscure how gender plays important, if less obvious, roles in aesthetic discourse.  Still, 
the basic concept of a gendered aesthetic relation does offer one way of understanding 
why theories of aesthetics rely so heavily on systems of stratification to explain and 
rank different types of subjective experiences.  The feminized art object, seen as the 
manifestation or embodiment of various androcentric ideals and principles, is 
evaluated on the basis of its expression of traits which are themselves, in varying 
degrees, understood in terms of gender.  Most of the time, these traits are organized in 
terms of hierarchical, gendered binaries, such as the division between “the sublime” 
and “the beautiful.”  To paraphrase Edmund Burke, “the beautiful,” being associated 
with the feminine, is founded on the idea of pleasure; beautiful objects, therefore, are 
typically small, smooth and polished, light, delicate and uncomplicated, capable of 
arousing a sense of appreciation and enjoyment.  “The sublime,” being in the province 
of the masculine, is instead “whatever is fitted in any sort to excite the ideas of pain, 
and danger . . . operat[ing] in a manner analogous to terror”; its objects are vast in 
dimension, rugged, dark, gloomy, massive and mysterious (157, 86).28   
Lest these two categories be understood as separate but equal, Burke goes on 
to argue that the sublime “is productive of the strongest [emphasis mine] emotion 
which the mind is capable of feeling,” the strongest insofar as  
the ideas of pain are much more powerful than those which enter on the part of 
pleasure . . . the torments which we may be made to suffer are much greater in 
their effect on the body and mind, than any pleasures which the most learned 
voluptuary could suggest, or than the liveliest imagination, and the most sound 
and exquisitely sensible body could enjoy. (86) 
                                                 
28 Edmund Burke. A Philosophical Enquiry into the Sublime and the Beautiful, Part III, Sections VII 
and XXVII, ed. David Womersley (London: Penguin Books, 1998). 
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Burke’s distinction between the sublime and the beautiful turns on the issue of 
capacity.  The sublime, evoking the strongest human emotion, terror, has a more 
powerful effect on the observer than that of the beautiful and thus, implicitly, requires 
from that observer a correspondingly stronger and more powerful “body and mind” 
capable of withstanding the experience.  Also, as, for Burke, this fear of physical pain 
is rooted ultimately in the fear of death, an awareness of the sublime demands from 
the observer the ability to fathom a state beyond sensation, beyond the body.  The 
sublime, which breaks in upon the consciousness of the observer through a recognition 
of how the body may be acted upon by the outside world, is granted a kind of 
objective, autonomous existence by virtue of this association with pain and death, 
death (obviously) putting the individual beyond the possibility of feeling, and pain, in 
the words of Elaine Scarry, so overwhelming the consciousness and senses of the 
individual that it is “unshareabl[e]” and ultimately “resistan[t] to language” and 
representation (4).29  The effect of the beautiful, in contrast, must always be less than 
the sublime in that it is bounded by what the body is capable of sensibly registering.  
The beautiful is a more limited (and limiting) experience because, even with “the most 
sound and exquisitely sensible body,” there is only so much that it can enjoy.  Perhaps 
the reason for this limitation lies in the fact that (as Burke here formulates it) the 
experience of the beautiful is something courted and cultivated, possibly even created, 
by the individual, whereas the experience of the sublime arises unbidden from the 
individual’s proximity to objects and ideas terrible and awe-inspiring.  That Burke 
describes the definitive experience of the beautiful as something envisioned by “the 
most learned voluptuary” or the “liveliest imagination” is telling in that it designates 
the beautiful as that which embodies the sensual as well as aesthetic appetites of an 
individual (or a culture).  To deem the learned voluptuary—one who has studied the 
                                                 
29 Elaine Scarry. The Body in Pain: the Making and Unmaking of the World (Oxford: Oxford UP, 
1985). 
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myriad methods by which bodily desires may be satisfied—the most able to exemplify 
the beautiful is to associate (albeit indirectly) this aesthetic experience with its sexual 
counterpart, both being acts that center on some sort of gratification.  Similarly, to 
represent the body most able to enjoy the beautiful as the “most sound and exquisitely 
sensible” is to focus on its own physicality in a way that eroticizes it and puts it on 
display. 
Thus, though Burke’s conceptions of the sublime and the beautiful, 
respectively, depend on his extended comparison of them as related aesthetic states, as 
experiences they are hardly comparable.  They are fitted for different types of 
observers, different types of sensibilities, and it is not too much to claim that the 
experience of the sublime (in addition the objects that inspire it) is coded as masculine 
and the experience of the beautiful as feminine.  Of course, Burke would not have said 
that women are more capable than men of apprehending the beautiful (except 
perhaps—I would speculate—insofar as they are capable of being beautiful and 
consequently might experience an element of recognition in their perception of 
beautiful objects that might make them more familiar).  But, it is nevertheless the case 
that Burke’s methods of differentiating between these two modes of aesthetic 
apprehension emphasize, in the case of the sublime, the forceful presence of the ideas 
and objects themselves and, in the beautiful, the delicate and sensitive body ready to 
receive the sensations that ideas and objects can produce.  And, if Burke does not 
specifically address a female readership when describing the experience of the 
beautiful, he does remark that the “appearance of delicacy, and even of fragility . . . 
almost essential” to beautiful shapes and bodies has an “obvious” counterpart “in the 
case of the fair sex, whose timidity is a quality of mind analogous to it” (549-550). 
This difference in focus informs other major conceptual binaries in the 
philosophy and literature of aesthetics.  While probably few today would argue with 
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the claim that gender plays an important role in the representation of aesthetic objects, 
what could benefit from further interrogation is the way in which the gendering of 
categories, of varieties of experience, and of real and theoretical spaces informs the 
complex “rules of engagement” (as it were) that prescribe the aesthetic relation.30  
Especially in the nineteenth century, in which the socially-coded dynamics of 
viewership were becoming increasingly volatile (owing to broadening conceptions of 
what could be defined as “art,” to the expansion and diversification of its audience, 
and—part and parcel with these two things—to the birth of modern museum culture), 
the fictional or analytic representation of a particular observer’s relation to a particular 
object was also an argument in favor of or against a specific notion of cultural 
authenticity and authority.  In addition to designating certain objects as rightfully 
“aesthetic” and certain observers as “aesthetes,” these literary representations also 
served to establish the perspectives and modes of apprehension that united them as 
“aesthetical.” When these aesthetical states are characterized in gendered terms, these 
terms implicitly position the unique vantage point of artist or aesthete within a social 
and moral order.  It also cues the reader in to the ways in which this vantage point 
should itself be viewed.  
Thus, when a writer like Swinburne appraises Charlotte Brontë by setting the 
form of her artistry against that of another famous female author, his opinion of “lady 
novelists” operates within and contributes to this gendered system of evaluation.  
Swinburne’s article (which at roughly a hundred pages can hardly be considered a 
mere “note”) relies heavily on the major conceptual binaries in the aesthetic and 
artistic theory of the period, at various points trotting out (in slightly altered forms) 
such mainstays as genius v. intelligence, imagination v. fancy, and poetic v. prosaic.  
                                                 
30 In this case, when I say “aesthetic relation,” I mean both real and fictional representations of the 
relation between the viewer and the object.  Also, I intend for “viewer” to encompass both the passive 
observer and the active artist, though for Genette “the aesthetic relation” and the “artistic relation” are 
two different things. 
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Most of these binaries serve to distinguish the “quality” of Brontë’s vision from that of 
Eliot’s, and in the first ten pages, Swinburne cycles hectically through a number of 
comparative frameworks.  The first substantial point of comparison is their methods of 
characterization, which Swinburne somewhat perversely anatomizes in their male 
characters, as the highest and best examples of what each woman is capable of 
imagining.  For Eliot, Swinburne points to Adam Bede (the eponymous hero of that 
novel) and Tito Melema (Romola), and, for Brontë, Edward Rochester (Jane Eyre) and 
Paul Emanuel (Villette).  He argues that “the inevitable test or touchstone of this 
indefinable difference is the immediate and enduring impression set at once and 
engraved for ever on the simplest or the subtlest mind of the most careless or the most 
careful student,” and, with Swinburne himself serving as some incarnation of that 
student, the result of that test is that Brontë’s male characters are “creations” and 
Eliot’s are “construction[s],” the former being the province of “genius” and the latter 
of “intellect” (7).31  This distinction, Swinburne continues, illustrates the difference 
between “the second” (Eliot) and “the third” (Brontë) classes of “imaginative work,” 
the second class being “of high enough quality to engage our judgment in its service, 
and make direct demand on our grave attention for deliberate assent or dissent” while 
the third “in the exercise of its highest faculties at their best neither solicits nor 
seduces nor provokes us to acquiesce or demur, but compels us without question to 
positive acceptance and belief” (9, emphasis mine). According to this formulation, the 
marker of Brontë’s genius is that her work dominates the reader, demanding 
conformation to its vision and forestalling any kind of critical gaze.  Conversely, 
Eliot’s fiction, the product of intellect, is in the considerably less powerful position of 
cajoling or seducing its reader, using its various wiles to win an approving evaluation.  
                                                 
31 This seems to suggest Coleridge’s distinction between Imagination and Fancy, the former being the 
power to bring something imaginatively into being, the latter being the ability to put already existing 
components into interesting combinations. 
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Like Burke’s account of the sublime and the beautiful, Swinburne’s distinction 
focuses on the aesthetic effect; it is in the relation between the subject and the object 
(in this case, the imagined reader of the women’s writing and the creative force that 
that writing displays) that the essential difference between Brontë and Eliot can be 
registered. 
Yet, after contending for the superiority of Brontë’s genius over Eliot’s 
intellect, Swinburne complicates the gendered hierarchy he has just set up through a 
series of elaborate concretizations, in which he envisions the creative faculties of both 
women using terms that constantly evoke (and contrast) the personalities and persons 
of the women themselves.  Eliot’s imagination is now lauded for its “large and liberal 
beneficence,” its “wealth and depth of thoughtful and fruitful humor, of vital and 
various intelligence” and its “capacity for knowledge and culture,” as is Brontë’s for 
its “purity of passion,” its “depth and ardour of feeling,” its “spiritual force and 
fervour of forthright inspiration” (18-19).32  Amid these compliments certain 
conventional lines are being drawn, which situate the two women within oppositional 
and gendered spheres of knowledge.  Eliot’s talents position her squarely within the 
masculine realm of the public intellectual, deeply involved with the culture of ideas.33  
Brontë’s creative faculties are also celebrated for their “depth,” but it is a depth 
associated with emotional—rather than intellectual—capacity, and with the feminine 
realm of private self-reflection.  In this instance, though, the gendering of spaces has 
very different connotations in terms of what it suggests about the two women authors 
being compared.  Even if Brontë is aligned with habits of mind deemed “feminine,” 
                                                 
32 Vintage Swinburne, here, an almost overwhelming amount of alliteration 
33 It was fairly commonplace, especially toward the end of her career and in the years following her 
death, for critics and contemporaries to ascribe to George Eliot and her work a “masculine” quality.  In 
one example, from a 1907 text called “References for Literary Workers,” its author Henry Matson 
makes the following representative observation: “The genius and fame of George Eliot are identified 
chiefly with her novels.  In these she shows the strength, comprehension, and originality of a mind more 
masculine than feminine” (335). 
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any limitation to her genius is still counterbalanced by the fact that her work is the 
purest and highest expression of this intuitive way of knowing the world.  However, 
for Eliot, though Swinburne grandly grants that she may “claim precedence” over “all 
other illustrious women” in the aforementioned mental attributes, her triumph is still 
rather like that of a person gaining mastery of a foreign language (19). Though she 
may learn its basic rules, Swinburne implies, she will never have the same sort of 
fluency possessed by a native speaker.  
Even if Swinburne’s masculine descriptors for Eliot are common enough in the 
contemporary reception of her work (both admirers and detractors frequently made 
reference to her robust and strong-featured . . . intelligence), the effort that he puts 
forth in critically situating her (lower) in the literary stratosphere betrays a profound if 
undefined anxiety about the significance of her work and her legacy in the canon of 
English literature, an anxiety that seems rooted in her embodiment of a kind of un-
feminine female creative intellect.  He takes especial offense to the suggestion of 
certain unnamed critics that Eliot (“the author of Adam Bede) as well as Tennyson 
(“the author of Queen Mary”) will someday be regarded as equals of Shakespeare.34  
As is typical of Swinburne, outrage takes the form of almost hysterically convoluted 
invective: 
Only in the eyes of such critics as these, or in the glassy substitutes which 
serve their singular kind as proxies for a human squint, will it seem to imply a 
want of serious interest and respect in the former direction, of loyal and 
grateful admiration in the latter, if I confess that to my unaided organs and 
                                                 
34 Echoing his earlier discussion of Brontë and Eliot in terms of their male counterparts, his association 
of Eliot and Tennyson with works that are titled after the names of characters of the opposite sex seems 
deliberate, especially from a poet who was heartily interested in the figure of the hermaphrodite.  In this 
case, Eliot might be seen to be masculinized by her association with Adam Bede and Tennyson 
femininized by his association with Queen Mary.  Again, Swinburne is only following convention in 
this critical maneuver, but his preoccupation with gender-bending nevertheless reinforces a sort of 
latent discomfort (even if this discomfort might have been rooted in his own youthful subversiveness).  
On an unrelated note, the only definition that I’ve been able to find of the word “subsimious” (which is 
not in the OED) is from The Century Dictionary (1891), which defines it as “nearly simious or monkey-
like” and the example provided is, tellingly, from the abovementioned quotation. 
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limited capacities of sight the one comparison appears as portentously farcical 
as the other in its superhuman or subsimious absurdity; that I should find it as 
hard an article of religion to digest and assimilate into the body of a living 
faith, which bade me believe in the assumption of the goddess as that which 
bade me believe in the ascension of the god to complete the co-eternal and co-
equal personality of English genius at its highest apogee, in its triune and 
bisexual apotheosis. (11-12) 
In translation, Swinburne asserts that he is demonstrating no “want of serious interest 
and respect” towards Eliot or deficiency of “loyal and grateful admiration” towards 
Tennyson, if he pronounces the idea of either being the peer of Shakespeare as 
“portentously farcical” in the case of the former and as a “superhuman or subsimious 
absurdity” in that of the latter.  The very notion that Eliot and Tennyson might 
someday occupy the rarified sphere of Shakespeare is enough for him to consider 
apostasy towards the “living faith” of English literature, as he flatly refuses to worship 
the god of “English genius” in this “triune and bisexual apotheosis.”  To distinguish 
between Eliot and Tennyson while lampooning both of them might seem counter-
productive, but this dual-pronged strategy actually serves to refine his earlier critique 
of Eliot.  By linking the female author of Adam Bede with the male author of Queen 
Mary, Swinburne makes the point that, if both of them are laughable as goddess and 
god of the literary heavens, part of what makes them so is their sexually-ambiguous 
and transgressive authorial personas.  If Swinburne is granting the masculinized author 
of Adam Bede the “respect” a lady is due, and the feminized author of Queen Mary the 
amount of “admiration” due a brother poet, he nevertheless reminds us that both of 
them have themselves crossed those same gendered lines.  Moreover, to put them in 
the same stratum as Shakespeare is to perform some strange sex-change operation on 
English genius, making it at once “triune” and “bisexual,” destroying its previous 
masculine autonomy.  This passage offers an elaboration of Swinburne’s earlier 
argument, drawing attention to the fact that his critique of Eliot is not of her creative 
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powers per se, but rather the propriety of a woman possessing them.  Though he 
echoes earlier critics in applying masculine identifiers to Eliot, her intellect, and her 
writing, that rhetoric takes on new meaning in the context of passage so centrally 
concerned with gender propriety.  Swinburne never lets us forget that while Brontë is 
making herself useful in the Queen’s Gardens, Eliot is trespassing in the King’s 
Treasuries.   
That Swinburne sees something threatening and potentially dangerous about 
this infiltration is made even more explicit in his analysis of Eliot’s The Mill on the 
Floss.  Here, again, he begins by praising the first two parts of the text: 
They carry such affluent weight of thought and shine with such warm radiance 
of humour as invigorates and illuminates the work of no other famous woman; 
they have the fiery clarity of crystal or of lightening. (30) 
Yet, his praise of the first two parts is no sooner offered than it is undercut by his 
condemnation of the third and final section—in which the heroine Maggie Tulliver is 
drawn into a compromising relationship with her cousin’s suitor, Stephen Guest—as 
an unforgivable authorial offense:  
No such degradation of female character seems ever to have suggested itself as 
imaginable . . . Madame de Merteuil [from Les Liaisons Dangereuses] would 
never have believed it . . . The hideous transformation by which Maggie is 
debased . . . would probably and deservedly have been resented as a brutal and 
vulgar outrage on the part of a male novelist . . . Here then is the patent flaw, 
here too plainly is the flagrant blemish, which defaces and degrades the very 
crown and flower of Eliot’s most noble work; no rent or splash on the raiment, 
no speck or scar on the skin of it, but a cancer in the very bosom, a gangrene in 
the very flesh. (33, 36-37) 
As Swinburne’s attitude towards Maggie (post-boat trip) falls in line with those of the 
small-minded townspeople that Eliot’s novel critiques, his criticisms also conflate the 
plot of the novel with its form and its heroine with the author.  The figurative language 
that Swinburne uses throughout his reading of The Mill on the Floss imagines the 
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novel not as the product of the author’s imagination but rather as a vehicle through 
which one can see that imagination.  It is a crystal through which Eliot’s thoughts 
refract; it is a bolt of lightning illuminating a mental darkness.  Later, it is a “damned 
spot” on the body of the text that reveals its internal state of disorder and decay.  For 
Swinburne, Maggie’s fall from grace is something for which Eliot is responsible.  
What is more, Maggie’s debasement is also the novel’s, and both speak to the 
corrupting influence of certain types of fiction (in this case, realism) on the intellect of 
a woman.  That Eliot is deemed capable of imagining a situation that Swinburne 
argues—a bit impertinently—would have boggled the mind of even Laclos’s 
scheming seductress, Madame de Merteiul, signals the degree to which his argument 
blurs the boundaries between the real and the fictional.  It also implies that the 
imaginative transgressions of women are in some ways more dangerous than any real 
liaisons into which they may enter; George Eliot’s disgrace is to have imagined what 
should have been “unimaginable,” what “on the part of a male novelist” would have 
been “a brutal and vulgar outrage.”   
So, when written by a male novelist, the representation of a heroine’s 
“transformation” from complete innocent to a woman with a half-conscious, guilty 
awareness of her own desires is itself understood as a sort of sexual violation, on par 
with the actions of an actual seducer.  But, how should this fictional scenario to be 
understood if it is conceived of by a female novelist?  Swinburne never answers this 
question directly, which makes it tempting to assume that his anxiety is with the idea 
of one woman corrupting another, even if the corrupting influence is a real woman and 
the figure corrupted is fictional.  Yet, for a poet who once chose Sappho as his 
mouthpiece—a Sappho who when addressing her lover Anactoria, a woman “more to 
me than all men as thou art,” wishes that she might “crush thee out of life with love, 
and die / Die of thy pain and my delight, and be / Mixed with thy blood and molten 
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into thee”—it is hard to believe that quasi-Lesbian debauchery, in any form, would 
have been so terrifyingly “unimaginable” (85, 130-132).35  What remains, then, is the 
possibility that what most alarms Swinburne is narrative possibility itself.  Eliot’s 
“corruption” of Maggie Tulliver is distressing precisely because it cannot be explained 
(or excused) using the familiar cultural script of male seducer and female victim.  The 
scenario that Eliot’s text imagines offers nothing so simple as a tale of sexual 
innocence lost; rather, it locates its heroine’s potential guilt beyond the body, in the 
uncharted waters of her imaginative longing for a kind of life unbounded by the social 
controls that define her real existence.  And, like her heroine, Eliot herself is 
threatening to Swinburne because, as a woman writer, she is able to give voice and 
form to these previously unrepresentable ideas and to bring into (fictional) being all 
sorts of unsettling and subversive scenarios.  To describe this one scene from The Mill 
on the Floss as a “cancer,” which is malignant because of its potential for unlimited 
expansion at the expense of the body of its host, seems to suggest that the body for 
which Swinburne is so concerned is not Eliot’s novel specifically but the novel 
generally, and generically.  Moreover, the complex series of images that he employs in 
his critique could be seen as part of an extended effort to figuratively embody the 
writings of his feminine subjects in ways that evoke and reinstate the gendered codes 
of literary and artistic representation that these writings and the writers themselves 
challenge.   
Swinburne’s complementary praise of Charlotte Brontë’s Villette only 
underscores the dynamics of gender informing his argument.  The proof of Brontë’s 
genius is to be found in her “painting and . . . handling of human characters in mutual 
relation and reaction,” he argues.  His analysis of Villette accordingly focuses almost 
                                                 
35 Algernon Swinburne, “Anactoria,” Selected Poems (New York: Routledge, 2002). Of course, 
Swinburne himself had changed a good deal between writing “Anactoria” and his “Note,” having been 
under virtual house arrest at the home of Theodore Watts, to whom his Note is dedicated.   
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exclusively on Brontë’s representation of character, which Swinburne continues to 
describe in terms of the visual arts, particularly painting and photography.  Curiously, 
though, his depiction of Brontë rarely grants her the agency of a creative artist; he 
portrays Brontë’s writing as a transparent or reflective medium, a clear, mirrored, or 
refractive surface through which pass images from the real world.  Thus, when 
describing the “exquisite veracity and pathos [of] the subtle and faultless portrait” of 
Paulina Home, a child befriended by Lucy Snowe, the heroine of Villette, Swinburne 
insists that the charm of this character is  
not wholly or mainly the charm of infancy, as felt either in actual fleshly life or 
in simple reflection from the flawless mirror of loving or adoring genius; it 
comes rather from the latent suggestion or refraction of the woman yet to be, 
struck sharply back or dimly shaded out from the deep glass held up to us of a 
passionate and visionary childhood. (49-50) 
In this slightly dizzying proliferation of visual imagery, the character of Paulina 
Home—a “portrait” in and of itself—is not merely a narrative painting taken from real 
life or even a reflection of Brontë herself (her genius being the mirror in which Paulina 
Home is reflected); the character of Paulina Home as a child is also a crystalline 
substance through which one can glimpse the refracted image of the woman Paulina 
will become.  The charm of this character, for Swinburne, lies in its pellucidity, a 
clarity that transcends the progression of the narrative.  Whether infant or adult, 
Swinburne suggests, all are only facets of the same gemstone, and there is but one, 
essential Paulina, a true self clearly visible to the eye of the reader.  Contrary to the 
“transformation” of Maggie Tulliver—offensive precisely because it challenges one’s 
initial impression of her character—the development of Paulina Home only confirms 
what the reader has already seen of her “passionate and visionary” nature.   
That the description of Paulina Home as “passionate and visionary” could as 
easily be applied to her creator is not perhaps an accident.  Though Swinburne does 
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not belabor the biographical in his assessment of Brontë, his readings of her novels 
continually suggest that her especial skill as a “narrative painter” is in the field of self-
portraiture.  For example, Villette’s Lucy Snowe is deemed by Swinburne “the faithful 
likeness of Charlotte Brontë, studied from life, and painted by her own hand with the 
austere precision of a photograph rather than a portrait” (82).  While obviously meant 
as praise, this comment is importantly ambiguous.  As with the description of Paulina 
Home, Swinburne’s assessment of the characterization of Lucy is based on its fidelity 
to a particular ideal or model of femininity.  Swinburne celebrates the “austere 
precision” of Brontë’s hand, but in a way that denies her of the role of creator.  Lucy 
Snowe is presented as a photographic negative of Charlotte Brontë, rendering the 
author little more than a glorified (self)copyist.  Brontë herself again becomes 
embodied within her own fiction as an object of the reader’s perception.  Through 
Lucy, Brontë herself is offered up for both critical and aesthetic evaluation:  her talent 
as a portraitist is determined by the degree of realism with which she depicts herself, 
and that depiction, in turn, determines how she (the woman, not the writer) is to be 
viewed by her audience.  Conflating the real with the fictional, Swinburne confines 
Brontë within the bounds of her own creation, a maneuver that renders indistinct the 
difference between (female) subject and (female) object while it reinforces the 
centrality of the (female) body to discussions of the aesthetic relation. 
Charlotte Brontë herself anticipated Swinburne’s argument here.  Swinburne’s 
description of Brontë “drawing” Lucy Snowe almost exactly replicates a scenario in 
Jane Eyre in which the title heroine draws herself.  In this particular scene, Jane Eyre, 
in an effort to resign herself to what she sees as her inevitable defeat by Blanche 
Ingram in a contest for her master’s affections, sets herself the task of sketching a pair 
of contrasting portraits.  Though she has yet to lay eyes on Blanche Ingram, she 
instructs herself to spare no creative expense and to “delineate carefully the loveliest 
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face you can imagine,” complete with an “oriental eye,” and a head with “raven curls” 
attached to a “Grecian neck and bust.”  As for her own portrait, she gives herself very 
different advice:  
Listen, then, Jane Eyre, to your sentence tomorrow, place the glass before you, 
and draw in chalk your own picture, faithfully; without softening one defect: 
omit no harsh line, smooth away no displeasing irregularity; write under it, 
“Portrait of a Governess, disconnected, poor, and plain. (183)36 
For Jane Eyre, to draw these images is an exercise in self-chastening, a way of 
checking her unruly passions by making visible to herself the desirability of her rival 
and her own comparative insignificance.  Jane imagines not only two different female 
models but also two very different methods of representation.  Envisioned as the 
perfect object of masculine desire, Blanche Ingram is constructed (as yet only in 
Jane’s mind) according to standards set by the Western aesthetic tradition.  The 
resulting image is an ideal woman; with her “oriental” eye and “Grecian” bust, she is 
the epitome of various cultural conventions of feminine beauty.  The specificity with 
which Jane Eyre can describe the ideal incarnation of each feature—down to its place 
of origin—speaks to the pervasiveness and tenacity of these aesthetic conventions.  It 
also suggests the typical way in which actual female bodies are seen by male artists 
and viewers:  not as subjects in their own right, but, instead, as so much scrap metal, 
valuable collections of individual parts.  Preparing herself to draw the ideal Blanche 
Ingram, Jane temporarily adopts this anatomizing perspective; her cataloguing of the 
imaginary Blanche’s physical attributes as well as her rich and sumptuous attire 
(“aerial lace and glistening satin, graceful scarf and golden rose”) anticipates the gaze 
of the desiring male viewer and provocatively envisions a figure positioned and 
arranged solely for its viewing pleasure.   
                                                 
36 Charlotte Brontë, Jane Eyre, ed. Michael Mason (New York: Penguin Books, 2003). 
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If Blanche Ingram, though, is imagined as the ultimate pin-up model (the 
Victorian equivalent of Betty Grable in a white bathing suit), Jane Eyre’s idea of self-
representation is a different thing entirely.  Whereas Blanche is mentally painted by 
Jane according to a process of delimitation (an ideal beauty constructed through the 
recognition of pre-set aesthetic standards and boundaries), Jane sketches out her own 
self-portrait through the denial of such ideals.  As she says to herself, she will look in 
the mirror and represent what she sees “faithfully,” “softening” nothing, “omit[ting]” 
nothing, “smooth[ing] away” nothing.  It is a defiant realism that she holds to here, 
and what is distinctive about her chosen method of representation is that Brontë 
frames it in terms of what her heroine will not do.  Though Jane’s refusal to idealize 
her own image is ostensibly a means of punishing herself for emotions she now 
considers presumptuous, it also signals her unwillingness to be complicit with an 
aesthetic tradition that traffics in idealized female forms.  By foregrounding the ways 
in which her own person deviates from accepted standards of feminine beauty, Jane 
attempts to escape aesthetic objectification; she demands to be seen as nothing more 
than what she is: “a Governess, disconnected, poor and plain.”  Of course, it is 
impossible to escape objectification completely, and, in a way, Jane simply exchanges 
an aesthetic evaluative framework for a social one, circumventing judgments based on 
gender conventions by defining herself in terms of class and economic markers.37  Yet, 
the difference is that these other systems of classification—if they objectify her as a 
category or a type—do not involve her body, leaving her less vulnerable to the kinds 
of exposure and psychic violation that explicitly gendered systems entail. 
Brontë frequently draws her own heroines through this strategy of negative 
description, which suggests that she shares their sentiments.  Even when her female 
protagonists engage in moments of self-observation, these scenes are typically 
                                                 
37 I am indebted to James Eli Adams for this idea, which has been helpful in terms bringing the question 
of different social dynamics back into the discussion. 
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rendered in ways that keep the bodies of the characters off the page.  As when 
Villette’s Lucy Snowe catches a glimpse of herself in a large concert-hall mirror, the 
experience has little to do with the image itself and much more with the experience of 
seeing:  in her words, “Thus for the first, and perhaps only time in my life, I enjoyed 
the giftie of seeing myself as others see me. No need to dwell on the result. It brought 
a jar of discord, a pang of regret; it was not flattering, yet, after all, I ought to be 
thankful: it might have been worse” (286).38  Here, as with Jane Eyre’s self-portrait, 
Brontë creates a narrative scenario that seems to encourage the reader to view the 
heroine’s body as an aesthetic object—in this case, literally placing Lucy within the 
frame of a mirror—only to then frustrate that impulse when Lucy herself fails to relay 
the content of what she sees.  Instead, she offers the reader her weirdly fractured 
impression of the moment, in which her objective “reflection” (the image in the 
mirror, the physical self seen by the world) is almost totally elided in her subjective 
“reflections” (her intellectual and affective responses to that image).  In other words, 
the dubious “giftie” (as Lucy calls it, after Robert Burns) to occupy, if only for a split-
second, the position of the disinterested viewer produces an uncanny division of self.  
As doppelgängers, self-as-observer and self-as-object face each other in a moment of 
confrontation, their close proximity belying the fact that they are separated by what 
Brontë suggests is an indivisible barrier between two perspectival positions that cannot 
be reconciled without the danger of canceling each other out. 
Though written more than a decade before “A Note on Charlotte Brontë,” this 
scene from Villette proleptically problematizes the aestheticizing gaze informing 
Swinburne’s critical assessment of Brontë’s genius.  Like Brontë’s, Swinburne’s 
                                                 
38 Charlotte Brontë, Villette. ed. Mark Lilly (New York: Penguin Classics, 1980).  Included in this 
passage is a reference to the final stanza of Robert Burns’s “To a Louse”: “Oh wad some power the 
giftie gie us / To see oursel’s as ithers see us! / It wad frae monie a blunder free us, / An’ foolish 
notion” (43-46). 
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depiction of Lucy Snowe—made close to the end of his essay—places her in a frame, 
albeit a frame of a very different sort: 
In the house where I now write this there is a picture which I have known 
through all the years I can remember—a landscape by Crome; showing just a 
wild sad track of shoreward brushwood and chill fen, blasted and wasted by 
the bitter breath of the east wind blowing off the eastward sea, shriveled and 
subdued and resigned as it were with a sort of grim submission . . . As with all 
this it is yet always a pleasure to look upon so beautiful and noble a study of so 
sad and harsh-featured an outlying byway through the weariest waste places of 
the world, so is it in its kind a perpetual pleasure to revisit the wellnigh sunless 
landscape of Lucy Snowe’s sad, passionate and valiant life. (83-84)  
To describe the experience of re-reading the narrative of Lucy Snowe as akin to that of 
re-viewing a painted landscape by Romantic artist John Crome is in many ways fitting 
conclusion to a piece of criticism that has striven throughout to render its subject as a 
visual spectacle and its own evaluative methods in aesthetic terms.  The top-heavy 
form of the analogy—with Swinburne’s impression of Crome’s landscape looming 
over the brief description of “Lucy Snowe’s sad, passionate, and valiant life”—is also 
fitting, as in “A Note on Charlotte Brontë,” Brontë’s fiction seems most valuable to 
Swinburne as an occasion for his own critical meditation on literature, aesthetics, and 
gender.  For Swinburne, every aspect of Brontë is defined by his own experience of 
her work, the experience of the masculine viewer with the feminine object.  Whether 
she and George Eliot are seen as works of art (the former “a type of genius directed 
and moulded by the touch of intelligence,” the latter “a type of intelligence vivified 
and coloured by a vein of genius”) or as female knights of legend (a “Britomartis or 
Bradamante, on her most desperate and forlorn adventure” whose missteps have “a 
claim at least on the compassionate forebearance of every good knight-errant”), 
Swinburne’s depictions of Charlotte Brontë always presuppose the existence of a 
masculine observer for whom the feminine (in all of its various incarnations) must be 
concretized, objectified, aestheticized (20, 24).  The comparison of Villette to an 
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untitled landscape painting is a logical last step in the process—having already 
conflated Lucy Snowe with her author, the time-span of her narrative “life” is now 
condensed into a single detemporalized image of “sad and harsh-featured” scenery that 
has nothing to do with the novel itself.  Yet, the fact that Brontë’s text and Crome’s 
painting are only associatively related in Swinburne’s mind illustrates the degree to 
which Brontë and her narrative surrogates have been successfully woven into the 
fabric of Swinburne’s evaluative tapestry, incorporated into the complex binaristic 
system of aesthetics that underwrites this piece of criticism.  Though Swinburne does 
not go so far as to claim to actually see Lucy Snowe in the painting on the wall of his 
study, his description of Crome’s landscape is vividly colored with language that 
evokes the “sad, passionate, and valiant” person of Brontë’s heroine.   
In this way, Swinburne detaches Lucy Snowe from the setting of Villette and 
relocates her to the scene of Crome’s painting, where she is transformed into a 
diffused presence that infuses his experience of the painting with significance.  
Swinburne’s transformation of Lucy Snowe has a poetic antecedent in Wordworth’s 
vision of another Lucy, one who once dead and buried becomes spiritually 
omnipresent as a part of an anthropomorphized feminine Nature, a comfort to her 
bereaved lover who imagines her “rolled round in earth’s diurnal course / with rocks, 
and stones, and trees” (7-8).39  In both of these imagined scenarios, evocation becomes 
invocation; the natural world (or, at least, its painted or poetic representations) 
continually brings the absent woman to the speaker’s thoughts, and it is the thought of 
her that—muse-like—is called upon to inspire and give form to the speaker’s 
utterance.  Swinburne’s perception of Lucy Snowe becomes the frame through which 
he views Crome’s landscape, and it is this frame that, in this article at least, makes the 
prospect worth viewing.  Ultimately, though, the object on display here is neither the 
                                                 
39 William Wordsworth, “A slumber did my spirit seal,” Selected Poems, ed. Stephen Gill (New York: 
Penguin, 2004) 71. 
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novel nor the painting; rather, it is the peculiar “pleasure” that Swinburne derives from 
the “perpetual” contemplation of these things, their “sunless landscape[s]” and 
“weariest waste places.”  Female character and feminine landscape are both prized for 
the response they elicit in their masculine viewer: a self-conscious pleasure that 
recognizes as art that which is capable of engaging the aesthetic faculties and of 
engendering the reflective state in which the observer becomes aware of himself in the 
act of viewing.   
That this state of aesthetic reflection similarly depends on the gendered relation 
between subject and object is something that Swinburne’s article takes for granted. 
Swinburne’s assessments of Charlotte Brontë and George Eliot consistently work to 
naturalize the way in which gender informs the representation of art objects and 
aesthetic states, in the process reinforcing the social and philosophic ideas that 
underwrite nineteenth-century art criticism and aesthetic theory.  Ironically, it is this 
same complex matrix of gendered hierarchies that Brontë and Eliot strive to 
defamiliarize and to unsettle in novels written more than two decades before “A Note 
on Charlotte Brontë,” in their very different depictions of individuals encountering 
both aesthetic objects and the aestheticizing gazes of others in the symbolically-
charged space of the museum.  In Villette (the subject of the following chapter), Lucy 
Snowe’s visit to a Belgian art gallery provides Brontë with an opportunity to display 
that “great and absolute genius” with which Swinburne credits her “for the painting 
and handling of human characters in mutual relation and reaction.”  As the narrative 
scene, however, is rendered through the eyes of that exotic and disruptive animal—the 
female viewer—Brontë’s handling and painting of its characters against the backdrop 
of the museum confronts and challenges those relations and reactions on which 
Swinburne’s own critical perspective is dependent, revealing the complicated set of 
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cultural assumptions on which even the most fleeting of aesthetic experiences is 
founded.  
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CHAPTER 2.  
Cordons of Protection:  The Stage of Spectatorship in Charlotte Brontë’s Villette 
I have lately been reading ‘Modern Painters,’ and I have derived from the work 
much genuine pleasure and, I hope, some edification; at any rate, it made me 
feel how ignorant I had previously been on the subject which it treats.  Hitherto 
I have only had instinct to guide me in judging of art; I feel now as if I had 
been walking blindfold—this book seems to give me eyes—I do wish I had 
pictures within reach by which to test this new sense.40 
I never had a head for science, but an ignorant, blind fond instinct inclined me 
to art.  I liked to visit picture-galleries, and I dearly liked to be left there 
alone . . . I was happy; happy, not always in admiring, but in examining, 
questioning, and forming conclusions.41 
Written roughly five years apart, these professions both flow from the pen of 
Charlotte Brontë.  The first is from an 1848 letter to her publisher W.S. Williams, the 
second from a passage in her last novel Villette (1853).  Strikingly similar in their 
language, these quotations employ the same, superficially paradoxical formulation to 
describe what was in the nineteenth-century typically invoked as a hall-mark of the 
truly aesthetic sensibility: an innate responsiveness to art.  Hardly the prelapsarian 
state of aesthetic innocence sometimes imagined by Romantic writers, the inherent 
“instinct” towards the visual arts as Brontë represents it is “ignorant, blind [and] 
fond,” a primitive drive strangely dislocated from knowledge, deep feeling, and even 
sight itself.42  Whereas Wordsworth, in spite of his own prodigious learning, was 
constantly moved to privilege (if somewhat disingenuously) the perception of 
children, rustics, ascetics, and eccentrics as somehow purer and more authentic for the 
absence of a corrupting outside influence, Brontë—both in her fiction and letters—
                                                 
40 Charlotte Brontë, “To W.S. Williams,” 31 July 1848, The Letters of Charlotte Brontë, ed. Margaret 
Smith, vol. 2 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000) 94. 
41 Charlotte Brontë, Villette. ed. Mark Lilly (New York: Penguin Classics, 1980) 273-274. All 
subsequent citations are to this edition. 
42 In this context, I am interpreting Brontë’s use of the word “fond” to mean “trivial or foolish” [OED]. 
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frequently reiterates the importance of “test[ing]” one’s perceptual faculties through 
often painful contact with the world.43  In her letter to Williams, Brontë credits the 
first two volumes of Ruskin’s Modern Painters with this realization; his work is 
“edif[ying]” precisely because it reveals to her the ignorance of her former state, 
which she compares to movement without any real awareness of direction or 
destination, to “walking blindfold[ed].”  Modern Painters, by showing her the 
purposeless and unstructured nature of her previous aesthetic judgments, renders 
viewership a more (self)conscious enterprise, making the earlier, innocent mode of 
perception seem in itself a sort of blindness.  
Of course, in voicing these opinions, Brontë is in part taking her cue from 
Ruskin himself.  The first volume of Modern Painters—which is largely devoted to 
outlining the major “ideas” conveyable by great art—is also where Ruskin begins to 
draw the distinction between two different states of aesthetic perception that he fully 
articulates in the second volume as the distinction between aesthesis and theoria.  As 
he defines it, “the mere animal consciousness of the pleasantness [of aesthetic 
impressions] I call aesthesis; but the exulting, reverent, and grateful perception of it I 
call theoria” (236).44  Peter Fuller, in his study of Ruskin, helpfully reframes the 
distinction: “[t]he former he described as ‘mere sensual perception of the outward 
qualities and necessary effects of bodies’ . . . the latter as the response to beauty of 
one’s moral being” (45).45  Sidestepping the thorny religious dimension of Ruskin’s 
aesthetic binary, I want to emphasize how this opposition is structured in terms of 
surface and depth.  Aesthesis is represented as a largely superficial sensory pleasure 
                                                 
43 Though I acknowledge that Wordsworth does “refract” the innocent perceptions of his children and 
madwomen through his own consciousness, I nevertheless would argue that he still privileges the 
“naïve” (child being the father of man, and all that) even if his own poetry provides an example of the 
“sentimental.” 
44 John Ruskin, Modern Painters Volume II, Part III, Chapter II (Boston: Aldine Book Publishing, 
190?) 231. 
45 Peter Fuller, Theoria: Art, and the Absence of Grace (London: Chatto & Windus, 1988). 
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inspired by beautiful objects, while theoria is a “grateful” and “exulting” perception of 
this pleasure, a conscious awareness of the aesthetic faculties whilst one is in the 
throes of aesthetic experience.  This second level of perception, which operates 
simultaneously and in tandem with “mere sensual perception” in the viewer, has a 
self-reflexive, performative element, as Ruskin himself obliquely acknowledges in 
Modern Painters when he makes the claim that even the “sensual impressions 
themselves” might be considered aesthetic “ideas” insofar as they can also be “things 
which the mind occupies itself about in thinking” (83).  The “mere animal” pleasure of 
aesthesis, it seems, has itself a potentially aesthetic component that can be appreciated 
by the “theoretic” faculty.  Thus, Ruskin allows for the possibility that the viewer can 
turn this higher level of perception inwards and aesthetically evaluate his or her own 
sensory reactions, scrutinizing them with the same critical gaze that is typically 
directed at the art object.  
In his use of the term “theoretic” (and in his rejection of the more typically-
utilized descriptor “aesthetic”) to signify a more elevated and conscious level of 
perception, Ruskin also refines the model of experience typically understood to elicit 
this kind of perception, limiting it to scenarios in which viewership is the intended, 
rather than the accidental, function of the moment.  I make this argument based on the 
etymology of the word “theoria,” an etymology of which Ruskin was certainly aware.  
Theoria is the Latin derivation of the Greek θεωρία, which is itself derived from the 
word θεωρός, meaning "spectator," or literally "one looking at a show.” Moreover, 
though θεωρία [theoria] does mean “contemplation” or “speculation”—Ruskin’s 
official interpretation of the term in Modern Painters—it also can be translated as 
“spectacle” as well as [the state of] “being a spectator.”  Thus, implicit in Ruskin’s the 
term is a sort of perspectival indeterminacy.  While theoria refers to the act or faculty 
of aesthetic contemplation, it also gestures towards the spectacle itself and to the 
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spectator’s awareness of him- or herself in the act of viewing.  As opposed to 
aesthesis, which is limited to the perceptual act, theoria is a viewership that depends 
on an object being displayed and a space created specifically for its display.  It is a 
reciprocally-defining relation: to be a spectator requires a spectacle, and a spectacle is 
something created with the expectation of spectators.  As an aesthetic experience, it is 
to be distinguished from the typically Romantic epiphanic awakening to (natural, 
unintended, and unexpected) beauty; instead, it is a moment that has been, in a sense, 
pre-arranged, even scripted.  The viewer comes to it with eyes wide-open (as it were), 
in anticipation of a visually-arresting (created) sight and with certain pre-conceived 
notions as to what qualifies as a spectacle and what it means to be a spectator. 
My reasons for offering what might seem like a flagrant digression into the 
wilds of connotative speculation are manifold.  On the most basic level, given that I 
will be focusing on Brontë’s representation of aesthetic experience in Villette, it seems 
to me useful in terms of orienting her novel in relation to the ideas of the major 
aesthetic critic of her day, a critic of whose work her letters prove her to be a diligent 
reader.  Her assertion that Ruskin’s book awakened in her a wholly “new sense,” a 
mode of vision so profoundly different as to qualify as a fresh pair of “eyes,” is 
important to consider when thinking about Brontë’s increasingly radical 
experimentation with the representation of perception (specifically feminine 
perception) in her later novels, particularly Villette.  I would argue that Brontë’s 
avowed desire in her 1848 letter to Williams—that she might have “pictures within 
reach by which to test this new sense”—comes to fruition in her last (completed) 
novel.  In Villette, Brontë performs by proxy the newly self-conscious mode of 
viewership that is the inheritance of her encounter with Modern Painters.  The novel’s 
heroine Lucy Snowe—an English Protestant émigré teaching in a ‘Pensionnat de 
Demoiselles” in Catholic Brussels—is repeatedly made an audience to pictures and 
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performances, private scenes and public spectacles, all of which test the limits of her 
perceptual faculties and, in the process, put on display a developing aesthetic 
sensibility that is anything but “ignorant, blind, [and] fond.”  Significantly, though, in 
Villette the formative influence of Ruskin is largely obscured, making the strange echo 
of Brontë’s letter that one hears in Lucy Snowe’s description of her aesthetic “instinct” 
a repetition with an important difference.  The viewer’s encounter with an art object—
the “test” to which Brontë refers in her letter—is, in Villette, not the confirmation of a 
“new sense” but rather the genesis of it.  In other words, Brontë’s representations of 
aesthetic experience in her novel do not presuppose the perspectival position of 
Ruskin’s ideal “theoretic” viewer so much as they attempt to imaginatively create the 
sorts of situations that might encourage its development.  Offering a series of narrative 
scenarios that dramatize Lucy’s encounters with various pieces of art, Brontë brings to 
the fore what might be called the institutional aspect of aesthetic experience.  By 
focusing on the process (not the result) of such experiences, she reveals what is 
typically obscured in aesthetic treatises like Modern Painters: the fact that the 
aesthetic encounter is itself a rule-bound experience, shaped and delimited by 
internalized and external social forces that reinforce the mores and values that define 
the emerging art culture of which Lucy is both an eager and skeptical disciple. 
In these narrative efforts, Brontë emphasizes something that is noticeably 
absent from Ruskin’s book: an awareness of the potential complications that face the 
viewer in places specifically created for aesthetic appreciation.  Whereas Modern 
Painters focuses solely on the hypothetical relation between the viewing subject and 
the object of his gaze (I use the masculine pronoun advisedly), Villette depicts these 
supposedly private moments as they occur within public spaces.  Setting all of Lucy’s 
most profound aesthetic encounters against a series of bustling backdrops—the places 
of pleasure for the bourgeoisie in the Belgian city of Villette—Brontë complicates 
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Ruskin’s equation through the inclusion of various social integers.  Rather than 
affording Lucy Snowe the mental solitude that Ruskin assumes for his viewer, Brontë 
depicts her heroine’s aesthetical experiences as being constantly intruded upon, 
responsive to and altered by the shaping forces of outside stimuli.  Even when (as in 
the quotation above) Lucy Snowe wishes to be “left alone” in an art gallery in order to 
do the aesthetic work of “examining, questioning, and forming conclusions” about a 
piece of art, this work is shown to be inevitably affected and effected by the 
environment in which it occurs.   
Though many moments in Villette might qualify as aesthetic experiences, Lucy 
Snowe’s aforementioned visit to the art gallery is exemplary.  While critics have made 
the case for reading this scene in conjunction with Lucy’s later visit to the theater, to 
conflate the space of the museum and the space of the theater is to obscure the unique 
place that each occupies in the Victorian cultural imaginary and, more specifically, in 
Brontë’s novel.  Even if there is something inherently “theatrical” about Lucy Snowe’s 
behavior in the art gallery, it is a theatricality that can be traced back to Brontë’s 
interest in staging a newly-conceived Ruskinian conception of viewership, a mode of 
perception that is inextricably tied to the rise of museum culture in the nineteenth 
century.  This changing conception of aesthetic experience figured in Ruskin’s 
conceptualization of theoria is bound up with the transition in the philosophy of 
aesthetics from the Kantian privileging of nature as the primary object of perceptual 
appreciation to the Hegelian privileging of the work of art.46  Neither of these 
conceptual shifts can be divorced from the historical context, however, in which the 
museum as a public institution really came into its own.  The significance of this latter 
development is rarely explored in nineteenth-century aesthetic criticism and 
philosophy.  Though Modern Painters, for example, is a text with a deliberately 
                                                 
46 Gerard Genette talks about this change in The Aesthetic Relation (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1999) 199-201. 
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pedagogical function, intended to educate the masses on the subject of aesthetic 
appreciation, Ruskin is always cagey on the matter of where the public should go to 
test out those very sensibilities his book is intended to cultivate.  Similarly, when 
Hegel, in Gerard Genette’s words, pronounces “artistic beauty, as a production of the 
spirit, superior to natural beauty,” the work of art is imagined as separate from the 
scene of viewership, unfettered by the material specificities that are always a part of 
lived experience (202). 
The material contexts that remain obscured in Ruskin and Hegel are exactly 
what Charlotte Brontë exposes in Villette through her narrativization of the aesthetic 
encounter as it occurs in the controlled and coded space of the museum.  The web of 
contingencies that constitute the viewing experience—the way in which the work is 
arranged (where it is hung and what other works are proximate to it), the physical 
position of the viewer (where he or she is placed in relation to the art object), the 
presence or absence of other viewers—are represented in this scene as having a major 
and determinate influence on perception itself.  In addition to the physical position of 
the viewer, one must acknowledge the viewer’s subject position: the unique 
combination of physiological and psychological features that predisposes the 
individual to perceive a particular object in a certain light.  In the museum, Brontë 
stages Lucy Snowe’s encounter with art objects in ways that underscore the impact 
that these external and internal factors have on the structuring of aesthetic experience.  
In the process, she removes theoria from the realm of the philosophically theoretical 
and puts it into narrative practice, thereby recuperating the lost spectacle at the heart of 
θεωρία and demonstrating through the self-consciously performative perceptions of 
her heroine a “mind occup[ying] itself . . . in thinking.” 
This narrative enactment of something approximating Ruskinian viewership 
can be seen as much more than a simple demonstration of aesthetic competency.  
 69 
While Brontë’s rendering of Lucy Snowe’s experience in the museum proves her 
familiarity with the key terms and concepts in aesthetics, her application of this 
knowledge shows an agenda ultimately quite different from Ruskin’s.  The museum 
scene in Villette should be read as the strongest expression of a concerted effort on 
Brontë’s part (an effort that extends throughout her novel) to demystify the process by 
which certain sorts of perceptual acts are vested with the authority that comes from 
being deemed aesthetic.  The museum is the ideal site for this sort of endeavor, as it is 
itself a sort of narrative space, by which I mean a space that is created and structured 
for the purpose of communicating a particular narrative of culture.  In Foucault’s 
words, the museum is a “heterotopia[] of indefinitely accumulating time,” a real place 
that is nevertheless also imaginary in that it is a reflection of a society’s vision of itself 
and its slanted view of the history that preceded it.47  Enshrining certain cultural 
artifacts to the exclusion of others, the museum represents spatially the oppressive 
social and ideological structures that authorize the perspectives of particular viewers, 
enforce their privileged position, and proclaim their standards of judgment as 
normative or universal.  Tony Bennett, in his book The Birth of the Museum, argues 
for a critical awareness of how the “layout” of a museum—its arrangement of objects 
within the confines of its space—is indicative of its “theory”—“a particular set of 
explanatory categories and principles of categorization.”  It is the “theory” underlying 
a museum’s use of space, he claims, that “mediates the relations between the viewer 
and the art on display in such a way that, for some but not for others, seeing the art 
exhibited serves as a means of seeing through those artifacts to see an invisible order 
of significance that they have been arranged to represent” (165).48  In Villette, it is 
through Lucy Snowe’s aesthetic perceptions that the reader comes to see through the 
art objects that she sees to the Foucauldian “order of things” that lies underneath.  
                                                 
47 Michel Foucault, “Of Other Spaces” (1967), Diacritics 16 (Spring 1986): 26. 
48 Tony Bennett, The Birth of the Museum: History, Theory, Politics (London: Routledge, 1995). 
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Lucy herself alludes to the existence of this “invisible order” directly prior to her trip 
to the museum, when she comments on the “perfect knowledge” of Villette possessed 
by her self-appointed “cicerone,” Dr. John Bretton (Lucy’s countryman, as the name 
suggests): 
I often felt amazed at his perfect knowledge of Villette; a knowledge not 
merely confined to its open streets, but penetrating to all its galleries, salles, 
and cabinets: of every door which shut in an object worth seeing, of every 
museum, every hall, sacred to art or science, he seemed to possess the ‘Open! 
Sesame!’” (273). 
In likening the museums, galleries, and all other places “sacred to art or 
science” to the Thieves’ Cave in The Book of One Thousand and One Nights, full of 
stolen gold and protected by a secret, magical password, Lucy draws attention to the 
deceptively private nature of these supposedly public institutions.  The mark of the 
cultural insider is that one knows the “open streets” to be ultimately “confin[ing],” that 
one is capable of seeing not simply laterally (along the surface of things), but also 
vertically (“penetrating” the depths to things “worth seeing”).  That Lucy attributes 
this “perfect knowledge” of Villette to John Bretton is fitting, as his job as a physician 
grants him a level of access to the homes and society of the cultural elite that he 
otherwise, as a foreigner and as a member of the middle-class, would be denied. 
Yet, even as Lucy compares John Bretton to the poor but wily woodcutter Ali 
Baba, this chapter of Villette invites the reader to carry the analogy even further and to 
compare Lucy herself to the narrator of One Thousand and One Nights, Scheherazade.  
With its elaborate prefatory remarks, the “Cleopatra” chapter seems intended to 
illustrate Lucy’s (and the author’s) views on art and perception.  After the 
aforementioned general reflections upon aesthetic experience and those cultural inner 
sanctums in which such experiences are supposed to take place, the story switches 
abruptly into a more decidedly narrative account of what happened “[o]ne day, at a 
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quiet early hour, [when she] found herself nearly alone in a certain gallery” (275).  
Read in relation to the latter tale, Lucy’s opening remarks operate as a frame of sorts, 
providing the reader with insight into the aesthetic criteria on which her judgments are 
based.49  Again, the influence of Modern Painters is unmistakable.  Ruskin’s famous 
injunction to the young artist to “go to Nature in all singleness of heart . . . having no 
other thoughts but how best to penetrate her meaning and to remember her 
instruction . . . rejoicing always in the truth” is echoed in Lucy’s comments on what 
distinguishes a good painting from a bad one (210).  For Lucy, even “chef d’oeuvres 
bearing great names” might be dismissed if what they represent is “not a whit like 
nature”; those worthy of her praise are ones that display 
fragments of truth here and there which satisfied the conscience, and gleams of 
light that cheered the vision.  Nature’s power here broke through in a mountain 
snow-storm; and there her glory in a sunny southern day.  An expression in 
                                                 
49 That there is something potentially subversive about Lucy Snowe’s dramatic enactments of what 
George Eliot would later call “double consciousness”—an inherently self-reflexive mode of perception, 
in which the individual is both an active participant in a scene and a detached viewer of it—has been 
noted by several critics, including Mary Jacobus and Christina Crosby.  Though they come at it from 
different angles, with Jacobus using a psychoanalytic and Crosby a loosely deconstructive model, both 
locate in Villette’s “Gothic” fascination with doubling and doppelgängers the presence of a 
revolutionary feminism that strives to dismantle from within the patriarchal system of hierarchies that 
defines and confines its heroine.  In “Villette’s Buried Letter,” first published in Essays in Criticism 29 
(July 1978), Jacobus argues that “this doubleness informs the novel as a whole,” indicating the presence 
of “an incompletely repressed Romanticism” threatening to overwhelm “the narrative and 
representational conventions of Victorian realism.” In “Charlotte Brontë’s Haunted Text,” published in 
SEL 24 (1984), Crosby, responding to Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar’s claim that Brontë is inviting 
the reader “to experience with her the interiority of the [feminine] Other,” reads the strange “play of 
doublings, mirrors, and reversals” at work in the narrative as part of a more radical effort to “displace 
identities and compromise the founding differences on which notions of consciousness and interiority 
depend.”  Both of these arguments offer compelling interpretations of the seemingly divided nature of 
the narrative, the tendency of its speaker’s sensitive and imaginative perspective to transform an 
everyday, unremarkable occurrence into a moment verging on the Uncanny.  Each also stresses the 
significance of gender in Brontë’s experimentation with the representation of subjective experience, 
with Jacobus going so far as to describe Lucy’s consciousness as “a distorting hall of mirrors in which 
each projection [the other female characters in the novel through whom “Lucy both defines and fails to 
recognize herself”] is obedient to her feelings of gratitude, rivalry, attraction, hatred or envy.”  While it 
is undeniable that Lucy’s imagination is a profoundly destabilizing force in Villette, there is a potential 
danger to reading the novel as the unstable composite of two, dichotomous narrative registers, part 
realist, conventional and patriarchal, part Romantic, subversive, and feminist; it risks reducing the 
complex interplay of these two narrative registers to merely oppositional forces, conflicting with instead 
of complementing each other. 
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this portrait provided clear insight into character . . . These exceptions I loved: 
they grew dear as friends (275). 
Reversing Ruskin’s command for the artist to go deep to “penetrate” Nature’s hidden 
meaning, Lucy’s ideal conception of aesthetic experience imagines the viewer 
somehow seeing through the painting’s surface and catching a glimpse of an 
underlying elemental power or universal truth.  What differentiates Lucy’s position 
from Ruskin’s is that she can only conceive of this process as occurring in a piecemeal 
fashion.  As her description shows, it is only in “fragments” and “gleams” that a 
particular representation succeeds in piercing through the layer of convention and 
communicating to the viewer anything of significance.  Moreover, Ruskin’s 
formulation never considers what the story that follows Lucy’s opening takes great 
pains to establish: that the space of the museum works against the epiphanic moment, 
mostly because of its highly artificial, anticipatory staging of the aesthetic encounter. 
Following as it does on the heels of Lucy’s sincere and impassioned reflections 
upon the nature of art and the art of nature, her recounting of an actual gallery 
experience in which she acts as a viewer—in this case, of a much-lauded painting of 
Cleopatra—strikes a jarringly discordant note.  Using the detailed yet indeterminate 
language of the storyteller (establishing the scene without locating it within a specific 
context), Lucy describes the arrangement of the gallery in a way that strives to expose 
its constructedness, its contrivedness:  
One day, at a quiet early hour, I found myself nearly alone in a certain gallery, 
wherein one particular picture of pretentious size, set up in the best light, 
having a cordon of protection stretched before it, and a cushioned bench duly 
set in front for the accommodation of worshipping connoisseurs, who, having 
gazed themselves off their feet, might be fain to complete the business sitting: 
this picture, I say, seemed to consider itself the queen of the collection. (275) 
In this long and elaborate sentence, a paragraph unto itself and an anacoluthon to boot, 
Lucy gives the most ironical of answers to a question often asked by museum visitors:  
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How does one know which art object is “the queen of the collection”?  The answer:  
Look for the one sitting on the throne.  Refusing at this moment to give the reader any 
clue as to the picture itself (except a brief note about how its size indicates a 
pretension to grandeur on the part of the artist), Lucy instead focuses on how the 
arrangement of space surrounding the painting is designed to underscore its 
importance.  Using a series of buried clauses, one piled upon the next, her grammar 
serves as a textual analogy for this spatial structuring; not only is this painting placed 
front and center, but it is placed in the best light, is sectioned off from the rest of the 
gallery by a protective barrier, and has a bench set in front of it in order to herd 
onlookers into an appreciative group before it.  Indeed, the only way to describe the 
scene is to embed descriptive phrase within descriptive phrase, repeatedly deferring 
the reader’s encounter with the painting itself.  Thus, the experience of reading this 
passage mimics the experience of viewing the painting; Brontë prepares the reader for 
what is about to be described in much the same way that the museum prepares the 
viewer for the encounter with the celebrated picture.  Yet, as the conclusion of this 
sentence implies, no amount of scenic pageantry can change the intrinsic worth of the 
art object.  The painting is not “the queen of the collection” because there is anything 
about it essentially powerful and worthy of worship.  Rather, like her living 
counterparts, the Cleopatra’s status as monarch is largely a function of the arbitrary 
organization of things, royalty and other positions of power being themselves 
bestowed by custom, biological accident, and political arrangement.  Thus, in spite of 
the pomp and circumstance heralding its presence, the painting’s appearance of value 
is mostly the product of its situation within the artificial, coded space of the gallery. 
Lucy Snowe’s description of the gallery housing the Cleopatra indicates her 
unstated recognition of (and resistance to) a form of aesthetic experience in which 
one’s response to an art object is manipulated by external circumstances.  While she 
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makes a point of noticing the physical boundary separating the picture from the 
viewer, her highly figurative language also partially collapses (or at least complicates) 
the implicit distinction between the imaginary space of the painting and the “real” 
space of the museum.  The non-verbal signifiers used by museum curators to confer 
distinction on a particular painting—ornate frames, prohibitive cordons, light sources, 
chairs and benches (all of which, importantly, work to position the viewer as well)—
are read parodically as indicators of the homage to which the painting feels that it is 
entitled as “the queen” of this particular collection.  By pretending to ignore the role of 
the museum in establishing a painting’s value and instead ironically attributing that 
evaluative capacity to the picture itself (anthropomorphizing it only to deride its 
conscious self-satisfaction with its own beauty), Lucy underscores the strange and 
ultimately groundless abdication of authority practiced by viewers when they allow 
their judgment to be manipulated by the literal arrangement and figurative ranking of 
art objects in a space designed for aesthetic contemplation and consumption.  
Moreover, as her derision of the painting’s supposed feeling of entitlement suggests, 
the viewer is encouraged to surrender evaluative agency through the implication that 
artistic value is an intrinsic feature of the art object itself.50  To appreciate a painting 
because it is placed in such a way that it demands notice, Lucy suggests, makes as 
little sense as crowning a woman a queen simply because she sees herself as royalty. 
Tony Tanner has argued that the art gallery and the theatre in Villette are 
“framed spaces” in which “[t]he frame separates the audience from the spectacle and 
thus the framed space is discontinuous with the social space containing it.”  “One 
effect of this,” he adds, “is to allow extremes of representation or action, (which are 
only latent or totally suppressed in the social space,) to be projected in a way which 
                                                 
50 I am indebted to Fredric Bogel for this very helpful observation. 
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allows for contemplation without actual involvement.”51  What Tanner might have 
considered, though, is that the museum—unlike the theatre—is a social space designed 
to create relations not only between the viewer and the art object but also between the 
viewer and other viewers.  Thus, to say that framed space is “discontinuous” with 
social space is to overlook scenarios in which social space is, itself “framed,” 
rendering the audience part of the spectacle that they suppose themselves to be outside 
of.  It is the “createdness” and the sociality of museum space that gives it this aura of 
theatricality, a theatricality that infuses the entire scene, compromising the boundary 
that Tanner assumes between subject and object, between spectator and spectacle.   
Without such clear lines of division, the theatricality of the museum space is 
capable of transforming viewership itself into a performance, a point that Lucy herself 
acknowledges when she describes her dislike of visiting such places with others: 
In company, a wretched idiosyncrasy forbade me to see much or to feel 
anything . . . where it was necessary to maintain a flow of talk on the subjects 
in presence, half an hour would knock me up . . . I never yet saw the well-
reared child, much less the educated adult, who could not put me to shame, by 
the sustained intelligence of its demeanour under the ordeal of a conversable 
sociable visitation of pictures (274). 
The problem with visiting a museum in a group is here two-fold.  On the one hand, the 
consciousness of others’ presences makes the subjective experience of aesthetic 
reflection nearly impossible, preventing Lucy from “see[ing] much or feel[ing] 
anything.”  On the other, to be “in company” at the museum is to submit to being on 
display to and as a part of that company.  At the theatre, one might attend as part of a 
group and yet, for at least the duration of the play, hide in the darkness of the 
auditorium, allowing for the “contemplation without involvement” that Tanner 
describes.  The well-lighted, open space of the museum, however, does not offer its 
                                                 
51 Tony Tanner, introduction, Villette, by Charlotte Brontë, ed. Mark Lilly (New York: Penguin 
Classics, 1980) 21-22. 
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visitors the same security against scrutiny.  Instead, it creates an environment in which 
private perceptual acts can have a public aspect and potentially a social function.  In 
the “conversable sociable visitation of pictures” that Lucy finds so arduous, 
contemplation is no longer an end in itself but rather a means to an end; one looks at 
pictures in order to speak on them, in the process demonstrating a certain level of 
aesthetic proficiency as well as politely contributing to the social “flow of talk on the 
subjects in presence.”  Even when one is not speaking, Lucy laments, one still must be 
conscious enough of oneself to sustain an “intelligence of demeanour” that signals a 
certain level of engagement with others.  Tellingly, Lucy sees the social necessity as 
an “intelligence of demeanour,” rather than, say, an intelligence of expression.  A 
“demeanour” (etymologically and otherwise) has little to do with real feelings; it 
refers to a “conduct, way of acting,” a “manner of comporting oneself outwardly or 
towards others” [OED].  A public persona that is constructed out of internalized social 
codes, the individual’s “demeanour” is a creation of a certain disciplined self-
consciousness that is meant for an audience.  Thus, when Lucy states that both an 
“educated adult” and a “well-reared child” are her superiors in this regard, it is not true 
aesthetic engagement that she is speaking of but rather the look of engagement, not the 
disinterested, detached perspective prized by aesthetic theorists but the active, self-
involved and ultimately performative mode of viewership that the museum encourages 
or perhaps even requires.   
Indeed, what Lucy’s subsequent narration of her Belgian gallery visit makes 
clear is that no one is truly outside the shaping influence of those cultural scripts that 
structure the space of the museum.  While Brontë invests her heroine with a critical 
awareness of the social dynamics that complicate idealized conceptions of aesthetic 
experience, this awareness only serves to heighten and, in different ways, to ironize 
the intrinsically dramatic nature of her encounter with the Cleopatra.  It is Lucy’s very 
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attentiveness to the ways in which outside circumstances can manipulate her aesthetic 
responses that renders the Cleopatra an object of such importance, and her description 
of the painting, for this reason, is an exercise in resistance: 
It represented a woman, considerably larger, I thought, than the life.  I 
calculated that this lady, put into a scale of magnitude suitable for the reception 
of a commodity of bulk, would infallibly turn from fourteen to sixteen stone.  
She was, indeed, extremely well fed: very much butcher’s meat—to say 
nothing of bread, vegetables, and liquids—must she have consumed to attain 
that breadth and height, that wealth of muscle, that affluence of flesh.  She lay 
half-reclined on a couch: why, it would be difficult to say; broad daylight 
blazed round her; she appeared in hearty health, strong enough to do the work 
of two plain cooks; she could not claim a weak spine; she ought to have been 
standing, or at least sitting bolt upright.  She had no business to lounge away 
the noon on a sofa.  She ought likewise to have worn decent garments; a gown 
covering her properly, which was not the case:  out of abundance of material—
seven-and-twenty yards, I should say, of drapery—she managed to make 
inefficient raiment.  Then, for the wretched untidiness surrounding her, there 
could be no excuse.  Pots and pans—perhaps I ought to say vases and 
goblets—were rolled here and there on the foreground; a perfect rubbish of 
flowers was mixed among them, and an absurd and disorderly mass of curtain 
upholstery smothered the couch and cumbered the floor.  On referring to the 
catalogue, I found that this notable production bore the name ‘Cleopatra.’ 
(276)   
Lucy’s spirited and combative engagement with the painting is a direct response to her 
reading into its subject, style, size and spatial arrangement an institutionalized 
insistence on its value.  Of course, by making the Cleopatra the battlefield on which 
she stakes her opposition to the collective standards of judgment that would praise it, 
she tacitly acknowledges the painting’s social—if not aesthetic—significance.  This 
acknowledgment, though, is necessary to the larger agenda that informs this chapter of 
Villette.  In order for Brontë to illustrate the process by which certain spaces transform 
aesthetic experience itself into a sort of self-conscious spectacle, her heroine must 
engage with a painting that, if we take her earlier professions at face-value, is beneath 
her notice.  Yet the Cleopatra, epitomizing a mode of artistic representation that is 
focused solely on technical mastery, on surface detail that is “beautiful” rather than 
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“true,” offers a perfect complement to the performative mode of aesthetic valuation 
that Lucy ironically mimics and, through mimicry, seeks to unsettle. 
That Brontë made the subject of this painting Cleopatra is no less important to 
the scene than its style.  As other critics have noted, Brontë probably based the picture 
on one by Edouard De Biefve that she saw at the Brussels Salon of 1842, but that 
image was simply called “Une Alme” (A Dancing-Girl).52  In identifying her 
odalisque as a representation of the infamous Egyptian queen, Brontë situates the 
image more broadly within what Jill Matus has called “the burgeoning nineteenth-
century fascination with the East and interest in Oriental exoticism.”53  More 
specifically, the figure of Cleopatra was of particular interest to artists and writers of 
the period as a model of the femme fatale, embodying (in Coleridge’s words, taken 
from his criticism of Antony and Cleopatra) “a passion [that] springs out of the 
habitual craving of a licentious nature, and that . . . is supported and reinforced by 
voluntary stimulus and sought-for associations, instead of blossoming out of 
spontaneous emotion.”54  As Coleridge’s description attests, it is not simply 
Cleopatra’s supposed carnality that constitutes her dangerous allure but also the 
assumption that this carnality is itself consciously and deliberately cultivated.  Her 
incitement of her own “licentious nature” is seen to give to her “passion” a dramatic 
aspect, rendering it a provocative display directed towards a susceptible viewer.  
Coleridge’s representation of Shakespeare’s character closely aligns with Brontë’s 
imaginary ekphrasis in their shared insistence on the unnatural and artful quality of 
Cleopatra’s posturing.  In both cases, the figure of Cleopatra symbolizes the art 
                                                 
52 See Enid L. Duthie, The Foreign Vision of Charlotte Brontë  (New York: Barnes and Noble Book, 
1975) 95. 
53 Jill Matus.  “Looking at Cleopatra: The Expression and Exhibition of Desire in Villette,” Victorian 
Literature and Culture 21: 347. 
54 Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Shakespearean Criticism in Two Volumes: Volume One (London: J.M. 
Dent & Sons Ltd, 1960) 77. 
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object’s power to seduce and, in the seduction of the viewer, to “deny things their truth 
and turn it into a game, a pure play of appearances.”55  
Yet, as Baudrillard has suggested, seduction depends on the willing complicity 
of the “seduced” with the “seducer,” an implicit agreement between them to keep 
everything on the surface level, with signs rather than what those signs might signify.  
In the case of the art object, the image seduces the viewer by holding the attention to 
its formal features and diverting all attempts to see below that beautiful surface, to the 
network of social and economic factors that determine its meaning.  Yet, in Villette, 
though the picture of Cleopatra is described as every bit the temptress as the real 
woman it is meant to represent, Lucy Snowe’s aesthetic encounter with the painting is 
as great a failure of a seduction as anything in the fiction of Samuel Richardson.  Lucy 
is unlike those earlier heroines in most respects; however, in her decided rejection of 
the solicitations of the spectacular image—in her refusal, as it were, to be charmed—
she too turns in a virtuoso performance of personal virtue.  What makes Lucy’s 
engagement with the painting a performance of virtue is that she puts herself in a 
position where the painting could potentially work its spell on her.  Rather than 
virtuously avoiding looking at the painting altogether (which is what, it is later 
suggested to her, propriety obliges her to do), she instead faces the temptation and 
withstands its solicitations.  Looking at the painting with a critical eye, dwelling at 
length on its stratagems and flaws, she refuses to admire it in the way that the space of 
the gallery and the painting itself seem to demand.  As she rather acerbically tells the 
reader, she will sit on the seat thoughtfully provided for her viewing pleasure for no 
other reason than “the bench was there” and she “might as well take advantage of its 
accommodation,” not because, like the connoisseurs before her, she has any intention 
of being swept off her feet (276). 
                                                 
55 Jean Baudrillard, Seduction, trans. Brian Singer (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1991) Introduction. 
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Her description of the painting also demystifies its allure by humorously 
translating its aesthetic effects into different frames of value, where the odalisque does 
not fare nearly so well.  The picture is first assessed using the language of the market-
place and economic theory:  imagining the figure of the Cleopatra as a “commodity of 
bulk,” Lucy wonders whether her “Junoesque” form is worth the amount of “butcher’s 
meat . . . bread, vegetables, and liquids” required for the attainment of “that wealth of 
muscle, that affluence of flesh” (275, italics mine).  Lucy then speaks from a medical 
standpoint, and considering Cleopatra’s reclining position on the sofa, finds reason to 
criticize her posture: “she appeared in hearty health . . . she could not plead a weak 
spine; she ought to have been standing, or at least sitting bolt upright” (275).  Finally, 
she surveys the scene from the joint perspectives of social and domestic propriety, 
Mrs. Grundy and Mrs. Beeton combined, and, on this front, chastises Cleopatra both 
for her indifferent and indecent toilette (“she ought . . . to have worn decent garments, 
a gown covering her properly”) as well as for the state of her abode (“for the wretched 
untidiness surrounding her, there could be no excuse” . . . strewn as it is with “pots and 
pans”) (275).  Voicing her resistance to the Cleopatra-as-painting through a sarcastic, 
scathing critique of the Cleopatra-as-woman, Lucy invokes the authority of different 
evaluative discourses and, in the process, demonstrates how that authority is attained 
through a performance of judgment that, in each instance, reifies social norms and 
results in the controlling objectification of the “feminine.”  Also, by using the 
language of the market, of medicine, and of domestic morality in her assessment of the 
picture, Lucy brings into the realm of the aesthetic the more sordid concerns and 
perspectives of the outside world and insists on their interrelatedness.  The Cleopatra 
is not merely an enigmatic image, impervious to penetration; recontextualized 
(however satirically), she is the product of a complex and somewhat contradictory set 
of cultural scripts, scripts on which subjective judgments of taste also depend.   
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A spectacle exists primarily to be seen, its dazzling surface constantly 
threatening to overwhelm conscious thought through visual over-stimulation.  Lucy’s 
deliberate misreading of the painting is only one of the strategies she employs to avoid 
succumbing to the visual spectacle.  She simply refuses to view it as such.  Her 
description also carefully avoids confronting the picture directly (as an image in its 
totality); instead she focuses on the details of its arrangement, stressing particularly its 
affectedness.  Even her sole compliment to the painting—that “some of the details—as 
roses, gold cups, jewels, &c.—were very prettily painted”—undermines the 
Cleopatra’s potential aesthetic effect by limiting its success to the competently pretty 
representation of various feminine trifles, so unimportant as to merit an “&c.”  Lucy 
further undermines the painting’s claim to attention by contrasting those small details 
of roses, gold cups, and jewels, with details from a number of adjacently-situated 
“exquisite little pictures of still life: wild-flowers, wild-fruit, mossy wood-nests, 
casketing eggs that looked like pearls seen through clear green sea-water” (276).  The 
comparison is an intricate one, working on a number of levels.  Considered broadly, 
the artificiality of the Cleopatra, metonymically evoked through the list of cultivated 
and crafted objects, is set against the quasi-natural authenticity of the still lifes.  
Narrowing the focus still further, one sees that each detail in the first list has its 
complement or perhaps antithesis in the second: for the carefully-tended roses we have 
wild-flowers and fruit; for golden goblets we have more rustic receptacles, birds’ 
nests; and for precious gemstones we have glossy-shelled eggs, poor man’s pearls.  
The indirect comparison of these two sets of objects works to demystify and thus 
devalue the allure of the Cleopatra, mostly by drawing attention to the obviously 
provocative function of even the minutiae of the “coarse and preposterous canvas” 
(276).  All luxury items, the roses, gold cups, and jewels that clutter the foreground of 
the painting are evocative of wealth, sensuousness, and, more crudely, female 
 82 
genitalia; within the context of the painting, they reinforce the erotic promise of the 
odalisque.  When offset by more natural symbolic equivalents—equivalents that 
suggest not feminine sexuality so much as fertility—they become little more than 
stage props, objects that have the appearance of value but are barren of any real 
meaning.  In this passage, Lucy strives to dispel the magic of the spectacular image in 
the same way that she reveals the contrivances of museum space: by exposing the 
technical machinery behind the effects.  Her final evaluation of the painting—that it is 
“on the whole an enormous piece of claptrap” (i.e. “a device or trick for catching 
applause” [OED])—only makes explicit what has inspired her antagonism in the first 
place—the self-conscious and manipulative theatricality of the Cleopatra, a 
theatricality that ultimately extends beyond the frame to include the dandified 
connoisseur on his “cushioned bench” mirroring the Egyptian odalisque on her sofa.  
Though Lucy herself sits on this bench, her engagement with the Cleopatra ridicules 
the facile, sensuous obsession with beautiful surfaces and demands a new standard of 
valuation, one based on the “truth” of the image. 
Still, her means of engagement—the parody—has a performative element not 
wholly dissimilar to the behavior of the aesthetes from whom she is trying to 
distinguish herself.  Thus, Lucy’s surveillance of the spectacle (her skeptical, 
interrogative stance) involves her in a spectacle of surveillance, in which, as Joseph 
Litvak has argued, the act of viewing implicates the viewer in “a widespread social 
network of vigilance and visibility.”56  Hardly the disinterested spectator, Lucy’s 
performance of viewership exposes what the situation of the painting—its 
arrangement, its protective cordons, its frame—is always attempting to conceal: the 
lack of fixed boundaries in the ever shifting relation between the viewer and the 
aesthetic object.  The space of the museum is all about situating the viewer, 
                                                 
56 Joseph Litvak, Caught in the Act: Theatricality in the Nineteenth-Century Novel (Berkeley: UC Press, 
1992) x. 
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positioning the viewer’s body in such a way as to arrange a particular (perspectival, 
physical, intellectual, emotional) relation to the art object, one that implicitly 
encourages the viewer to adopt the cultural narrative which the space and its objects 
endorse.  It is a fiction perpetuated by the museum, however, that viewers are 
interchangeable, that the individual does not bring to the viewing experience a unique 
perspective that influences how the art object is apprehended.  Moreover, within the 
coded space of the museum, the relation between the viewer and other spectators is 
also unstable.  Though the museum is ostensibly constructed to encourage individual 
perceptual experiences, that fact that others are witness to those experiences 
complicates and compromises the viewer’s claim to authority.  Thus Lucy, in the 
aftermath of her masterful deconstruction of the Cleopatra, finds herself in the gaze of 
M. Paul Emanuel, her school’s professor of literature.  Following on the heels of 
Lucy’s observation that she need not heed the arrival of other spectators in the gallery, 
“as,” she asserts, “indeed, it did not matter to me,” M. Paul’s intrusion throws her 
comment into a certain ironic relief: 
Suddenly a light tap visited my shoulder.  Starting, turning, I met a face bent to 
encounter mine; a frowning, almost a shocked face it was. 
Que faites vous ici? said a voice. (276) 
In a reversal of roles, Lucy finds herself sharply scrutinized by a sensibility as critical 
as her own.  The abrupt visitation of this initially unidentified (and thus all the more 
peremptory) hand, “face,” and “voice” breaks in upon her reverie in such a way as to 
remind Lucy and the reader that she is not outside the evaluative framework of the 
museum.  Moreover, M. Paul’s question (“What are you doing here?”) initially 
threatens to undermine Lucy’s carefully constructed aesthetic persona by doubting her 
right to be there in the first place.  Emanuel’s objection to Lucy’s situation, though, 
has less to do with her presence in the museum than with her choice of viewing 
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material.  A young, unmarried, and unaccompanied woman has decided for herself to 
sit before the Cleopatra.  It is, as he tells her, a matter of propriety: “How dare you, a 
young person, sit coolly down, with the self-possession of a garçon, and look at that 
picture?” (277).   
While Emanuel’s critique is humorously rendered, his statements serve a larger 
purpose in Brontë’s narrative anatomizing of the conventions of spectatorship.  M. 
Paul recognizes in Lucy’s self-possessed viewing of “that painting” the mark of a 
personality prone to insubordination.  Aligning her quiet contemplation of the 
Cleopatra with something like the bold stare of a cheeky waiter, Emanuel locates 
Lucy’s aesthetic experience within a distinctly social register.  Evincing no interest in 
her subjective impressions of the painting, he instead focuses on the objective fact of 
her looking at it.  His scandalized (over)reaction serves to move Lucy’s interior 
monologue, her private act of viewership, into the public sphere, where her gaze 
becomes a contested object in an implicit struggle for power that plays out between 
the two of them.  His subsequent attempt to redirect her attention to subjects more 
proper for female contemplation—which he does by physically moving her from the 
scene of the Cleopatra and towards a “quadtych” titled “La vie d’une femme”—only 
further evidences the social dynamics at work in the space of the museum.  “La vie 
d’une femme,” as Lucy notes, occupies not center stage like the Cleopatra but rather 
“a particularly dull corner,” which is not especially surprising given the subject matter: 
The first [of the four panels] represented a ‘Jeune Fille,’ coming out of a 
church-door . . . her eyes cast down, her mouth pursed up—the image of a 
most villainous little precocious she-hypocrite. The second, a ‘Mariée’ with a 
long white veil, kneeling at a prie-dieu in her chamber . . . and showing the 
whites of her eyes in a most exasperating manner. The third, a ‘Jeune Mère,’ 
hanging disconsolate over a clayey and puffy baby . . . The fourth, a 
‘Veuve,’ . . . holding by the hand a black little girl, and the twain studiously 
surveying an elegant French monument, set up in the corner of some Père la 
Chaise.  All these four ‘Anges’ were grim and gray as burglars, and cold and 
vapid as ghosts . . . Insincere, ill-humoured, bloodless, brainless nonentities! 
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As bad in their way as the indolent gipsy-giantess, the Cleopatra, in hers. (277-
278) 
As other critics have observed, these images, also based on an actual triptych that 
Brontë viewed at the Brussels Salon, offer a clear contrast to the Cleopatra, an 
alternative construction of femininity that is more socially acceptable if every bit as 
androcentric.  Characterizing the life of woman as defined by four stages—girlhood, 
married life, motherhood, and widowhood—the painting has an obviously didactic 
function, the progression of images reproducing a dominant narrative of bourgeois 
culture.  Yet, the four panels are also united by a common feature, to which Lucy’s 
description insistently draws attention.  While all four women look as they are 
supposed to (insofar as all of the images offer cloyingly clichéd feminine ideals), they 
also look where they are supposed to.  The gaze of each figure, as Lucy points out, is 
reverently—if weirdly disconsolately—directed towards an acceptable recipient of 
worship, be it God, baby, or dead husband.  Yet, their concentration, it is intimated, is 
exaggerated to the point of artificiality, and ultimately, this posture of dutiful attention 
is seen to deprive them of materiality and vitality, rendering them as weirdly inhuman 
as excessive materiality does the Cleopatra. 
When, subsequent to this description, Lucy declares that “it was impossible to 
keep one’s attention long confined to these masterpieces,” she is arguably stating a 
psychological imperative more than an aesthetic opinion.  To “confine” her attention 
to “Le vie d’une femme” would be to replicate the conventional performance of 
viewership that turned those depicted female figures into “bloodless, brainless 
nonentities” and to senselessly reenact the social scripts that inform such images.  For 
Lucy’s gaze to remain fixed on the painting would also entail her opting out of the 
strange game of mutual surveillance in which she and M. Paul are engaged.  When she 
defies his edict and turns to “survey the gallery,” her disobedient roving eye meets his 
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controlling one:  “I noticed, by the way, that he looked at [the Cleopatra] himself quite 
at his ease, and for a very long while: he did not, however, neglect to glance from time 
to time my way, in order, I suppose, to make sure that I was obeying orders, and not 
breaking bounds” (278).  The interplay of their glances—an interplay that also 
includes the two paintings—creates a dynamic of authority and rebellion.  M. Paul’s 
gaze strives to police Lucy’s by keeping it restricted to the safe boundaries of one 
particular image, while Lucy’s gaze escapes its confines in order to secretly survey its 
would-be jailer and the world outside its jail.   
In many ways, it is the coded space of the gallery itself that lends to their 
interactions such a dramatic charge, since Lucy, in defying M. Paul, is also defying the 
social conventions that determine and differentiate aesthetic experiences.  Lucy’s 
refusal to obey his “orders” is part and parcel of her broader resolve to come to her 
own conclusions about the images in the gallery, regardless of (in the words of Tony 
Bennett) the institutional “theories” implicit in the space’s “layout.”  When M. Paul, in 
the traditional position of the male pedagogue, again instructs her to “turn to the wall 
and study your four pictures of a woman’s life,” his authority rests on the assumption 
that there is something morally elevating for women about the pictures (280).  Lucy’s 
response—that “they are too hideous”—appeals to a different standard of valuation.  
They deliberately talk at cross-purposes; he attends to the pictures’ meanings, while 
she focuses on their form.  Similarly, when she asks him what he thinks of the 
Cleopatra, his answer is consciously evasive: “Une femme superbe . . . des formes de 
Junon, mais une personne dont je ne voudrais ni pour femme, ni pour fille, ni pour 
soeur” [a superb woman, the form of Juno, but not a person I would wish for a wife, or 
a daughter, or a sister] (280).  That a half-naked Junoesque female form is typically 
intended to evoke for the viewer his mother, sister, or daughter seems incredible, as 
does Emanuel’s omission of the most obvious role for the Cleopatra—that of 
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paramour and general object of masculine desire.  By eliding the sexual appeal of the 
Cleopatra, though, he remains consistent in his attempt to shield Lucy, as an 
unaccompanied “demoiselle,” from a corrupting erotic subtext of which she is 
supposed to be ignorant.  Meanwhile, Lucy’s pert declaration that, in spite of his 
efforts, she can “see her [the Cleopatra] quite well from this corner” shows the failure 
of his efforts as well as her determination to claim for herself an independent 
perspective. 
Through Lucy Snowe and M. Paul Emanuel’s spectatorial battle-of-wills, 
Brontë reveals the hierarchies of power that structure aesthetic experience.  Lucy’s 
taunting and disobedient gaze further denaturalizes those accepted practices of 
viewership by refusing to train itself on subjects proper to its class, gender, and 
station.  In her final, half-teasing affront to M. Paul, she sets her sights on something 
even more objectionable to the schoolmaster than the Cleopatra: a group of male 
spectators that have gathered before the odalisque. Asking Emanuel to “move an inch 
to the side,” Lucy’s clearly-directed stare draws from him the shocked question, 
“How! At what are you gazing now? You are not recognizing an acquaintance 
amongst that group of jeunes gens?” (281).  M. Paul’s question is again less a request 
for information than a chastening of any inclination to openly “recognize” a young 
man in public, such an acknowledgement implying a suspect familiarity.  Lucy does 
admit to knowing one of the men—a young Belgian dandy, Alfred de Hamal, who is 
courting Lucy’s student and countrywoman, Ginerva Fanshawe—but her reaction is at 
once less public and more radical than the social gesture that Emanuel expects.  
Contemplating de Hamal as he in turn ogles the Cleopatra, Lucy commences a 
scathing—if wholly internal—parody of the gentleman-aesthete, a parody made all the 
more subversive for having another gentleman-aesthete as the object of the desiring 
gaze: 
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In fact, I had caught a glimpse of a head too pretty to belong to any other than 
the redoubted Colonel de Hamal.  What a very finished, highly-polished little 
pate it was! What a figure, so trim and natty! What womanish feet and hands! 
How daintily he held a glass to one of his optics! With what admiration he 
tittered and whispered to a friend at his elbow! Oh, the man of sense! Oh, the 
refined gentleman of superior taste and tact! I observed him for about ten 
minutes, and perceived that he was exceedingly taken with the dusk and portly 
Venus of the Nile. (281) 
A series of trite exclamations redundantly studded with exclamation points, Lucy’s 
sketch of de Hamal uses the conventions of polite viewership against one of its more 
skilled practitioners.  Her language plays with the typical gendering of the aesthetic 
relation to throw into relief the “feminine” preoccupation with physical appearance 
that characterizes the fop.  Her deliberately objectifying gaze carves him up into 
pieces; de Hamal’s “finished” pate, his “womanish” appendages, his “natty” figure all 
mark him as artificial a creation as the Cleopatra.  Moreover, his manner of 
observation—the “dainty” use of a monocle, while “titter[ing]” to a friend—is as 
affected as the way in which Lucy describes him.  In the scene before her, Lucy is 
presented with the realization of the aesthetic encounter that she believes the situation 
of the Cleopatra to encourage.  De Hamal is the epitome of the swooning connoisseur, 
posed in front of the canvas, caught up in an act of aesthetic- and self-admiration.  
That a “hamal” is an “Oriental porter” and a “palanquin-bearer” [OED] seems 
important in this context, as it is on de Hamal’s shoulders that the Cleopatra’s 
reputation figuratively rests.  As the “refined gentleman of superior taste and tact,” he 
is representative of those cultural forces that govern the aesthetic standards and 
practices inscribed in the museum.  As Lucy’s depiction of de Hamal takes pains to 
point out, though, the emptily performative nature of this variety of aesthetic 
experience creates a closed circuit of mutually-reinforcing subjects and objects.  It is a 
hollow kind of appreciation insofar as it simply reifies those social codes that 
determine the experience in the first place. 
 89 
Yet, if Villette is unsparing in its critique of cultural ciphers like the Cleopatra 
and de Hamal (objects and subjects that only simulate, offering a parody that is vacant 
of meaning), it does not advocate a return to an earlier, less self-conscious mode of 
aesthetic engagement.  Instead, in the gallery scene, Brontë imagines a variety of 
perspectives and scenarios through which she can explore the complexities of the 
aesthetic encounter as it occurs in spaces created for acts of viewership.  For Brontë, 
the individual’s response to the prescriptive nature of such spaces provides the greatest 
insight into the intricacies of spectatorship, intricacies to which she was first 
introduced through her reading of Modern Painters.  Near the chapter’s conclusion, 
Brontë’s indebtedness to Ruskin again shows itself in her attempt to create a character 
that in some aspects approximates his ideally theoretic viewer, a viewer who responds 
to beauty with not just the senses but with his “moral being.”  This figure, though, 
significantly is not Lucy Snowe but rather Dr. John Graham Bretton, and again, Lucy 
bears witness as he too encounters the art object that has evoked such revealing 
responses from the other characters.   
After Lucy’s extensive observation of de Hamal—an observation so intense, 
perhaps purposely so, that it causes M. Paul “to withdraw voluntarily”—her 
“pursuant” eye lights upon a fitting contrast to the Belgian dandy in the form of Dr. 
John, the man who brought her to the gallery: “He approached de Hamal; he paused 
near him; I thought he had a pleasure in looking over his head; Dr. Bretton, too, gazed 
on the Cleopatra. I doubt if it were to his taste: he did not simper like the little Count; 
his mouth looked fastidious, his eye cool” (281).  Choosing to remain herself 
unobserved, Lucy watches Bretton and de Hamal as they contemplate the Cleopatra in 
close proximity to each other.  As Lucy knows, the two are bound in more ways than 
the shared object of their gaze.  They are also rivals for the affections of Ginevra 
Fanshawe, and the moment, as Lucy reads it, is charged with that significance.  The 
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Cleopatra functions as a placeholder for the absent Ginevra, and Dr. John’s reaction to 
the painting underscores the differences between the men.  Whereas de Hamal is 
“taken” by the sensuality of the image, Dr. John is faintly repulsed by it.  He is not an 
admirer but a judge, and in his “cool eye” and “fastidious” mouth, Lucy reads a 
different standard of valuation from de Hamal’s and also from Emanuel’s.  His “taste” 
(as opposed to the others’) depends on his ethics, and thus the provocative beauty of 
the Cleopatra does not engage his aesthetic sensibilities because its subject and style 
is, for him, morally objectionable.  When Lucy finally announces her presence to Dr. 
John and joins him, they discuss various artworks in the gallery, including the 
Cleopatra.  Lucy admires his unpretentious manner of aesthetic discourse:  “without 
pretending to be a connoisseur, he always spoke his thought, and that was sure to be 
fresh: very often it was also just and pithy” (282).  Still, that Dr. John always speaks 
his mind but is only very often “just” in his evaluations leaves open the possibility that 
even the theoretic viewer has a blind-spot, a particular point on which his judgments 
are compromised by certain prejudices.  His evaluation of the Cleopatra hints at what 
that prejudice might be:  “Pooh! . . . My mother is a better-looking woman.  I heard 
some French fops, yonder, designating her as ‘le type du voluptueux;’ I can only say, 
‘le voluptueux’ is little to my liking.  Compare that mulatto to Ginerva!” (282)  If Dr. 
John’s insensibility to the Cleopatra is “fresh”—setting him apart from the other 
viewers in the museum—it nevertheless is underwritten by a rather (f)rigid set of 
beliefs and principles.  His last statement is also unconsciously ironic; Ginerva, in 
spite of her pale and slim English beauty, is a heartless flirt who has been relentlessly 
teasing Dr. John while encouraging the attentions of de Hamal, making her more akin 
to the Cleopatra than the “graceful angel” to which the doctor has previously 
compared her (222).  Dr. John’s inability to compare Ginevra and “that mulatto” (a 
descriptor freezing with ugly contempt) falls short of Lucy’s perspicacity in at least 
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one respect: he is blind to how this aesthetic encounter visually reproduces the love 
triangle in which he occupies one anguished corner. 
In the strange spatial and perspectival triangulation of the Cleopatra, de Hamal, 
and Bretton, Lucy’s (and Brontë’s) sympathies clearly are with Dr. John, but this 
radically relativistic narrative reveals the limitations of even his perspective: it puts 
him, as it were, in a narrative frame.  This framing of Dr. John in the Cleopatra chapter 
has a precedent in Lucy’s only other recorded encounter with an art object: a 
childhood encounter with a portrait of Bretton as a youth, when he was simply known 
to her as “Graham.”  Coming across the picture a second time when she crosses paths 
with Dr. John in Villette, Lucy recalls that the  
portrait used to hang in the breakfast-room, over the mantel-place: somewhat 
too high, as I thought. I well remember how I used to mount a music-stool for 
the purpose of unhooking it, holding it in my hand, and searching into those 
bonny wells of eyes, whose glance under their hazel lashes seemed like a 
penciled laugh; and well I liked to note the colouring of the cheek, and the 
expression of the mouth. I hardly believed fancy could improve on the curve of 
that mouth, or of the chin; even my ignorance knew that both were beautiful, 
and pondered, perplexed over this doubt: ‘How it was that what charmed so 
much, could at the same time so deeply pain? (243) 
That Lucy finds in the “bonny wells” of the portrait’s eyes a “glance” is yet another 
example of Brontë’s beliefs that the viewing subject is never outside of the boundaries 
of surveillance and that every attempt to perceive something always also reveals 
something of oneself.  The beauty attributed to the mouth is also quite telling, as it 
seems to signify that “whatever sentiment met him in form too facile, his lips 
menaced, beautifully but surely, caprice and light esteem” (243).  What is truly 
beautiful in Brontë’s system of aesthetics, this description suggests, is also what is 
most menacing, in that it stands in judgment of whatever “sentiment” or consciousness 
chooses to meet it.  To engage in aesthetic contemplation is to commit oneself to a 
particular perspective, thereby situating oneself within a larger socio-ideological 
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framework.  Brontë’s depiction of museum-space attempts to manifest this framework 
through her heroine’s performative anatomizing of the internal and external factors 
that inform aesthetic judgment.  In the characters of M. Paul Emanuel, Colonel de 
Hamal, and Graham Bretton, Brontë showcases different incarnations of a largely 
Ruskinian conception of self-conscious spectatorship but also insists upon what these 
characters and Ruskin himself fail to acknowledge: the material and institutional 
forces that contextualize and, to some degree, determine what the viewer is capable of 
taking from aesthetic encounter.   
In many ways, Lucy’s question to herself regarding Graham’s portrait—How it 
was that what charmed so much, could at the same time so deeply pain?—gets to the 
heart of what distinguishes Brontë from Ruskin and Brontë’s heroine from the other 
viewers with whom she both openly and secretly interacts throughout her experience 
at the gallery.  Lucy’s appreciation of Graham’s portrait is tempered by an unhappy 
semi-awareness of the circumstances surrounding and shaping that appreciation.  As 
she acknowledges of the portrait, “any romantic little school-girl might almost have 
loved [it] in its frame” (243); she, at that time, is just one such romantic little school-
girl, and to love it uncritically, without distance and without consciousness of one’s 
circumstances, is to remain willfully blind to the shaping influences of the outside 
world.  Even the most transcendent of aesthetic experiences emerges from the crucible 
of context, and by choosing a relativistic independence of gaze, Lucy is able to see 
outside the frame of the aesthetic system, consequently gaining for herself the painful 
knowledge of her own perceptual limitations that the Ruskinian aesthete has forgotten 
to remember. 
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CHAPTER 3.  
“A Difficult Kind of Shorthand”:  An Aesthetic Translation of History in George 
Eliot’s Middlemarch 
When Villette was published in 1853, George Eliot could not adequately 
express her enthusiasm for the novel without the liberal use of exclamation points: 
“Villette! Villette!  Have you read it? . . . It is a still more wonderful book than Jane 
Eyre.  There is something almost preternatural in its power.”57  Though pertaining to 
the novel as a whole, Eliot’s celebration of Villette’s “almost preternatural power” also 
gestures towards one particular aspect of that text: its fascination with a realm of 
experience itself in some ways “beyond nature”—that of aesthetic affect.  Brontë’s 
narrative representation of a Ruskinian conception of spectatorship (the focus of the 
previous chapter) strives to demystify the museum experience, particularly the power 
of the space to shape viewers’ responses to the art on display.  In revealing the 
complexity of cultural scripts informing even the most banal of aesthetic encounters, 
Villette situates individual acts of perception within a broader social context, deriving 
a strange energy from its heroine’s combative—if largely interiorized—engagements 
with art works and other viewers.   
George Eliot’s fascination with Villette and with that novel’s engagement with 
aesthetic matters offers a useful point of entry into Middlemarch (1871-72, 1874), 
long regarded as an exemplar of Victorian realism.  As Harry Shaw has argued, one of 
the great myths of literary realism is that its adherents trafficked in “transparent 
representation,” offering the reader unmediated access into the historical moment 
being represented.58  That Middlemarch’s sprawling, multi-threaded narrative thwarts 
                                                 
57 George Eliot, “GE to Mrs. Charles Bray,” 15 February [1853], The George Eliot Letters, ed. Gordon 
Haight, Vol. 2 (New Haven: Yale UP, 1954) 87. 
58 Harry Shaw, Narrating Reality: Austen, Scott, Eliot (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1999) 38-39. 
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this expectation complicates its reception history, leading to comments like Henry 
James’s: 
In spite of these faults . . . [Middlemarch] remains a very splendid 
performance.  It sets the limit, we think, to the development of the old-
fashioned English novel.  Its diffuseness, on which we have touched, makes it 
too copious a dose of pure fiction.  If we write novels so, how shall we write 
history?59 
Putting aside the irony of the author of The Golden Bowl criticizing another for the 
copiousness of a fictional dosage, the “diffuseness” that he identifies as a structural 
flaw in the novel might also be read as a deliberate narrative strategy, one that (as with 
Villette) has its roots in nineteenth-century aesthetic theory and finds expression in the 
performative space of the museum.  It is a strategy that has everything to do with the 
subtitle of Eliot’s novel—“a study of provincial life,” not, significantly, a study of 
provincial lives or a study of a provincial life.  Rather, in Middlemarch, George Eliot 
attempts to capture the quiddity of a particular moment—a market town in the 
Midlands in the 1830s, just prior to the Reform Bill—through a dissemination of 
perspectives, each one providing a fragmentary glimpse of the complete historical 
picture.  For James, this method of storytelling is problematic because it seems more 
akin to the writing of history than the writing of fiction.  Yet perhaps Eliot was trying 
to blur this categorical distinction by substituting for a focused and focalized 
imaginative reflection on an era more diffusive refractions of one.   
If Middlemarch refracts rather than reflects history through the lens of 
narrative, has Eliot (as James supposes) sacrificed some fundamental artistic principle 
for the sake of historical veracity?  That Eliot herself thought otherwise can be 
inferred from her review of Ruskin’s Modern Painters, in which she states that 
                                                 
59 Henry James, unsigned review of Middlemarch, by George Eliot, Galaxy, XV March 1873: 428. 
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[t]he aim of Art, in depicting any natural object, is to produce in the mind 
analogous emotions to those produced by the object itself; but as with all our 
skill and care we cannot imitate it exactly, this aim is not attained by 
transcribing, but by translating it into the language of Art.60 
Building off Ruskin, Eliot’s description of the artistic process intriguingly reframes 
the former’s insistence that the artist must “go to nature.”61  As Eliot explains it, the 
“aim of Art” in the depiction of some real object is to engender in the viewer feelings 
that are structurally similar to those evoked by the object itself.  But because an object 
can never be imitated “exactly” by the artist, regardless of “skill and care,” the 
representation cannot work on the sensibilities of the viewer in the same way as does 
the object.  Rather, success in artistic representation depends on clearly recognizing 
the emotions that the object produces and finding an alternate means of 
communicating those emotions to others.  With transcription, one is a copyist, 
reproducing the form as faithfully as possible.  Translation, though, transfers the 
substance or content of the thing from its native medium into another, with the goal of 
communicating what was formerly incomprehensible to a particular audience.  
Transcription is a process of recording, but translation is a mode of communication.  
This difference would have been important to Eliot, herself a translator of Strauss, 
Feuerbach, and Spinoza, and when she describes Art as itself a language, she has a 
greater sense than most writers of the implications of such a claim.  To take Eliot’s 
argument one step farther, if Art is a language into which certain universal feelings are 
translated, then those whose aesthetic experiences allow them to “read” it are, like the 
artist, in possession of an idiom that has wholly to do with individual and collective 
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impressions.  Also, if art objects, like words, are seen as signifiers for otherwise 
indescribable emotional signifieds, then they can be used to make visible and 
intelligible to oneself and to others what otherwise would remain an untranslatable 
aspect of subjective experience.   
In Middlemarch, the city of Rome and, more specifically, the Papal collection 
of ancient sculpture housed in the Vatican offer vehicles for exploring the narrative 
possibilities of the language of Art.  The honeymoon destination of the novel’s 
heiress-heroine, Dorothea Brooke, and her husband, the scholar Edward Casaubon, 
Rome provides a museum-like space in which to stage the couple’s growing 
recognition of their intrinsic incompatibility, which is brought home through a series 
of contrasting aesthetic encounters.  For Casaubon, aesthetic experience presents 
another opportunity for demonstrating erudition; his “way of commenting on the 
strangely impressive objects around them” is to repeat accepted opinions culled from 
guidebooks, delivering these pronouncements “in a measured official tone, as of a 
clergyman reading according to the rubric.”62  Set against this pedantic deference to 
authority—a deference that all but extinguishes affect—Dorothea’s unschooled but 
passionate grapplings with the language of the great works of art she encounters 
suggest an innate responsiveness to and interest in these sorts of experiences, which 
will increasingly put her at odds with her husband.  In this way, Rome and its 
community of would-be aesthetes serve as backdrop, audience, and catalyst for 
Dorothea’s developing aesthetic sensibilities and her burgeoning awareness of her 
own deep unhappiness in her new marriage.  The only section of the novel not set in or 
near the Midlands town of Middlemarch, Rome (Book II: Old and Young, Ch. XIX-
XXII) offers an experiment into how the discourse of art might be used to represent 
both personal and more collective moments of change.  In her characters’ 
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engagements with art culture, Eliot personalizes and dramatizes some of the major 
aesthetic theories and debates of the day, in the process demonstrating how aesthetic 
experience provides a means of giving shape and expression to previously indefinable 
emotions, ideas and desires.  The scenes of aesthetic engagement in this Roman 
interlude also serve as an analogue to the structuring process of the novel itself, 
bringing into focus Eliot’s understanding of how the novel goes about assembling 
perspectival fragments in order to refract the broader historical picture, the “life” of 
which Middlemarch announces itself a study.  Competing points of view on the same 
art object recreate in miniature the diffusion of storylines that James critiqued in 
Middlemarch, a diffusion that follows from Eliot’s conception of how meaning is 
translated and disseminated through the dynamic exchange between viewer and object 
in the moment of aesthetic encounter.  
The scene in the Vatican Museum which opens the Rome chapters is one of the 
more exhaustively dissected in Eliot scholarship.  Joseph Wiesenfarth, Hugh 
Witemeyer, and more recently, Abigail Rischin all have considered how this episode 
reflects Eliot’s efforts to incorporate her knowledge of the visual arts into the fabric of 
the narrative.63  When Casaubon leaves Dorothea behind in the statue galleries, she 
becomes the unwitting object of attention of two aesthetes, her husband’s cousin and 
ward, the young Englishman-abroad, Will Ladislaw, and the German pseudo-
Nazarene painter, Adolf Naumann, whose eye is captivated by Dorothea’s pose of 
“brooding abstraction.”  Naumann’s ecstatic descriptions of her as a potential model 
raises the proprietary ire of the poetical Ladislaw, who argues that “[y]our painting 
and Plastik are poor stuff . . . Language is a finer medium” (178).  Though lasting only 
a moment (Dorothea becomes conscious of the presence of “the two strangers” and 
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leaves the room), the “picture” she unconsciously creates, her figure set against the 
backdrop of the gallery, is the indirect cause of everything that subsequently unfolds 
in Rome, most importantly her reacquaintance with Ladislaw, who, in turn, causes her 
to recognize her husband’s emotional and intellectual impotence.  In this brief 
narrative framing of Dorothea, Eliot creates a scenario structured around and through 
acts of viewership.  The sculpture gallery provides a frame within which the 
admiration of Ladislaw and Naumann transforms her from an attractive woman into an 
aesthetic object, as Eliot’s description suggests: 
the two figures passed lightly along by the Meleager towards the hall where the 
reclining Ariadne, then called the Cleopatra, lies in the marble voluptuousness 
of her beauty, the drapery folding around her with a petal-like ease and 
tenderness. They were just in time to see another figure standing against the 
pedestal near the reclining marble: a breathing blooming girl, whose form, not 
shamed by the Ariadne, was clad in Quakerish gray drapery . . . one beautiful 
ungloved hand pillowed her cheek. (176) 
Past the statue of Meleager and towards the room containing the “Ariadne, then . . . 
Cleopatra,” the two friends’ movements are charted in relation to widely-known works 
of ancient sculpture, underscoring the fact that within the space of the museum, the 
ostensible purpose of all movement is to change the perspective of viewing and the 
subject being viewed.  As the last of the objects sighted and described—an “object” all 
the more so because she is first identified as simply “another figure”—Dorothea is 
swept up in the aestheticizing gaze directed towards the Ariadne/Cleopatra.  The 
seamlessness of tone as the focus shifts from the stone woman to the real one suggests 
that the viewers have integrated them both into the same evaluative framework.  As 
Rischin has noted, calling Dorothea’s body a “form” and her clothing “drapery” 
renders her an empty body with artistically arranged clothing, as empty of 
consciousness and as carefully posed as the piece of “marble voluptuousness” she 
stands next to.  More subtly, the perceived connection between the reclining figure and 
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Dorothea extends even to the level of connotation; the “petal-like ease” of cloth over 
body in the Ariadne/Cleopatra has a flower-like delicacy also conveyed by the 
“blooming, breathing” figure of Dorothea, the statue’s “reclining” posture a 
slumberous listlessness also conveyed by Dorothea’s hand “pillowed” on her cheek.  
The men are also enthralled by what Michael Fried would call the “absorption” of the 
two figures, the sculpture (in Naumann’s words) depicting “antique beauty . . . 
arrested in the complete contentment of its sensuous perfection” and Dorothea with 
“her large eyes . . . fixed dreamily on a streak of sunlight which fell across the floor” 
(176).  In both figures, the raptness of their pose is read as an invitation to the gaze; 
self-absorption is given an erotic charge in virtue of the fact that it allows the viewer 
to openly and unabashedly objectify the figure before him.   
If the theory behind and layout of the museum encourages a generally 
objectifying perspective from its visitors, as Eliot suggests, this perspective is 
reinforced by the superfluity of symbolism that the educated viewer is able to derive 
from and read into the art object.  Naumann’s appreciation of Dorothea also stems 
from the “fine bit of antithesis” that he sees her offering to what in the 1830s was still 
thought to be a representation of the dying Cleopatra.64  While the Cleopatra is an 
image of ancient, pagan beauty, “not corpse-like even in death,” Dorothea appears to 
him as “beauty in its breathing life, with the consciousness of Christian centuries in its 
bosom” (176).  Naumann’s familiarity with the story of Cleopatra and (as in the 
previous section) the commonly-held associations of the Egyptian queen with a kind 
of exotic, dangerously seductive carnality underwrites his reading of the scene before 
                                                 
64 It is generally accepted that Adolf Naumann is mainly modeled on the Nazarene painter Johann 
Friedrich Overbeck, whose Roman studio Eliot visited in 1860.  Precursors to the Pre-Raphaelites, the 
Nazarenes were similarly interested in bringing  back a pre-High-Renaissance simplicity and vividness 
of color, and their paintings were full of spiritual symbolism and often sought to convey complex 
religious and historical narratives.  I would also make the observation that Naumann’s first name could 
be a tribute to Adolf Stahr, the German art historian whose book Torso takes its title from the statue of 
the Belvedere Torso, mentioned at the beginning of Chapter XIX, and contains a discussion on the 
history of the Ariadne/Cleopatra. 
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him, as does his investment in certain historical narratives.  Naumann’s interpretation 
of the picturesque configuration of woman and statue seems a means of validating a 
rather self-serving story of historical change, the transition of Western civilization 
from the classical era to the Christian, from an artistic tradition characterized by a 
sensuous preoccupation with form to one concerned with the spiritual meaning of the 
image.  When he next goes on, in a particularly Hegelian maneuver, to merge the 
thesis of the Cleopatra with the antithesis of Dorothea into a pictorial synthesis—
describing a painting he might do of Dorothea alone as “antique form animated by 
Christian sentiment—a sort of Christian Antigone—sensuous force controlled by 
spiritual passion,” he collapses the already strained allegory of aesthetic conflict into 
one overfull symbolic feminine receptacle.  In Naumann’s imagined painting of 
Dorothea, she is the embodiment and subject par excellence of the manner of art that 
he has devoted himself to creating. 
Ladislaw’s sarcastic response illuminates the subtext of Naumann’s proposed 
portrait, mocking the painter for his unstated assumption that the portrait would be 
“the chief outcome of her existence—the divinity passing into higher completeness 
and all but exhausted in the act of covering [his] bit of canvas” (177).  Eliot represents 
Will as savvy enough to play the Feuerbach to Naumann’s Hegel—pointing out to him 
how the belief that “the universe is straining towards the obscure significance of your 
picture” is nothing more than absurd projection of Naumann’s own egotism and need 
for divine justification for his desire to paint.65  Yet, Ladislaw’s critique of Naumann 
ultimately does not seek to discredit this belief so much as to underscore the unfitness 
of the painter’s chosen medium of expression.  Claiming that Naumann “want[s] to 
                                                 
65 Eliot’s translation of Feuerbach’s Das Wesen des Christentums (The Essence of Christianity, trans. 
1853) might have informed this exchange between Naumann and Ladislaw, in the same way that their 
subsequent discussion is structured around Lessing’s Laokoön. 
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express too much with [his] painting,” he then goes to label this problem as one 
inherent to painting as an art form:  
After all, the true seeing is within; and painting stares at you with an insistent 
imperfection.  I feel that especially about representations of women.  As if a 
woman were a mere coloured superficies! You must wait for movement and 
tone . . . they change from moment to moment.—This woman . . . how would 
you paint her voice, pray? But her voice is much diviner than anything you 
have seen of her.” (178) 
This speech develops the chapter’s insistent allusion to Lessing’s Laokoön: An Essay 
on the Limits of Painting and Poetry [1766, trans. 1836].  Arguing against an overly 
literal understanding of ut pictura poesis, Lessing differentiates the representational 
strategies of painting from poetry, painting unfolding spatially and poetry temporally.  
George Eliot herself reviewed Laokoön in 1856 for the Westminster Review, and her 
approving observation therein of Lessing’s “masterly distinction” between “the 
materials wherewith the poet and the painter or sculptor respectively work” and “their 
mode of appeal to the mind” takes on a rather pugilistic incarnation in Naumann and 
Ladislaw’s debate, as they engage in a game of artistic one-upmanship as to which 
method of presentation is more accurately expressive.66  The eloquence of each 
character has been read to signify the author’s endorsement of opposing positions, 
with Witemeyer finding that “the novel supports Will’s view of the limitations of 
painting” and Rischin averring that “Eliot undercuts rather than supports her 
character’s critique of the visual arts.”67   
That both readings can be strongly defended reveals a crucial element of 
Eliot’s ethics of narrative:  she must adequately and fairly represent even theoretical 
positions which she does not share.  Moreover, Eliot’s efforts here are not 
                                                 
66 George Eliot, “Belles Lettres,” Westminster Review 66, October 1856, re-published in A Writer's 
Notebook, 1854-1879, and Uncollected Writings 285.  The Westminster Review is the same periodical 
that later would publish anonymously Pater’s articles, “Coleridge’s Writings” (1866) and 
“Winckelmann” (1867), a point of note when considering the following chapter. 
67 Witemeyer 42; Rischin 1121. 
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programmatic; striving to clearly articulate both sides of the argument, she shows 
herself interested less in defending any particular aesthetic concept than in using these 
concepts to broaden the scope of her fiction, illuminating the ways in which even 
small personal dramas are both informed by and evocative of larger philosophical and 
cultural debates.  In this scene, some of these influences are more obvious, at least to a 
fairly knowledgeable reader.  For example, Ladislaw and Naumann begin to argue the 
merits of the verbal and visual arts in the Vatican museum, where the statue of 
Laocoön is housed, linking their conversation to the unmentioned Lessing, whose 
theories become all the more suggestive for being only indirectly referenced.  Other 
influences take us not just outside the text but to other points within it.  Will’s sense of 
the divine quality of Dorothea’s voice—a divinity whose temporal quality can only be 
conveyed through poetry—stems from his first impression from many months 
previously that her voice “was like the voice of a soul that had once lived in an 
Aeolian harp” (90).  The harp being one of the major symbols of the Romantic 
movement in which Ladislaw is an ardent participant, his description also evokes more 
specifically Coleridge’s poem “The Aeolian Harp” (1795), wherein the poet ponders 
the nature of creation, both divine and human: 
 And what if all of animated nature 
Be but organic Harps diversly fram'd, 
That tremble into thought, as o'er them sweeps 
Plastic and vast, one intellectual breeze, 
At once the Soul of each, and God of all ? (44-48) 
An instrument played upon by Nature itself, Coleridge’s Aeolian harp is an analogue 
for the mind of the poet, whose inspiration is fitfully evoked from a divine presence 
immanent in the world.  Will’s two descriptions of Dorothea’s voice echo aspects of 
this poetic image in a revealing way.  Ladislaw’s second reference to this “divine” 
voice is part of a broader challenge to Naumann—an argument not against the 
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painter’s objectifying gaze but on behalf of a different method of objectification.  In 
his view, visual “representations of women” are always inadequate because, in their 
“tone and movement,” women “change from moment to moment.”  Like the 
intermittent “plastic” “intellectual breeze” of which Coleridge speaks, women, to 
Ladislaw, are dynamic forces that can only be truthfully rendered in the verbal 
medium of poetry.  Thus, when looking back to Will’s earlier description of 
Dorothea’s voice—not as the Aeolian harp itself but as the “soul” that once inhabited 
it—it becomes clear that from the beginning he thinks of her as an object or instrument 
of inspiration.  For Ladislaw, a painting can never fully convey the complexity of 
one’s impression; it is thus always a failure, and the artist’s awareness of failure is 
projected onto the object, which takes on an accusing and defiant look, “staring at [its 
creator] with an insistent imperfection” (178).  Poetry, though, channels the inspiring 
object through the consciousness of the poet, making the finished product a testament 
to the transformative powers of the imagination.  Ladislaw would substitute 
Naumann’s blank canvas for a lute, but, as Eliot’s chain of buried allusions suggests, 
both men perceive the scene before them as one which calls for the shaping 
consciousness of the artist to bring it to a more meaningful state of being. 
In Naumann and Ladislaw’s hectic and competitive aestheticizing of Dorothea 
against the pedestal of the Ariadne/Cleopatra, the surfeit of symbolism and 
significance that they seek to embody in these female forms exemplifies Kathy 
Psomiades’s argument that “femininity” works within nineteenth-century aestheticism 
as a “signifying system” which mediates between the realms of art and culture.68  
Certainly, as Eliot demonstrates in this scene, the painter and the would-be poet are 
supported by a long-standing aesthetic tradition of trafficking in the bodies of 
beautiful women, Cleopatra, Ariadne, the Madonna, and Antigone, just to name a few.  
                                                 
68 Kathy Psomiades, Beauty’s Body: Femininity and Representation in British Aestheticism (Stanford: 
Stanford UP, 1997) 2-3. 
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Yet if this net of intertextual references illustrates the ways in which real people and 
real experiences are put in the service of the aesthetic, it also shows how aesthetic 
experiences serve to make things more real to people, the relation between viewer and 
art object functioning as a model for other, more social forms of interaction.  Ladislaw 
feels the stirrings of romantic feeling towards Dorothea, for instance, only after he is 
able to view her with a modicum of aesthetic detachment—to think about their 
relationship as that of an unattainable female object to a yearning masculine subject.  
Though he denies even the possibility of capturing the scene before him in a visual 
medium, the act of viewing it aesthetically allows him to recognize that “something 
had happened with him in regard to” Dorothea (178).  As a detached spectator, 
Ladislaw finds a means of articulating a previously unavowed desire for his cousin’s 
wife.  From an aesthetic perspective, he can admire Dorothea in a way that would 
otherwise be unseemly—even, given Casaubon’s patronage, treacherous.   
Of course, even if Will worships Dorothea with “Faith that inly feels” (to again 
quote Coleridge), it is almost impossible to distinguish his admiration of the actual 
woman from her power to embody his own deeply-held aesthetic convictions.  While 
different from Naumann’s, Ladislaw’s habit of viewing displays a kind of blindness 
that comes from desiring to see into the object in order to use it as a means of inspiring 
emotion and creativity.  In a later conversation with Dorothea, Ladislaw describes the 
“poet” as having  
a soul so quick to discern that no shade of quality escapes it, and so quick to 
feel, that discernment is but a hand playing with finely ordered variety on the 
chords of emotion—a soul in which knowledge passes instantaneously into 
feeling, and feeling flashes back as a new organ of knowledge. (202-203) 
As Dorothea observes, this tribute to the poet rather curiously “leave[s] out the 
poems,” the artifacts that are supposed to result from the world-soul wafting over the 
poet’s harp-like sensibilities.  Will’s omission here fits a larger pattern; though he 
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professes to desire a vocation in the arts, he evinces very little interest in actually 
creating or producing anything.  For him, artistry is a means to sensibility, not the 
other way around.  Besides, if his comment to Dorothea—that she herself “[is] a 
poem . . . what makes up the poet’s consciousness in his best moods”—reflects what 
he truly believes, he has no reason to write poetry, the world having already 
thoughtfully provided an embodiment of all he might otherwise been motivated to 
express.  In this way, Will’s theory of poetry displays a sense of entitlement not all 
that different from Naumann’s.  Eliot underscores the solipsistic bent to Will’s 
aestheticism by linking it to his broader worldview:  “There are characters which are 
continually creating collisions and nodes for themselves in dramas which nobody is 
prepared to act with them.  Their susceptibilities will clash against objects that remain 
innocently quiet” (178).  This somewhat pitying commentary on Ladislaw’s 
“susceptibilities” has the curious effect of casting back over the narrative scene just 
staged with a distancing, aestheticizing gaze.  While Ladislaw is the ostensible subject 
of the observation, Eliot’s description of his character as a type speaks to the general 
situation outlined in this chapter, specifically to the strange clash of perspectives 
between Naumann and Ladislaw, at the center of which collision is the “innocently 
quiet” Dorothea.   
The isolated viewer, trapped in an internal drama of his own making, 
transforms objects of vision into a coherent picture by means of his framing 
perspective.  Eliot works to situate the pictures of Ladislaw and Naumann within the 
narrative frame of intellectual history, replicating in miniature the contemporary 
cultural debates which were elsewhere being waged on a much grander scale.  The 
spatial triangulation of the two aesthetes and their chosen object allows Eliot to map 
the process by which hermeneutic conflicts [differences in theories of interpretation] 
lead to perceptual differences [in how people actually see].  The scene offers no overt 
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drama; the dispute never escalates into a confrontation that requires resolution, nor do 
the two men intrude upon the reverie of the woman they are admiring.  Yet the 
narrative implications are quietly momentous, especially in the case of the third 
viewer: the beautiful object otherwise known as Dorothea Casaubon.  It is not until the 
end of the next chapter that Eliot returns to the Vatican museum and refers once more 
to Dorothea “in that brooding abstraction which made her pose remarkable.”  In this 
instance, though, instead of focusing on how Dorothea is seen by others, the emphasis 
is shifted to what Dorothea herself both sees and does not see at that particular 
moment: 
She did not really see the streak of sunlight on the floor more than she saw the 
statues: she was inwardly seeing the light of years to come in her own home 
and over English fields and elms and hedge-bordered highroads; and feeling 
that the way in which they might be filled with joyful devotedness was not so 
clear to her as it might have been. (187) 
On the one hand, Dorothea’s experience in the sculpture gallery bears little 
resemblance to the more obvious acts of aesthetic appreciation by her two admirers.  
She lacks both the focus and the knowledge of her surroundings necessary to organize 
the scene before her into a meaningful tableau.  Nevertheless, as for Ladislaw and 
Naumann, the moment in the gallery is a catalyst of sorts for Dorothea, inspiring a 
coming-to-awareness that is the hallmark of Eliot’s understanding of aesthetic 
experience.  As the substance of Dorothea’s vision makes clear, though, this newfound 
awareness is hardly epiphanic.  It is the culmination of a protracted process of 
aesthetic awakening, a process that began early in the novel, as Dorothea and her sister 
Celia sorted through her dead mother’s jewels and she was struck by another 
significant gleam of light. 
In this earlier scene, Dorothea—with the ascetic fervor that underwrites many 
of her decisions—means to renounce her claim to all of her mother’s jewelry until, 
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opening a ring box, she sees “a fine emerald with diamonds, and just then the sun 
passing beyond a cloud sent a bright gleam over the table” (39).  Captivated by the 
hard, gem-like flame of the emerald, Dorothea is charged by “a new current of feeling, 
as sudden as the gleam.”69  The surprising burst of sensuous pleasure at the beauty of 
the gemstones reveals Dorothea’s relative ignorance of such experiences.  Lacking an 
aesthetic vocabulary or frame of reference, she first tries to “justify her delight in the 
colors” by putting it in a religious context, recalling the use of gems as “spiritual 
emblems” in St. John’s description of the New Jerusalem.  Yet even this merging of 
the sensuous and the spiritual does not fully assuage Dorothea’s puritanical social 
conscience, and she is guilt-stricken by the thought of “what miserable men find such 
things, and work at them, and sell them” (39).  Her unsuccessful attempts to translate 
aesthetic response into religious and social registers only underscore Dorothea’s 
inability to account for individual, subjective experience within her current world 
view.  The language she uses to explain the beauty of what she sees further exposes 
this psychological blind spot; not “aesthetic” so much as “synaesthetic,” Dorothea first 
observes “how deeply colors seem to penetrate one, like scent” and then resolves to 
“often hav[e] them by her, to feed her eye at these little fountains of pure color” (39).  
She articulates intense visual experience in olfactory and gustatory terms, and, in spite 
of her delight in the stone’s “color,” she never mentions the actual green hue of the 
emerald.  In these small details, Eliot conveys Dorothea’s early unfamiliarity with the 
aesthetic discourse of “I” and “eye.”  Though her reaction to the “bright gleam” shows 
an innate responsiveness to beauty, Dorothea’s tendency to think in universals, to 
“turn[] all her small allowance of knowledge into principles,” has turned her gaze 
                                                 
69 I would argue for reading this description of Dorothea’s response to the emerald as very possibly an 
allusion or response to that famous phrase from Pater’s “Poems by William Morris,” later republished 
as “The Conclusion” in Studies in the History of the Renaissance (1st ed., 1873).  Since, like his two 
earlier essays, “Poems by William Morris” (Oct. 1868) was published anonymously in The Westminster 
Review, it is quite likely, I think, that Eliot would have read it and, given her interest in the visual arts 
and the Pre-Raphaelites more specifically, would have given it some attention. 
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outward (to the world) and upward (to heaven), leaving her unequipped for moments 
requiring introspection (180).  The deep discomfort that Dorothea evidences at the 
idea of wearing jewelry in company—for, as she says, if she did, she would “feel as if 
[she] had been pirouetting” (38)—is part and parcel with a more general discomfort 
with situations that encourage a preoccupation with self.   
Dorothea’s encounter with the emerald is the first of a series of aesthetic 
encounters, all of which serve to rouse in Dorothea an intensifying awareness of her 
own turbulent inner life.  That this development begins with light refracting through a 
gemstone might seem a minor point, but it is worth mentioning that in the nineteenth-
century jewelry—especially carved stones like cameos—was often considered among 
the plastic arts.  Eliot’s Middlemarch notebooks contain references to C.W. King’s 
book Antique Gems (1866), which argues for considering the cutting and engraving of 
gemstones as a fitting subject for the British connoisseur, it being “one department of 
art in which the ancients particularly excelled.”70  More importantly, though, the 
image of “a bright gleam” against a dark surface—of the chiaroscuro disposition of 
light and shade--is picked up again and again by Eliot in the illustration of Dorothea’s 
later attempts to make sense of her impressions.  It is also an image that has a 
precedent in Ruskin’s Modern Painters; in a section titled “On the Truth of Color,” 
Ruskin designates “color” the “least important feature of nature” and says of his hero, 
J.M.W. Turner, that though “he paints in color . . . he thinks in light and shade, and 
were it necessary, rather than lose one line of his forms, or one ray of sunshine would, 
I apprehend, be content to paint in black and white to the end of his life.”71  The 
relative insignificance of color in Ruskin’s estimation can be tied to his understanding 
                                                 
70 Rev. C.W. King, Antique Gems: Their Origins, Uses, and Values (London: John Murray, 1866) iii.  
Wiesenfarth mentions King in his book, especially as regarding the symbolism of emeralds, their 
association with the healing of impaired vision. 
71 John Ruskin, Modern Painters, Volume II, Section II, Chapter II (Boston: Aldine Book Publishing, 
190?) 276-277. 
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of the function of beautiful objects: color is merely decorative, adding a sensuous 
pleasure to the viewing experience; light and shade, though, give clarity and 
intelligibility to the image and (to return to an earlier point) allow the viewer to grasp 
the substance of the artist’s affective “translation.”   
In what seems another application of a Ruskinian concept, the interplay of 
brightness and shadow becomes a dominant motif for the “current of feeling” that 
opens in Dorothea upon seeing light refracting through an emerald.  This new emotive 
channel is, in fact, a mode of perception that, as with Turner, involves “think[ing] in 
light and shade.”  At the novel’s beginning, Eliot stresses Dorothea’s aesthetic 
inexperience; meeting Ladislaw for the first time, Dorothea professes herself unable to 
judge his sketch of the surrounding landscape, as she cannot “see the beauty of those 
pictures which you [her uncle] claim are so much praised.”  She goes on to say, “They 
are a language I do not understand. I suppose there is some relation between pictures 
and nature which I am too ignorant to feel” (90).  This ignorance, though, is not 
constitutional but situational, which is why Dorothea’s honeymoon trip to Rome is so 
important.  Formerly deprived of a traditional aesthetic education—except, as Eliot 
sarcastically mentions, in “art chiefly of the hand-screen sort” (180)—Dorothea’s 
Roman holiday doubles as an immersion course in the language of art.   
Yet what makes Rome the ideal spot for the cultivation of an aesthetic 
sensibility is also what threatens to makes such an enterprise impossible.  Rome is “the 
city of visible history, where the past of the whole hemisphere seems to be moving in 
funereal procession with strange ancestral images and trophies gathered from afar” 
(179, emphasis mine).  Almost buried under a superabundance of unearthed artworks 
and artifacts, the “Imperial and Papal city” Dorothea encounters offers an 
overwhelming display of objects from different eras, each the embodiment of what 
was valued at the moment of its creation.  The close spatial proximity of what 
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temporally spanned centuries is what renders history “visible” in Rome, but it is a 
sight, Eliot suggests, that is easily borne only by two distinct types of visitors.  For one 
of these types, Rome promises access to a narrative of Western culture, but only to the 
viewer already skilled enough to read it.  This visitor—the aesthete—is capable of 
“look[ing] at Rome with the quickening power of knowledge which breathes a 
growing soul into all historic shape, and traces out suppressed transitions which unite 
all contrasts” (179).  Removed from the Roman experience by a sense of themselves 
as refined spectators, these individuals stand in judgment outside the historical pageant 
they read in the scene before them.  A very different visitor is one for whom a lack of 
knowledge is irrelevant; in the words of the narrator, “the weight of unintelligible 
Rome might lie easily on [these] bright nymphs” as for them the spectacle of the past 
only “form[s] a background for a brilliant picnic of Anglo-foreign society” (180).  
Like their mythological predecessors, these mortal nymphs have no desire for 
historical consciousness.  The Rome they experience is merely a picturesque 
landscape that adds a deliberate piquancy to their ordinary activities.   
Though diametrically opposed, these two types of visitors—one the 
quintessential spectator, the other the ideal object—are both insulated from the 
unsettling and uncanny aspects of the Roman experience by the distanced and 
impersonal nature of their respective perspectives.  One finds in the city confirmation 
of a particular philosophy of history while the other finds mere scenery for the staging 
of personal dramas.  Both of these outlooks afford a certain degree of security against 
the “gigantic broken revelations” that confront a susceptible viewer who comes to 
Rome seeking answers to questions both personal and universal, a viewer like 
Dorothea: 
Dorothea had no such defence against deep impressions.  Ruins and basilicas, 
palaces and colossi, set in the midst of a sordid present . . . the dimmer yet 
eager Titanic life gazing and struggling on walls and ceilings; the long vistas of 
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white forms whose marble eyes seemed to hold the monotonous light of an 
alien world: all this vast wreck of ambitious ideals . . . at first jarred her as with 
an electric shock, and then urged themselves on her with that ache belonging to 
a glut of confused ideas which check the flow of emotion. (180) 
The innate receptiveness to beauty that engendered Dorothea’s rapturous moment with 
the emerald is also what renders her defenseless against the overpowering Roman 
scene.  As Eliot’s syntax underscores, her heroine experiences Rome as of a chaotic 
piling-up of confusing and conflicting impressions.  A vast dust-heap of historical 
fragments, Rome overwhelms Dorothea with its sheer abundance of things on which 
“to feed her eye.”  Moreover, unlike the “pure fountain of color” which awakens 
Dorothea’s aesthetic sensibilities, Rome offers a beauty corrupted by context; its 
myriad antiquities are set against a “sordid present,” a contrast that speaks not to the 
triumphs of civilization so much as its failures. 
This contrast between the purity of the past and the sordidness of the present is 
part of a larger set of contrasts fundamental to Dorothea’s aesthetic education.  
Rome’s juxtaposition of “the monotonous light of an alien world” with the “deep 
degeneracy” of its current state gives it the chiaroscuro quality that speaks directly to 
Dorothea’s own situation, as she is forced to recognize the difference between her own 
idealized vision of married life and its reality.  Dorothea married Casaubon on the 
mistaken belief that her husband’s mind would give her access to scholarly “large 
vistas and wide fresh air”; instead, she finds “anterooms and winding passages which 
seemed to lead nowither” (181).  As evidenced by his unfinished (and unfinishable) 
Key to All Mythologies, Casaubon’s perspective on the world is almost entirely 
mediated through a hyper-critical awareness of intellectual priority.  His paralyzing 
consciousness of earlier theories and ideas on a given subject traps him in a negative 
feedback loop in which his obsession with synthesizing or refuting all previous 
arguments guarantees that his own argument is continually and everlastingly deferred.  
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When asked his opinion about some frescos created by Raphael, his response—that 
the frescos are “highly esteemed” and that Raphael “has been held to combine . . . 
grace of form with sublimity of expression”—circumvents the real question, supplying 
instead “the opinion of the conoscenti” (183).  In Casaubon, Eliot demonstrates how 
erudition divorced from “interest or sympathy” can become an impediment to 
subjective experience.  His knowledge of the conventions of appreciation has made it 
impossible for his appreciation to be anything but conventional.  For Dorothea, 
seeking to make sense of her impressions of Rome and of her new husband, 
Casaubon’s dryly impersonal aesthetic (pseudo)responses only underscore a 
bewildering remoteness in both city and man. Still, it is in the recognition of these 
limitations that Dorothea develops a Turner-esque sensitivity to the shading of a 
particular moment.  Though Dorothea is baffled by the Roman spectacle, her 
confusion points to a visual cognition independent of mental comprehension.  
Dorothea sees the objects before her with a depth and clarity that has nothing to do 
with their meaning.  Rather, her “deep impressions” suggest an attention to the 
distribution of light and shadow.  She sees “long vistas of white forms” with “marble 
eyes” that “hold the monotonous light of an alien world” and a “dimmer but yet eager 
Titanic life gazing and struggling on walls and ceilings” (180).  In Dorothea’s 
perceptions, the historicity of these objects is encoded in how the light falls on them.  
Bright white marble statues and dimly illuminated frescoes both convey the 
remoteness and foreignness of a Classical past.  That this strange lighting is 
concentrated in the eyes of the objects—the “monotonous” and thus blinding light in 
the empty, iris-less eyes of statuary and the “gazing and struggling” of shadowed 
figures painted on walls—hints at what these artworks cannot communicate to the 
viewer: the quiddity of the scene on which they were created to look and of which 
they are the only remnants that remain to be looked at.  Complicating the old chestnut 
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about the eyes being the window to the soul (of person or of era), the eyes of these 
artworks intimate a limitation in transparent media like windows; even if one can see 
through them, that does not mean that one is capable of understanding what one sees.  
Apprehended visually, the light-filled and dim gazes of sculpted and painted eyes are 
still radically and inalterably “alien,” belonging to a moment in history that can only 
be understood abstractly and at a great remove.   
One might argue, though, that this sense of historical distance aroused by a 
new aesthetic awareness of scenic chiaroscuro is what underwrites Dorothea’s insight 
into her own situation.  While she cannot yet articulate her growing marital 
disillusionment, her experience in the Vatican museum offers a compelling analogue 
that allows Eliot to translate into visual terms the distance that Dorothea recognizes 
between herself and her husband.  Tellingly, it is when Dorothea is seen staring, 
seemingly uncomprehendingly, at a “streak of sunlight on the floor” next to the 
Cleopatra that she is described as also “inwardly seeing the light of years to come in 
her own home” (187).  Her despair over the substance of this vision is never fully 
explained, because, as the narrator suggests, such an explanation would be impossible; 
it would be “like trying to give a history of the lights and the shadows, for the new real 
future which was replacing the imaginary drew its material from the endless minutiae 
by which her view of Mr. Casaubon . . . was gradually changing.”  Even though her 
husband is, for all intents and purposes, the same man that she married, Dorothea’s 
changing perspective on the situation renders her earlier view as “alien” to her as the 
light in the eyes of statues, for “whatever else remained the same, the light had 
changed, and you cannot find the pearly dawn at noonday” (181).  In these closely 
linked observations, Eliot draws attention to an aesthetic enigma.  In the distribution of 
light and dark that shades a scene or object, one can read the distinctive stamp of a 
particular moment in history.  Yet lights and shadows themselves have no history.  
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Once a moment is past, there is no recalling it to mind or fitting it into a narrative of 
progress.  Thus, viewers will always be forever alienated from earlier perspectives, 
whether their own or others.  In chiaroscuro, one has a sense of history, but history 
itself can only be recognized, never experienced. 
For Eliot, though, the recognition of radical subjectivity is not sufficient reason 
for her heroine to turn her gaze inwards, to retreat behind that “thick wall of 
personality,” and to find “success in life” through the courting of aesthetic experience, 
with the end goal of giving “the highest quality to [her] moments as they pass, and 
simply for those moments’ sake.”72  While Dorothea is initially despondent when 
neither Rome nor her new husband lives up to her expectation “that if she knew more 
about them the world would be joyfully illuminated for her,” it is the limited and 
mystifying nature of her impressions of them that fuels her desire for a new way of 
understanding and relating to the world around her (183).  When Eliot, in a famous, 
oft-quoted letter, declared Pater’s Renaissance “quite poisonous in its false principles 
of criticism and false conceptions of life,” she arguably is not criticizing his 
conception of aesthetic experience but the “conclusions” he drew from it.73  Pater’s 
descriptions of such moments as a series of linked, breathless pauses in the midst of 
rapid Heraclitean flux in fact accord quite closely to Eliot’s, in Middlemarch and 
elsewhere.  But, whereas for Pater—aesthetic impressions being the products of “the 
individual in his isolation, each mind keeping as a solitary prison its own dream of a 
world”—the individual’s greatest responsibility is to “experience” itself, to capturing 
exquisite moments for the delectation and refinement of one’s senses74, Eliot 
                                                 
72 Walter Pater, The Renaissance: Studies in Art and Poetry, ed. Donald L. Hill (Berkeley: U of 
California Press, 1980) 186-190. 
73 George Eliot, “To John Blackwood,” 5 November 1873, The George Eliot Letters, ed. Gordon 
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74 The Renaissance 187-188. 
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condemns such an end as solipsistic, evidencing a kind of “moral stupidity” in which 
one takes “the world as an udder to feed our supreme selves” (192).   
Nevertheless, Dorothea’s emergence from this state of moral stupidity is 
directly linked to her developing aesthetic sensibilities and her growing awareness of 
the distance between herself and the outside world.  As Eliot elsewhere suggests, this 
distance is not only inevitable but necessary, because “if we had a keen vision and 
feeling of all ordinary human life, it would be like hearing the grass grow and the 
squirrel’s heart beat, and we should die of that roar which lies on the other side of 
silence” (180).  Yet, if to retreat inwards is morally “poisonous” and to move beyond 
the boundaries of self fatal, what alternative remains?  Eliot attempts an answer to this 
question in the same way that she has answered others throughout this Roman 
interlude: through the aesthetic experiences of her heroine.  In a scene directly 
following the scene in the Vatican, Ladislaw calls upon Dorothea at her hotel, 
interrupting a fit of weeping over her confusion and unhappiness in her new married 
life.  Discussing Casaubon, Will unthinkingly adds to Dorothea’s despair by 
suggesting that her husband’s work is ultimately pointless because he has refused to 
acquaint himself with the work of his German contemporaries who have, in Will’s 
argument, “taken the lead in [such] historical inquiries” (191).  For Dorothea, who 
looked to Casaubon to make herself “wise and strong in his strength and wisdom,” this 
devastating suggestion puts everything in a new light, literally, as Casaubon just then 
enters the room and stands in contrast to Ladislaw:    
Mr Casaubon was less happy than usual, and this perhaps made him look all 
the dimmer and more faded; else, the effect might easily have been produced 
by the contrast of his young cousin’s appearance.  The first impression on 
seeing Will was one of sunny brightness . . . Mr Casaubon, on the contrary 
stood rayless. (192) 
 116 
In a perspectival triangulation that inverts the scene in the Vatican museum, here 
Dorothea’s gaze unites the three characters and creates a tableau in which the 
significance is again in the shading.  In this instance, though, the picture presented to 
the viewer does not exemplify or otherwise confirm her aesthetic sense of things (as it 
does Naumann and Ladislaw) but rather serves to engender a compassionate 
awareness of other strange and dissimilar perspectives.  Though up until this point 
Dorothea has been seeking “joyous[] illuminat[ion],” it is in the shadowed chiaroscuro 
created by the proximity of “sunny” Ladislaw and “rayless” Casaubon that Dorothea 
feels deeply for another person, not (as might be expected) for the bright and winning 
younger man, but for her husband.  As the narrator observes, Dorothea is “perhaps not 
insensible” to how poorly her husband appears next to Ladislaw, but this visual 
contrast only serves to make “her more conscious of that new alarm on [Casaubon’s] 
behalf which was the first stirring of a pitying tenderness fed by the realities of his lot 
and not by her own dreams” (192).  In Will’s illuminating presence, Casaubon’s 
character is given a clarity and depth for Dorothea that has everything to do with a 
new-found awareness of how little she knows about her husband’s situation, the exact 
position from which he looks out on the world.  This “pitying tenderness” differs from 
her earlier feeling toward Casaubon because it is not motivated by any need on her 
own part.  Seeing him in shadow, she recognizes how misguided was her expectation 
that in marriage she would come to truly know her husband and, through him, all those 
objects and experiences to which she assumed his knowledge gave him access. 
Yet if the scene Dorothea witnesses between Casaubon and Ladislaw is meant 
to demonstrate the unattainability of true “sympathy” (“sympathy” meaning “to have a 
fellow feeling” or to feel “like” or “with” someone [OED],) Dorothea’s response to 
this revelation points toward the alternative aesthetic position that Eliot carves out 
between radical subjectivism and an ideal of sensus communis.  The closely-linked 
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aesthetic experiences that constitute the narrative of Dorothea’s time in Rome 
culminate in the birth of a specific kind of insight, one rooted in the awareness of how 
all perceptual experiences are, in essence, acts of translation.  For Dorothea, the 
overwhelming tide of sensory stimuli Rome affords lends to her impressions a 
materiality that makes it impossible to forget that her impressions are all refracted 
through the individual consciousness.  The awareness of that individual perspective, 
though, is what makes possible her compassionate understanding of others: she 
recognizes the equally determined nature of their own subject positions.  In her 
relationship with her husband in particular, the consequences are manifold; the birth of 
this new awareness lends to the memory of this particular day “the vividness with 
which we all remember epochs in our experience with some dear expectation dies, or 
some new motive is born” (192).  Again, Eliot attributes a visual “vividness” to 
contrast, in this case the contrast between past expectations and present realizations.  
After Casaubon is thrown into relief, as it were, by the presence of Ladislaw, Dorothea 
recognizes that “she had been under a wild illusion” in regard to her husband, but also 
feels “the waking of a presentiment that there might be a sad consciousness in his life 
which made as great a need on his side as on her own” (192).   
Regardless of Will Ladislaw’s later importance to Dorothea, in the scene at the 
hotel in Rome he remains an instrument that allows her to see her husband as an 
equally “sad consciousness” looking out on the world and “to conceive with that 
distinctness which is no longer reflection but feeling—an idea wrought back to the 
directness of sense, like the solidity of objects—that he had an equivalent centre of 
self, whence the lights and shadows must always fall with a certain difference” (193).  
As the final sentence in the penultimate chapter detailing Dorothea’s trip to Rome, the 
significance of this revelation cannot be overstated, for it offers the clearest expression 
of Eliot’s understanding of the form and function of aesthetic experience.  Dorothea’s 
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recognition of her husband’s “equivalent centre of self” is the moment in which she 
transcends the “moral stupidity” that mars even the most erudite aesthetic impressions 
of Naumann, Ladislaw, and Casaubon.  In something as simple as “feeling” that 
“lights and shadows” fall for each person “with a certain difference,” Dorothea attains 
proficiency in a mode of emotional translation that is similar to that practiced by those 
fluent in “the language of Art.”  In her review of Ruskin, Eliot states that, although the 
artist cannot transcribe exactly those emotions produced by an object in nature, the 
aim of the artist should be to translate those emotions in the act of representation.  A 
successful translation, though, is a highly personal act, and the result is still only an 
approximation of the original, an approximation in which some of the essence of the 
translated thing is lost and something of the consciousness of the translator is added.  
The translation is, in this way, in itself a chiaroscuro, the particular shading of which 
depends on how what is being translated is refracted through the unique perspective of 
the individual translating.   
Through her myriad aesthetic experiences of the Roman scene, the objects it 
contains, and the people who populate it, Dorothea comes to what might seem a rather 
obvious realization: that others also burn with a hard, gem-like flame, which 
differently illuminates the scene for them in way that she can only guess at, never fully 
experience.  Yet this realization is less important in itself than as it adds to her 
perception an ethical dimension, a sensory awareness of the limitations of her own 
gaze and of the never-to-be-heard “roar which lies on the other side of silence.”  A 
form of what Eliot elsewhere calls “double-consciousness,” Dorothea’s hard-won 
aesthetic perspective offers perhaps the only means of escaping a solipsistic disregard 
of the outside world in moments of intense perceptual experience.  To see a scene and 
at the same time inwardly see “with that distinctness which is no longer reflection but 
feeling” what lies beyond one’s purview (the same scene from the position of the 
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Other) is to recognize the distance between viewpoints and between eras. It is to 
remain firmly rooted in a historical moment and yet nevertheless not lose sight of what 
might be called “history,” the timeless space that includes all perspectives, a space that 
in moments in aesthetic experience is always just out of view. 
Middlemarch itself can be seen as a narrative exercise in double-
consciousness.  As the narrator reminds its 1870s readers at the start of the Roman 
interlude, it is looking back on the pre-Reform England of the 1830s, a time “[w]hen 
George the Fourth was still reigning over the privacies of Windsor, when the Duke of 
Wellington was Prime Minister, and Mr Vincy was mayor of the old corporation in 
Middlemarch” (173).  This merging of historical and fictional realities quite 
deliberately opens up a divide between the “now” of the reader and the “then” of the 
text.  This divide is again marked in the scene at the Vatican museum in the 
previously-discussed reference to the “reclining Ariadne, then called Cleopatra” (176).  
Other critics have commented on the significance of this double attribution, with 
Abigail Rischin in particular making a compelling argument for the narrative parallels 
between the story of Ariadne’s abandonment by Theseus and discovery by Dionysus 
and that of Dorothea’s abandonment in the gallery by Casaubon and discovery by 
Ladislaw.  But putting aside for the moment the matter of how the mythic figure of 
Ariadne or the hardly-less mythic figure of Cleopatra speaks to Dorothea’s situation, I 
would instead focus on the narrative function of the phrase—“reclining Ariadne, then 
called Cleopatra”—itself.  On one level, this phrasing suggests an attempt to place the 
statue historically, alerting the 1870s reader to its earlier (mis)identification as a 
representation of Cleopatra.  But the reference to its dual identity also detaches it from 
either historical context, capturing the complex process by which previously-held 
beliefs are overwritten by new ones.  At syntactic close-quarters (only a comma 
between them), the statue-as-Cleopatra and the statue-as-Ariadne makes visible to the 
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reader the faint outline of the past in the present, its continuing influence even when 
seemingly erased or overwritten.   
Eliot also depicts this dynamic in Middlemarch when detailing for the reader 
just how the Roman experience lingers on in Dorothea’s consciousness long after her 
honeymoon ends.  Dorothea’s impressions of Rome persist in her mind not as discrete 
memories but rather as fragmentary images: 
Forms both pale and glowing took possession of her young sense, and fixed 
themselves in her memory even when she was not thinking of them, preparing 
strange associations which remained through her after-years. Our moods are 
apt to bring with them images which succeed each other like magic-lantern 
pictures in a doze; and in certain states of dull forlornness Dorothea all her life 
continued to see the vastness of St. Peter’s . . . and the red drapery which was 
being hung for Christmas spreading itself everywhere like a disease of the 
retina. (180) 
Possessing her sense, fixing themselves in her memory, organizing themselves into 
chains of “strange associations,” the images that most affected Dorothea during her 
time in Rome assume an agency all their own.  They are not to be consciously 
summoned to mind but instead unconsciously assert themselves, providing material 
analogues to “moods” over which the individual has no control.  In this way, aesthetic 
experiences have a kind of after-life that can be read as part of a historical narrative of 
subjectivity.  Even if Dorothea does not see the connections between past and present, 
Eliot suggests, those connections can be intuited from the way in which memory calls 
up images from long-ago experiences to mark the continuity.  Moreover, “like magic-
lantern pictures in a doze”—projections of light through images on glass cast on 
darkened walls--these images remain in the mind as shadowy incarnations of their 
former selves, speaking to the passage of time even as those times are being recalled.   
Reference to the “red drapery” in St. Peter’s, as “like a disease of the retina” 
suggests in Dorothea’s memory a certain ambivalence regarding these moments of 
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aesthetic recollection.  But this description also functions like one of Dorothea’s 
afterimages, calling to mind an earlier text of Eliot’s in which the protagonist has a 
real “disease of the retina”: her 1859 novella The Lifted Veil. Published first in 
Blackwood’s Magazine, The Lifted Veil is, like Middlemarch, deeply concerned with 
the matter of perceptual experience, in this case with a supernatural element, since the 
narrator-protagonist Latimer has been cursed with the dubious gifts of telepathy and 
prevision.  With a gaze trained not backwards like Dorothea but forwards, Latimer is 
subject to impressions of moments in the future, the clarity and vividness of which 
make them akin to aesthetic experiences.  The most portentous of these visions occurs 
during Latimer’s visit to the Belvedere Gallery in Prague, where, lovesick over his 
elder brother’s disdainful fiancée Bertha, his prolonged study of a portrait of Lucrezia 
Borgia triggers his prevision: 
Just as I reached the gravel-walk, I felt an arm slipped within mine, and a light 
hand gently pressing my wrist. In the same instant a strange intoxicating 
numbness passed over me, like the continuance or climax of the sensation I 
was still feeling from the gaze of Lucrezia Borgia. The gardens, the summer 
sky, the consciousness of Bertha’s arm being with mine, all vanished, and I 
seemed to be suddenly in darkness, out of which there broke a dim fire-light, 
and I felt myself sitting in my father’s leather chair in the library at home. I 
knew the fireplace—the dogs for the wood-fire—the black marble chimney-
piece with the white marble medallion of the dying Cleopatra in the centre. 
Intense and hopeless misery was pressing on my soul; the light became 
stronger, for Bertha was entering with a candle in her hand—Bertha, my 
wife—with cruel eyes, with green jewels and green leaves on her white ball-
dress; every hateful thought within her present to me . . . It was a moment of 
hell . . . She came with her candle and stood over me with a bitter smile of 
contempt; I saw the great emerald brooch on her bosom, a studded serpent with 
diamond eyes . . . Gradually the hearth, the dim library, the candle-light 
disappeared—seemed to melt away into a background of light, the green 
serpent with the diamond eyes remaining a dark image on my retina.75 
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Though Latimer frequently refers to his foresight as a physiological or psychological 
abnormality, the offspring of a “diseased consciousness,” the structure of his vision 
closely follows Eliot’s description of the process of normal aesthetic recall.  A 
“sensation” caused by the “gaze” of a painted image calls up in his mind a magic-
lantern-like image of a scene lit by firelight, a scene that does not come to him as a 
coherent picture but a mass of fragments.  Though the picture captures a single 
moment, his shifting focus conveys a sense of movement that unfolds spatially rather 
than temporally.  Latimer’s description of his vision does not explicitly link its many 
details together, but it is the “strange poisoned sensation” evoked by the Lucrezia 
Borgia that creates the sinister ambience in which these fragmentary images are 
implicitly grouped together in a network of associations.  The poisoner Lucrezia 
Borgia merges with the poisoned Cleopatra (who in her death throes presumably has 
an asp clasped to her);  Cleopatra, in turn, merges with Bertha, who, in a dress 
ornamented with green leaves and with her emerald snake pendant, is connected to the 
biblical Eve whose eating of the apple curses mankind with the terrible burden of 
knowledge.  A series of metonymic substitutions, the triptych of infamous women 
directly referenced and indirectly alluded to in Latimer’s vision here are put in the 
service of narrative revelation.  They point to a future that Latimer, at this point, 
unconsciously anticipates but, having not yet experienced it, cannot fully comprehend.   
At the conclusion of The Lifted Veil, Latimer discovers that Bertha means to 
poison him, and the ominous import of his vision is brought home and the veil, as it 
were, lifted.  Yet, in this earlier text, such a moment of revelation brings nothing but 
horror and, instead of engendering in Latimer a greater understanding of his wife, 
reduces her in his eyes to “a cunning animal whose hiding-places are surrounded by 
swift-advancing flame.”76 More to the point, in spite of his telepathy and prevision, 
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Latimer at the end of the novella remains almost precisely where he started: his 
“insight” into others remains a torment to him, keeping him in a perpetual state of 
flight from a humanity whose petty concerns overwhelm him with a kind of visceral 
disgust.  Latimer’s “double-consciousness” thus remains in Eliot’s eyes something of 
an impossibility.  Even in a narrative where the character is thus gifted, hardwired into 
the gift itself is an emotional and physiological barrier to using it to gain a deeper, 
meaningful comprehension of others.  Thomas Albrecht has argued that “the novella’s 
failure” in this regard “is indicative of its true ethical dilemma: the inability to face the 
other as other, despite Eliot’s injunction that we must do precisely that, and the 
inevitable recourse to framing the other in terms of oneself.”77 Eliot revisits this 
dilemma in Middlemarch and finds, in the arena of aesthetic experience, a means of 
coming to a more ethically satisfying conclusion.   
Dorothea’s aesthetic experiences shares with Latimer’s vision in the Belvedere 
Gallery a number of objects.  Among the more prominent of these are the emerald and 
the dying Cleopatra.  In Eliot’s later reference to the statue, her allusion to the statue’s 
misidentification echoes her earlier text in a way that signals the progression of time 
between the two narratives.  The statue was widely assumed to be a representation of 
the dying Cleopatra, until the art historian Winckelmann challenged this identification 
in his Geschichte der Kunst des Alterthums (The History of Ancient Art Among the 
Greeks, 1764, trans. by Lessing in 1870).78  As Rischin has noted, Eliot would have 
become aware of the statue’s previous misidentification and Winckelmann’s renaming 
of it through her reading of Adolf Stahr’s book Torso (1854-1855), which she 
reviewed in The Leader and elsewhere.79  Curiously, though, in The Lifted Veil, 
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written four years after her review of Stahr, the statue’s revised identity goes 
unmentioned.  There is one very compelling potential explanation for this; at the 
beginning of the novella, Latimer introduces the matter of his prevision by stating that 
he has foreseen his own death, a death that will take place exactly a month from the 
day he sits down to write his account: “the 20th of September 1850.”  In 1850, the time 
in which the novella is set, Eliot herself and presumably an English readership would 
have been largely unaware of the statue’s contested identity.  Yet, the same would also 
be true of Middlemarch, and still, there the statue is the “Ariadne, then called 
Cleopatra.”  It is in this small difference that I read the mark of a major shift in Eliot’s 
conception of narrative, a shift towards a more aesthetically-oriented, translative 
approach to the depiction of subjective experience that is closely tied to her efforts to 
register within the text the imprint of broader historical changes on the lives of her 
characters.   
In another piece of writing, Eliot discusses what she calls the “exercise of a 
veracious imagination in historical picturing”: 
How triumphant opinions spread—how institutions arose—what were the 
conditions of great inventions, discoveries, or theoretic conceptions—what 
circumstances affecting individual lots are attendant on the decay of long-
established systems,--all these grand elements of history require the 
illumination of special imaginative treatment.  But effective truth in this 
application of art requires freedom from the vulgar coercion of conventional 
plot . . . 80 
Eliot is not discussing her own writing in this fragment, nor would it even be 
applicable to her body of fiction as a whole, but in the Roman chapters of 
Middlemarch Eliot is experimenting with ways of escaping, even if only temporarily, 
“the vulgar coercion of conventional plot” in order to convey a sense of history 
through the depiction of multiple histories of sense.  In the gallery scene, the 
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Ariadne/Cleopatra is seen and experienced from a variety of different subject 
positions, which generate discrete impressions that only can be understood in relation 
to one another.  Each informed by past occurrences and unique and determinative 
combinations of theories, ideas, inclinations, and desires, the perceptions of Naumann, 
Ladislaw, and Dorothea come together in the space of the Vatican museum to 
“illuminate” the “grand elements of history” that have produced them.  And in 
Dorothea Brooke’s extended aesthetic experience in the far larger museum that is 
Rome, Eliot finds a compelling analogue to the problem facing the novelist committed 
to creating truthful fictions of history.  Dorothea’s acquired ability to visualize the 
otherness of others—not to understand it, but to recognize it, and through recognition, 
to see the limited nature of her own perceptions—is, for Eliot, the closest one can 
come to comprehending a moment in all of its very real diffuseness.  It is the same 
diffuseness that Eliot herself strives to capture in Middlemarch, a “study of provincial 
life” that looks for freedom from convention in a kind of “historical picturing” that is 
achieved through a deliberate “application of art.” 
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CHAPTER 4.  
“The Painted Visages of Men of Affairs”:  Aesthetic Renaissance in Walter 
Pater’s Imaginary Portraits 
Though he published a number of articles and short pieces of criticism early in 
his career, Walter Pater held off appending his name to any of his works until the 
printing of his Studies in the History of the Renaissance (1873).  Pater’s decision to 
publicly identify himself as an author only when he could attach his name to a work 
that amply demonstrated his mastery of his chosen subject matter (aesthetics and art 
history) and his authorial persona (gentleman aesthete) fits with what we know of a 
writer interested, both personally and thematically, with the impression a given 
gesture, word, or art object could produce.  Considering the careful attention that Pater 
gave in his criticism to even the smallest of artistic details, one imagines that his 
decision to name the generically confounding, formally complicated, and substantively 
elusive fictional artifacts of his 1887 composition “imaginary portraits” was not made 
lightly.  But, how are we to interpret that name?  What can we infer about the form, 
the meaning, or the purpose of these short stories of aesthetic awakening by their 
author identifying them as “imaginary portraits”?  For many critics, the vital clue is to 
be found in Pater’s letter to his publisher at Macmillan’s Magazine, in which he 
stresses that his first portrait “The Child in the House” 
is not, as you may perhaps fancy, the first part of a work of fiction, but is 
meant to be complete in itself; though the first of a series, as I hope, with some 
real kind of consequence in it . . . I call the M.S. a portrait, and mean readers, 
as they might do on seeing a portrait, to begin speculating—what came of 
him?81 
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Preemptively refuting any “fanciful” ideas of the part of his publisher about what this 
work might be, Pater indirectly acknowledges certain ambiguities about its form and 
attempts to carve out exactly what “The Child in the House” is by distinguishing it 
from what it is not.  First of all, it is not “the first part of a work of fiction,” suggesting 
that it is both “complete in itself” and lacking the conclusiveness that “fiction” 
supposedly conveys (otherwise, why would he expect his publisher to assume it 
unfinished?).  Second, though it is not the first part of a longer work, it is the “first of a 
series,” which implies that Pater imagines this piece to adhere to a certain model that 
will productively connect with later pieces, albeit not in a conventionally organized 
narrative.  Third, it is a work that, when seen in relation to later works of the same 
stamp, will hopefully have “some real kind of consequence to it.”  The third part of 
this description could be read as the author simply voicing the hope that his work will 
have merit and impact, but the strange insistence of the phrase “some real kind of 
consequence” indicates that Pater is aiming towards an effect somehow different from 
what is expected from “fiction,” an effect that leaves some tangible mark of itself on 
the minds of his readers.   
 If not a piece of fiction per se, then what is it?  Pater calls it “a portrait,” but as 
he takes pains to point out, he does not mean for this term to suggest ekphrasis, a 
verbal representation of a visual object.  He calls it a portrait because he means for the 
experience of reading it to be akin to the experience “seeing a portrait,” for it to arouse 
in its audience the same sorts of emotions and thoughts evoked by the aesthetic 
contemplation of a painted representation of a real or fictional person.  As Pater goes 
on to explain, the typical responses to viewing a portrait are speculations born from 
the question, “what came of him?”  If this question seems to us, if not to Pater, rather 
                                                                                                                                            
with the ideas of his contemporaries.  For some “the ‘spiritual content’ of an art object came first.”  For 
Hegel the work of art was the “realization” of an ideal concept; for Schiller, Art was held up as the 
preserver of what is best in humanity, an Ideal in copy from which “the original will once again be 
restored.”   
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an odd one, it does gesture toward one aspect of the portrait that differentiates it from 
other sorts of pictures and aligns it more closely with the plastic arts.  Like statues, 
portraits rarely provide much of a background that would allow the viewer to place the 
figure in a situating historical context.  Thus, with the portrait, the viewer is 
encouraged to speculate on the circumstances that led to its composition and to 
attempt to read into the figure a narrative that accounts for the image being 
contemplated.   
This formulation is of a piece with other nineteenth-century discussions of 
portraiture, in that the technical accomplishment of capturing a physical likeness is 
often considered secondary to the artist’s ability to evoke the indwelling soul of the 
sitter, something that the viewer might detect through the study of the subject’s 
physiognomy, posture, and expression.82  Pater’s letter quite cannily picks up on the 
fact that this kind of viewing experience already possesses something of a divinatory 
aspect and takes it one step further, shifting the hypothetical viewer’s speculation from 
the question of a particular figure’s temperament or spirit to that of the figure’s history 
and fate.  In doing so, he insinuates that the focus of his own literary portraits is not 
simply on the essence of the represented figure paused forever at a specific moment 
but also on the mystery of its origins and its end, the story of “what came of it.”  
Pater elsewhere challenges the idea that the portrait always is to be assumed 
the depiction of a specific character.  In the essay “The Age of Athletic Prizeman,” a 
sculpture of a young discus-thrower prompts him to ask,  
Was it a portrait? . . . was it the portrait of one much-admired youth, or rather 
the type, the rectified essence of many such, at the most pregnant, the essential 
moment, of the exercise of their natural powers, of what they really were? . . . 
was it in that case a commemorative or votive statue . . . ? . . . was it, again, 
designed to be part only of some larger decorative scheme . . . or a work of 
                                                 
82 That being said, this comment of Pater’s does diverge from arguments that he made elsewhere, 
particularly in The Renaissance, where he argues that the painting’s melding of form and subject should 
suspend these sorts of questions. 
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genre as we say, a thing intended merely to interest, to gratify the taste with no 
further purpose?83 
In light of his insistence upon the “real” subject of portraiture, his series of questions 
here throws into doubt what Pater meant by calling his fictive character sketches 
“imaginary portraits.”  What does come across clearly is that for Pater the portrait has 
a myriad of potentially contradictory associations and functions.  It can be a plastic art 
as well as a visual art; it can depict a particular figure or a universal type; it can 
memorialize something past or look longingly towards something not yet come into 
being; it can be something to admire in and of itself or it can exist as a single ornament 
in a richly-decorated scene.  Considering all of these alternatives, it would seem that 
part of the attraction of the portrait form for Pater is its essential ambiguity, the way in 
which the featured image is capable not only of depicting a character but also of 
suggesting a milieu, a context that the portrait hearkens back to and in which it once 
had a designated place.  To say, then, that the portrait should inspire in the viewer a 
curiosity concerning “what came of” the subject might signify more than an interest in 
what the represented figure might have made of himself.  “What came of him?” might 
also mean “what came out of or from him?” or “what effect did the represented subject 
have on the outside world?”   
However, to evaluate the characters of the Imaginary Portraits on the basis of 
what they achieved is something of an exercise in futility, since the narratives almost 
uniformly illustrate subjects who are not creators or shapers of history in any 
conventional sense.  Pater’s subjects produce nothing substantial, neither children nor 
finished works of art, nothing to grant them a form of immortality.  Still, as Pater 
points out, their legacies are actually of a more wide-reaching, if less concrete, variety, 
largely owing to this failure.  It is through inspiration, the influence of their example 
                                                 
83 Walter Pater, The Works of Walter Pater, vol. 7 Greek Studies (London: Macmillan, 1901) 289-290. 
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that something “comes of” these characters.  Unlike the other more recognizably 
historical portraits found elsewhere in Pater’s writing, the imaginary portraits offer 
narratives of aesthetic education, the education of figures whose refined and visionary 
consciousnesses mirror the confluence of social and cultural forces associated with 
periods of cultural renaissance.  Hence, the moments of aesthetic encounter in the 
Imaginary Portraits can be read as both allegories of and participants in a process of 
aesthetic awakening.  The important reservation here, however, is that for Pater this 
awakening cannot be represented as the effect of an individual’s heroic efforts.  
Rather, the encounters that Pater stages—of subjects and their milieus—are 
dramatizations of events too diffuse to narrate in any simple way.  Through a broader 
discussion of Pater’s “imaginary portraits” in relation to certain earlier critical works 
and a more intensive study of the quasi-biographical portrait “The Child in the 
House,” this chapter tries to illustrate the ways in which this complex narration of a 
culture’s aesthetic education—as it is focalized through the personal experiences and 
broader influence of a doomed and beautiful individual—unfolds. 
The Historical and Intellectual Context of the Imaginary Portraits 
As regards the Imaginary Portraits, William Shuter has argued that “these 
fictions may be described as compositions in which the central figure forms an integral 
part of the landscape from which he can neither be isolated nor dislodged.”84  Shuter’s 
observation rightly stresses an aspect of Pater’s portraits that is often overlooked: they 
focus on their characters’ interactions with specific places.  It is too often the tendency 
to understand Pater’s fiction as—in the words of Percy Lubbock—the epitome of a 
type in which “the art of drama is renounced as thoroughly as it has ever occurred to a 
novelist to dispense with it.”85  Yet, to label these narratives as static, as purely 
                                                 
84 William Shuter, Rereading Walter Pater (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1997) 18. 
85 Percy Lubbock, The Craft of Fiction (New York: Penguin, 1957) 195. 
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ekphrastic elaborations, is to ignore the dialectical character of Pater’s narrative 
structure.  This structure is characterized by the interplay of subject and background—
which often includes minor characters witnessing the central character’s aesthetic 
experiences from a distance—which furthers the development of his characters while 
gesturing towards changes in the historical periods in which those characters find 
themselves.86  This interplay gives Pater’s fictive tableaus a theatrical aspect in that 
moments of aesthetic encounter always concern both the act of seeing and the act of 
being seen.   
A passage in “Duke Carl of Rosenmold” observes that “[p]eople had in Carl, 
could they have understood it, the spectacle under those superficial braveries, of a 
really heroic mind at a disadvantage.”87  The spectacle to which Pater here refers is not 
Duke Carl himself but rather his mental striving towards an ideal, in this case, an 
aspiration to reclaim the arts and culture of an earlier period.  Throughout “Duke 
Carl,” the title character is referred to as “the northern Apollo,” the idea being that he 
is bringing to benighted Germany the light of culture, largely through the enthusiasm 
with which he seeks out and strives to appreciate neglected art forms.  In the realm of 
music, for example, he acts as a patron for “the deputy organist of the grand-ducal 
chapel,” and gives the young man the idea for “a project of some musical and dramatic 
development” based on the story of the Greek god of the arts.  When the organist 
composes the piece, he finds inspiration not in myth, but in Duke Carl himself:  “the 
near, the real and the familiar, gave precision to, or actually superseded, the distant 
and the ideal . . . [t]he soul of the music was but a transfusion from the fantastic but so 
interesting creature close at hand” (91).  Carl later performs the role the organist writes 
                                                 
86 To use Michael Fried’s terminology, it would not be incorrect to say that in Pater’s portraits, the 
composition—the part of narrative painting concerned with character and action—is to be read through 
the ordonnance—the part concerned with the physical arrangement of figures on the surface of the 
canvas. 
87 Walter Pater, Imaginary Portraits (New York: Allworth Press, 1997) 89. All subsequent citations are 
to this edition. 
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with him in mind, and, he is “true to his proposed part in that he gladdened others by 
an intellectual radiance which had ceased to mean warmth or animation for himself.”  
Making the reader a viewer of the “heroic mind at a disadvantage,” or, more 
concretely, a man performing the role of Apollo for an audience that he is teaching to 
appreciate his performance, Pater dramatizes the subject’s aesthetic coming-of-age 
and, in the process, offers up as an object of contemplation not the viewing subject but 
visual experience more generally.  These visual experiences most often are translated 
through the narrative framing of the subjects’ engagements with particular spaces, 
particular objects that evoke or recall strong sensations.   
By making “spectacles” of his characters’ aesthetic encounters with their 
respective environs, Pater attempts to give form to what is typically understood to be 
intangible and ephemeral, solely in the realm of the experiential.  Their “sensations” 
externalized, it is the subjects in their roles as viewers that become the things worth 
contemplating.  In “Sebastian von Storck,” when the title character attempts to think 
through the Spinozist “ideal of intellectual disinterestedness,” his ruminations 
“showed him, as he fixed the mental eye with more and more of self-absorption on the 
facts of his intellectual existence, a picture or vision of the universe as actually the 
product, so far as he knew it, of his own lonely thinking power—of himself, there, 
thinking” (76).  That even this celebration of abstract thought—the world of ideas cut 
off from the world of sensation—is here rendered by Sebastian as a concretized image 
of himself thinking illustrates Pater’s commitment to the idea that great acts of thought 
(philosophic or aesthetic) only lead the thinker more deeply into the mysteries of the 
self.  There is no escaping the frame of the individual consciousness in the portraits; 
its parameters are always shifting to accommodate various modes of engagement with 
the world.   
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That being said, if the protagonists of Pater’s imaginary portraits never quite 
manage to escape “the narrow chamber of the individual mind,” one could argue that 
they make for themselves excellent companions.  Like the Shaftesburian soliloquy, 
Pater’s narratives are all concerned with “the business of self-dissection,” with the 
moment when the subject “becomes two distinct persons,” the actor and the 
audience.88  Though the degree of self-consciousness attributable to the central figures 
varies, it is nevertheless the case that all of the portraits include incidences of 
confrontation in which the subjects act as spectators to their own lives.  This deeply 
uncanny moment of self-division and self-recognition is rendered in the first 
imaginary portrait, “The Child in the House,” when the protagonist Florian Deleal, 
awakening from a dream of his childhood home, falls “to thinking of himself therein” 
and of how “[i]n that half-spiritualised house he could watch the better, over again, the 
gradual expansion of the soul which had come to be” (4).  The idea is that “the story of 
[his] spirit” is something that Florian might watch and, moreover, must watch set 
against a proper backdrop.  Thus, autoscopy (self-examination)—one of the two 
activities that, as Derrida notes, are contrasted by Plato in the Phaedrus with “the 
hermeneutic adventure of myths”—becomes a drama that the Paterian subject 
simultaneously stages, performs, and views en route to autognosis (self-knowledge).89  
The author, though, persistently complicates this process by the introduction of an 
audience that witnesses the autoscopical endeavors of the protagonist with an interest 
verging dangerously on scopophilia.  The erotic charge that this audience receives 
from viewing these figures transforms not just their sensibilities but their perspectives.  
As in “Denys l’Auxerrois,” the young man’s “influence” creates a sense of 
community, a feeling of intimacy between the townspeople founded on a shared 
                                                 
88 Anthony Ashley Cooper Shaftesbury (Earl of), Characteristics of Men. Manners, Opinions, Times, 
ed. John M. Robinson, vol. 1 (London: Grant Richards, 1900): 72. 
89 Jacques Derrida, “Plato’s Pharmacy” in Dissemination, Norton Anthology of Criticism and Theory, 
ed. Philip Leitch (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2001) 1834. 
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enthusiasm for new ideas that his presence evokes.  The narrator deems him 
responsible for “turning the grave, slow movement of politic heads into a wild social 
license, which for a while made life like a stage-play” (53).  The town falling under 
the spell of his influence, “one man engaged with another in talk in the market-place; a 
new influence came forth at the contact . . . at last a new spirit was abroad 
everywhere.” 
In this psychological play, spaces that evoke personal and communal memories 
and, more generally, a sense of the past often serve as the basis (and the base) for the 
aestheticization of certain types of sensory experience.  Gerard Genette has argued that 
“the reason for aesthetic feelings lies in the phenomena of affinity,” and what Pater’s 
narrative portraiture strives to illustrate time and time again is that “sensation” is 
actually grounded in some correspondence between the inner world of the subject and 
the reality that he inhabits, a correspondence all the more powerful because it becomes 
inscribed on the subject’s consciousness, “inward and outward being woven through 
and through each other into one inextricable texture” (4).  Thus, when Pater states in 
his unfinished essay “The Aesthetic Life” that the “entire scene of human action 
experience” is like “a portrait to interpret, to get behind,” one cannot help but note that 
the spot in which he literally places the observer—“behind” the picture—is, 
positionally at least, that of the portrait’s subject, looking outward from behind the 
frame.90  Even if one only gets behind the portrait to then, as Pater says, “return to the 
face of it . . . with finer and fuller sense of the particular visible fact,” it is still the case 
that observation of the world depends on viewing oneself within the frame, either as 
part of the composition or as something beneath it. 
                                                 
90 Quotation taken from James Eli Adams’s Dandies and Desert Saints: Styles of Victorian Manhood 
(Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1995) 199.  Adams, in reading this passage, cannily notes that “the observer’s 
vigilant distancing and aestheticizing of experience is enforced […] by the paradigm of the portrait.”  
My own reading is certainly indebted to this observation. 
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Given the concreteness here of Pater’s formulation, his noted insistence 
elsewhere on the fictiveness of his fiction, on these narratives being “Imaginary—and 
portraits,” suggests a more fundamental difference between them and the “historical 
portraits” of The Renaissance than is typically acknowledged.91  Certainly, as others 
have argued, the appellation that Pater gave to his short fiction owes something to both 
his desire to avoid strictly autobiographical interpretations and to his awareness of 
literary precedents such as Landor’s Imaginary Conversations.  However, Pater was 
playing off the dialectical opposition between the terms—if we understand 
“imaginary” in the strictest sense as that which exists only in the imagination and the 
portrait as the very real representation of a particular likeness, then the “imaginary 
portrait” offers a very specific synthesis: the bodying forth of an ideal personality, the 
creation of a material form and a historical context (a portrait) for what is immaterial 
and atemporal (the imaginary).  Pater’s imaginary portraits, in their preoccupation 
with figures like those that he calls in “Diaphaneitè” “evanescent shades” evincing 
“that colourless, unclassified purity of life” (205), tell a very different story from the 
historical portraits.  As Pater says in that early essay, there is a particular narrative that 
is attached to the diaphanous character: “[p]oetry and poetical history have dreamed of 
a crisis, where it must needs be that some human victim be sent down into the grave.  
These are they whom in its profound emotion humanity might choose to send” (208-
209).  This passage outlines a process not dissimilar to the narrative arc of many of the 
imaginary portraits, and the portraits’ often-violent ends herald a gathering of energies 
and forces that catalyze such crises.  Pater’s theorization of crisis here resonates with 
what Robin Gilmour has called the “philosophical triad,” which includes “Hegel’s 
thesis-antithesis-synthesis . . . Saint-Simon’s notion of ‘organic’ and ‘critical’ phases 
leading to a ‘Golden Age’ . . . and . . . Comte[’s] . . . more influential system of the 
                                                 
91 Quotation taken from Gerald Monsman’s “Pater’s Aesthetic Hero,” University of Toronto Quarterly 
(Winter 1971) 144. 
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Theological, Metaphysical, and Positive (Scientific) stages of human history.”92  That 
being said, for all of Pater’s interest in a Hegelian conception of history, his 
representation of the process by which these moments of transition occur is never 
denaturalized or philosophically abstract.  On the contrary, his fascination with the 
physical violence that precedes and catalyses cultural upheaval manifests itself in the 
often painful and bloody ends met by his protagonists as they are sacrificed to the 
forces that their presences helped bring into being.  
That Pater understood the revolutionary implications of the ‘diaphanous type’ 
is evidenced by his otherwise puzzling inclusion of a reference to and discussion of a 
passage from Thomas Carlyle’s French Revolution in “Diaphaneitè.”  The passage in 
question imagines Charlotte Corday, the murderer of Marat, at the particular moment 
she had resolved upon her course of action: “‘What,’ [Pater quotes] says Carlyle, of 
Charlotte Corday, ‘if she had emerged from her secluded stillness, suddenly like a star; 
cruel-lovely, with half-angelic, half-demonic splendor; to gleam for a moment, and in 
a moment be extinguished; to be held in memory, so bright complete was she, through 
the long centuries” (209).  On one hand, this quotation seems an indirect reference to 
Saint-Simon, for whom the French Revolution was the exemplar of the crisis prior to a 
period of resolution and peace.  But this excerpt from Carlyle’s “poetic history” also 
prefigures the focus of Pater’s short fiction, which is not with the crisis itself but with 
the build-up to it.  Rather tellingly, the part of Carlyle’s representation of Charlotte 
Corday in The French Revolution that seems most illustrative of Pater’s own narrative 
preoccupations is not included in “Diaphaneitè” but instead is the sentence that 
follows right after, in which Carlyle goes on to envision a personified History: 
“History will look fixedly at this one fair Apparition of a Charlotte Corday; will note 
whither Charlotte moves, how the little Life burns forth so radiant, then vanishes 
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1830-1890 (London: Longman Group, 1993) 32. 
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swallowed of the Night.”93  The framing perspective of History here collapses the 
infamous story of Charlotte Corday into a portrait, a single aestheticized image in 
which her still figure is imagined to be animated by the coming convergence of her 
character with those circumstances that will cause it to flame up and then extinguish 
itself, her “little Life” immolated on the pyre of revolution.  Carlyle in this way 
foregrounds Charlotte Corday’s tragic end before he tells her story, infusing his 
narrative with a sort of gloomy fatalism that engenders a certain amount of speculative 
interest regarding how it all comes about and what then “comes of it.”   
Still, Carlyle’s description of Charlotte Corday foregrounds a problem with 
representation with which Pater’s portraits are also preoccupied.  Considering that she 
has “vanished, swallowed of the Night,” how is “History” expected to have the 
amount of light sufficient to “look” at her?  The answer is through Carlyle himself and 
others whose narrative representations of her are capable of drawing attention not to 
the facts for which she is remembered (as the intended murderer of Marat) but to her 
intentions, which are themselves aestheticized in The French Revolution through the 
verbal portrait of Corday poised on the cusp of action and which are offered up for the 
contemplation of the sympathetic viewer.  The tragedy of Charlotte Corday is that the 
sacrifice of her own life to a cause fails in its intent; her reason for the murder (“I 
killed one man to save a hundred thousand; a villain to save innocents; a savage wild-
beast to give repose to my country . . . I never wanted energy”) is not borne out by 
history.94  It is nevertheless the case that her character, perhaps because of her failure, 
partially fulfills Pater’s vision.  In Carlyle’s representation of her, she is put before the 
reader as “bright complete,” a description that seems to presage Pater’s later 
description of the diaphanous character as possessing a nature like “that fine edge of 
                                                 
93 Thomas Carlyle, The French Revolution: A History, vol. 2 (Chicago: Thompson & Thomas, [n.d.]) 
314. 
94 Carlyle 317. 
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light, where the elements of our moral nature refine themselves to the burning point” 
(205).  That she also, within the boundaries of Carlyle’s narrative, stands as a symbol 
of the values of the French Revolution, values that were forgotten in The Terror that 
followed her death, offers another correlation to “Diaphaneitè,” in that she—like 
Pater’s “diaphanous type”—is also put before the reader as “a kind of prophecy of this 
repose and simplicity . . . showing that it is indeed within the limits of man’s destiny” 
(206).95  Even though, by historical standards, Charlotte Corday is a failure, in 
Carlyle’s framing, she continues to exist as a character that both aesthetically satisfies 
and offers potential provocation to subsequent generations of readers who might view 
her as a model worthy of emulation.  
That being said, it is unlikely that Charlotte Corday herself would have been 
seen by Pater as the ideal incarnation of the character type “Diaphaneitè” attempts to 
outline.  Rather, Corday embodies Pater’s diaphanous type only in Carlyle’s depiction 
of her at a pivotal moment, a wholly imagined moment that is pre-historical in the 
sense that it is prior to the action that will ensure her place in the history of the French 
Revolution.  Carlyle’s “Charlotte Corday” anticipates Pater’s portraiture in this regard, 
as the imaginary portraits also all strive to give a face, an individual form to a 
particular society’s reinvigoration, its temporary coming-into-consciousness at the 
prompting of outside influences, the cultural equivalent of what he will call in the 
Conclusion to The Renaissance “the concurrence, renewed from moment to moment, 
of forces parting sooner or later on their ways” (R 187).  Pater’s narrative illustrations 
of characters that experience most intensely and convey to others this spirit of renewal 
capture the revolutionary potential of these convergences.  Yet, at the same time, the 
volatility and inherent instability of this atmosphere is always being underscored 
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the chapter “Charlotte Corday,” which is actually the first chapter of Book XVII, “Terror.” 
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through the repeated insistence on the sacrifice of these figures to the cultural energies 
that they have helped to rouse, accidentally or intentionally. 
Gerald Monsman has described Pater’s imaginary portraiture as “an attempt to 
isolate a cultural phase by portraying the contribution which the hero, the 
representative of his age, makes as he breaks through the veil of mortality into the 
immortal world of light.”96  Though Monsman quite vividly renders the general 
trajectory of these narratives, his focus on the mythic structures underlying the fiction 
both simplifies the role of the central figure (for is he necessarily a hero?) and 
overlooks the violence implicit in his “breaking through.”  To be sure, Monsman in 
this way takes a page from Pater himself, as the latter often elides or metaphorizes 
moments of destruction and bloodshed in his fiction.  But if Pater can be said to 
aestheticize acts of violence, it must also be acknowledged that he frequently describes 
acts of aesthetic perception in terms of physical pain and suffering, in the process 
drawing attention to the dynamics of domination and submission implicit in the 
“longing for some undivined, entire possession” of the beautiful object and the way in 
which that longing in an especially receptive individual amounts to “a kind of tyranny 
of the senses” (11).  The interconnectedness of pain and perception in Pater’s fiction is 
part of what Regenia Gagnier has called his “notorious materialism,” an almost 
morbid preoccupation with the phenomenal basis of aesthetic experience, an 
appreciation of beauty intensified by a constant awareness of mortality.97   
In “The Child in the House,” the protagonist describes the expansion of his 
mental faculties as the concomitant “growth of an almost diseased sensibility to the 
spectacle of suffering, and, parallel with this, the rapid growth of a certain capacity of 
fascination by bright color and choice form” (8).  Both lines of development are 
                                                 
96 Gerald Monsman, Pater’s Portraits (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1967) 39. 
97 Regenia Gagnier, “A Critique of Practical Aesthetics,” Aesthetics and Ideology, ed. George Levine 
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understood in terms of spectatorship: suffering is a “spectacle” which evokes certain 
sensations and beautiful objects are appreciated for their ability to “fascinate.”  In the 
case of aesthetic development, the world is a stage on which all aesthetes act as 
viewers.  Yet Pater’s idea of the viewer denies the connotations of distance and 
detachment usually attached to that role; his viewers are figures who are always being 
powerfully acted upon.  In the case of “bright color and choice form,” it is a question 
of opening oneself up and increasing one’s capacity for fascination.  Responsiveness 
to the spectacle of suffering, though, is frequently described as something that certain 
“diseased sensibilit[ies]” cannot keep out, a protective move on Pater’s part that 
attempts (perhaps a bit too vigorously) to defend his viewers against the charge of 
cultivating a taste for the pain of others.   
I would argue that it is precisely the preoccupation with the suffering of beauty 
and the beauty of suffering that galvanizes Pater’s fiction.  These narratives explore 
the possibilities for aesthetic engagement through the staging of visual experience as a 
kind of secular passion play, in which is dramatized the suffering and death of both the 
central figure and the particular mode of perceptual apprehension that he embodies.  
If, as Carolyn Williams has argued, “in Pater’s work the achieved figure of the 
‘person’ may be described as the formal composite (retrospective and totalized) of . . . 
‘transitive moments’ of attachment to culture,” then, how do the imaginary portraits 
endeavor to frame these “transitive moments” in their depictions of extraordinarily 
receptive personalities who embody the qualities of a superior vision capable of 
reforming the world?98  Also, why do the imaginary portraits so often stop short of 
representing this reformation, either breaking off before the subject ventures into the 
public realm or indicating that a later period of renaissance is something that the 
central figure influenced only indirectly, through the manner of his life and death?  In 
                                                 
98 Carolyn Williams, Transfigured World: Walter Pater’s Aesthetic Historicism (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 
1989) 283.   
 141 
many ways, the ultimate failure of the Paterian subject to bring about the renewal that 
his entrance heralded is tied to what Peter Allan Dale has called “the Epicurean or 
aesthetic relativism” that underwrites these texts: the idea that, as Pater so famously 
put in the Conclusion to The Renaissance, “not the fruit of experience, but experience 
itself, is the end.”99  As in his criticism, Pater’s fiction offers up aesthetic experience 
as not simply an end in itself but as the only kind of experience that has (as it were) an 
ending.  Though individual time rushes on in an endless flow of sensory data, and 
historical time presents itself as a dialectical progression, aesthetic experience 
temporarily arrests and gives form to a particular moment, framing a specific 
consciousness in the act of recognizing in an object in the world a “sensible vehicle or 
occasion” that is “the necessary concomitant of any perception of things.”  In the 
imaginary portraits, Pater structures through narrative the dynamic interplay of these 
myriad affinities, establishing correlatives between subject and object, the personal 
and the universal, the sensuous and the ideal.  In these narrative efforts, he frequently 
presents pain as a necessary conduit through which this recognition is achieved, pain 
(of self and others) frequently serving to make the individual aware of how, in spite of 
the “thick wall of personality” that shields them from various forms of contact with 
the world, they are nevertheless connected to it on a primal physical level, the world 
being “so ingeniously constructed to play pain-fugues on the delicate nerve-work of 
[all] living creatures” (10).  The awareness of this shared vulnerability is what adds the 
“painful” element to moments of aesthetic appreciation in Pater’s works, allowing 
these moments to also be productive of sympathy and understanding.  
All of these fictions are, in essence, dreams of space, which speak towards the 
yearning for a sense that aesthetic perception is not simply confined to an individual 
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subjectivity but also perhaps has a visible, even a communal aspect.  The first two 
portraits that Pater wrote—“The Child in the House” (1878) and the unfinished and 
posthumously published “An English Poet”—represent the development of the 
aesthetic temperament by creating genealogies that link up certain powerful sensations 
with the objects that first elicited them.  These etiological narratives work to frame 
their subjects’ engagements with the spaces that first gave meaning to perceptual 
experience, formative encounters that provide the basis of all subsequent impressions 
and sensations.  In the case of other imaginary portraits, “A Prince of Court Painters,” 
“Denys l’Auxerrois,” “Sebastian van Storck” and “Duke Carl of Rosenmold,”100 the 
quasi-historical landscapes that Pater depicts are imaginary places in which the 
unifying vision of the central character inscribes itself on a world and its inhabitants, 
transforming it into a scene or a picture that is aesthetically coherent.  Pater’s fantasy 
of a perceptible sensus communis—a community formed around a collective mode of 
apprehension—highlights the depth of the desire for an organizing, ideational structure 
to give concrete form to a transitory, subjective phenomenon.   
But much as the imaginary portraits give expression to that wish, they also 
evidence an underlying skepticism regarding the possibilities for its realization.  The 
fragility of these dreams of aesthetic unity—fragility that is registered formally in 
“The Child in the House,” which is structured as an actual dream narrative—is an 
issue to which these stories continually return in their representation of the coherence 
of the moment coming undone and of the character who brought it about necessarily 
being swept away (at different points, both figuratively and literally) with the tide of 
forces that had been temporarily arrested.  The question remains, though, whether the 
insistence on the breakdown and ultimate failure of this process is a necessary 
component of Pater’s conception of aesthetic experience, particularly his tendency to 
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explain acts of painful (and often futile) exertion as motivated by a hungering after 
some kind of unattainable emotional satisfaction.  In the appreciation of beauty Pater 
locates a suffering and longing for the lost source of perceptual experience, the “agony 
of home-sickness” that he attributes to his protagonist in “The Child in the House” 
(17).  Similarly, images of suffering and death are imbued with a beauty that is tied to 
the way in which they gesture towards the past and moments irrevocably lost to time, 
like the dismembered body of Denys l’Auxerrois, whose “tortured figure” is described 
as containing for the narrator “the trace of the Middle Ages . . . like old marks in the 
stone in rainy weather” (IP 62).  The Paterian aesthetic sensibility is a haunted one, 
and, in the imaginary portraits, this sense of loss or belatedness shows itself as an 
obsession with (re)capturing the “trace” or essence of a particular milieu through the 
narrative elaboration of a representative personality.   
In the same way, though, that a painted portrait draws the viewer’s attention to 
the physical absence of the portrait’s subject (the immortality of the person’s image 
contrasted with the mortality of the actual person), Pater’s narrative portraits, through 
their craftedness, their careful staging of encounters that best highlight the matrix of 
causes and effects that go into the formation of a cultural moment, reify their distance 
from the immediacy of the very situations they are meant to recreate.  In their 
depictions of cultures enacting transition and personalities performing perception, the 
imaginary portraits narrativize the psychic drive that undergirds the never fully 
satisfying pursuit of aesthetic gratification.  The questing subjectivities at the center of 
these portraits—who themselves are frustratingly elusive figures for viewers in and 
readers of these narratives—dynamically represent the essentially human search for 
what Pater has ambiguously called “something in the world, that is there in no 
satisfying measure, or not at all,” that is, a feeling of emotional, intellectual, and 
sensory fulfillment is fleetingly apprehended in moments of aesthetic experience (43).  
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With this in mind, it is possible to read the imaginary portraits as narratives 
that initially promise but ultimately withhold from the reader the depiction of such an 
aesthetic satisfaction, deferring resolution while gesturing beyond the frames of the 
individual narratives towards some ideal state of being that is always implicit but 
never fully realized.  What Pater does represent is the social aspect of aesthetic 
perception, its root in and its influence on the cultural milieu to which the subject 
belongs.  Further, his insistent staging of the individual subject’s visual and visible 
engagement with certain kinds of communal forms and spaces (e.g., polite society, the 
Parisian social scene, the monastic community of Auxerrois and the church, etc.) gives 
a supposedly private act a distinctively social cast, requiring the presence of an 
audience.  Yet these fictions also display a certain amount of anxiety concerning the 
possibility of actually representing through the narrative painting of these aesthetic 
personalities something approximating the subjective aesthetic experience.   
My argument will deal directly with this anxiety by focusing on Pater’s 
conflicted relationship with Samuel Taylor Coleridge and on the way in which the 
imaginary portraits evidence Coleridge’s influence on the prototypical form of the 
sensitive, melancholy young men whose coming-into-consciousness these narratives 
depict.  Pater’s radical reframing of the Coleridgean concepts of a benevolent, animate 
Nature and of the poet-as-aesthetic-instrument (“the Aeolian Harp”) in his imaginary 
portraits, particularly “The Child in the House” and “An English Poet,” also offers a 
suggestive way of analyzing the complex relation between subject and background 
and between exterior and interior landscapes.  In these narratives, the depictions of 
their title characters make certain types of experience “something to look at.”  
Creating historical frames and narrative forms for aesthetic perception, Pater works to 
capture and embody the indwelling content of a sensuously apprehended moment, 
rendering it much like a work of art.  It is the often tragic “spectacle” of visual 
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experience in the imaginary portraits with which this chapter is primarily concerned, 
the spectacle as something that is always both more and less real than the phenomenon 
it attempts to portray. 
Pater, Poetry, and the Romantic Prototype 
In his essay on the poetry of Dante Gabriel Rossetti, Pater shows his tendency 
to think of the artistic productions of a single mind as objects in relation to one 
another, to be arranged not temporally (in terms of chronology) but spatially (in terms 
of topography):  
The dwelling-place in which one finds oneself by chance or destiny, yet can 
partly fashion for oneself; never properly one’s own at all, if it be changed too 
lightly; in which every object has its associations—the dim mirrors, the 
portraits, the lamps, the books, the hair-tresses of the dead and visionary magic 
crystals in secret drawers, the names and words scratched on the windows, 
windows open upon prospects the saddest or the sweetest; the house one must 
quit, yet taking perhaps, how much of its quietly active light and colour along 
with us!—grown now to be a kind of raiment to one’s body, as the body, 
according to Swedenborg, is but the raiment of the soul—under that image the 
whole of Rossetti’s work might count as a House of Life, of which he is but the 
“Interpreter.” And it is a “haunted” house.101 
The figure of the house is central to the Paterian imaginative landscape, serving (as 
Perry Meisel so eloquently puts it) as “a cipher for a notion of cultural 
achievement . . . of the discipline required of genius on both the level of individual 
achievement and the level of civilization.”102  Yet as Pater’s narrative sketch of 
Rossetti’s work seems to suggest, all of these marks of progress are built and are 
balanced rather precariously on the foundations of the past, rendering each creative act 
a partial return to origins, a regression that is as stimulating as it is uncanny.  The 
objects that decorate this idealized “dwelling-place” are significantly all things that 
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facilitate moments of doubling and doubling-back.  In addition to more 
straightforward memorial tokens—the portraits, the locks of hair frequently used in 
mourning jewelry, signatures that in time read like epitaphs—there are tools of 
reflection and refraction, the mirrors, lamps, and crystals.  And there are also those 
portals that open literally and figuratively into other cherished and familiar scenes—
the windows and books that frame “prospects the saddest or the sweetest.”  All of 
these things come together in this description to create an atmosphere that is both 
melancholy and fantastical, if only because of the suggestion of the mystical or the 
occult attached to the idea of secret “visionary magic crystals” and unknown words 
scratched on glass.   
This infusing of the domestic with an element of the magical or miraculous is 
connected to the purpose of this passage, which is to capture the essence of the process 
by which external spaces are incorporated into the consciousness of the artist.  This 
process is depicted as akin to an instance of metempsychosis, but instead of the soul of 
the scene simply changing forms, Pater portrays this transformation as the atmosphere 
of the dwelling-place becoming a kind of “raiment” that clings to the physical body of 
the viewer, making it something potentially visible to others.  While thus impressing 
itself onto the living figure of the artist, this formative “image” also gives shape to his 
creative faculties.  It is, as Pater argues, the dwelling-place in which “one finds oneself 
by chance or destiny,” which means both that one cannot deliberately search out this 
charmed space but also that it is here that one “finds oneself,” becomes conscious of 
oneself in the act of viewing.  This moment of self-recognition is bound up in 
understanding how one’s perspective is determined by the “associations” which 
certain scenes and objects evoke, but as Pater stresses, these associations are always 
the unconscious product of what came before, of previous experiences that one did not 
consciously register at the time as integral to one’s intellectual and aesthetical 
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development.  For this reason, to revisit the sites of one’s profoundest encounters with 
the outside world is to feel oneself “haunted” by the ghosts of earlier sensations that 
one can only imperfectly recall. 
The image of the house here echoes that of Rossetti’s sonnet-sequence “The 
House of Life.”  Pater’s interest in this series of poems arguably is owing to more than 
the aptness of its title within the context of his own review of Rossetti.  Like Pater, 
Rossetti is also invested in the idea of tracing and recording a sequence of significant 
moments, in this case, moments that pertain to the formation and dissolution of 
romantic love.  In the prefatory sonnet with which Rossetti introduces “The House of 
Life,” he calls the sonnet form “a moment’s monument,— / Memorial from the Soul’s 
eternity / To one dead deathless hour” (1-3), a description that also encapsulates the 
structure of the Paterian imaginary portrait, another literary edifice devoted to the 
enshrinement of past experiences, albeit intensely personal ones.103  Rossetti’s “House 
of Life,” like John Bunyan’s “House of the Interpreter,” offers a model for the kind of 
narrative that the portraits come to exemplify: stories largely lacking in actual plot but 
consisting of a number of tableaus rich in symbolic import.  All of Rossetti’s works 
(Pater does not here distinguish between his poetry and his paintings) thus are 
presented as verbal and visual interpretations of the image of that internalized, ideal 
dwelling-place, each offering a glimpse into that room from its own unique angle. 104 
Pater’s remarks on Rossetti gesture towards his own creative preoccupation 
with perceptible forms of aesthetic experience, or the narration of moments in which 
                                                 
103 Dante Gabriel Rossetti, The House of Life: A Sonnet Sequence, introductory sonnet (Portland, ME: 
Thomas B. Mosher, 1908) xiii. 
104 John Bunyan’s Pilgrim’s Progress, the seventeenth-century Christian allegory widely read well into 
the nineteenth-century, lies behind Rossetti’s and Pater’s elaborations of the figure of the house.  That 
Pater at one point deems Rossetti just an “Interpreter” of his own “House of Life” implies that, for him, 
the web of personal experiences that determine the artist’s “light and colour”—his particular creative 
vantage point—is something that the artist in his many productions does not directly convey, but rather 
only translates. Gerald Monsman has noted the importance of Bunyan in Pater’s writings, although he 
focuses not on the “House of the Interpreter” passage but the later “House Beautiful” section and its 
relation to the quest-epic form that he sees as contributing to the imaginary portraits. 
 148 
the consciousness of the aesthete is manifested in its relation to those actual spaces 
and objects that gave it shape.  The dwelling-place of Pater’s description is a metaphor 
for this consciousness, a space crowded with things that in turn are meant to signify 
pivotal instances of aesthetic engagement.  In providing a concrete image that 
collapses a temporal continuum into a spatial format, Pater evidences a commitment to 
the idea that, though lost in reality, aesthetic experiences leave their mark on the mind, 
creating an internalized topography of sorts that can be read like a map of the 
individual’s most vital moments.  Breaking down this map into its component parts is, 
as Pater notes elsewhere, a means of honing and proving one’s own aesthetic faculties.  
For instance, Pater likens the reading of Wordworth’s poetry to a kind of aesthetic 
training, creating an ability—cultivated through hard work—of separating gold from 
dross, the “golden pieces” representing what is “organic, animated, expressive” in the 
poem and the dross what is “conventional, derivative, inexpressive.”105  Pater sees 
those who have “followed this difficult way” as having “passed through some 
initiation, a disciplina arcani,” a form of discipline the result of which is access to 
secret or arcane knowledge.106  This evaluation of Wordsworth offers a subtle but 
important revision of John Stuart Mill’s famous description of Wordsworth’s poetry as 
“medicine” for the mind, offering moral instruction through the representation of (as 
Mill puts it) “states of feeling, and of thought coloured by feeling, under the 
excitement of beauty.”107  Pater, like Mill, locates in Wordsworth’s poetry the edifying 
example of a “contemplative” nature, but it is an aesthetic, rather than ethical, 
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edification.  To read Rossetti and Wordsworth—in Pater’s formulation—is to learn 
how to distinguish the parts of a particular work that are commonplace and imitative 
from those that are expressive of an original and distinctive vision, to distinguish dross 
from gold.   
Pater’s view that the works of the imagination are “organic, animated, 
expressive” owes a great deal to Coleridge’s concept of the imagination, particularly 
as it is elaborated in “The Aeolian Harp,” which envisions the poet’s connectedness to 
an aesthetic universe.  Although not expressly stated, the distinction between imitation 
and creation is a slightly tweaked version of the Coleridgean distinction between fancy 
and imagination.  For Coleridge, “fancy,” a lower order of the mental processes, 
arranges and reorders sensory data while “imagination,” part of a higher order, is 
responsible for the creation of organically-unified forms derived from the same body 
of information.  For Pater, though, while he agrees with the ranked division of the two, 
the real point of differentiation between fancy and imagination has less to do with the 
final product—the work of art—than it does with what this final product tells us about 
the mind that created it.  Pater opens his essay on Wordsworth by restating the 
substance of Coleridge’s argument, but then goes on to lobby for his own particular 
emphasis:  
Some English critics at the beginning of the present century had a great deal to 
say concerning a distinction, of much importance, as they thought, in the true 
estimate of poetry, between the Fancy, and another more powerful faculty—
the Imagination.  This metaphysical distinction, borrowed originally from the 
writings of German philosophers, and perhaps not always clearly apprehended 
by those who talked of it, involved a far deeper and more vital distinction, with 
which indeed all true criticism more or less directly has to do, the distinction, 
namely, between higher and lower degrees of intensity in the poet’s perception 
of his subject, and in his concentration of himself upon his work.108 
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At once aligning his own ideas with the philosophical tradition of German Idealism 
and distancing himself from the individual perhaps most responsible for transmitting 
its central tenets to an English audience—Samuel Taylor Coleridge—Pater uses the 
distinction between fancy and imagination to establish his own critical position.  He 
acknowledges the role that this “metaphysical distinction” plays in “the true estimate 
of poetry,” but claims a superior level of critical acumen for those who recognize the 
“deeper and more vital distinction” underlying it.  This more fundamental distinction 
(fundamental in the sense that it is something with which “all true criticism more or 
less directly has to do”) is one not of kind but of degree; poetry is to be judged 
according to the amount of intensity in “the poet’s perception of his subject” and to 
“his concentration of himself upon his work.”  Similarly, critical works are to be 
evaluated based on the degree of “apprehension” the critic evidences and just how 
much his criticism “has to do” with distinguishing between the higher and lower forms 
of poetic intensity. The intimation here is that poetical and critical excellence rest on 
the same foundations.  In both cases, it is the clarity and strength of perception and 
one’s receptiveness to the subject matter that determines the quality of the work.  
Significantly, Pater’s standard of literary excellence has nothing to do with any 
particular moral or social code of conduct.  It is instead a question of fidelity to one’s 
vision of the world and understanding of the self.  In this way, Pater might be seen as 
attempting to recuperate the Romantic insistence on the primacy, the quasi-religious 
significance of perceptual experience from the didactic interests that it had been made 
to serve by Victorian sages like Mill, Carlyle, and Ruskin.  But his revision of 
Coleridge’s distinction also works to destabilize the binary opposition between 
different genres and modes of representation.  In much the same way that the 
“Winckelmann” chapter in The Renaissance blurs the lines between poetry and prose 
by defining “poetry” as “all literary production which attains the power of giving 
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pleasure by its form, as distinct from its matter,” Pater here undermines the division 
between creative work and critical analysis with the claim that both depend primarily 
on the acuity of the author.109  The imagination is thus no longer solely the province of 
the creative artist: it is a mental faculty that is used by both the artist and the critic, as 
long as they are superior viewers, capable of viewing intensely and self-consciously.   
Pater’s reconceptualization of the imagination / fancy dichotomy shows Pater’s 
resistance to interpretative systems that ascribe value on the basis of anything other 
than the text’s formal evidencing of a superior aesthetic sensibility.  In its attempt to 
revise the grounds upon which a work is judged as the product of fancy or 
imagination, this passage also opens up two conceptual questions significant to the 
topic of my discussion: how do we characterize Pater’s understanding of the word 
“imaginary” and in what way, exactly, does that understanding impact how we, in 
turn, make sense of his imaginary portraits?  “Organic, animated, expressive” is how 
Pater describes those parts of Wordsworth’s poetry that show the engagement of the 
imagination, but as his modification of Coleridge’s “metaphysical distinction” seems 
to suggest, it is also a matter of how a work gives structure to its creator’s unique 
personality and perspective, concretizing it into picture or narrative that testifies to the 
exalted nature of its own origins.  For a text to be “imaginary,” then, is for it to form 
an image that is “organic” in, “animated” by, and “expressive” of the organizing 
consciousness of its author.  Whether it is a deliberate reply to Coleridge or merely an 
evocation of a broader cultural understanding of imagination, Pater’s description of 
imaginative activity echoes the famous question that Coleridge puts to his “pensive 
Sara” in “The Aeolian Harp”: 
And what if all of animated nature 
Be but organic Harps diversely fram’d, 
That tremble into thought, as o'er them sweeps 
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Plastic and vast, one intellectual breeze, 
At once the Soul of each, and God of all? (44-48, emphasis mine)110 
Expressing a yearning for a pantheistic explanation of the universe, Coleridge 
considers in these lines the possibility that God is not transcendent but immanent.  
Rather than standing outside the world, God is seen as in and of the world, making all 
things in nature manifestations of this divine presence, each a part of an organically-
unified whole.  Though there is little in Pater’s oeuvre that suggests neo-pantheism, 
his sympathy for pantheism as a system of thought and a creative stimulus is evident 
even in his first published article, “Coleridge’s Writings” (1866), in which he argues 
that what makes Coleridge’s theory of the imagination distinctive is the 
“Schellingistic” (Pater’s word) pantheist worldview that underwrites it.111   
After describing Coleridge’s understanding of the imagination as “a vigorous 
act of association, which by simplifying and restraining their natural expression to an 
artificial order, refines and perfects the types of human passion,” Pater goes on to 
elaborate on how Coleridge’s theory shows “that faint glamour of the philosophy of 
nature which was ever influencing his thoughts”:  
[That philosophy] suggested the idea of a subtly winding parallel, a ‘rapport’ in 
every detail between the human mind and the world without it, laws of nature 
being so many transformed ideas. Conversely, the ideas of the human mind 
would be only transformed laws.  Genius would be in a literal sense an 
exquisitely purged sympathy with nature. Those associative conceptions of the 
imagination, those unforeseen types of passion, would come, not so much of 
the artifice and invention of the understanding, as from self-surrender to the 
suggestions of nature; they would be evolved by the stir of nature itself 
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realizing the highest reach of its latent intelligence; they would have a kind of 
antecedent necessity to rise at some time to the surface of the human mind.112   
The appeal of Coleridge’s speculation—as Pater describes it here—is in the way in 
which it locates the source of all imaginative activity not in the mind but in the 
continuing dialogue between the human mind and an intelligence latent in nature.  It is 
a relational or associative worldview; every human idea is the expression of some 
natural law and every natural law confirms the truth of some human idea.  The mark of 
genius, then, is the degree to which the “artificial” forms of an artist’s creations 
showcase the correlation between a particular “type[] of human passion” and the 
aspect of nature that suggested it.  Yet, when Pater speaks of “the suggestions of 
nature,” he does not mean simply that Coleridge believes that a natural object inspires 
a certain emotional state; it is also that the very existence of the natural object calls for 
and necessitates a fuller realization in the mind of the individual of what the object 
itself only imperfectly suggests.  In Coleridge’s formulation, nature itself awakens in 
the individual a sympathetic awareness of the correspondences between interior and 
exterior states of being.  Most importantly, the greater one’s receptivity to this 
awareness, the more one comes to embody the “highest reach” of nature, exhibiting an 
exquisitely refined sensibility to the natural foundation of all imaginative activity.   
What makes the pantheistic underpinning of Coleridge’s theory of the 
imagination so intriguing to Pater is arguably that it offers a means of escaping (if only 
in theory) the solipsistic confinement of imaginative activity to the individual 
consciousness.  In Coleridge’s philosophy of nature, God’s existence—manifested in 
the natural world—is visibly present and thus capable of being recognized and 
deciphered by viewers who are themselves “organic harps diversely fram’d,” animated 
and united by the same divine presence that infuses all perceptible objects in nature.  
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Offering an unbroken line of connection and continuity between the perceived and the 
perceiver, Coleridge’s poetic pantheism transforms the consciousness of the receptive 
observer into an instrument (“organic” in the etymological sense of the organon—
“organ of the body” or “tool”). The imaginative productions of this observer are also 
transformed when considered from the perspective of this theory.  No longer wholly 
subjective impressions or monologic utterances, works of art become testaments to 
their creators’ engagements with nature.  As epitomized by Coleridge’s “conversation 
poem” form, art objects in a pantheistic framework read like dialogues with silent 
interlocutors, recreations of a moment of correspondence between the elevated 
sensibility of the viewer and the suggestive atmosphere of his surroundings.   
Elsewhere in “Coleridge’s Writings” Pater expresses his wariness of pantheism 
as an abstract philosophical concept, a wariness echoed whenever confronting any 
system of thought that would restrict the free play of the individual’s impressions or 
that might harness those impressions in the service of some narrow epistemology.  
However, in spite of his stated ambivalence towards theories that would attempt to 
explain man’s relation to nature in terms of a set of fixed laws, Pater evidences a 
certain attraction to pantheism in its most primitive form: as an “unfixed poetical 
prepossession,” found first in the culture of ancient Greece (and later in “a certain 
class of minds” epitomized by a young Coleridge, prior to his embracing of a more 
orthodox Christianity) and marked by “the conception of nature as living, thinking, 
almost speaking to the mind of man.”113  In this incarnation, pantheism is not a 
religious belief or philosophical doctrine so much as it is an attitude, a poetic notion 
that colors the individual’s experience of the natural world.  Moments of aesthetic 
appreciation of nature suggest an almost mystical communication between the viewer 
and the landscape he surveys.  The individual is thus not simply appreciating nature 
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but is forced to recognize in a particular scene or object its quintessence, the animating 
and organizing spirit of it that corresponds closely with his own.   
To sense that nature is animated by a pervasive but disembodied world-soul is 
not all that different from sensing in a work of art or literature the animating 
consciousness of its creator or in a culture the animating force of a zeitgeist, which 
partially explains Pater’s sympathy for more poetical professions of pantheistic belief.  
In the Imaginary Portraits, Pater himself attempts to capture the distinctive essences 
of particular periods in history and of the personalities that are their least-corrupted 
products.  But, in “Coleridge’s Writings,” pantheism also speaks to the desire to 
explain the way in which aesthetic experiences seem to depend on a feeling of 
correspondence (whether actual or imagined) between the individual mind and the 
outside world and to outline the mental process by which these formative encounters 
come to give structure to the consciousness of that individual.  This desire finds fuller 
(and less conflicted) expression in Pater’s first imaginary portrait, “The Child in the 
House,” in which the protagonist, Florian Deleal, much like Coleridge’s unnamed 
speaker in “Kubla Khan,” falls asleep and dreams of a symbolically-freighted 
landscape inhabited by a dream-surrogate (in Pater’s case, the child-self of Florian).  
In Coleridge’s so-called poetic “fragment,” the speaker’s dream is said to have 
resulted from an “anodyne,” which caused him to lose consciousness in the midst of 
reading a passage in “Purchas’s Pilgrimage” detailing the palace and grounds of the 
Mongol emperor Kubla Khan.  Similarly, Florian’s dream is also preceded by an 
encounter with a story-telling traveler (albeit an actual as opposed to a textual 
encounter): “As Florian Deleal walked, one hot afternoon, he overtook by the wayside 
a poor aged man . . . and as the man told his story, it chanced that he named a place, a 
little place in the neighborhood of a great city, where Florian had passed his earliest 
years” (3).  That both are inspired by tales of pilgrimage suggestively associates the 
 156 
subsequent delineations of dreamscapes with the exotic and far-flung locales typically 
found in quest-narratives.   
Yet while Coleridge dreams of the mystical summer-palace in Xanadu, Florian 
dreams of his birthplace, making Pater’s narrative as much a story of return as one of 
venturing-forth.  Also, whereas “Kubla Khan” is typically Romantic in its description 
of a fantastical space in which the awe-inspiring forces of Nature act as an analogue 
for those of the Imagination (an expression of his early belief in—as M.H. Abrams has 
described it—“the Neoplatonic concept of the natura naturans, a dynamic principle 
which operates not only behind the particulars of the external world, but also in the 
mind of man”114), “The Child in the House” presents the reader with a landscape that 
seems animate and organically-unified precisely because it is seen through the eyes of 
Florian’s younger incarnation.  In “The Child in the House,” the imagination is no 
longer another manifestation of the same divine essence that is in evidence in the 
natural world.  Instead, the young Florian’s imagination, his “childish fancy,” is a 
vehicle through which Pater is able to represent feelings of connection with the outside 
world approximate to the kind inspired by a belief in an animated universe.  Florian’s 
formative experiences in and around his childhood are organized in Pater’s text into a 
narrative of aesthetic development.  Charting the process whereby the individual 
comes into consciousness of himself as an aesthetic subject, this quiet story of an 
isolated boy in a country house invites comparison to the quest-epic form in that the 
“mental journey” of the narrative’s young protagonist is meant to be understood as a 
specific (and extraordinary) example of a universal “process of brain-building by 
which we are, each one of us, what we are” (4).  For the young Florian, this process of 
brain-building takes the form of a series of progressively sophisticated aesthetic 
encounters, in which early experiences with beauty start the development of his 
                                                 
114 M. H. Abrams, The Mirror and the Lamp (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1971) 131. 
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sensibilities and then those increasingly refined faculties, in turn, make him capable of 
expanding his scope of observation and of thinking critically about what he has 
observed. 
Although “The Child in the House” is the most autobiographical of his 
imaginary portraits, Pater takes pains distinguish the narrative form he is creating/ 
employing from that of the character sketch or memoir (fictional or otherwise).  
Florian’s dream is not a straightforward, nostalgic reminiscence of his old home; 
rather, it is “a dream which did for him the office of the finer sort of memory, bringing 
its object to mind with great clearness, yet, as sometimes happens in dreams, raised a 
little above itself, and above ordinary retrospect” (3).  Pater, distinguishing between 
the “finer sort of memory” and “ordinary retrospect,” employs here a spatial figuration 
common to his oeuvre: that of artistic “relief.”  Carolyn Williams, in her incisive 
discussion of Paterian tropes, defines “relief” (as Pater understands it) as “an art form 
that expresses the relation between levels of focus and distance as foreground to 
background, or figure to ground.”115  Like bas relief or a cameo, the “object” of 
Florian’s reverie—his first home—is not the thing itself but the thing raised above 
itself, elevated above “ordinary retrospect” in a way that transforms it into something 
worthy of artistic contemplation.  The outward appearance of the house is not altered 
in his dream; it is the same building, “only with tints more musically blent on wall and 
floor, and some finer light and shadow running in and out along its curves and angles, 
and with all its little carvings daintier” (3).  Seen in the light of the adult Florian’s 
unconscious, aestheticizing perspective, the various parts of the building are unified 
and put in relation to one another in such a way that they form a coherent image, much 
like in a visual composition.116   
                                                 
115 Transfigured World 69. 
116 It is probably worth nothing here that in Pater’s writing generally, the so-called “light” on an object 
is often meant to signify the unifying gaze of a particular perspective. 
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The central object in this mental picture, to which all other things serve as 
backdrop, is the younger incarnation of Florian, the prototypical aesthete-in-training 
whose developing sensibilities are the focus of the narrative.  That the dynamics of 
“relief” also affect how he is to be viewed is evident from the first mention of the 
child’s appearance in the dream: “In the house and garden of his dream he [the older 
Florian] saw a child moving, and could divide the main streams, at least, of the winds 
that had played on him, and study so the first stage in that mental journey” (4).  
Florian sees a child in his dream house and gardens but fails to recognize that that 
child is his earlier self, and highlighting the difference and distance between them is 
the older Florian’s deliberately objective (and objectifying) stance.  In a utilization of 
the typically gendered codes of viewership, Florian is presented as the active subject 
who, from a removed vantage point, is capable of elucidating from the tableau put 
before him the relation between (to use Williams’ terms) “figure and ground,” his 
child-self and those things that might have an effect upon him.  In contrast, the child is 
described as a passive object, something to be acted upon by his surroundings and 
evaluated by the critical eye of his future self.  Moreover, in what seems an intentional 
echoing of “The Aeolian Harp,” the child is likened to a musical instrument, animated 
by “the main streams . . . of the winds that had played on him.”   
Pater, thus distinguishing the younger from the older Florian through this 
veiled system of aesthetic binaries, also reinforces the boundaries of the narrative 
frame that work to separate the dreamer from the product of his dream.  Florian, as an 
adult, views his own childhood much as the reader does; both Florian and the reader 
are viewers surveying the development of the child, watching “in that half-
spiritualized house . . . the gradual expansion of the soul which had come to be, there” 
(4).  While it is nevertheless a picture of his own early experience that he is observing, 
Florian’s distanced and critical attitude towards the dream-tableau makes it difficult to 
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see it as a sentimental self-portrait.  For one thing, Pater does not provide any real 
information regarding the adult Florian, meaning that there is no way of comparing 
him to the personality outlined in his dream.  Also, the persistent rhetorical “othering” 
of the child continually gestures towards the idea that there is something essential and 
unique about the young Florian, particularly in his association with “that half-
spiritualized house.”  To say that the child’s soul “had come to be, there”—a phrase 
whose awkward comma placement insists upon the connection between “being” and 
“being there”—as opposed to simply “had come to be” is to link the emergent 
personality of the child to a particular place at a particular moment in time.  It is also 
to suggest that there is something especially important to be gleaned from observing 
not simply the child himself, but the child against the backdrop of his first home.   
The dream figures as a re-imagining of the originary and tangible source of all 
of the adult Florian’s aesthetic feelings and impressions, the point to which he might 
“trac[e] back the threads of his complex spiritual habit” (5).  If we take “habit” here to 
mean both a customary activity and the vestments typically worn to signify one’s 
profession (a metaphorical reading further justified by Pater’s reference to the 
“threads” of this “habit”), Pater intimates that the description of the child’s “portrait” 
will serve as a narrative unraveling of Florian’s “texture [] of mind,” the patterns of 
thought and preferences that make him what he is (presumably, an aesthete).  As other 
critics have noted, for Pater, superior perceptual abilities often have a perceptible 
quality.117  In other words, figures possessed of unusually sensitive aesthetic faculties 
themselves are described in Pater’s work as having a discernible aura that renders 
them objects worthy of contemplation and adulation by and for other (potential) 
subjects of aesthetic experience.  It is precisely this aura of aesthetic superiority that he 
                                                 
117 James Eli Adams talks at length about just this thing in Dandies and Desert Saints.  Particularly of 
note is his discussion of the visibility of masculine “reserve” in Marius the Epicurean, where he argues 
that, in the expression of “reserve,” “the spectator has become the performer, whose authority resides in 
a capacity at once to show and to control one’s feelings” (198). 
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will trace in the later portraits.  In “The Child in the House,” however, Pater is 
interested in providing through narrative a concrete basis or ground for legitimate 
aesthetic preferences, impressions, and judgments.  The topography of the adult 
Florian’s consciousness is mapped out for the reader through the story of the child’s 
formative experiences in his home and garden.  The defining characteristics of 
Florian’s aesthetic sensibilities are “trace[d] home” to various pivotal moments in the 
child’s life, serving to link up the “customary” sentiments that characterize the adult 
aesthete’s perspective to the material object or objects that first called these feelings 
into being.   
The individual’s emotional tenor and his encounters with a series of tangible 
vehicles are the two terms around which the narrative movement from innocence to 
experience revolves. Yet without the Romantic belief in a sentient universe to bind all 
things together “in God,” the network of correspondences between the mind of the 
child and the outside world outlined in Pater’s text lacks the philosophical validation 
of a “Great Chain of Being.”  In the Darwinian light of the late-nineteenth century, it 
is by chance, not destiny, that one comes by the experiences that shape one’s 
character.  Even if the individual is uniquely well-suited (even genetically hard-wired, 
Pater seems at times to intimate) for the rigors of aesthetic appreciation, the fruitful 
intersection of personality and place is always only an arbitrary occurrence: “half, tint 
and trace and accident of homely colour and form, from the wood and the bricks; half, 
mere soul-stuff, floated thither from who knows how far” (4).  In the same vein, Pater 
also dispenses with the notion that the aesthetic faculties can be honed only through 
early exposure to established examples of natural or man-made beauty, arguing that “it 
is false to suppose a child’s sense of beauty is dependent on any choiceness, or special 
fineness, in the objects which present themselves to it” (5).118  Rather, it is the ability 
                                                 
118 Of course, it is debatable how far one should take this assertion.  Certainly Pater’s own work as an 
art-critic depends upon the idea of an artistic “canon,” and the influence of Hegel can be seen in his 
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of an object to evoke “a difference for the sense” that renders it “aesthetic.”  In the 
case of the child, even the air pollution from distant factories (which adds a range of 
colors to the sky) has its appeal “in the lack of better ministries” (5).   
One of the “better ministries” that Pater (again, through his employment of 
distinctive terminology) might be referencing here is once more to be found in the 
early poetry of Coleridge, in this instance, “the secret ministry of frost” that is the 
source of the speaker’s ecstatic vision of his own child’s aesthetic awakening in the 
poem “Frost at Midnight.”  Pater’s ministry of smog—one of the many “things 
without thus ministering” to the child throughout “The Child in the House”—is 
distinct from the “ministry of frost” in “Frost at Midnight” in that the two authors 
understand ministration differently.  In Coleridge’s poem, the speaker espouses the 
idea that it is better for a child to be brought up in nature because  
[ . . . ] so shalt thou see and hear  
The lovely shapes and sounds intelligible  
Of that eternal language, which thy God  
Utters, who from eternity doth teach  
Himself in all, and all things in himself. (58-62)119  
For Coleridge, the development of the aesthetic faculties is directly tied to the pursuit 
of divine knowledge. To attain fluency in the symbolic meanings of objects in nature 
is to become a hierophant capable of interpreting “the eternal language,” the hidden 
order of the universe. Gerard Genette would see in Coleridge’s poetic vision another 
example of what he calls “a psychological phenomenon” constitutive of many systems 
of aesthetics:  the “tendency toward objectivization,” that is, the tendency to read into 
one’s own subjective impressions of an aesthetic object a confirmation of its inherent 
properties or value.  In contradistinction to this position, Genette argues, is that of 
                                                                                                                                            
frequent prioritization of works of art over objects in nature.  What I take this assertion to mean is that, 
contrary to the idea put forth in many “how-to” manuals of aesthetic appreciation popular in the period, 
there is no standard education that might be said to prepare one for the role of an aesthete.  
119 Samuel Taylor Coleridge: Selected Poetry and Prose 94.  
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“aesthetic relativism,” which “consists solely in taking note of an empiric, a posteriori, 
unsystematic datum (the plurality of appreciation) and in recognizing its cause (the 
subjective or relative nature of these appreciations).”120  Judged by this standard, Pater 
is much more of an aesthetic relativist.  In “The Child in the House,” Pater evokes the 
idea of an aesthetic ministry mainly to suggest the way in which various things 
become linked by their shared significance in the mind of the individual.  Objects have 
value to the degree that they command the attention and appreciation of the child and 
are later incorporated into his “house-room” of memory, “giving form and feature . . . 
to early experiences of feeling and thought” and creating certain “susceptibilities” 
which come to define the adult’s relation to the world (6).  Similarly, his first house—
the source of so many of these experiences—“becomes a sort of material shrine or 
sanctuary of sentiment,” an external correlative to the interior space of consciousness, 
as weighted with symbolic meaning as the “Nature” of Coleridge’s poem.   
Though his relativist position—by locating meaning not in the object but in the 
subject—effectively evacuates from the material world the atmosphere of divinity that 
is perceptually present to Coleridge, Pater’s language throughout this portrait (and, 
one might add, throughout the other portraits) retains a decidedly sacral cast.  The 
house is likened to a “shrine” and a “sanctuary,” and the life of the child “who lived 
on there quietly” is described as ascetic, almost monkish, in its seemingly perpetual 
state of contemplative solitude.  Of course, these religious forms of expression are 
being utilized in a secular context, which raises the ever-contentious question of 
whether Pater’s use of Christian tropes actually evidences anything beyond a 
meaningless love of the ceremonial.  I instead would argue that, for Pater, there is no 
such thing as an empty ritual.  All of his protagonists are characterized as possessing 
an inherent solemnity or gravitas—what, in “The Prince of Court Painters,” is referred 
                                                 
120 The Aesthetic Relation 68, 119. 
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to as “an air of seemly thought . . . le bel sérieux” (25)—that invests their actions with 
a kind of deliberation that verges on the ceremonial.  What is more, in “The Child in 
the House,” aesthetic experience is itself typically figured, in different ways, as a rite, 
a personal transformative event that is also a public (re)enactment of the dual 
“recognitions of the visible, tangible, audible loveliness of things, as a very real and 
somewhat tyrannous element in them—and of the sorrow of the world, of grown 
people and children and animals, as a thing not to be put by in them” (8).  In calling 
Florian’s first home “the material shrine or sanctuary of sentiment,” Pater is indicating 
its significance, not simply as the site of the child’s initial aesthetic experience but as 
the ground for all of his later aesthetic experiences.  It represents “a system of visible 
symbolism,” that, when anatomized over the course of the narrative, showcases the 
ways in which a particular “sentiment”—the individual’s feeling or attitude towards 
something—is always a hearkening back to the first time (and first place) that this 
sentiment was elicited.    
The symbolic network of sentiment embodied in the image of the house offers 
the relativistic “modern spirit” the closest thing possible to a sense of universality—of 
a continuous, permanent and comprehensible connection with things outside the self—
in a world now deaf to the “sounds intelligible” of the “eternal language.”  This 
feeling of continuity is fostered by perceived similarities between seemingly dissimilar 
aesthetic experiences, similarities that ring like echoes in the mind of the child, 
producing the same emotional response.  Organizing his narrative of development 
around such echoes, Pater thus makes visible the process of “brain-building” that goes 
along with the experience of recurrent “sentiments of beauty and pain.”  These “two 
streams of impressions” serve to shape the child’s consciousness, arousing in him 
what is rather ambiguously described as “a more than customary sensuousness: the 
‘lust of the eye,’ as the Preacher says, which might lead him, one day, how far!” (8, 
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emphasis mine).  The intrusive voice of “the Preacher” in this passage evidences 
Pater’s awareness of how his focus on the “sensuousness” of aesthetic experience 
might be interpreted by a public audience already suspicious of any worldview that 
prioritizes the pleasures of the body over the salvation of the soul.  In the figure of the 
Preacher, Pater ventriloquizes the alarmist position previously adopted by those who 
found in the “Conclusion” to The Renaissance a host of ideas corrupting to susceptible 
youths and for whom the cultivation of exquisite experiences was seen as dangerously 
decadent, the first step on the road to ruin.121  Yet, there is also another “Preacher” 
who Pater positions himself against here: the lionized Slade Professor of Fine Arts, 
John Ruskin.  In an early work, The Elements of Drawing, Ruskin advocates the 
importance of regaining what he famously calls “the innocence of the eye; that is to 
say, of a sort of childish perception of these flat stains of colour, merely as such, 
without consciousness of what they signify;—as a blind man would see them if 
suddenly gifted with sight.”122  Jonathan Crary posits that by “innocence of the eye,” 
Ruskin means “a vantage point uncluttered by the weight of historical codes and 
conventions of seeing,” a mode of perception that seeks “to avoid the repetitiveness of 
the formulaic and conventional.”123  Though ably illuminating one aspect of Ruskin’s 
proposal, Crary’s explanation overlooks the thing that one imagines Pater most would 
have objected to: that Ruskin’s ideal viewer comes to the aesthetic object with no 
previous perceptual experience, lacking the capacity to make distinctions, to compare 
or prefer.  The “innocent eye” demands a prelapsarian purity of vision, informed by 
neither knowledge nor desire.   
For Pater, though, there is no especial virtue to be found in such a model of 
aesthetic experience.  A gaze uncorrupted by a “consciousness” of what things 
                                                 
121 Just an aside: the words of the Preacher are from the KJB, John 2:16: “For all that is in the world, the 
lust of the flesh, and the lust of the eyes, and the pride of life, is not of the Father, but is of the world.” 
122 John Ruskin, The Elements of Drawing (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1888) 22. 
123 Jonathan Crary, Techniques of the Observer (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999) 96. 
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“signify” is little better than a tabula rasa, a blank surface on which the images that 
continuously flash across it leave no trace or mark.  To see with this innocent eye—as 
Pater suggests in the “Conclusion—is to be forever caught in Heraclitean flux (a 
never-ending stream of “impressions, unstable, flickering, inconsistent”124), incapable 
of deriving from or investing in the moment anything permanent.  It is also to be 
curiously resistant to the affective power of aesthetic objects, their inherent emotional 
and/ or erotic appeal.  The receptivity of the protagonist in Pater’s portrait to these 
forms of appeal is what makes his perception—though he is a child—anything but 
“childish.”  Possessing a “lustful” eye rather than an innocent one, the child’s 
sensibility is defined (and, in a sense, predetermined) by the “more than customary 
sensuousness” of his responses to certain natural and artistic tableaus, specifically 
those that strongly represent and evoke “sentiments of beauty and pain” (8).  Pater’s 
conception of aesthetic experience is structured by the relation between what I earlier 
called the suffering of beauty and the beauty of suffering: beautiful objects tyrannize 
the senses while representations of physical suffering can seem beautiful.   
In “The Child in the House,” Pater describes the twin experiences of beauty 
and pain as fundamental to the child’s mental development.  “Those elementary 
apprehensions of the tenderness and of the colour in things” (as Pater calls them in one 
passage) are linked in the mind of the child by their shared ability to temporarily arrest 
the unconscious flow of impressions in a moment of intense sensation (9).  The 
sensuous component of these moments imparts to them their particular clarity.  The 
strong association between the apprehended object and the feeling that it inspired 
gives these experiences a kind of presence that inscribes them indelibly in the child’s 
consciousness with all the vividness and detail of visual compositions.  At the same 
time, the narrativizing of these formative encounters focuses not simply on the child’s 
                                                 
124 The Renaissance 187. 
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engagement with a particular object or scene but also on its aftermath or, perhaps one 
should say, its afterlife, the way in which it the moment extends beyond itself by 
shaping the adult Florian’s aesthetic sensibilities.  One incident that amply illustrates 
this dynamic is the child’s discovery of a blooming hawthorn tree, an experience 
which the narrator describes as inadvertent, yet definitive: 
I have remarked how, in the process of our brain-building, as the house of 
thought in which we live gets itself together . . . little accidents have their 
consequence; and thus it happened that, as he walked one evening a garden 
gate, usually closed, stood open; and lo! Within, a great red hawthorn, in full 
flower . . . a plumage of tender crimson fire out of the heart of the dry wood.  
The perfume of the tree had now and again reached him, in the currents of the 
wind, over the wall, and he had wondered what might be behind it, and was 
now allowed to fill his arms with flowers . . . the beauty of the thing struck 
home to him feverishly, and in dreams, all night, he loitered along a magic 
roadway of crimson flowers, which seemed to open ruddily in thick fresh 
masses around his feet . . . Always afterwards . . . the blossom of the red 
hawthorn still seemed to him absolutely the reddest of all things; and the 
goodly crimson, still alive in the works of old Venetian masters, or old Flemish 
tapestries, called out always from afar, the recollection of the flame in those 
perishing little petals, as it pulsed gradually out of them, kept long in the 
drawers of an old cabinet. Also, then, for the first time, he seemed to 
experience a passionateness in his relation to fair outward objects, which 
disturbed him, and from which he half-longed to be free.  A touch of regret or 
desire mingled all night with the remembered presence of the red flowers, and 
their perfume in the darkness about him; and the longing for some undivined, 
entire possession of them was the beginning of a revelation to him, growing 
ever clearer . . . (11) 
Earlier in “The Child in the House,” Pater compares the way aesthetic impressions 
penetrate the “sealed” and “enclosed” soul of the child to the way sensory data from 
“the larger world without” penetrates a similarly closed-off house “as at windows left 
ajar unknowingly, or over high garden walls” (8).  In this later passage, the figuring of 
aesthetic experience as a moment of infiltration, in which an impression of a sensible 
object in the real world passes into the enclosed space of the viewer’s consciousness, 
finds its literal equivalent in the child’s accidental intrusion into the secret garden 
 167 
containing the hawthorn tree.  As the commentary of the first-person narrator suggests, 
the child’s passage through the gate is a transformational moment, one consequential 
to the development of his “house of thought.”  For one thing, the image of the red 
hawthorn tree—it is intimated—is the originary source of at least one of the adult 
Florian’s aesthetic preferences:  his taste for Italian paintings and Flemish tapestries 
which possess a particular shade of “goodly crimson” reminiscent of the hawthorn 
blossom, “absolutely the reddest of all things.”  Also to be traced back to the child’s 
impression of the hawthorn tree is the “revelation” of his “passionateness,” his 
propensity for intense attachments to “fair outward objects.”   
Significantly, though, it is through the descriptive rendering of the tree that the 
extremity of the child’s reaction to it is registered.  The narrative is not in the child’s 
voice, but nevertheless, it is through his eyes, his imagination, that the scene is 
presented to the reader.  In the elaboration of the child’s vision (both what he sees in 
the moment and what he later dreams and recollects), the hawthorn tree functions as a 
symbolic index of the complicated, often contradictory sensations and feelings 
provoked by the encounter.  Thus, the guise in which it first appears to the child—as a 
“plumage of tender crimson fire out of the heart of the dry wood”—is suggestive of 
the outpouring of emotion he experiences while viewing it.  Similarly, the burgeoning 
awareness of his “passionateness” is manifested in the form of his dream, in which he 
walks along a roadway composed of blooming hawthorn flowers.  Even the disturbing 
undercurrent of erotic violence—the child’s longing for “some undivined, entire 
possession” of the hawthorn coupled with his own half-articulated desire to free 
himself from its oppressive influence—is captured in the arrestingly graphic 
description of the broken tree branch as a severed limb, life pulsing out of its 
“perishing little petals.”  Condensing a flood of sensory details into a linked series of 
images, Pater narratively reconstructs the process by which material objects are 
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impressed upon and incorporated into the mind of the viewer, becoming a kind of 
symbolic shorthand for subjective sensations of which the individual is only partially 
conscious.  The hawthorn tree—the first object to evoke desire—becomes, to the 
child, the objective embodiment of that emotion.   
Pater’s rendering of the aftermath of the child’s adventure indicates that it is 
not the moment of encounter with the aesthetic object which determines an 
individual’s preference but rather the awareness of the moment’s passing.  With the 
child, it is notable that even his gathering of the hawthorn blossoms does not satiate 
the need for the “entire possession” that his passion requires.  Indeed, almost as soon 
as the initial moment of ecstatic contemplation (in which the hawthorn’s existence, 
before only indirectly sensed through its elusive perfume, is manifestly present) is 
finished, the child is described as dominated by a feeling of “inexplicable excitement” 
over which he has no control.  “The remembered presence of the red flowers” is now 
mixed with “a touch of regret or desire,” the choice of conjunction suggesting that, 
when considered in relation to the immediate sensuous gratification of the aesthetic 
encounter, there is no real distinguishing between regret (which focuses on something 
in the past) and desire (which casts forward into the future); both are emotions whose 
object is not in the present, in the realm of the directly perceivable.  Whether the child 
feels desire or regret, what is significant is that he is now no longer able to 
uncomplicatedly exist in the moment.  The “revelation” of his own nature has changed 
his perspective, making him (self)conscious of a heretofore unacknowledged longing 
for a certain kind of experience.  
The experience with the Hawthorn tree is definitive to the child’s development 
insofar as it foregrounds the connection between bodily sensation and aesthetic 
perception.  Throughout “The Child in the House,” formative aesthetic moments 
mostly occur in extremis, at a moment in which the child senses what Pater calls “this 
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pressure upon him of the sensible world,” a feeling of pain or pleasure that 
underscores the corporeality of his own being and of the perceptible world.  Like the 
speaker in the “Aeolian Harp,” the child is described as “yield[ing] himself to these 
things, to be played upon them like a musical instrument” (12).  That being said, 
Nature is nowhere near the gentle handmaiden to experience in Pater’s narrative that 
she is in Coleridge’s poem.  Although the natural world plays a role in the expansion 
of the child’s aesthetic faculties, it is an arbitrary, somewhat violent one, as in an 
instance in which the child is bitten by a wasp:  
—and coming in one afternoon in September, along the red gravel walk, to 
look for a basket of yellow crabapples left in the cool, old parlour, he 
remembered it the more, and how the colors struck upon him, because a wasp 
on one bitten apple stung him, and he felt the passion of sudden, severe pain.  
For this too brought its curious reflexions; and, in relief from it, he would 
wonder over it—how it had then been with him—puzzled at the depth of the 
charm or spell over him, which lay . . . in the mere absence of pain. (12) 
Again, here, Pater’s narrativization of the incident (re)enacts the progression of events 
by which a series of impressions are unified in the mind of the viewer, transformed 
into a coherent aesthetic image.  By noting first the salient visual details—the red 
gravel and the yellow apples—the scene is already evoked when it is noted that these 
colors “struck upon him” (in much the same way that the beauty of the hawthorn 
“struck home”) “because . . . he felt the passion of sudden, severe pain” [emphasis 
mine].  The sting of the wasp, Pater suggests, is what gives the child’s impression of 
the room a hyper-real clarity, a vividness that is registered bodily by the sensation of 
passionate-pain.  Though any “ministering” by nature in this instance is inadvertent, 
an accidental confluence of circumstances, the feeling of pain nevertheless serves to 
punctuate the moment and set it apart from ordinary experience, making the scene in 
which it occurred—in a way—something to look at.  Elaine Scarry has argued that 
physical pain is “exceptional in the whole fabric of psychic, somatic, and perceptual 
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states for being the only one that has no object . . . pain is “not ‘of’ or ‘for’ anything—
it is itself alone.”125  Pater’s representation of the child in pain bears out this assertion 
to the extent that it is the irreducible, incomparable experience of pain that makes it a 
moment resistant to analysis and assimilation.  Because the child cannot recall the 
feeling of physical suffering in its absence, his memory of that afternoon is preserved 
as an aestheticized scene, a tableau that is as beautiful as it is unfamiliar when viewed 
from the “charmed” perspective of a subject relieved of the pressing awareness of 
intense bodily sensation.   
When the child, in the aftermath of the wasp incident, ponders the “depth of 
the charm or spell over him, which lay . . . in the mere absence of pain,” the 
description of pain’s absence as a “spell” suggests that, for Pater, the more abnormal 
state-of-being is not that of intense sensation but rather the lack of it.  That there is 
something dangerously anesthetizing about everyday routines and habits is an idea to 
which Pater returns to throughout his career.  In the imaginary portraits, though, he 
drives this point home by underscoring the revelatory potential of moments in which 
the viewing subject breaks through the “wall of custom,” in the process making visible 
to himself (and the reader) the myriad ways in which he is connected to the world, part 
of a causal network of relations in which he both acts and is acted upon.  The child’s 
discovery of this invisible network develops over the course of “The Child in the 
House,” but is perhaps nowhere better illustrated than when he is given the gift of a 
starling, only to realize that his desire for a pet resulted in the separation of a mother 
from her children.  Although eventually letting the bird go, the child nevertheless feels 
a sense of remorse tied to the insight that “he too was become an accomplice in 
moving, to the limit of his small power, the springs and handles of that great machine 
in things, constructed so ingeniously to play pain-fugues on the delicate nerve-work of 
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living creatures” (10).  In “Winckelmann,” Pater argues that the function of “modern 
art” is to represent the “tragic situation” that arises when the individual with an 
inherent “sense of freedom” comes in conflict with the “bewildering coils” of the 
“network” of natural laws.  Yet, he goes to say, it is not enough to simply depict one 
of these “fatal combinations” of personality and circumstance; one must do so while 
“reflecting” upon the situation a sense of “blitheness and repose”—Heiterkeit—that 
ennobles the subject matter, making the conflict a “spectacle of the dignity, not the 
impotence of the human spirit.”126  Though hardly serene, the child’s thoughts upon 
releasing the starling have the distanced tranquility usually found when considering 
something that seems less a real problem than a philosophical abstraction.  In the 
plight of the mother bird, the child sees a particular example of a universal condition:  
the starling beating itself against the bars of its cage as a symbolic embodiment of this 
instinctual desire for freedom in conflict with the restraining network of natural laws.  
Its pain is in this way elevated, dignified, transformed into a tragic spectacle with 
which the child powerfully—though not fully consciously—identifies.  Part of what 
makes this scene so affecting to the child is the revelation of his own complicity.  His 
desire for a pet being the indirect cause of the bird’s distress, his remorse is tied to a 
newfound awareness of how he, too, is bound up in this system, a part of “the great 
machine in things.”  The child’s remorse—like that of Hopkins’ famous Margaret—is 
not wholly unselfish, as there is obviously something deeply unsettling about the idea 
of nature as a “great machine” and of the living body (especially one’s own) as an 
instrument or tool that operates independently of one’s will.  Yet, significantly, this 
does not lessen the aesthetic appeal of envisioning the experience of pain or beauty as 
something enacted on the body.  To imagine suffering as a “pain-fugue” played upon a 
physical form wrought with “delicate nerve-work” is to externalize and aestheticize 
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the sensation, to make it something capable of being perceived and (it is hinted) 
appreciated, at least by those with what Pater calls, in reference to the child, a “strong 
innate sense for the soberer tones in things” (IP 15).   
The experience with the starling—as with all of the experiences outlined in the 
text—serves to reinforce what Pater describes as “instinctual in [the child’s] way of 
receiving the world”—that is, his need for a “sensible vehicle or occasion . . . the 
necessary concomitant of any perception of things” to make the experience “real 
enough to be of any weight or reckoning in his house of thought” (11).  In the same 
way, Pater’s narrative strives to make Florian’s “house of thought” “real enough” to 
the reader by illustrating how its structure is based upon that of its own “necessary 
concomitant”—the child’s first home—and how the “sensible vehicle[s]” with which 
the child therein comes in contact all have been incorporated into Florian’s 
consciousness as parts of a complex system of visible symbolism, each moment a 
particular “thread” in the aforementioned “spiritual habit.”  It is the weaving of this 
spiritual habit that Pater aims to reproduce through the narrativizing of Florian’s 
dream, in the process providing what might best be described as a map of 
consciousness.  By continually presenting the child as the passive recipient of the 
ecstatic moments of perception that come to shape him so profoundly, Pater 
underscores the accidental nature of aesthetic experience, the way in which it is not 
something to be sought but something imposed from without, a resistless force that 
overawes those susceptible to it by an inherent “lust of the eyes.”  Though there is 
presumably a democratic impulse behind this idea—in that Pater refuses to deem 
certain scenes and objects (such as those one might encounter on a Continental tour) 
more aesthetically “valuable” than others—the stress that he puts on the arbitrary 
intersection of personality and place also masks a weird masochistic elitism.  The 
fineness of the child’s perceptual faculties is proven time and again by his capacity for 
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suffering, for enduring the pain and passion inspired by the violent infliction of 
aesthetic experience.   
By putting the body of the aesthete at the center of the narrative, Pater grounds 
the subjective experience of beauty in the outside world, suggesting that the aesthetic 
faculties, even if they serve to whet appetites more than satisfy desires, offer the surest 
way of (temporarily but transcendently) escaping one’s essential solitude by 
engendering feelings of contact and communication with what lies outside isolating 
individual frames of reference, a “world . . . wherein are water and trees, and where 
men and women look, so and so, and press actual hands” (12).  Aesthetic education 
teaches Pater’s child “a trick even his pity learned, [of] fastening those who suffered in 
anywise to his affections by a kind of sensible attachments.”  These sensible 
attachments are what save him from ultimate and irrevocable despair in the deaths of 
his closest companions:  
He would think of Julian, fallen into incurable sickness, as spoiled in the sweet 
blossom of his skin like pale amber, and his honey-like hair; of Cecil, early 
dead, as cut off from the lilies, from golden summer days, from women’s 
voices; and then what comforted him a little was the thought of the turning of 
that child’s flesh to violets in the turf above him. (12) 
“Florian” derives comfort from the very floral idea of beautiful Cecil “in the sweet 
blossom of his skin” and Julian, now “cut off from the lilies,” both live on in the 
“violets” that grow above their graves.  Florian’s imaginings illustrate the degree to 
which his aesthetic development has provided him with a means of reconciling 
himself to the individual’s death by thinking of that individual as only one 
manifestation of an ongoing natural process of death and renewal.  In the more 
historical imaginary portraits, the deaths of their protagonists serve a similar function.  
When living, they cast an “unreal, imaginary light upon [common] scenes and 
persons,” which allows the rest of the world “to see . . . what makes life really 
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valuable” (37).  In their deaths, they are sacrificed to the forces of change that they 
have instigated; it is a sacrifice that promises a period of cultural renaissance that they 
presaged and embodied but that they cannot live to see, as it is in the diffusion of the 
“aspiring soul” of the Paterian aesthete at the moment of his death that the rest of the 
world takes his place, becoming, like him, “a seeker after something in the world, that 
is there in no satisfying measure, or not at all” (102, 43). 
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CHAPTER 5.  
“Not things that I created, but things that haunt me”:  Aesthetic Complicity in 
Nathaniel Hawthorne’s The Marble Faun 
In the effort to understand just what Nathaniel Hawthorne meant by labeling 
his literary works not novels but “romances,” it has become customary to look at his 
Prefaces and, to a certain degree, to take his word for it.  Yet, to do just that in regards 
to his last completed novel, The Marble Faun (1860), raises certain questions that 
forces the reader to recognize how perceptibly this final romance differs from his 
earlier productions by virtue of its setting amidst what Henry James aptly described as 
the “denser, richer, warmer, European spectacle.”  Set in Italy, mostly in Rome, The 
Marble Faun is literally half a world away from the New England villages that 
provide the backdrop to his previous romances.  More importantly, Hawthorne argues, 
the Italian scene is replete with those elements of “Ruin” on which “romance and 
poetry” thrive, those very same elements that are lacking in America, “a country 
where there is no shadow, no antiquity, no mystery, no picturesque and gloomy 
wrong, nor anything but a common-place prosperity, in broad and simple daylight.”127  
This difference, Hawthorne would have us believe, made this last novel less of a 
“trial” to the author than the earlier romances; already “a sort of poetic or fairy 
precinct,” Rome exudes the “quality of strangeness and remoteness” that the romance-
writer must otherwise create out of more ordinary materials. A prosaic setting can only 
become the site of romance when seen in “an unusual light,” from an imaginative 
vantage point that Hawthorne once famously described as akin to looking in a mirror 
reflecting a familiar room illuminated by “a dim coal-fire” and “moonbeams.”  By 
“glancing at the looking-glass,” one is almost magically transported to a “haunted 
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verge” at “one remove further from the actual and nearer to the imaginative.”  Rome, 
though, as Hawthorne avers in the preface to The Marble Faun, needs no such 
imaginative sorcery; the city itself casts a spell that lingers long after one leaves it.  As 
evidence, he recounts his surprise at seeing “the extent to which he had introduced 
descriptions of various Italian objects, antique, pictorial, and statuesque” into his novel 
(4).  He presents the pervasive presence of aesthetic artifacts in the text as proof of 
Rome’s ability to haunt, even possess, the viewer, making it impossible to keep 
depictions of “these things . . . from flowing out upon the page, when one writes 
freely, and with self-enjoyment” (5).   
Yet, if Hawthorne intended for his preface to explain (away) the persistent 
fascination with aesthetic experience manifested throughout The Marble Faun, it falls 
far short of its goal, for it seems rife with contradictions.  For one thing, how does one 
write “freely, and with self-enjoyment,” when in thrall to the ghosts of myriad 
beautiful objects that presumably dictate what it is that one writes?  More to the point, 
from what aspect of these seemingly harmless “descriptions of various Italian objects” 
does the author feel the need to distance himself by performatively abdicating agency?  
Hawthorne’s Italian Notebooks, a collection of the journals that he kept throughout his 
sojourn in Italy, show him to be as haunted by art during his time in Italy as he was 
afterwards.  Unlike the preface, though, this haunting is not represented as guiding the 
unconscious author into a kind of aesthetic automatic writing; instead, Hawthorne, as a 
spectator, describes himself as haunted mostly by a conscious awareness of the 
massive effort it will take to accurately capture his impressions in a textual medium: 
There is but one little interval when the mind is in such a state that it can catch 
the fleeting aroma of a new scene . . . And it is always so much pleasanter to 
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enjoy this delicious newness than to attempt arresting it, that it requires great 
force of will to insist with one’s self upon sitting down to write.128 
While one could read Hawthorne’s journal entry simply as a more truthful description 
of the writing process, a process that the preface—specifically, its confident assertion 
of a writer’s creative freedom—retrospectively attempts to obscure, I would argue that 
the two passages placed in relation to one another stand as testaments to an abiding 
and shaping preoccupation in The Marble Faun: the question of whether acts of 
aesthetic perception incur for the viewer any moral or social responsibility.  In both 
cases, Hawthorne seems most concerned with whether the spectator might be 
accountable for and to those impressions generated by perceptual experience.  With 
the preface, his anxious dislocation of those representations of art objects in the text 
from the realm of the plot—the former being the product of unconscious and 
spontaneous appreciation, the latter of conscious and laborious thought—strives to 
preemptively distance that plot from any morally dubious connotations attached to the 
Italian objects described.  In his journal, he implies that while it might be his 
inclination to simply “catch,” “enjoy,” and then release “the fleeting aroma of a new 
scene,” he feels somehow compelled to expend the “great force of will” necessary to 
“arrest” his impression in writing.  Just what forces Hawthorne to do what he claims to 
be unaware of doing or unwilling to do is never specified, but the very vagueness of 
the impulse lends to it a haunting, almost deterministic quality.  Moreover, by 
lingering on in memory and resurfacing, unbidden, in his writing, these encounters 
with Italian objects take on a significance that is rendered all the more mysterious in 
that the author seems reluctant to wholly avow it.   
Hawthorne’s ambivalence towards the representation of art objects and 
aesthetic experience finds even greater expression in The Marble Faun itself, where 
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the actions of its four principal characters—three artists (Miriam, Hilda, and Kenyon) 
and one beautiful living art object (Donatello)—are constantly molded by and take the 
mold of real and fictional works of art.  Hardly the irrelevant outcroppings of a mind 
still suffused with the Italian scene, certain artworks described in the romance serve as 
narrative touchstones, signaling hidden motivations and buried secrets that hurry the 
story along to a series of tragic climaxes.  In the unstable relations between the 
characters and various beautiful objects, Hawthorne explores what might be called the 
double-bind of aesthetic experience.  Striving to mentally and artistically “capture” the 
essence of a work of art, the characters risk being themselves “captured,” exposed by 
and involved in the fundamental mysteries of human experience of which it is a 
symbol.129 While these mysteries are only fleetingly and fragmentarily apprehended, 
the imperfect knowledge that the characters attain from their perceptions reveal a 
complex network of affinities and connections that binds the four of them together 
more inextricably and in ways more morally complicated than sheer sympathy might.  
Though vague enough in the particulars to have provoked angry readers of the 
first printing to clamor for an explanatory postscript (which Hawthorne appended to 
the next edition), the basic plot of The Marble Faun is rather beautifully simple.  In 
Rome, four friends—Kenyon, a straitlaced American sculptor; Hilda, a virginal 
American painter; Miriam, a beautiful half-Jewish painter of obscure origins; and 
Donatello, a young Italian count whose manners and looks make him an exact replica 
of Praxiteles’s famous statue of a faun—live an ostensibly idyllic life within a 
community of expatriate artists, until Donatello kills a mysterious figure from 
Miriam’s past who had been relentlessly pursuing her, an act that Hilda witnesses.  In 
the aftermath of the murder, the group splinters, each to undergo separate trials, until 
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reunited at the very end, at which point Donatello turns himself into the Italian 
authorities, Miriam assumes the life of a Catholic penitent, and Kenyon and Hilda 
leave Italy to settle as a married couple in America.  What transforms this seemingly 
fundamental human drama into “the stuff of romance” is its setting within the 
sprawling, museum-like setting of Rome, a space where, for Hawthorne, almost every 
scene demands aesthetic valuation but almost every paving-stone is tainted by the 
mark of some unspeakable crime.  Throughout The Marble Faun, nearly every 
narrative episode takes place in the midst of or in proximity to some symbolically—
and historically-replete object or site, informing even the most commonplace of 
activities with a dark and awful sense of precedence that borders on the Uncanny.   
In an atmosphere in which viewers are continually haunted by the dark past of 
even the most beautiful and illuminating of sights, where even “the very dust . . . is 
historic,” it is not surprising that the aesthetic encounter is an especially fraught mode 
of experience.  Although Hawthorne initially describes aesthetic impressions as 
belonging to “a frame of mind” that takes viewers “into a certain airy region, lifting 
up . . . their heavy, earthly feet from the actual soil of life . . . and reliev[ing] them, for 
just so long, of all customary responsibility for what they thought or said” (15), this 
cheery picture is belied by the majority of perceptual experiences in the romance, 
which far from relieving its fictional spectators from the “customary responsibility” of 
their thoughts and actions, actually weighs them down further with a burdensome 
knowledge of “the secret of guilt or grief” (160) that is the animating mystery at the 
center of the art object’s appeal. That this hidden “sorrow or sin” is made visible and, 
in some ways, legible only to those whose faculties allow them “moments of deepest 
insight” lends to aesthetic experience a peculiar social and ethical dimension (124); 
these characters, through their visual apprehension of the terrible secrets at the heart of 
an object or scene, become to some degree responsible for those secrets.  This sense of 
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responsibility is what begins to transform perceptual experience from a benign act of 
sympathy (a key Hawthornian term) into a more problematical assumption of 
complicity.  
Complicity most broadly defined is “partnership in an evil action” [OED], but 
it is the very openness of the term “partnership” that allows it to be applied to what 
seem wholly discrete forms of activity and, as is the case more often, non-activity.  
Legally, to be complicit is to be capable of being held responsible for a crime which 
one did not perpetrate.  Morally, though, complicity can mean many things; as 
Christopher Kutz describes it, complicity can mean that one is “connected to harms 
and wrongs, albeit by relations that fall outside the paradigm of individual, intentional 
wrong-doing,” 130 but in Judith Lee Kissell’s formulation, complicity can also be 
understood as a more general “toleration of wrong,” being cognizant of harmful 
actions being committed by others but eschewing any sense of personal responsibility 
for stopping or denouncing those actions.131  Complicity, as its etymology suggests 
(from the Latin complicitas—noun of state from complex), is a concept that is rooted 
in intricacy and indeterminacy, which stems from the fact that it is meant to span the 
divide between the private and the public selves, between the individual’s thoughts 
and feelings and the laws and duties imposed on the individual by society.  One is 
complicit in instances when the private and public selves come into opposition—
when, for instance, an individual witnesses what could be read as a threat to another 
and yet, from the desire to remain untainted and unburdened by an explicit knowledge 
of the reasons for that threat, fails to engage or intervene.  
It is exactly this aspect of complicity that makes it a useful term for thinking 
through the social implications of the aesthetic encounter, as such encounters are 
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represented in The Marble Faun.  For Hawthorne, to discern through the medium of 
one’s impressions the existence of traumas and crimes occurring outside one’s sphere 
of action and even in the long-distant past or potentially in the future raises the 
question of the individual’s relation to the society in which one is both an actor and an 
observer. Of course, this question is an aesthetic as well as an ethical one; the pressure 
on the viewer to conform to a socially-accepted standard of aesthetic judgment is 
analogous to the pressure on the citizen to conform to a socially-accepted standard of 
morality.  In The Marble Faun, though, these pressures are nearly indistinguishable, 
because every act of aesthetic perception has moral and social ramifications.  
Throughout the romance, almost every effort made by a character to “seize the subtle 
mystery” of the work of art is witnessed by another character, and, since for 
Hawthorne, there is nothing so revealing of viewers as how they see (and how they 
look to others when they see) an art object, the person watching the viewer becomes, 
in essence, a witness to whatever truths about that viewer come to the surface in the 
act of viewing.  If the witness misreads or, more damningly, chooses not to 
acknowledge the significance of he or she has read in the spectacle of another’s 
aesthetic encounter, then this person becomes complicit in the viewer’s future actions.   
In The Marble Faun, the single tragic action around which the entire narrative 
revolves is Donatello’s murder of Miriam’s mysterious tormentor—who is only 
referred to as “The Model.”  In the major aesthetic encounters leading up to this event, 
all four characters—Kenyon, Hilda, Miriam, and Donatello himself—each bear 
witness, as it were, to strange affinities that their friends as viewers have with various 
art objects, strange affinities that, in different ways, all presage the configuration of 
circumstances that lead inexorably to the tragedy to come.  How the collective failure 
of this “aesthetic company” to account for and respond to certain powerful 
resemblances and revelations on display in the moment of aesthetic encounter makes 
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each of them complicit in the Model’s murder is a central preoccupation of the 
characters in the crime’s aftermath.  Finding themselves simultaneously self-estranged 
and bonded to each other in a kind of guilty intimacy, the four friends must work 
through the loss of what might be called their aesthetic innocence, as their previous 
mode of perceptual experience is altered by a new sense of themselves as moral agents 
even when in the role of aesthetic observers. 
Besides the four friends, there is another silent witness and accomplice in 
Hawthorne’s romance:  Rome itself.  The city’s myriad public museums, private 
galleries, numerous studios, and innumerable ruins provide the backdrop that lends to 
these aesthetic encounters the weighty sense of historical precedent.  Hawthorne 
describes the feeling of the foreign visitor to Rome in terms greatly similar to those of 
the romance-writer, standing before a mirror and seeing the “poetic or fairy precinct” 
in the familiar-yet-unfamiliar room reflected therein.  In Rome, the narrator says in the 
first chapter, the visitor enters into a “state of feeling” inspired by “a vague sense of 
ponderous remembrances; a perception of such weight and density in a by-gone life, 
of which this spot was the center, that the present moment is pressed down or crowded 
out, and our individual affairs and interests are but half as real, here, as elsewhere” (8).  
Rome’s spatial juxtaposition of past and present make the entirety of the city a kind of 
“haunted verge,” where the distinction between “the real” and “the imaginary” is 
difficult to discern, and the present takes on a “dreamy character” from its proximity 
to “the square blocks of granite wherewith the Romans built their lives” (8).  This 
dynamic unsettling of boundaries in Rome generally carries over into the realm of 
aesthetic experience, where the offsetting of the “dreamy present” of life in the Italian 
capital with ancient “blocks of granite” finds more specific expression in the relation 
between the dream-filled lives of viewers and the marble statues and antique frescos 
they contemplate.  Ultimately, by setting his story within this kind of space—where art 
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objects and aesthetic scenes constantly provide concrete analogues to otherwise 
indescribable states of human experience—Hawthorne revises his conception of the 
romance.  In doing so, his text casts a retrospective, aestheticizing gaze over the 
narrative genre it is in the process of transforming.  From the other side of the mirror, 
as it were, The Marble Faun finds in the shared experience of art a means of accessing 
a psychological reality that demands of the viewer not the distanced sense of sympathy 
but a more immediate and more conflicted awareness of complicity in “the denser, 
richer, warmer, European spectacle” which Italy provides. 
Jonah Siegel, in his study of what he calls the “art-romance tradition,” 
describes The Marble Faun as “inescapably a romance about the encounter with 
Europe in one of its most fraught manifestations, the play of study, evaluation, 
emulation, synthesis, assimilation, and rejection that takes place when contemporary 
artists respond to the art of the past.”132  Certainly, the principal characters in 
Hawthorne’s romance, in their admittedly fraught aesthetic experiences in Rome, do 
all of these things, but not necessarily in that order.  Siegel’s enumeration suggests a 
fixed process, an exorcism of sorts in which the artist figure moves through a series of 
stages, the result of which is a final release from an enthrallment to Europe and to the 
past.  While such a progress narrative is at the heart of the standard künstlerroman 
(though the result of such a release is often fatal), in The Marble Faun, with the 
exception of one unfinished bust of Donatello, all of the artwork created by Miriam, 
Hilda, and Kenyon is, for all intents and purposes, finished before the story begins.  
Though each produces at least one painting, drawing, or sculpture that provokes a 
strong reaction from the others, these works of art have much the same function in the 
text as Classical statues and Renaissance paintings; they serve as staging-grounds for 
the spectacle of the aesthetic encounter.  In fact, Hawthorne’s decision to make three 
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of his main characters artists seems less about presenting them as skilled creators of 
beautiful objects than as skilled viewers of those objects.  As serious and—the text 
assures us—recognizably gifted artists, Miriam, Hilda and Kenyon are thus 
differentiated from the average aesthetic-tourist, who views Rome through the lens of 
guide-books and other kinds of travelogues and whose experiences are prescripted to 
the point of becoming empty re-enactments, like the “party of English or Americans” 
scornfully mentioned by the narrator, who, when “paying the inevitable visit by 
moonlight” to the Coliseum are only capable of “exalting themselves with raptures 
that were Byron’s [from Childe Harold’s Pilgrimage], not their own” (120).  The 
artwork created by Hawthorne’s characters testifies to a perceptual acuity and 
emotional authenticity lacking in this sort of tourist; though his characters are shown 
to be as, if not more, cognizant of the shaping influence of cultural narratives like 
Byron’s poem on their impressions of the Italian scene and its many revered objects, 
their success as artists depends on seeing things for themselves.   
Hawthorne’s protagonists are distinguished from the shifting “tide of foreign 
residents” in Rome from the beginning, as the story opens with the four friends in the 
Capitol sculpture gallery, the three artists having just “been simultaneously struck by a 
resemblance between one of the antique statues, a well-known masterpiece of Grecian 
sculpture, and a young Italian, the fourth member of their party” (8).  The first of 
many such impressions of uncanny similitude, Miriam, Kenyon, and Hilda’s 
discussion of the resemblance between Donatello and Praxiteles’ statue of a faun also 
sets the tone for subsequent aesthetic encounters.  As their debate concerning the 
physical likeness between man and statue gives way to more fragmentary and yet 
more revealing reflections on the significance of this resemblance—of what it might 
mean if Donatello truly were “the very faun of Praxiteles,” a reincarnation of a 
creature belonging to some “long-past age”—the scene takes on the aspect of a 
 185 
collective hallucination.  The innate susceptibilities of the viewers to art and to each 
other transform what began as a whimsical suggestion into a miraculous possibility.  
When questioned by Miriam if she too sees the similarity, Hilda replies, “Not quite—
almost—yes, I really think so . . . the resemblance is very close, and very strange,” as 
if the similarity between Donatello and the faun comes into focus while she speaks.  
Her conclusion is then supported by Kenyon, who deems the likeness “wonderful” and 
again by Miriam, who echoes Hilda almost exactly: “But how strange this likeness is, 
after all” (13). 
But, what is the nature of the “nameless charm” of this idea?  Though 
despairing of the inadequacy of words to describe the statue’s “magic peculiarity,” the 
narrator nevertheless attempts to explain the wonder of Praxiteles’ creation in a way 
that seems an inverted image of what the three artists see in Donatello’s resemblance 
to it.  The faun, we are told, is “unlike anything else that ever was wrought in that 
severe material of marble” because what is captured in the statue seems antithetical to 
its medium.  The epitome of a warm and sensual animality, the faun is a creature in 
which “brute creation meet and combine . . . with humanity,” the “mute mystery” of 
its appeal stemming from it being a holdover from “a period when man’s affinity with 
Nature was more strict, and his fellowship with every living thing more intimate and 
dear” (10-11).  An art object that somehow represents a time before art was necessary 
(man’s connection with Nature being so close as to obviate the need for mimetic 
representation), Praxiteles’ statue gestures towards a mode of being in which there was 
no estrangement between man and his environment.  Yet, even to try to imagine such a 
time, the narrator suggests, is to acknowledge the impossibility of its recurrence; put 
into language, “the idea grows coarse, as we handle it, and hardens in our grasp,” 
becoming as much a monument to a lost antiquity as the faun itself (11).   
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In Donatello’s startling resemblance to the statue, though, Miriam, Kenyon, 
and Hilda are given a fleeting glimpse of the faun come back to life, an impression 
that does not solve its “mute mystery” but instead makes felt to the viewers how far 
they are from the uncomplicated and harmonious state of nature it inhabits.  If the faun 
has “nothing to do with time” or “sin, sorrow, or morality itself,” the viewers’ 
common sense of distance and difference from it underscores how much they do have 
to do with these things.  Hilda’s “shrinking” perplexity when contemplating the faun’s 
“sensuous, earthy” charm, Kenyon’s regret at the idea of the faun as an extinct 
interpreter between man and nature, Miriam’s grief that she too cannot live having “no 
conscience, no remorse, no burthen on the heart”—all of these reactions speak to an 
awareness of the laws and obligations imposed in a moral universe, where desire is 
policed, nature alienated, and actions judged (13).  Their aesthetic appreciation of 
Praxiteles’ faun is thus bound up with their ethical sensibilities, sensibilities that 
Donatello’s likeness to the statue suggests he does yet not share.   
The three friends notice prior to the visit to the statue gallery that “indefinable 
characteristic about Donatello, that set him outside the rules,” but it is in the “half-
deep, half-mirthful impression” produced by “the resemblance between the marble 
Faun and their living companion” that this characteristic is given form and rather 
ominous narrative implications (13-14).  Initially—when the artists see the man and 
the statue together—the similarity is strong enough for Kenyon to playfully argue that 
Donatello must be immortal as “Praxiteles carved on purpose for him,” but the longer 
they look at the two, the less Donatello seems a statue and the more the statue 
resembles a living man.  This change is first suggested by Hilda, who suddenly 
exclaims that “looking . . . too long . . . instead of a beautiful statue, immortally young, 
[she sees] only a corroded and discoloured stone” (15).  Similarly, at the beginning of 
the scene, the enchanted possibility introduced by “the realization of the antique Faun, 
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in the person of Donatello” causes the viewers to imagine that all the “marble ghosts” 
in the gallery might awaken—“Antinous,” “Apollo,” “Bacchus,” and other fauns and 
satyrs among them—and “join hands” with their friend.  Yet by the time they turn 
their gazes to a “sarcophagus,” where “the exquisitely carved figures might assume 
life, and chase each other round its verge with that wild merriment,” the sight becomes 
shaded with “some subtile [sic] allusion to Death, carefully veiled, but forever peeping 
forth amid emblems of mirth and riot” (16).133   
The fragile atmospheric balance between the fantastic and the real sustaining 
the moment begins to shift, and with it, the certainty of the viewers regarding their 
perceptions gives way to doubt.  Moving beyond the point where the statue is visible, 
Miriam confides to Hilda that she is no longer sure of “the reality of this likeness of 
Donatello to the Faun,” and, moreover, she asserts, the resemblance “never struck me 
as forcibly as it did Kenyon and yourself, though I gave in to whatever you were 
pleased to fancy” (16).  Beyond the moment of aesthetic encounter, what was 
experienced as a magical kind of sensus communis is recollected as willful complicity 
in the “fancies” of others “for the sake of a moment’s mirth and wonder” (16).  Yet 
considering that it was Miriam who first introduced the idea of Donatello’s similarity 
to the faun, her retrospective claim to have imaginatively given into what she saw to 
be false strikes a discordant note, the self-consciousness of her disavowal drawing 
even more attention to her coded expressions of regret and misery when faced with the 
“happy ignorance” displayed by Donatello and the faun.  Hilda’s belief in their shared 
impression likewise does not survive the encounter, and looking at Donatello out of 
proximity to the statue, she is amazed to find “[h]ow sad and sombre he has grown, all 
of a sudden,” a change that proves attributable to his sighting of Miriam’s strange 
persecutor, whose penitential garb makes him seem just “stept [sic] out of a picture,” 
                                                 
133 Here we have what also seems an allusion to Keats’s “Ode on a Grecian Urn,” an allusion, though, 
that leads to a very different conclusion. 
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hence his moniker, “The Model” (17).  While Hilda ascribes this sudden alteration to 
the simple variability of expression, which organizes “the same set of features” into 
widely dissimilar formations, her passing observation proves to be a premonition of 
sorts, as Donatello’s later murder of the Model he is now angrily beholding will erase 
his resemblance to Praxiteles’s faun irrevocably.  What is more, the aesthetic 
encounter shared by the four friends in the sculpture gallery stages, in miniature, the 
larger narrative drama of Donatello’s transformation, a transformation that 
Hawthorne’s original title for the romance, The Transformation of the Faun, made the 
centerpiece of the romance.134  As it is in the perceptions of the three artists that 
Donatello first becomes a resident of Arcadia and then a “sad and sombre” exile from 
it, so to does their involvement with him create the circumstances that result in his 
actual banishment from the enchanted state of nature he previously inhabited.  Their 
complicity (Miriam’s especially) in his real transformation is strangely anticipated by 
their shared impression of him in the gallery, an impression that once affirmed is 
almost immediately and uncomfortably denied.   
Yet Hawthorne’s conception of aesthetic complicity cannot be reduced to 
merely a dim prescience of events to come.  While it is suggested throughout The 
Marble Faun that in moments of aesthetic contemplation viewers become possessed of 
a kind of knowledge that lies beyond the boundaries of language and even conscious 
thought, the uncanny resemblances between viewers and art objects serve a variety of 
narrative purposes, another being to make visible (if still largely unintelligible) the 
weight and continuing influence of the past.  In a later aesthetic encounter—when 
                                                 
134 See The New International Encyclopedia, vol. 8, ed. Daniel Coit Gilman (New York: Dodd, Mead, 
and Co., 1906) 42.  Hawthorne’s proposed title, curiously, was split in half, each part serving as the title 
for the English and American versions, respectively.  Titled Transformations when first published in the 
UK, it was retitled The Marble Faun, or the Romance of Monte Beni in the American edition.  I would 
argue that by splitting up Hawthorne’s proposed title, both editions obscure the significance of this 
opening episode, which focuses not on transformations (generally) or Praxiteles’ Marble Faun 
(specifically), but the dynamic process by which Donatello loses his resemblance to the statue, 
transforming into something else entirely. 
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Donatello visits Miriam’s studio—a series of sketches by Miriam gestures towards a 
dark history all the more impacting for not being brought to light. Donatello visits 
owing to Miriam’s wish that he model for a painting of a “rustic dance,” but this 
picture is never to be painted, and focal point of the scene is not Donatello’s likeness 
but Miriam’s.  The resemblance becomes a great deal more complicated in this 
instance, as it emerges cumulatively, through Donatello’s viewing of images that are 
scattered throughout the room.  As with the sculpture gallery, the artist’s studio is for 
Hawthorne an enchanting, uncanny sort of space, “one of those delightful spots that 
hardly seem to belong to the actual world”; Miriam’s studio seems like  
the outward type of a poet’s haunted imagination, where there are glimpses, 
sketches, and half-developed hints of beings and objects, grander and more 
beautiful than we can find anywhere in reality. The windows were closed with 
shutters, or deeply curtained, except one . . . admitting only . . . that partial 
light which, with its strongly marked contrast of shadow, is the first requisite 
to seeing objects pictorially.” (34) 
That Hawthorne describes the studio as the embodiment of the poet’s, not the 
painter’s, “haunted imagination” suggests that his interest in art objects has more to do 
with aesthetic experience than artistic representation.  The studio affords glimpses into 
the realm of half-conceived ideas that is the basis for myriad forms of inspiration.  A 
reliquary for fictional “beings and objects” not to be found “anywhere in reality,” the 
studio spatially represents the moment of consciousness just prior to the creation of the 
work of art, when the artist is attempting to translate and concretize into a visual or 
textual medium an as-yet-unformed impression.   
Though it is precisely this kind of space that makes artistic creation possible, 
what interests Hawthorne more is that its arrangement—particularly the careful 
manipulation of light and shadow—is “the first requisite of seeing objects pictorially.”  
To see pictorially is to see “by means of a picture or pictures” or “in the manner of a 
picture” [OED], which allows for the possibility of two related perceptual activities: to 
 190 
see a live scene as if it were a picture (created for viewing and meant to convey 
something to the viewer) or to come to an awareness through the contemplation of an 
art object or a series of art objects of some truth that lies beyond them.  In Donatello’s 
visit to Miriam’s studio, both of these modes of seeing pictorially are in evidence, and 
together, they contribute to the heavy atmosphere of foreboding that speaks to the 
continuing influence of dark, unspoken events in the past.  Donatello’s sensibilities 
first register the tangible presence of history in Miriam’s studio, when, looking into a 
gloomy corner, he mistakes Miriam’s lay-figure—the mannequin used to accurately 
represent the human body in different postures and costumes—for a real woman, a 
woman to whom he immediately ascribes a dreadful past and a potentially sinister 
motive.  Working the magic that the narrator attributes to it, the enchanted space of the 
artist’s studio causes Donatello to see pictorially; no longer simply a room crowded 
with a jumble of beautiful objects, it is imaginatively transformed into a tableau vivant 
that seems staged for his benefit:  “[i]n the obscurest part of the room, Donatello was 
half-startled at perceiving, duskily, a woman with long dark hair, who threw up her 
arms, with a wild gesture of tragic despair, and appeared to beckon him into the 
darkness along with her” (34).  Though only lasting an instant, Donatello’s impression 
is at once complex and narratively-charged; the mannequin, half-shadowed and with 
limbs akimbo, presents itself to his imagination like Eurydice at the tragic moment of 
her return to the underworld.  As a witness to this scene, Donatello feels himself 
involved in it; as he tells Miriam, “[w]hen my eyes first fell upon her, I thought her 
arms moved, as if beckoning me to help her in some direful peril.”  Spectatorship 
again comes burdened with a sense of responsibility, and, though Miriam dismisses 
Donatello’s vision as a “sinister freak[] of fancy,” her attempt to distract him with 
various paintings and sketches she had done only further reinforces his initial 
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impression, lending it additional emphasis and clarity through a profusion of 
analogous images. 
Much like the art studio itself, the first “great pile and confusion of pen-and-
ink sketches, and pencil-drawings” that Miriam has spread out, upon Donatello’s 
perusal, come to seem anything but confused (35).  In fact, in their subject matter and 
manner of depiction, they are almost identical; each sketch is of a female figure from 
the Old Testament who is caught in an act of rebellious violence against a man.  Jael 
driving the stake through the head of Sisera, Judith cutting off the head of Holofernes, 
Salome holding the head of John the Baptist on a platter, in each case, a “stern 
Jewess” is decapitating a male figure who in some way oppressed her.  Beyond this 
similarity, the narrator also points to a certain originality and uniqueness of conception 
that distinguishes Miriam’s treatment of these biblical stories from how they have 
been “represented by the Old Masters so often” before (36).  Yet, these revisions, as 
their descriptions imply, were not the artist’s intention, but rather, re-visions of her 
original ideas, which fell initially along more conventional lines.  In the drawing of 
Jael, the narrator detects that Miriam’s “first conception” had been to present her as an 
image of “perfect womanhood . . . but dissatisfied either with her own work or the 
terrible story itself, Miriam had added a certain wayward quirk of the pencil, which at 
once converted the heroine into a vulgar murderess.”  In much the same way, her 
sketch of Judith gives the impression of having begun “with a passionate and fiery 
conception of the subject, in all earnestness,” but by the end, the “last touches” were 
done with “utter scorn, as it were, of the feeling which at first took such possession of 
her hand.”  Even the story of Salome, though its initial “conception appeared to be 
taken from Bernardo Luini’s picture, in the Uffizi gallery in Florence,” is transformed 
by Miriam’s hand at the last minute, lending to Salome not the typical look of 
vengeful satisfaction, but rather that of “womanhood . . . at once awakened to love and 
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endless remorse” (36).  Hawthorne’s repetition of the word “conception” has the effect 
of conferring on the original, now over-drawn image, the status of artistic creation.  
Moreover, the creation is no sooner completed than its creator assesses it critically and 
then adds a series of “last touches” that have less to do with fixing it than with 
scornfully marking her rebellion against the more conventional perspective on the 
narrative that she formerly attempted to convey.  Miriam’s “quirk of the pencil” is 
much like Donatello’s “freak of fancy” in that it registers her reaction to the image 
before her, recording the result of her aesthetic encounter with her own artwork.  In 
these finishing strokes, Miriam inscribes her own perspective “on these stories of 
bloodshed, in which a woman’s hand was crimsoned by the stain,” leaving behind on 
paper the visible trace of her dark and guilty past, the shaping influence behind the 
sketches.   
Donatello’s dramatic response to these images only confirms the ominous 
significance that the narrator “reads into” Miriam’s sketches.  Shuddering, his face 
assuming “a look of fear, trouble and disgust,” Donatello rapidly shuffles through the 
pile of drawings until “finally . . . he shrank back from the table and clasped his hands 
over his eyes.”  By covering his eyes and refusing to see what is right in front him, 
Donatello seeks to deny what his own expression betrayed only a moment before: that 
he has seen in or through the pictures some truth about Miriam of which he would 
have wished to remained ignorant.  That Miriam herself wishes the same thing 
becomes clear a moment later, when she apologizes for directing his attention at that 
pile of drawings, calling them “ugly phantoms that stole out of my mind; not things 
that I created, but things that haunt me” (37).  Here “seeing pictorially” is a mode of 
comprehension seemingly divorced from agency.  Though facilitating a moment of 
understanding between Donatello and Miriam, this understanding is not actively 
sought nor is it openly avowed.  Rather, their bond is based on a shared sense of 
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hauntedness; the ghosts that “stole” out of Miriam’s mind now also trouble Donatello.  
Also, by describing her sketches as “ugly phantoms” that emerged unbidden by her, 
Miriam perpetuates an understanding of the art object as itself haunted, a remnant of 
some prior moment in history that continues to bear witness to the circumstances that 
brought about its creation.   
Yet, if the sketches in this first instance are ghostly reminders of shadowy 
events in the artist’s past, the remainder of the scene suggests that there are myriad 
ways in which an art object or a viewer may be visibly or visually haunted.  
Hawthorne introduces another kind of aesthetic hauntedness when Miriam, in an 
attempt to distract Donatello from the sketches that so unsettled him, gives him 
another portfolio, this one full of “domestic and common scenes, so finely and subtly 
idealized that they seemed such as we may see at any moment, and everywhere; while 
still there was the indefinable something added, or taken away, which makes all the 
difference between sordid life and an earthly paradise” (37).  Again, images that might 
otherwise have been merely conventional—in this case, of sentimental and more 
orthodox feminine subjects, scenes of courting couples and delicate sketches of baby 
shoes—are transformed by an “indefinable something” into revelations of the Ideal in 
the everyday.  Here, however, as the narrator points out, the “profound significance” 
of the pictures lies somewhere other than in the past of the artist.  Miriam’s “youth” 
makes it quite improbable that she has experienced “the bliss and suffering of woman” 
depicted in her sketches, and besides, “it is more delightful to believe, that, from first 
to last, they were the productions of a beautiful imagination, dealing with the warm 
and pure suggestions of a woman’s heart” (38).  Yet, as the determinedly optimistic 
but implicitly skeptical nature of the phrase “it is more delightful to believe” suggests, 
the strange magic at work in Miriam’s pictures is likely the product of more than just 
her lovely imagination and womanly heart.  These sketches, like the previous pile that 
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Donatello rifled through, are also animated by a sort of revisionary impulse, that here 
manifests itself through a common element present in each image: that of an almost 
hidden figure that, in one case, “peeped through the branches,” and, in another, 
“look[ed] through a frosted window from the outside,” a figure “always depicted with 
an expression of deep sadness . . . the face and the form [which] had the traits of 
Miriam’s own” (38).  If the first batch of pictures were, as Miriam claimed, things that 
haunt her, these are ones which Miriam herself haunts.  As both a viewer of and 
outcast from the “common life” she so compellingly depicts, Miriam makes visible her 
feelings of distance and alienation from the domestic happiness that typically “belongs 
to woman.”  The “quirk” of these images comes through in Miriam’s attempt to 
distinguish herself—as a woman—from what the narrator suggests should be her 
rightful sphere.  She creates these scenes only to “relinquish[], for her personal self” 
any claim to them, and in this gesture, Miriam again betrays how the past shapes the 
present as well as the future.  Pictures haunted by what is never to be, they negatively 
foreshadow what is to come; in them, Hawthorne imaginatively posits a number of 
potential happy endings (all resolutions typical to the romance genre), while, at the 
same time, implying that his own narrative will follow another path. 
Again, Donatello’s negative reaction to this second batch of images reinforces 
the portentous subtext that the narrator reads into the pictures.  Continuing this 
pattern--in which Miriam’s darkly pessimistic perspectives on conventional subjects is 
forcefully impressed on her doomed admirer—the chapter ends with her treating 
Donatello to one final artwork, this time a portrait that she claims “has been shown to 
no one else.”  With only this ominous preface, she turns “to her easel, on which was 
placed a picture with its back turned towards the spectator” and reverses the canvas, at 
which point, 
 195 
there appeared the portrait of a beautiful woman, such as one sees only two or 
three, if even so many, in all a lifetime; so beautiful that she seemed to get into 
your consciousness and memory, and could never afterwards be shut out, but 
haunted your dreams, for pleasure or for pain; holding your inner realm as 
conquered territory, though without deigning to make herself at home there. 
(39) 
While Donatello might be the first and only “spectator” of the portrait within the 
narrative, this final aesthetic encounter in Miriam’s studio signals that its intended 
audience is the reader.  The painting, dramatically unveiled by Miriam, “appear[s]” 
like a revelation before an unsuspecting Donatello, who functions mainly as a 
narrative stand-in or placeholder for the reader, the “you” on whom the image has 
such a profound effect.  Infiltrating the viewer’s psyche, the beauty of the portrait’s 
subject overawes both “consciousness and memory,” an effect that—it is intimated—
lingers long after the eye is turned away.  Again described as a form of haunting, the 
effect of this portrait on the viewer is more clearly articulated here than in the previous 
two aesthetic encounters, in which the reader is left to gauge the sketches’ power 
mostly through the medium of Donatello’s reactions.  In this instance, the narrator 
makes clear what it means for the art object to haunt the viewer; it is for the beautiful 
image to capture the viewer’s imagination and hold it as a ruler would hold a 
“conquered territory,” taking away the sovereignty of one’s “inner realm” but, at the 
same time, ruling over it only in absentia.  A form of occupation defined less by 
presence than by absence, in the mind of the viewer it creates a sense of self-alienation 
and unheimlichkeit, in that the trace left behind by the beautiful image choosing not 
“to make herself at home there” transforms this inner realm into an unfamiliar and 
potentially threatening space.  Also, having lost the ability to imaginatively self-
govern, the viewer is, to a degree, in thrall to this captivating representation of a lovely 
women with “a Jewish aspect,” in the same way, the narrator says, as the biblical 
Jacob was to Rachel when “he deemed her worth the wooing seven years” and as 
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“Holofernes” was when “vanquished” by the beauty of Judith, she “slew him for too 
much adoring it” (39).   
In the description of the painted woman’s “black, abundant hair . . . Jewish 
hair, [of] a dark glory such as crowns no Christian maiden’s head” and in the likening 
of her beauty to that of Old Testament heroines, the narrator hints at what is not 
revealed to the reader until Miriam asks Donatello if he recognizes the image: that 
picture is not just a portrait, but a self-portrait of Miriam.  The narrator explains the 
reason for delaying “to speak descriptively of Miriam’s beauty earlier in our narrative” 
and for withholding the portrait’s identity until after it is described as “we foresaw this 
occasion to bring it perhaps more forcibly before the reader” (40).  Rather than “more 
forcibly,” the narrator might have said “more pictorially,” as Miriam’s beauty is 
communicated through the series of haunting images she created, in which, in 
different ways, she herself is present.  If the first batch of sketches haunt Miriam, and 
Miriam herself haunts the second portfolio of pictures, in this third object described—
her self-portrait—these two energies come together, and it is not the just artist or the 
image that is haunted, but also the reader.  And, being haunted by Miriam’s beauty, 
both Donatello and the reader are given a means of seeing pictorially into her 
character and, through her artwork, of coming into a dim awareness of her hidden 
torment and suppressed rebelliousness regarding past events that continue to shape her 
existence.   
Yet, if, as the narrator intimates, Miriam’s self-portrait “conveyed some of the 
intimate results of her heart-knowledge” and she shows the painting to see “whether 
they would be perceptible to so simple and natural an observer as Donatello,” his 
reaction reinforces the fact that this visual mode of understanding cannot be fully 
articulated in language.  When questioned by Miriam as to whether he likes the 
painting, he answers, “Oh, beyond what I can tell . . . so beautiful, so beautiful.”  An 
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affective response so strong as to resist verbal representation, Donatello’s repetition of 
the phrase “so beautiful, so beautiful” hearkens back to the narrator’s remark that the 
painting’s subject is “so beautiful” as to enchant and enslave the consciousness of her 
viewers.  However, this beauty’s fascination is located in its unfathomability, like the 
eyes of the painting’s subject, “dark eyes, into which you might look as deeply as your 
glance would go, and still be conscious of a depth you had not yet sounded” (39).  
Donatello’s sounding of the depths of Miriam’s many artistic productions is a shifting 
dynamic of impression and expression; the profoundly sad and arrestingly vengeful 
expressions of her various subjects (which, tellingly, are what have been changed or 
added with her persistent, last minute quirk of the pencil) elicit Donatello’s ambivalent 
and similarly troubled impressions of the works generally.   
As for the self-portrait, Miriam next questions Donatello as to whether, liking 
its form, its expression also pleases him.  He answers, “yes . . . if it would only smile 
so like the sunshine as you sometimes do. No; it is sadder than I thought at first.  
Cannot you make yourself smile a little, Signorina?”  His request provoking a “bright, 
natural smile” from the real Miriam, he exclaims, “Oh, catch it now! . . . Let it shine 
upon the picture!  There; it has vanished already!  And you are sad again, very sad; 
and the picture gazes sadly forth at me, as if some evil had befallen it in the little time 
since I looked last” (40).  Like the scene in the sculpture gallery with the faun of 
Praxiteles, the perceived resemblance between the human Miriam and her painted 
double fluctuates from moment to moment, and it is in the pattern of these fluctuations 
that Hawthorne encodes Donatello’s growing awareness of Miriam’s character; he 
learns that she too is “sadder than [he] thought at first,” and it is through his 
comparison of her brief expressions of transcendent, forgetful happiness to her more 
general demeanor of tormented unhappiness that he comes to realize that “some evil 
had befallen” her, an evil that inexorably continues to push the narrative towards its 
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climax.  Recognizing finally that Miriam and her self-portrait are true mirrors of each 
other, both gazing “sadly forth” at him, Donatello’s aesthetic experience in Miriam’s 
studio comes full circle, and the chapter concludes with an observation that more 
coherently communicates what he only imperfectly grasped at the beginning.  
Responding to his perplexity at the painting’s expression, Miriam tells Donatello to 
search for “other faces” and to “never more gaze at mine,” to which he replies, “You 
speak in vain . . . shroud yourself in what gloom you will, I must needs follow you” 
(41).  Having experienced Miriam’s many expressions of hauntedness in her artwork, 
Donatello finds himself bound to her, complicit in a shadowy crime that has yet to 
take place.  Donatello’s initial impression of Miriam’s lay-figure—that she was 
“beckoning [him] to help her in some direful peril”—is thus retrospectively validated.  
What he has seen pictorially, through the images scattered throughout the enchanted 
space of Miriam’s studio, has awakened in the formerly simple and innocent Donatello 
a consciousness of the complexity of circumstances that determine human destiny and 
of his own entanglement therein.  Yet, if Donatello is depicted as leaving Miriam’s 
studio resigned to the inevitability of his involvement, Hawthorne hints also that the 
reader (for whom Donatello is a stand-in for much of the chapter), unless one stops 
reading, is similarly complicit, and prevented from any other action than following 
Miriam into the dark. 
What is to be made, though, of individuals who refuse to acknowledge or 
involve themselves in situations of which they have become aware through the act of 
spectatorship?  To what degree are these viewers complicit in the past sins and future 
crimes from which they attempt to distance themselves?  In counterpoint to 
Donatello’s experience among Miriam’s pictures, Miriam’s visit to the studio of the 
sculptor Kenyon offers a scenario in which the shared contemplation of an art object 
exposes the strange culpability Hawthorne ascribes even to those characters that would 
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remain willfully blind to the secrets such moments bring to the surface.  In this scene, 
it is Kenyon who demonstrates an overly fastidious reserve when faced with the 
unsettling implications of his friend’s emotional identification with one of his own 
artistic productions.  Yet, even before this event takes place, the narrator anticipates 
Kenyon’s reaction with a critical meditation on the creative process of a sculptor.  This 
introductory description, with its focus on the typical studio space of a sculptor, draws 
an implicit comparison with the studio of a painter, thus pitting against each other two-
dimensional visual arts (painting and drawing) and three-dimensional plastic arts 
(sculpture).  Whereas Miriam’s studio is depicted as an enchanted space, full of props 
and artfully-arranged lights and shadows, Kenyon’s, as it is argued is generally the 
case with sculptors, is “but a rough and dreary-looking place, with a good deal the 
aspect, indeed, of a stone-mason’s workshop” (90).  Mostly bare, its only noted 
adornments are “some hastily scrawled sketches of nude figures on the white-wash of 
the wall . . . probably the sculptor’s earliest glimpses of ideas that may hereafter be 
solidified into imperishable stone, or perhaps may remain as impalpable as a dream.”  
In noting the widely divergent nature of the two possible fates facing these sketches—
either an eternity in marble or, otherwise, oblivion—the narrator establishes how far 
apart are the two poles of the extensive process by which a sculpture is brought into 
being.  The narrator next fills in the steps in between the “impalpable dream” and “the 
final marble”; there is the hasty sketch, then the “very roughly modeled little 
figures . . . exhibiting stage of the Idea,” then “the exquisitely designed shape of clay,” 
then the “plaister-cast.”  And, between the plaster-figure and the finished marble 
sculpture is a change of even more significance: the work goes from being molded and 
shaped by the hands of the sculptor himself to being copied by a master-carver, a man 
of “merely mechanical skill” whose task it is to translate the model of sculptor into its 
ideal medium, marble.   
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That the modern sculptor does not carve his design with his own hands marks a 
profound break between the artistry demonstrated by “the ancient artificers” like 
Praxiteles.  Nowadays, the narrator says satirically,  
The sculptor has but to present these men with a plaister-cast of his design, and 
a sufficient block of marble, and tell them that the figure is imbedded in the 
stone, and must be freed from its encumbering superfluities; and, in due time, 
without the necessity of touching the work with his own finger, he will see 
before him the statue that is to make him renowned.  His creative power has 
wrought it with a word.  In no other art, surely, does genius find such effective 
instruments, and so happily relieve itself of the drudgery of actual 
performance. (90) 
This description alludes to Michelangelo’s famous fresco, The Creation of Adam, on 
the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel, in which God is animates Adam through the touch of 
a single finger.  Where even God’s creative process requires a finger, the narrator 
mocks, modern sculptors need only “a word.”  Ironically, the sculptor’s art is among 
the most permanent, as the excavations in and around the Roman capital at that period 
attested.  The modern sculptor’s “renown” also potentially has a much longer shelf-
life, but this renown is partially undeserved, as the final “immortal” object is carved 
not by him but by “some nameless machine in human shape” (91). 
Given the number of nineteenth-century sculptors complimented throughout 
The Marble Faun (among them Harriet Hosmer, Hiriam Powers, and William 
Wetmore Story, all, like Hawthorne, American expatriates in Rome at that time) and 
that most of the sculptures attributed to the character of Kenyon were modeled on 
works that Hawthorne had seen in their studios, it seems unlikely that Hawthorne was 
entirely dismissive of sculpture as a modern art form.  So, what might have been the 
purpose of this critique, particularly as a prelude to the scene that follows?  The 
general rumination of the situation of the modern sculptor brings to the fore the 
question of responsibility, responsibility understood as the individual’s obligations to 
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an outside entity or circumstance to which he or she is somehow connected.  In the 
case of the modern sculpture, the narrator observes, sculptors gain renown for art 
objects that are not entirely their own creation.  Yet, at the same time, “this endless 
endurance, this almost indestructibility of a marble” makes their creative decisions 
weightier, in that their works will last to become testaments to eras that have long 
since passed.  The images that they commit to stone should therefore be carefully 
chosen, with an eye towards posterity and a sense of accountability to the present. 
In some ways, the representation of Kenyon lives up to this ideal of the modern 
sculptor, or at least modern sculpture.  He is described as possessing a face “which, 
when time had done a little more for it, would offer a worthy subject for as good an 
artist as himself; features finely cut, as if already marble; an ideal forehead, deeply set 
eyes, and a mouth much hidden by a light brown beard, but apparently sensitive and 
delicate” (91).  He is a man of marble, in both senses of the phrase, but, as his display 
to Miriam of his two most prized creations suggests, these same qualities come with a 
stony inflexibility and cold reserve that distances him from the world he has tasked 
himself to represent.  Out of the objects he shows Miriam, most revealing of this 
dynamic is a sculpture he keeps hidden in “a little, old-fashioned, ivory coffer . . . 
richly carved with antique figures and foliage”: “a small, beautifully shaped hand, 
most delicately sculptured in marble,” the hand of their mutual friend, Hilda (94).  
Miriam recognizes the identity of the hand’s possessor immediately and attributes 
Kenyon’s skill in capturing its likeness, “its maiden palm and dainty finger-tips,” to 
the fact that he “must have wrought it passionately.”  Yet, she says, “I did not dream 
you had won Hilda so far!  How have you persuaded that shy maiden to let you take 
her hand in marble?”  Kenyon either not acknowledging or getting the joke—that a 
“hand in marble” is a more permanent and perhaps even more impressive 
accomplishment than winning that same hand in marriage—he claims that the 
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sculpture is “a reminiscence” he “stole” from Hilda, now “reproduce[d] to something 
like the life” (95).  Though a symbol of his unspoken and unrequited love, Kenyon’s 
copy of Hilda’s hand and his treatment of it reveal a love of a complex, somewhat 
angst-ridden nature.  Though it is “like the life,” he keeps the hand out of sight, housed 
in the jewel-box equivalent of a sepulcher; never touched or kissed, even (it is 
mentioned) by the sculptor himself, the sculpture is less an art object than a religious 
artifact, bearing an unsettling resemblance to the Catholic reliquaries which so 
unnerved Hawthorne during his time in Rome.  Moreover, as a synecdochal substitute 
for Hilda herself, the hand is a curious choice on Kenyon’s part, as it is her skill as a 
painter and her devotion to copying the works of the Old Masters that keep her outside 
the earthly sphere of romantic love; Kenyon despairs of ever winning her precisely 
because her artistic aspirations make her “utterly sufficient to herself” (95).  For this 
reason, his decision to steal her hand, even in the figurative sense, has an aggressive 
undercurrent to it, which Miriam notices, when she tells him, in slightly mocking 
consolation, that there is always the possibility that Hilda “perhaps may sprain the 
delicate wrist which you have sculptured with such perfection.” 
That Kenyon’s relationship to his creations is as potentially fraught as 
Miriam’s is clear from his sculpture of Hilda’s hand, but it is Miriam’s encounter with 
his unfinished masterpiece—the clay-model of what is to be a marble statue of 
Cleopatra—that reveals the degree to which Kenyon’s mastery over his chosen 
medium is indicative of a temperament resistant, even hostile, to the revelatory aspect 
of shared aesthetic experience.  Unlike the Cleopatras of Bronte’s Villette and Eliot’s 
Middlemarch, Kenyon’s statue does not represent a voluptuous odalisque but rather 
the Egyptian queen seated in a pose of gloomy abstraction: 
A marvelous repose . . . was diffused throughout the figure.  The spectator felt 
that Cleopatra had sunk down out of the fever and turmoil of her life, and, for 
one instant—as it were, between two pulse-throbs—had relinquished all 
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activity, and was resting throughout every vein and muscle.  It was the repose 
of despair, indeed; for Octavius had seen her, and remained insensible to her 
enchantments. (98) 
The narrator’s emphasis on the figure’s “marvelous repose” makes a distinction 
between this attitude of self-forgetful inactivity and the deliberately seductive 
lounging pose typically associated with Cleopatra; Kenyon’s statue depicts her in the 
spatial equivalent of a dramatic aside, in a posture all the more illuminating for not 
seeming staged.  Also, the narrator intimates, by representing Cleopatra “between two 
pulse-throbs,” between familiar narrative moments (that of her failed seduction of 
Octavius after Antony’s death and her own eventual suicide), Kenyon’s statue puts the 
viewer in an uncharacteristic relation to the Egyptian queen.  Instead of a surrogate for 
Antony or Octavius—viewing an image of Cleopatra whose function is to seduce and 
enchant—the spectator is privy to a secret scene outside the history books, catching a 
fugitive glimpse of her private, not her public, self.   
This hidden aspect of Cleopatra is presaged in a conversation between the two 
artists about nudity and artistry.  Right before Kenyon literally unveils the Cleopatra 
(kept obscured underneath a sheet), Miriam voices a hope that it is not a “nude figure,” 
as, in her opinion, “now-a-days, people are as good as born in their clothes, and there 
is practically not a nude human being in existence.”  Thus, she argues, a modern artist 
“cannot sculpture nudity with a pure heart, if only because he is compelled to steal 
guilty glances at hired models,” and “the marble inevitably loses its chastity under 
such circumstances” (97).  Paralleling the narrator’s earlier critique of the process of 
modern sculpture, Miriam’s indictment of contemporary sculptural representations of 
“indecorous womanhood” rests on a contrast of the current situation with that of 
antiquity:  “an old Greek sculptor, no doubt, found his models in the open sunshine, 
and among pure and princely maidens, and thus the nude statues of antiquity are as 
modest as violets, and sufficiently draped in their own beauty.”  Miriam imagines the 
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Greco-Roman world presenting mankind in a prelapsarian aesthetic state, in which 
nudity could be tastefully and modestly depicted because, with no sense of shame or 
sin, there was nothing to cover up.  People today, “practically born in their clothes,” 
now come into the world with something to hide, with guilty secrets that they would 
rather keep concealed.  From this perspective, the whole process of sculptural 
representation is corrupted, from the sculptor’s very first “guilty glances” at his “hired 
models” (96).  Even the Neo-Platonic theory of sculpture to which Kenyon ascribes 
(and Miriam shares)—that each block of marble contains within it a particular form or 
“human countenance within its embrace [that] must have existed there since the 
limestone ledges of Carrara were first made” (91)—takes on a slightly seedy aspect, 
as, by Miriam’s account, the sculptor no longer is simply freeing the statue from its 
marble prison but exposing it to the potentially censorious appraisal of the outside 
world.  It is an act of violation as much as an act of creation; the statue “inevitably 
loses its chastity under such conditions,” and both sculptor and viewer, in varying 
degrees, are complicit in its degradation. 
Strangely reinforcing Miriam’s condemnation of modern sculpture, the 
narrator lauds Kenyon’s molding of the Cleopatra in language more suitable to the 
heroic vanquishing of a mortal enemy, only strengthening the association between 
certain forms of artistic representation and brutal public demonstrations of supremacy 
and control.  The sculptor’s success is measured by the amount of force necessary to 
wrest the hidden figure from a resistant medium; in the Cleopatra, “difficulties, that 
might well have seemed insurmountable, had been courageously encountered and 
made flexible to the purposes of grace and dignity” (98).  The difficulty here alluded 
to is that of exposing “the truth” of what this sculpture is supposed to represent 
without sacrificing the aesthetic standards that sculpture is supposed to meet.  As with 
the elaborate costume, including the “stiff Egyptian head-dress,” it is faithfully copied 
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from “the strange sculpture of that country,” but also “softened into a rich feminine 
adornment without losing a particle of its truth” (98).  Similarly, the visage of 
Cleopatra herself is described as a testament to Kenyon’s “courage and integrity,” as 
“the sculptor had not shunned to give the full Nubian lips, and other characteristics of 
the Egyptian physiognomy,” by which the figure’s “beauty shone out richer, warmer, 
more triumphantly, beyond comparison, than if, shrinking timidly from the truth, he 
had chosen the tame Grecian type.”  Significantly, Kenyon’s uncompromising 
adherence to the truth divests the Cleopatra of some of her authority; by turning her 
royal head-dress as a “feminine adornment” and by stressing her ethnicity, he marks 
her, both in terms of gender and of race, as Other.  Though the statue is still, in the 
words of the narrator, “all Cleopatra—fierce, voluptuous, passionate, tender, wicked, 
terrible, and full of poisonous and rapturous enchantment,” her power now lies no 
longer in her role as captivating monarch but in that of seductive captive (99).  As a 
statue of a beautiful and exotic female form, the Cleopatra’s sphere of influence is 
limited to her effect on the viewer, in her ability to evoke an eroticized aesthetic 
response.  Forged out of Kenyon’s triumphant technical overmastering of a resistant 
material and subject, the statue is soon to be in a similarly captive relation to the 
viewer, as once “apotheosized in an indestructible material, she would be one of the 
images that men keep forever, finding a heat in them which does not cool down 
throughout the centuries” (99, emphasis mine).   
What makes the statue captive to the viewer, though, is not the viewer’s 
aesthetic response to it.  It is the viewer’s ability to control that response, to potentially 
subordinate feelings of attraction or admiration to one’s critical faculties, to rational 
assessment and judgment.  Indeed, the moment in Cleopatra’s history that Kenyon 
chose as his subject—a private moment immediately after “the cold eyes of Octavius” 
had “seen her, and [he] remained insensible to her enchantments”—gestures towards 
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an unsuccessful aesthetic encounter in which the beautiful object has failed to move a 
particularly unsympathetic spectator (98).  The scene to which the narrator here refers 
is most probably from Shakespeare’s Antony and Cleopatra:  in Act V, after Mark 
Antony’s death, Cleopatra attempts to win over the ever prudent Octavius Caesar, who 
easily resists her personal charms when he considers the political advantage of putting 
her on public display as a captive back in Rome.  It is to avoid being made a spectacle 
before the populace that Cleopatra commits suicide-by-asp, an effort that is somewhat 
ironically thwarted by that fact that it is in her death-pose that most artists choose to 
depict her. Kenyon’s statue steers clear of the necrophilic worship of the dead, 
beautiful female body, but, as the remainder of the chapter demonstrates, his decision 
to sculpt the living queen in the posture of defeat and despair is itself rather morally 
dubious, suggesting a strange disaffection for the object he has created.  This attitude 
comes to the surface when Miriam comments on the miraculously real and complex 
“womanhood” displayed in the sculpture, asking him, “did she never try—even while 
you were creating her—to overcome you with her fury, or her love?  Were you not 
afraid to touch her, as she grew more and more towards hot life, beneath your hand?” 
(99).  Though Miriam’s questions are meant as compliments to Kenyon’s skill, the 
emphasis she lays on the tactile aspect of the sculptural arts again colors the 
relationship between sculptor and creation with the threat of erotic violence.  But, in 
this instance, it is the artist who is imagined as on the defensive, vulnerable to being 
“overcome” by the “fury” and “love” of his creation to the same degree that he is 
capable of bringing it to “hot life” with his skill.   
As Miriam’s formulation makes clear, what Kenyon might have to fear from 
his sculpture is his own responsibility for it, for bringing it to some semblance of 
complicated and tormented life.  Yet, it is precisely this responsibility that Kenyon 
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eschews, when he describes to Miriam the process by which the Cleopatra came into 
being: 
It is the concretion of a good deal of thought, emotion, and toil of brain and 
hand . . . But I know not how it came about, at last.  I kindled a great fire in my 
mind, and threw in the material—as Aaron threw the gold of the Israelites into 
the furnace—and, in the midmost heat, uprose Cleopatra, as you see her. (99) 
Certainly Susan Manning is correct when she claims that Kenyon’s comparison of 
himself to the biblical Aaron (who idolatrously created the Golden Calf out of the 
jewelry of the Israelites) “suggests the ambiguous resonances of his own creative 
activity for a Puritan consciousness.”135  At the same time, there is arguably more to 
this curious simile than a half-suppressed Protestant uneasiness with graven images; 
Kenyon’s likening of his mind to a rough kiln out of which his creation magically 
“uprose” (rather like Aphrodite rising out of the waves) deliberately obfuscates the 
artist’s intentionality.  Though Kenyon admits to being the instrument through which 
the Cleopatra was wrought, his description of the creative process obscures his 
conscious determination of the final product.  This disavowal of agency gives to 
Kenyon’s artistry a fugitive aspect, signaling an unwillingness to openly acknowledge 
the “secret” that Miriam reads within it. 
Repeating a pattern found throughout The Marble Faun, Kenyon’s attitude 
towards his sculpture and the tormented passions it embodies presages his attitude 
towards his friends and the hidden events in their pasts that weigh on the narrative.  In 
this instance, recognizing that in the Cleopatra Kenyon grasped the “secret” of the 
figure’s essential “womanhood . . . mixed up with all those seemingly discordant 
elements,” Miriam is encouraged to speak of her own secret.  She begs Kenyon, as one 
who “sees far into womanhood,” to receive into his “large view” her confidence.  His 
                                                 
135 Susan Manning, note 99, The Marble Faun, by Nathaniel Hawthorne (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2002) 
367. 
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response to this request reproduces the surreptitious avoidance of responsibility and 
involvement that marked his relationship to the Cleopatra.  Though he voices a 
willingness to hear whatever Miriam has to tell him, she detects “a certain reserve and 
alarm in his warmly expressed readiness to hear her story” (100).  The reason given is 
that “in his secret soul, to tell the truth, the sculptor doubted whether it were well for 
this poor, suffering girl to speak what she so yearned to say, or for him to listen . . . for 
the more her secret struggled and fought to be told, the more certain would it be to 
change all former relations” between them.  Yet, no sooner are Kenyon’s reasons for 
his disinclination to hear Miriam’s confession articulated than those reasons are 
revealed by the narrator to be paltry self-justifications masking a truth about himself 
he would rather not reveal: 
This was what Kenyon said to himself; but his reluctance, after all, and 
whether he were conscious of it or no, resulted from a suspicion that had crept 
into his heart, and lay there in a dark corner.  Obscure as it was, when Miriam 
looked into his eyes, she detected it at once. (100) 
In the space of two paragraphs, the narrative shifts modes twice, moving from direct 
speech (Kenyon’s statement to Miriam) to a kind of free indirect discourse (the 
narrator speaking from and through Kenyon’s point-of-view) to a more distanced and 
critical third-person omniscient perspective (the narrator exposing the sculptor’s 
true—if unacknowledged—motivations). This layering of what Kenyon says to 
Miriam, what Kenyon says to himself, and what Kenyon truly feels reveals the 
intricacy of conscious stratagems and unconscious subterfuges that underlie and 
complicate even the most seemingly “frank and kind” of responses.  What Kenyon 
cannot admit to himself is that, if Miriam’s secret is fighting and struggling to be told, 
he is just as actively attempting to repress that utterance, under the guise of 
sympathetically preventing her from making an exposure that she would later regret.  
Thus, sympathy becomes a means of rationalizing suspicion; because he believes 
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himself to be acting on Miriam’s behalf, Kenyon can excuse or otherwise overlook 
less generous reasons why he might want to avoid hearing her secret.  Much like his 
behavior with the Cleopatra, Kenyon’s oppression of Miriam’s desire for expression 
takes shape as a concern for form, in this case, for the forms of polite social discourse.  
He tells himself that her confession would destroy the “relations” between them, 
ruining their friendship by forcing a degree of intimacy that it cannot sustain.  Yet he 
already suspects her of crimes for which he is unwilling to allow her to vindicate 
herself, which suggests that this intimacy already exists, albeit only in his 
displacement of his suspicion onto the statue that embodies the guilty womanhood of 
which Miriam is the obvious model. 
That Miriam detects his reluctance and, more to the point, grasps the real 
reasons for it merely by looking into his eyes further extends the parallel between this 
scene and the narrative back-story attached to the statue.  Cleopatra’s despair is 
described as the result of her failure to kindle “a tropic fire in the cold eyes of 
Octavius,” and, similarly, Miriam’s is rooted in her recognition that Kenyon, in spite 
of what he says, has already refused her the solace and aid she is so desperately 
seeking.  Denied an outlet, she turns on him, exclaiming, “Ah, I shall hate you . . . You 
are as cold and pitiless as your own marble” (100).  Earlier in the text, Kenyon was 
called “a man of marble,” but at this moment, that moniker takes on new and 
unpleasant associations, implying a certain moralizing inflexibility and critical 
detachment that is part and parcel of the “large view” Miriam believed would 
engender his sympathy on her behalf.  Though he attempts to defend himself, claiming 
that he is “but full of sympathy, God knows,” Miriam now recognizes the limitations 
of this particular social affinity and she tells him to “[k]eep your sympathy, then, for 
sorrows that admit of such solace” (100-101).  For one to be “admitted of” some kind 
of sympathetic fellowship, it seems, one’s “sorrows” must be untainted by guilt or 
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responsibility for what caused those sorrows.  More to the point, at least to Kenyon’s 
understanding, sharing those sorrows through sympathy must in no way burden or 
obligate the sympathizer; his reluctance to act as Miriam’s confessor is bound up in an 
awareness that—whatever her secret must be—hearing it would involve him in it, 
making him complicit by association.  Thus, the failure of his sympathy, in this 
instance, might be understood as the failure of sympathy generally to bridge the 
expanse between those who are tormented by the association with some past sin and 
those who remain fortunately free of such complicating relations. 
In the scene immediately prior to Miriam’s entering Kenyon’s studio, her 
desire to visit the sculptor is explained as motivated by a feeling of “infinite, shivering 
solitude,” which is “one of the most forlorn results of any accident, misfortune, crime, 
or peculiarity of character, that puts an individual ajar with the world.” “Very often,” 
the narrator continues, “as in Miriam’s case, there is an insatiable instinct that 
demands friendship, love, and intimate communion, but is forced to pine in empty 
forms; a hunger of the heart, which finds only shadows to feed upon” (89).  Again 
skirting the exact nature of Miriam’s dark secret, this description of just what puts an 
individual “ajar with the world” also reveals the complexity of Hawthorne’s notion of 
guilt.  Dismantled from the comforting binary opposition with innocence, guilt in The 
Marble Faun is the product of any sort of experience that forces upon the individual 
the unwelcome, isolating knowledge of things that cannot be openly avowed to or 
shared with others.  That Kenyon has glimpsed this knowledge through witnessing 
Miriam’s aesthetic encounter with her marble double and refuses to acknowledge it 
seems to suggest, on his part, a willful, hypocritical ignorance, which is further 
evidenced by his request that the next time they meet it be “in the same clear, friendly 
light as heretofore” (101).  Miriam denounces this subterfuge, and tells him, “You are 
less sincere than I thought you . . . if you try to make me think that there will be no 
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change” (101).  Instead of giving her the true “intimate communion” she desired, the 
sculptor only offers Miriam the “empty forms” of polite social intercourse, another 
shadow in place of the substance she is seeking.  For him to claim that they might 
return to seeing each other in the “clear, friendly light” of their previous interactions 
adds insult to injury, as it announces his determination to turn a blind eye to what he 
has just seen, an act that, though he does not know it, makes him more complicit in the 
tragedy that follows than he would have been complicit—had he been willing—in the 
tragedies of the past.  When Miriam leaves Kenyon’s studio, she briefly debates 
returning in order to “compel him to listen,” but decides against it, concluding finally 
that her secret is a “dark-red carbuncle—red as blood— . . . too rich a gem to put into 
a stranger’s basket.”  That Kenyon, who, prior to the scene in his studio, was deemed 
“[n]ext to Hilda, the person for whom Miriam felt most affection and confidence” is 
now offhandedly referred to as “a stranger” evidences how completely the suppression 
of Miriam’s confession has altered the nature of their relationship (88).  When Miriam 
leaves Kenyon, only to find “her Shadow”—the mysterious monk—waiting for her in 
the street below, his presence only further reinforces what she learned from her 
aesthetic experience in Kenyon’s studio: that her “hunger of the heart” must go 
unsatiated, with, as the narrator said before, “only shadows to feed upon.”   
If the scene in Miriam’s studio recasts the story of Orpheus and, all of the talk 
in this scene about Kenyon bringing the Cleopatra to life gestures towards another 
myth, that of Pygmalion and Galatea.  The story of a once deeply misogynist sculptor 
whose love for his finished creation is so great that it magically brings the ivory figure 
to life, the Pygmalion myth represents the aesthetic encounter as a mutually-
transformative experience, capable of animating a dead marble object and also, 
perhaps as miraculously, of reviving the deadened sensibilities of the creator and 
viewer.  Yet, the scene in Kenyon’s studio differs from its mythic proto-narrative in its 
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abortive conclusion; nothing comes to life (or to light, for that matter) and the sculptor 
remains unchanged by and undetached from the secrets that his creation brought to the 
surface.  This lack of resolution—the hallmark of all the aesthetic experiences in The 
Marble Faun before Donatello’s murder of Miriam’s Model—signals the failure of 
sympathy alone to break through the barriers erected by the polite forms of social 
discourse that determine how the individual engages with the world.  That said, though 
the aesthetic encounter in Kenyon’s studio does not lead to the revelation of Miriam’s 
secret, it does reveal another secret: the ultimate emptiness of those forms, both artistic 
and social, through which we simulate understanding, while remaining unfettered by 
the responsibilities true understanding entails.  
When Hawthorne visited the Barberini Palace in Rome in 1858 and first saw 
Guido Reni’s painting of what was then assumed to be Beatrice Cenci, he described it 
in his journal as an art object whose “spell is indefinable, and the painter has wrought 
it in a way more like magic than anything else.”  He goes on to say that, though it is 
“the most profoundly wrought picture in the world,” he wishes “it were possible for 
some spectator, of deep sensibility, to see the picture without knowing anything of its 
subject or history: for, no doubt, we bring all our knowledge of the Cenci tragedy to 
the interpretation of it.”136  Not one to wait for divine intervention, Hawthorne grants 
his own wish in The Marble Faun through the character of Hilda, the virginal New 
England painter, whose innocent eye is capable of rendering a copy of the Beatrice 
Cenci, seemingly without the corrupting influence of its subject matter, then widely 
known owing to Shelley’s play The Cenci, published in 1819. A Renaissance tale of 
depravity, incest, and patricide, the Cenci tragedy, like Miriam’s past, is frequently 
alluded to in the novel but never disclosed.  Though its backstory is only vaguely and 
fragmentarily referenced, the portrait of Beatrice Cenci functions in The Marble Faun 
                                                 
136 Vol. 10: Passages from the French and Italian Notebooks 89-90. 
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as the keynote for the novel’s broader meditation on the ethical enigma of aesthetic 
complicity.  More specifically, Hawthorne uses Reni’s depiction of Beatrice’s 
mysterious expression to explore the ways in which innocence can be lost merely by 
bearing witness to the discovery “that sin is in the world” (159). 
In Hilda’s capacity to reproduce “Guido’s very Beatrice” and thereby inspire 
the novel’s most protracted and inclusive aesthetic encounter, the visual artist’s talent 
for representation is again tied to her sympathetic faculties.  Hilda’s unparalleled skill 
as a copyist is attributed to the fact that she has sacrificed all individuality of 
perspective for the chance to more perfectly “catch and reflect some of the glory 
which had been shed upon canvas from the immortal pencils of old” (46-47).  
Sympathy is Hilda’s “guiding light” in the act of aesthetic appreciation; thus, her 
copies are not mimetic in a technical so much as in an emotional or spiritual sense.  
Going “straight to the central point, in which the Master conceived his work,” she is 
described as able to view it “as it were, with his own eyes” and thus her copies are 
infused with “that evanescent and ethereal life—the flitting fragrance . . . of the 
originals.”  Yet Hilda’s capturing of “the indefinable nothing, that inestimable 
something, that constitutes the life and soul” of the original artwork comes at the 
exclusion of other, earthier elements (48).  As the narrator points out, Hilda rarely 
copies the whole of the picture, but only “some high, noble, and delicate portion of it,” 
and she does not represent the original art object as it is—“darkened,” “injured,” or 
“retouched”—but rather as it might have looked “in its pristine glory” or even as “the 
great Master had conceived in his imagination, but had not so perfectly succeeded in 
putting upon canvas” (47-48).  The narrator pronounces this ability “a miracle,” a term 
that might be meant to be taken literally, as Hawthorne named his heroine after St. 
 214 
Hilda of Whitby, the patron saint of the small North Yorkshire town where he wrote 
part of the novel.137   
Yet, depicting her as an artistic saint (or martyr), whose wondrous paintings 
are produced seemingly through the will of God, only further reinforces the idea that 
Hilda herself is not ultimately responsible for her creations.  While she is better than 
other copyists, who are derisively dubbed “Guido machines, or Raphaelic machines,” 
she is still only a “finer instrument, a more exquisitely effective piece of mechanism” 
(48).  Her artwork, unlike Miriam’s sketches or Kenyon’s statues, are not expressions 
of a unique vision or conception; they are acts of obeisance to the Old Masters to 
whom she has pledged herself a devoted “handmaid” (another term that the narrator 
begs us to take literally).  Appropriately, Hilda’s abode is not a proper studio space, 
but rather a kind of hermitage in the top of an old medieval tower, adjacent to a shrine 
to the Virgin Mary.  Hilda tends to the oil lamp in front of the shrine, which 
“according to a legend which we cannot here pause to tell” must be kept alight at all 
times (42).  Again reflecting the historical palimpsest of Rome, this legend weirdly 
puts the Protestant Hilda in the dual roles of Catholic nun and Vestal Virgin.138  Of 
course, both feminine religious vocations share with Hilda’s artistic vocation the 
sacrifice of one’s “individual hopes” to the various gods one “love[s] and venerate[s]” 
(49).  Also, as the spiritual duties of her religious predecessors were dependent on 
their chastity, so too is Hilda’s innocence—her “purity of heart and life”—deemed 
integral to her success as a copyist (45).  Loving the Old Masters “with a virgin’s 
love,” Hilda’s “faculty of genuine admiration” is untainted by any trace of personal 
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Sky: the Mind and Heart of Nathaniel Hawthorne (Durham, NC: Duke UP, 1962), notes that 
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506. 
138 The primary occupation of a Vestal Virgin was to tend to the sacred fire of the Goddess Vesta; to 
allow the fire to go out, thus endangering the welfare of the city, was a punishable offense. 
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desire or the knowledge of those profane materialities that might have corrupted the 
original artist’s ideal conception.  Thus, her sympathy is a state of pure reflection, a 
mirroring of whatever she sees or otherwise senses.   
For the narrator, Hilda’s decision not to contribute to “the already crowded and 
cumbered world” original compositions—which, however good, must fall “short, if by 
ever so little, of the best that has been done”—is a heroic act, and he encourages the 
reader to “let us try to recompense her in kind by adducing her generous self-
surrender, and her brave, humble magnanimity” (49).  Certainly Hawthorne does hold 
up Hilda as a model of these very qualities, but he leaves somewhat ambiguous why 
she needs to be recompensed.  Is it simply that she has forgone the chance to be a 
recognized as an original artist, or is there something more fundamental that she has 
sacrificed in her chaste devotion to the great Renaissance painters?  In an especially 
poetical description of Hilda’s talents, the narrator claims that she removes the original 
picture “from the dark, chill corner of a gallery—from some curtained chapel in a 
church, where the light came seldom and aslant—from the prince’s carefully guarded 
cabinet, where not one-eye in thousands was permitted and behold” it and brings it, in 
her reproduction “into daylight, and gave its magic splendour for the enjoyment of the 
world” (49).  While this seems a democratizing gesture, removing the painting from its 
secluded and shadow-filled home (be it corner, chapel, or cabinet) risks taking the text 
out of its proper context.  By thrusting the painting into the direct sunlight of 
decontextualized public scrutiny, much like scrubbing from one’s copies the 
corrupting touches of man or time that mark the original work, Hilda denies the art 
object its embeddedness in place and history.  That it can be viewed potentially 
anytime or anywhere, in a condition that evidences none of the limitations of 
technique or medium, changes the terms of its reception.  The painting is no longer a 
testament to what was; instead, it is a testament to what might have been.   
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That said, Hilda’s crystalline purity of perception, her wholly reflective 
sympathy, allows her to succeed where others have failed in transferring from “image 
to canvas” what in Hawthorne’s opinion is “the very saddest picture ever painting or 
conceived”: the portrait of Beatrice Cenci (51, 52).  The perfection of her copy is 
validated by Miriam, who visiting Hilda in her hermitage, pronounces it “the greatest 
miracle you have yet achieved.”  What makes the painting so difficult to replicate 
(besides the fact that its owner at the time, Prince Barberini, refused to allow copyists 
to set up their easels before the picture) is the indefinable but unmistakable impression 
produced by the expression of its subject: 
The picture represented simply a female head; a very youthful, girlish, 
perfectly beautiful face, enveloped in white drapery . . . The eyes were large 
and brown, and met those of the spectator, but evidently with a strange, 
ineffectual effort to escape . . . The whole face was quiet; there was no 
distortion or disturbance of any single feature; nor was it easy to see why the 
expression was not cheerful . . . But . . . it involved an unfathomable depth of 
sorrow, the sense of which came to the observer by a sort of intuition. It was a 
sorrow that removed this beautiful girl out of the sphere of humanity, and set 
her in a far-off region, the remoteness of which—while her face is so close 
before us—makes us shiver as at a spectre. (51-52) 
In Michael Fried’s influential distinction between artworks exhibiting “absorption” 
(the seeming unawareness of an audience) and those exhibiting “theatricality (a 
performative awareness of the audience), Hawthorne’s description of the Beatrice 
Cenci seems to carve out a middle space.  In the opinion of the narrator, the mystery of 
the painting lies in its subject’s self-conscious attempt to avoid the scrutiny of the 
spectator, “a strange, ineffectual effort” that engenders in the viewer a frisson of 
uneasiness at the disjunction of what is so physically close being so emotionally 
remote.  Again, the root of alienation is not simply sadness but rather “an 
unfathomable sorrow” that isolates the sufferer from the rest of humanity.  Beatrice’s 
essential otherness, on some level incomprehensible to anyone but her, is what 
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previous copyists have been unable to render, though not for lack of trying.  
Hawthorne, through Miriam, pokes fun at the proliferation of sub-par Beatrice Cencis 
that flooded the Roman art market in the nineteenth-century.139  She likens the 
situation to a hall of mirrors in a fun-house: “everywhere we see oil-paintings, crayon-
sketches, cameos, engravings, lithographs, pretending to be Beatrice, and representing 
the poor girl with blubbered eyes, a leer of coquetry, a merry look, as if she were 
dancing, a piteous look, as if she were beaten, and twenty other modes of fantastic 
mistake.”  This grotesque concatenation of false Beatrices underscores the potentiality 
for the subtle mystery of the painting to be misinterpreted and cheapened when 
reproduced by lesser artists.  Hilda, though, is praised for having captured “Guido’s 
very Beatrice; she that slept in the dungeon, and awoke betimes, to ascend the 
scaffold” (52).  Miriam’s distinction here boils down to the difference between 
“doing” and “being”; the expressions of the other Beatrices all can be explained by 
either actions (crying, leering) or causes (dancing, being beaten), but Hilda’s Beatrice 
is Reni’s Beatrice, and since Reni was alleged to have done the portrait with the real 
model right in front of him, just prior to her execution, Hilda’s Beatrice thus is the 
doomed lady herself.  If, according to Miriam’s formulation, one false Beatrice only 
spawns another, her explanation of Hilda’s true copy conflates model with artwork 
and original with copy, all being identical to her on account of the “mysterious force” 
that animates that elusive expression. 
Yet, it is precisely the relation between the copy and the original that is 
troubled in the two friends’ discussion of the painting, a discussion that signals the 
limitations of the kind of perceptual or apprehensive sympathy that characterizes Hilda 
and her art.  After Miriam praises Hilda’s copy of the Beatrice Cenci, she asks her 
                                                 
139 Interestingly, proving Hawthorne’s point years after the fact, a casual search of Ebay today usually 
will yield at least a few, very dubious copies of the Beatrice Cenci, in any one of the mediums Miriam 
mentioned, all obviously mementos brought back from various Grand Tours. 
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friend to “interpret what the feeling is, that gives it such a mysterious force.”  Hilda’s 
response is almost identical to that of the narrator’s, given just a few paragraphs 
before; while she admits to being unable to put the exact feeling into words, she says,  
I felt all the time as if [Beatrice was] trying to escape from my gaze.  She 
knows that her sorrow is so strange, and so immense, that she ought to be 
solitary forever, both for the world’s sake and her own . . . she is a fallen angel, 
fallen, and yet sinless; and it is only this depth of sorrow . . . that . . . brings her 
within our view even while it sets her beyond our reach.” (52-53)   
Hilda’s interpretation of the painting’s effect expands on the narrator’s by way of a 
seeming contradiction; she explains the strange sense of alienation that infuses the 
painting by deeming Beatrice Cenci a “fallen angel, fallen, and yet sinless.”  Hilda’s 
evaluation here picks up a philosophical thread that runs throughout the narrative 
regarding the aesthetics of secrets.  Just how should the viewer attempt to make sense 
of the elusive expression of either living person or artistic representation thereof, 
particularly if that elusive expression seems rooted in the wish to elude scrutiny?  A 
secret is something that, for whatever reason, must be kept hidden, and when its 
presence is espied by an outsider, it raises the possibility that its possessor deserves 
some form of judgment.  Yet, because the secret, by its very nature, is something 
private, the only thing that can be speculated on is what feeling motivates this desire 
for privacy.  In The Marble Faun, two types of emotion most demand privacy: guilt 
and grief.  Both originate in some past occurrence for which the individual still 
suffers, some “accident, misfortune, crime, or peculiarity of character, that puts an 
individual ajar with the world” (88). The main difference is that guilt is a form of 
suffering tied up with a feeling of personal responsibility.  Yet, from the outside, there 
is no way to differentiate between guilt and grief; both cloak the individual in a kind 
of embarrassed reserve that alienates the viewer, setting the sufferer “beyond our 
reach.”  That even Hilda, who initially acquits Beatrice of having sinned, 
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acknowledges that “sorrow so black as hers oppresses her very nearly as sin would,” 
underscores how indistinguishable are the two emotions to an audience with no other 
information than that gleaned from the individual’s expression. 
Yet, as Hawthorne’s journal entry intimated, to aesthetically comprehend the 
ambiguity of the Beatrice Cenci’s expression, the viewer must be capable of 
suspending judgment on the real woman’s tragic history.  When Miriam, having 
already questioned Hilda’s initial assessment, claims that, to her, Beatrice’s innocence 
is “not so plain” and that she is not sure Beatrice, from “the dim region, whence she 
gazes so sadly and strangely at us” would acquit herself “of something evil, and never 
to be forgiven,” her doubt unsettles Hilda’s certainty.  When she goes on to remind 
Hilda of the “deed for which” the real Beatrice was beheaded, the copyist’s opinion 
changes dramatically: 
“Ah,” replied Hilda, shuddering, “I really had quite forgotten Beatrice’s 
history, and was thinking of her only as the picture seems to reveal her 
character.  Yes, yes; it was terrible guilt, an inexpiable crime, and she feels it to 
be so.  Therefore it is that the forlorn creature longs to elude our eyes, and 
forever vanish away into nothingness! Her doom is just.” (53) 
 Though diametrically opposed to her earlier judgment, Hilda’s reassessment of the 
painting is similar in its moral absolutism.  As she sees it, Beatrice can be either sinful 
or sorrowful, never both things at once.  Miriam laments Hilda’s severity in this 
instance and suggests that it is the product of the same character trait that makes Hilda 
such an excellent copyist: her innocence.  Though Hilda’s innocence allows her to 
imbue her creations with an especial emotional purity, it also renders her incapable of 
understanding or empathy in situations that are morally and aesthetically complex.  
Miriam describes Hilda’s innocence as “like a sharp steel sword,” and like King 
Solomon’s sword before her, it works in absolute divisions and in categorical 
distinctions, never recognizing the complications introduced by the actual context in 
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which a particular deed occurred.  It cannot appreciate that there might be such a thing 
as extenuating or mitigating factors, and therefore Miriam deems her friend’s 
judgments “terribly severe,” even if Hilda herself seems “all made up of gentleness 
and mercy” (53).  
Once again a foil to Hilda, the Duessa to her friend’s Una, Miriam offers an 
alternative worldview, a relativistic approach to the conundrum of the Cenci’s guilt.  
As she tells Hilda, “Beatrice’s sin may not have been so great; perhaps it was no sin at 
all, but the best virtue possible in the circumstances.”  Moreover, she proposes, if 
Beatrice viewed her action “as a sin, it may have been because her nature was too 
feeble for the fate imposed on her” (53).  Seeking to present Beatrice’s participation in 
the murder of her abusive father as to some degree justified by the situation, Miriam 
considers a tempting end run around the dichotomy of guilt and innocence.  If Beatrice 
had no better option, can what she did really be considered a sin?  And, if she persisted 
in viewing what she did as a sin, is it possible that her belief speaks only to her own 
intellectual limitations, rather than the truth concerning her actions?  A neat piece of 
casuistry, Miriam’s rationalization of Beatrice’s crime is ultimately irrelevant, as it 
does not get to the source of the painting’s mystery, which is not how Beatrice is 
viewed by the world but rather how Beatrice views herself.  This question torments 
Miriam, causing her to exclaim, “if I could only get within her consciousness!  If I 
could but clasp Beatrice Cenci’s ghost and draw it into myself!  I would give my life 
to know whether she thought herself innocent, or the one great criminal since time 
began!” (53).  As in many of the aesthetic encounters in Hawthorne’s novel, Miriam 
succeeds in this effort, but not exactly as she intended.  As Miriam utters this wish, 
Hilda, looking “from the picture into her face . . . was startled to observe that her 
friend’s expression had become almost exactly that of the portrait.”  Miriam does 
indeed “draw” the Cenci into herself, literally inscribing the ghostly outline of 
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Beatrice on her own visage, but in doing so, she only replicates the mystery; she does 
not solve it.  Gesturing towards some fundamental similarity between her undisclosed 
history and the back-story attached to the art object she faces, Miriam’s involuntary 
adoption of the look of Beatrice Cenci also signals the pertinence of “Beatrice’s 
mystery”—the mystery of that expression—to the novel itself.  From this early 
moment in Hilda’s turret, the Cenci’s strange, reluctant, side-long glance comes to 
signify the look of a kind of knowledge for which one is responsible but, for whatever 
reason, one cannot openly avow.   
With the ghost of Beatrice Cenci, Hawthorne most clearly represents the act of 
aesthetic encounter as a kind of haunting, one that leaves a trace of itself behind on the 
viewer.  In the Cenci, that trace is manifested in the side-long glance that 
communicates at once a sense of alienation from the rest of the world and a self-
conscious awareness of its scrutiny.  Miriam’s momentary likeness to the Cenci 
signals that she is similarly haunted, that she too has been involved in some past deed 
with which she is afraid to be associated.  Tellingly, Hilda does not recognize 
Miriam’s revelation for what it is.  Begging Miriam not to “look so,” she marvels that 
she had never before “guessed” “what an actress” she is (53).  Hilda’s attribution of 
Miriam’s passing resemblance to Beatrice Cenci to an aptitude for performance, an 
ability to assume “the look” of a certain state-of-mind, demonstrates that her copyist 
sensibility confines her to a knowledge of surfaces.  She is unable to fathom a kind of 
similarity based on aesthetic affect, Miriam’s replication of the Cenci’s expression 
stemming from the painting evoking an unconscious, identical emotional response; in 
her mind, this duplication must be the product of artistic effect, a consciously 
constructed artificial posture.  This crucial misreading reveals that unmediated 
perception can be as much a danger as a virtue.  If Hilda’s success as a copyist 
depends upon her possession of what Ruskin called an “innocence of the eye,” “a sort 
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of childish perception of flat stains of color, merely as such, without consciousness of 
what they signify,” this perceptual innocence is also what renders Hilda perilously 
blind to the greater implications of symbols and gestures.140  Her “pure vision,” which 
is pure insofar as it is (in the words of W.J.T. Mitchell) “uncontaminated by 
imagination, purpose, or desires,” obstructs her ability to see outside the frame, to 
recognize the art object’s function as an analogue or a substitute, standing in for what 
must remain unseen or unsaid.141 
But, as Hawthorne’s novel underscores, even aesthetic innocence must 
undergo a (questionably) fortunate fall, and Hilda’s witnessing of Dontello’s murder 
of Miriam’s Model awakens her to how perception can implicate individuals in crimes 
in which they have no active role.  That being said, what is curious about Hawthorne’s 
staging of the murder is that no single character—including Donatello, whose hands 
push the man over the precipice—is presented as wholly responsible for the Model’s 
death.  Rather, all three participants, Donatello, Miriam, and Hilda, are bound together 
in an exchange of guilty glances, which, on the one hand, absolves each of deliberate 
intent but, on the other, ties them all to the crime as inexorably as if they had plotted it 
out together.  Initially focalized through Miriam’s consciousness, the moment of the 
Model’s death is given a hazy unreality by her sense of impending doom, as the Model 
emerges, horrifically animated, from the darkness of “a deep, empty niche, that had 
probably once contained a statue” (132).  A grotesque reenactment of the Pygmalion 
story, the Model is presented as a marble form come to life, bearing down on Miriam, 
                                                 
140 John Ruskin, The Elements of Drawing (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1888) 22.  In her 
introduction to The Marble Faun, Susan Manning, building off of the work of Pierre Bordieu argues 
that Hawthorne’s representation of the “pure gaze” places the novel “on the cusp of a new 
understanding of aesthetic experience” that came out of 1860s French Impressionism: xxxii-xxxiii.  
While, at a later point, I can imagine Bordieu’s theories to be greatly beneficial to this study, I would 
still argue that this aspect of Hawthorne’s aesthetics evidences an indebtedness to Ruskin rather than to 
the Impressionists. 
141 W.J.T. Mitchell, Iconology: Image, Text, Ideology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986) 
118. 
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whose feeling of “cold, sick despair . . . impeded her breath, and benumbed her 
promptitude of thought.”  Watching the scene unfold with a detachment akin to an out-
of-body experience, she “dreamily . . . remember[s] falling on her knees,” from which 
vantage point she “beh[olds] herself as in a dim show, and could not well distinguish 
what was done and suffered; no, not even whether she herself were really an actor and 
sufferer in the scene” (132).  As for Donatello, in murdering the Model, he does not 
see himself as acting under his own volition, but under Miriam’s direction.  He tells 
her afterwards, “I did what your eyes bade me do, when I asked them with mine, as I 
held the wretch over the precipice!” (134)  And, finally, Hilda, having left the rest of 
their group of friends to find Miriam and Donatello, is poised at the threshold of a 
“little courtyard,” and, looking through the doorway, sees occur “all in one breathless 
instant . . . the whole quick passage of the deed, which took but that little time to grave 
itself in the eternal adamant” (133).  Though each registers the event differently, all 
their impressions have in common a distancing aesthetic framework.  Miriam, whose 
position puts her in the same relation to the scene as a spectator in the orchestra is to 
the proscenium, views it as a dramatic spectacle, a “dim show” of violence and 
suffering which serves as a reflection of her own private emotions.  Donatello, by 
contrast, is in the grips of a literary mindset; standing at the precipice of the Tarpeian 
Rock, the infamous peak from which ancient Romans hurled traitors to the Republic, 
he is thinking of his act in a broader mythological and historical context.  “Conscious 
of the historical associations of the scene,” he frames his murder of the Model as a re-
enactment of a familiar narrative, that of a dangerous traitor to a community meeting 
his just end (131).  Hilda, as is fitting, sees the event through the frame of the 
doorway, which renders the scene a picture—one that in its setting and subject bears a 
startling resemblance to the productions of the Old Masters--from which she is unable 
to look away.  Experienced by all three not temporally (as a progression of actions) 
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but spatially (as a dramatic or narrative scene or visual image), the moment is frozen 
in time, rather like a tableau vivant in which they are all participants as well as 
observers.   
The narrator pronounces this action of “one breathless instant” as henceforth 
graven “in the eternal adamant,” and, certainly, the text bears out this statement by 
illustrating the various ways in which Donatello’s deed almost artistically sculpts the 
remainder of the narrative, particularly as regards the bonds between the novel’s 
quartet of main characters.  A transformative moment, the murder of the Model is the 
final stage in a long process, one that fixes (or perhaps affixes) the social relations of 
the four friends, connecting them to each other in a way that was previously 
unimaginable.  That Hawthorne is encouraging the reader to draw the connection 
between this process and that of artistic creation is evidenced by Miriam’s observation 
directly after the Model’s death.  Looking over the precipice and seeing her 
tormentor’s body below, she exclaims, “You have killed him, Donatello! He is quite 
dead . . . stone dead!” (135, emphasis mine).  An artist’s model no longer, Miriam’s 
shadow is apotheosized (figuratively) into a stone figure, a statue that they all have 
had a hand in creating.  Though she initially attributes the Model’s death solely to 
Donatello, Miriam quickly amends her statement to acknowledge her own culpability, 
saying, “We two slew yonder wretch.  The deed knots us together for time and 
eternity, like the coil of a serpent!”  Given the preponderance of Biblical imagery in 
the text, it is tempting to read any mention of serpents as an allusion to the tempter in 
the Garden of Eden.  Here, however, Hawthorne perhaps has another figure in mind, 
one with an extensive aesthetic pedigree: the statue of Laocoön and His Sons, which, 
like Praxiteles’ Faun, is housed in the Vatican Museum.  The subject of the famous 
debate between Winckelmann and Lessing, the ancient statue, unearthed in the 
 225 
sixteenth-century, depicts the Trojan priest and his two sons being strangled by two 
sea-serpents sent as divine punishment for Laocoön’s past actions.142   
Hawthorne mentions the statue on a few occasions in his French and Italian 
Note-Books, one of these reflections being particularly pertinent to this discussion:  
“The Laocoön on this visit impressed me not less than before; it is such a type of 
human beings struggling with an inextricable trouble, and entangled in a complication 
which they cannot free themselves from by their own efforts, and out of which Heaven 
will not help them.”143  As is the case throughout The Marble Faun, this aesthetic 
observation from Hawthorne’s notebook is picked up and developed in relation to the 
narrative, providing an image that encapsulates the complexities of a situation in 
which the characters are ensnared.  Though not yet directly mentioned, the Laocoön 
haunts both Miriam’s statement and the narrator’s elaboration of the idea of 
complicity, the state in which Miriam and Donatello find themselves subsequent to the 
Model’s death.  Knotting them together “like the coil” of a snake, 
[t]heir deed—the crime which Donatello wrought, and Miriam accepted on the 
instant—had wreathed itself . . . like a serpent, in inextricable links about their 
souls, and drew them into one, by its terrible contractile power . . . So intimate, 
in those first moments, was the union, that it seemed as if their new sympathy 
annihilated all other ties . . . a new sphere, a special law, had been created for 
them alone. (135) 
Up until this moment, Donatello has been “a simple and joyous creature” who seems 
to exist mostly for the contemplation of his artistic companions, a faun whose innocent 
sensuality recalls a lost state of being uncomplicated by questions of morality and 
judgment (134).  His murder of Miriam’s model makes him an artist in his own right; 
the crime which he has “wrought” “kindle[s] him into a man,” and thus moves him 
                                                 
142 Held up by Pliny as the epitome of visual artistry, the Laocoön has a long and pertinent history in 
aesthetic criticism, which I hope to pursue in greater depth later. 
143 Vol. 10: French and Italian Notebooks 132.  In an alternate edition, this quotation ends differently, 
concluding “out of which Heaven alone can help them.”  
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into “a new sphere” where his burgeoning rational faculties give him the capacity to 
think and act as a moral agent.  This new sensibility manifests itself in the language he 
uses to characterize his killing of the Model; as he tells Miriam, “there was short time 
to weigh the matter; but he had his trial in that breath or two . . . and his sentence in 
that one glance, when your eyes responded to mine” (135).  A curious commingling of 
the aesthetic and judicial registers, this notion of judgment being communicated not in 
a word but in a glance is indicative of way in which complicity lies outside the 
boundaries of easily determinable and definable categories of guilt and innocence.  In 
two previous instances, Donatello had asked Miriam’s permission to dispatch the 
Model, and in both cases, she had verbally denied that request.144  In this instance, her 
assent is unspoken.  The Model’s trial, sentence, and execution occur in an instant, and 
this instant of non-verbal communication unites the pair in an “inextricable” bond 
whose hallmark is a terrible kind of intimacy, a “new” kind of sympathy that is rooted 
in a shared sense of responsibility for the deed which one “wrought” and the other 
“accepted.”   
The statue of the Laocoön, with the serpent twined about the limbs of three 
sufferers, would not be an applicable figure for complicity in The Marble Faun if the 
allusion extended only to Donatello and Miriam; for it to be fully realized, Hilda, the 
third participant in the scene, must also be involved.  Thus, Hawthorne returns to the 
image in a later chapter, in which Hilda, having retreated horror-stricken from the 
scene without alerting her friends to her presence, grapples with her own loss of 
innocence and the moral implications of bearing witness to a crime:  
                                                 
144 In the first instance, the Model comes upon Miriam and Donatello in the Borghese Gardens, and 
Donatello asks, “Shall I clutch him by the throat? Bid me do so; and we are rid of him forever” and 
Miriam responds, “In Heaven’s name, no violence!” (71)  In the second, the Model surprises them by 
the Trevi Fountain, and Donatello tells her to “Bid me drown him!” to which Miriam responds, “Peace, 
peace!” (114).   
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A torpor . . . had possessed itself of the poor girl, like a half-dead serpent 
knotting its cold, inextricable wreaths around her limbs.  It was that particular 
despair . . . which only the innocent can experience, although it possesses . . . 
the gloomy characteristics that mark a sense of guilt . . . It was that dismal 
certainty of the existence of evil in the world. (256) 
That Hilda is twined in the same “inextricable wreaths” that have encircled Donatello 
and Miriam is indicative of the far-reaching and expansive nature of complicity (as 
opposed to outright guilt).  While she herself has in no way contributed to the Model’s 
death, her witnessing of it intimately connects her to those involved and connects her 
in ways perceptible both to her and to the outside world.  On one level, Hilda’s sense 
of complicity in the event burdens her with a sorrowful knowledge that transforms her 
previous mode of aesthetic apprehension.  She loses “the gifted simplicity of vision” 
that made her such a brilliant copyist, the “eye of faith” that allowed her to see in the 
works of the Old Masters the ideal that they intended but never quite managed to 
execute (262, 261).  Going to the galleries now, she sees “beauty less vividly, but 
fe[els] truth, or the lack of it, more profoundly.”  On another, her despair leaves a 
mark on her countenance that is visible to others, a despair that has all the same 
“characteristics” of “a sense of guilt.”  This outward change is first observed by Hilda 
herself, when she catches a glimpse of her own face in the mirror, as she sits in her 
room next to her copy of the Beatrice Cenci.  Happening to “throw her eyes on the 
glass” and to take in “both of these images at one unpremeditated glance . . . [s]he 
fancied—nor was it without horror—that Beatrice’s expression, seen aside and 
vanishing in a moment, had been depicted in her own face, likewise, and flitted from it 
as timorously” (160).  Echoing Miriam’s encounter with the picture, Hilda’s face now 
also takes on the mysterious expression of the Cenci, and in the mirror’s reflection of 
her face next to her own copy of the picture, we are given an image that represents 
Hilda’s progression from one form of perceptual understanding to another.  Her 
painted copy of the picture represents her earlier aesthetic sensibility—based largely 
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on a superficial accuracy of vision, a capacity for scrutinizing surfaces—and her facial 
expression reveals how the witnessing of Miriam and Donatello’s crime has given her 
a deeper and more conflicted comprehension of what lies beneath those surfaces, the 
situations and responsive emotions that bring them into being.  By virtue of having 
been involved (however tangentially, unintentionally, and unwillingly) in the scene on 
the precipice, she is now an “actress” in the same way Miriam was, a figure who 
embodies and projects a certain look and posture indicative of a drama in which she is 
a player. 
Part of what characterizes Hawthorne’s notion of complicity is the idea of 
endless proliferation.  Rather like a contagion, complicity continually spreads 
outwards, affecting those who, through different means, come in contact with those 
already affected (and infected).  Even Hilda becomes a “carrier” insofar as her copy of 
the Cenci (the one now graven on her face) is passed on in the public sphere, when she 
visits a gallery soon after the scene in her studio.  As she stands before a painting in 
the gallery, a painting whose subject reminds her of Miriam, she is observed by a 
young Italian artist, who sketches her portrait and uses it as the basis for an original 
composition of a woman “gazing, with sad and earnest horror, at a blood-spot which 
she seemed just then to have discovered on her white robe” (258).145  The picture is 
later made into an engraving from which copies are printed and made available “in the 
print-shops along the Corso,” and it becomes an object of interest to “connoisseurs” 
who argue that “the idea of the face was supposed to have been suggested by the 
portrait of Beatrice Cenci” (258).  So, the expression of Beatrice Cenci is transferred 
from the original painting to Hilda’s copy to Hilda’s face, then to a random spectator’s 
sketchbook, then to his canvas, then to an engraving, and then to a series of copies 
                                                 
145 The painting that Hilda is looking at is a painting of the Spanish Queen, Joanna of Aragon, a 
painting at that time attributed to Leonardo da Vinci.  That this minor member of the intriguing and 
inbred Spanish royalty reminds Hilda of Miriam is yet another coded allusion to the possibility of incest 
in the relation between Miriam and her Model. 
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made from that engraving.  The fact that this expression is still discernable in the eyes 
of practiced and refined viewers as suggestive of the painting from which it originated 
speaks to the indestructibility of the expression’s essence, an essence that might be 
misinterpreted, but its outward look never mistaken.  The Italian artist who records 
Hilda’s expression in his painting “reads the mystery” of it rightly; he calls his picture 
“Innocence, dying of a Blood-Stain.”  But, as the narrator notes, this original title is 
changed when the painting is purchased by a picture-dealer, who, desiring to make the 
picture more “intelligible” to his audience, renames it “The Signorina’s Vengeance.”  
Taking what was a highly allegorical composition, meant to represent the anguish of 
Innocence when “a man is slain in her presence” and his blood stains her robe, and 
characterizing it as instead a “very natural representation of a not uncommon fact”—
that of a passionate young woman having “stabbed her perfidious lover with a 
bodkin”—the picture-dealer denies the possibility of complicity, reducing the 
composition to, again, a well-worn tale of innocence falling prey to guilt (258).  The 
narrator wearily acknowledges that this gross over-simplification of the art object’s 
significance is all too typical, asserting, “thus coarsely does the world translate all 
finer griefs that meet its eye! It is more a coarse world than an unkind one.”  In this 
short imaginary history of a painting’s elusive expression, Hawthorne demonstrates 
how the “fineness” of emotions and the specificities of occurrences are so often lost in 
perceptual translation, made “coarse” by the blunt and indiscriminate perspective of 
the average viewer.  The picture-dealer, by appending to the picture of Hilda an 
inaccurate but more “intelligible” title, performs an act of aesthetic adjudication, an 
act that mystifies the complexities of truth by offering a familiar narrative in a 
traditional format.  Like the painting of her, though, Hilda’s situation—in which her 
gaze links her to an actual criminal act—cannot be reduced to a familiar narrative of 
guilt and innocence.  Hawthorne suggests that those viewers capable of understanding 
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this more complex form of responsibility are also the ones who would resist the kind 
of simplifications of which the picture-dealer is guilty.  Significantly, that class of 
viewers does not yet include Hilda herself, who looks horror-stricken at her own 
indirect involvement and despairs, like Lady Macbeth, that “all the perfumes of Arabia 
will not sweeten this little hand,” stubbornly refusing to acknowledge the mitigating 
circumstances that determine complicity.146 
Perhaps because he is the only one of the main characters not to have 
participated in or witnessed the death of the Model, Kenyon most clearly articulates 
Hawthorne’s notion of complicity.  That Kenyon is a sculptor also makes him the most 
plausible candidate for making explicit the extended allusion to the Laocoön that has 
been used to explain the guilty and grief-filled bonds that link the friends in the wake 
of the murder.  The Laocoön is finally directly mentioned in a scene towards the end 
of the text, after Kenyon has left Miriam and Donatello in Perugia and has returned to 
Rome to reunite with Hilda.  Hilda having failed to meet him, as promised, at the 
Vatican Museum, he wanders the sculpture gallery by himself, lonely and isolated, 
finding only dissatisfaction in the great works of art that formerly defined his 
existence: 
In the chill of his disappointment, he suspected that it was a very cold art to 
which he had devoted himself . . . Nothing pleased him, unless it were the 
group of the Laocoön, which, in its immortal agony, impressed Kenyon as a 
type of the long, fierce struggle of Man, involved in the knotted entanglements 
of Errour and Evil, those two snakes, which (if no Divine help intervene) will 
be sure to strangle him and his children in the end . . . In the Laocoön, the 
horrour of a moment grew to be the Fate of interminable ages. (303-304) 
                                                 
146 Macbeth V.i.20-21.  Hawthorne alludes to this image of the “bloody hand” of complicity a few times 
in The Marble Faun.  In the first instance, Hilda and Miriam witness Miriam meeting with the Model 
before a public fountain, and Miriam stoops before him and disguises her act of submission by 
pretending to wash her hands in the fountain (84-85).  Later, the four friends, out on a evening walk 
with a group of artists, are surprised at the Trevi Fountain by the Model, who walks up behind Miriam 
and Donatello, adding his shadow to theirs, and he gestures to her, “inviting her to bathe her hands” 
(114).  That Hilda, after witnessing Miriam and Donatello’s crime, frequently imagines herself marked 
with blood carries the analogy further, expanding it as Hawthorne expands his notion of complicity. 
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Echoing, with a few important differences, the aforementioned passage from 
Hawthorne’s journal, Kenyon’s impression of the Laocoön transforms the author’s 
earlier observations into a grand allegory of the human condition.  What makes the 
statue, for Kenyon, “the one triumph of sculpture” is that it conveys “repose,” the 
“essential” feature of the plastic arts, “in the very acme of effort” (304).147  In other 
words, by taking the struggle of a moment and casting it in marble, the Laocoön 
displays a figure perpetually, even eternally, in agony.  Forever suspended in this 
entangled posture, it comes to signify for Kenyon mankind likewise suspended in the 
“knotted entanglements of Errour and Evil,” a struggle that is “the Fate of 
interminable ages” and, for the individual, ceases only with death.  Kenyon’s 
sensitivity to “the terrible magnificence, as well as to the sad moral of this work” 
speaks to his own growing sense of complicity, which manifests itself not as a feeling 
of grief or guilt, but rather as a more philosophical recognition of the complexity of 
the bonds that link individuals to each other and to the world more generally.   
Originating in his own undeclared love for Hilda, a feeling that (in a very Jane 
Eyre-like fashion) is compared to “an exquisitely sensitive cord . . . knotted with 
his . . . heart-strings” and stretched between the “owl-tower” on which he stands and 
“Hilda’s dove-cote,” Kenyon’s acceptance of complicity takes on a more definite form 
in his realization that Miriam and Donatello, guilty as they are, hold each other’s sole 
means of salvation, a salvation rooted in the intimacy of the attachment they formed in 
the murder of the Model.  When the pair meet again in Perugia, Kenyon takes on the 
role of officiant, overseeing a reunion that shares its outward form with a marriage 
ceremony.  As the two stand before him with linked hands, he offers up his opinion 
that “as a bystander, though a deeply interested one,” he might be able to “discern 
                                                 
147 Hawthorne’s insistence on the importance of sufficient “repose” in successful sculpture seems 
indebted to the Winckelmann/ Lessing debate, particularly the idea that beauty can only be 
communicated visually by softening the expression of certain emotions, of transfiguring them so that 
they inspire pity and sympathy in the viewer as opposed to fear or disgust.   
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somewhat of truth that is hidden from” them (250).  That truth is that Miriam, in 
taking Donatello “out of a wild and happy state, . . . [has] incurred a responsibility,” 
and that responsibility is to educate Donatello in the business of being mortal, which, 
in the context of this narrative, is synonymous with being moral.  As Miriam 
“possesses what [Donatello] requires, and, with utter self-devotion, will use it for [his] 
good,” Kenyon pronounces “the bond betwixt [them] . . . a true one, and never—
except by Heaven’s own act—be rent asunder” (251).   
Yet this union differs from an ordinary marriage: a bond “twined with such 
black threads” as sin, guilt, and grief, it is not meant to facilitate “earthly happiness” 
but instead “it is for mutual support; it is for one another’s final good; it is for effort, 
for sacrifice . . . for mutual elevation and encouragement towards a severe and painful 
life.”  And, Kenyon concludes, “if, out of toil, sacrifice, prayer, penitence, and earnest 
effort towards right things, there comes, at length, a sombre and thoughtful happiness, 
taste it, and thank Heaven” (252).  Kenyon envisions the form and purpose of Miriam 
and Donatello’s union in a way recalling the form and purpose of aesthetic experience.  
Essentially, he is arguing that Miriam, having awakened Donatello’s conscience 
through a crime committed on her behalf, can use her “rich gifts of heart and mind, 
[her] suggestive power, [her] magnetic influence, [her] sympathetic knowledge” to 
help him move from an overwhelming despair at his own fallen state to a moderate but 
conflicted sort of happiness.  Like the art object, her redemptive power lies in her 
ability to stimulate his intellectual and emotional faculties, to use her “rich gifts” to 
help him refine his own sensibilities and hone the “sympathetic knowledge” of the 
world that first emerged out of the crucible of “misfortune.”  The complicitous bond 
between the pair is thus redeemed by an emotion equally outside the realm of rational 
understanding and easy understanding: love.  But, if the flip side of complicity is love, 
this incarnation of it bears little resemblance to the ecstatic avowals that decorate lyric 
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odes and Valentines.  Instead, sharing with the sin and sorrow of complicity a certain 
furtiveness, the love between Miriam and Donatello is a private thing that cannot 
withstand direct scrutiny, even from the lovers themselves.  As the narrator muses, 
“who can tell where happiness may come, or where, through an unexpected guest, it 
may never show its face?  Perhaps—shy, subtle thing—it had crept into this sad 
marriage-bond, when the partners would have trembled at its presence, as a crime? 
(252, emphasis mine)  A product of the same event by which they are forever guiltily 
linked, Miriam and Donatello’s happiness in their “sad marriage-bond” is like the 
secret look of art objects; it can only be fleetingly apprehended by a sympathetic 
viewer, who “catch[es] a glimpse” of the object at just such an moment and angle that 
“all [its] hidden meaning [is temporarily] on the surface” (253).  To the majority of 
onlookers, though, the significance of Miriam and Donatello’s meeting in Perugia 
remains inscrutable; with the notable exception of Kenyon, the “thousand eye-
witnesses” who are an audience to their symbolic marriage only “gaze[] so curiously 
at the unintelligible scene” and, in their innocence, fail to understand its import. 
In Hawthorne’s preface to The Marble Faun, he addresses himself to a 
particular kind of reader, a reader that he is no longer sure actually exists, an “unseen 
brother of the soul” capable of reading his work with the “apprehensive sympathy” 
that allows the author to leave certain  identities ambiguous and certain mysteries 
unresolved.  Judging by his decision to append an explanatory “postscript” to the 
second edition of the novel, he did not find many readers of this “mythic” breed.  Still, 
if the postscript, teasingly and reluctantly, offers a few largely unsatisfying answers to 
more mundane questions, it also provides insight into what Hawthorne saw himself 
doing in The Marble Faun to the unique form of the romance that he had spent his 
career developing.  As he tells this later generation of readers, with The Marble Faun 
 234 
he had attempted to revise the romance genre by adding an aestheticizing narrative 
frame, 
throwing about this Romance the kind of atmosphere essential to the effect at 
which he aimed.  He designed the story and the characters to bear, of course, a 
certain relation to human nature and human life, but still to be so artfully and 
airily removed from our mundane sphere, that some laws and proprieties of 
their own should be implicitly and insensibly acknowledged. (359) 
As much a challenge as an explanation, this description gestures towards the function 
of the Roman spectacle in Hawthorne’s text.  Rome, as described in Middlemarch, is a 
city of “visible history,” it art, its architecture, even its landscape all attesting to the 
rich diversity of competing styles, value systems, and beliefs that contributed to its 
construction.  The visibility of this diversity is what provides the specific “kind of 
atmosphere” “essential to the effect at which [Hawthorne] aimed.”  The author might 
have substituted “affect” for “effect” here, as it is by focalizing so much of his story 
through the aesthetic experiences of his characters that he moves beyond the limited 
and limiting idea of a dualistic, wholly cohesive moral universe to a more expansive if 
sometimes frighteningly indeterminate model of social relations to which The Marble 
Faun ultimately ascribes.  In the aesthetic frames provided by his characters’ 
subjective impressions of various art objects, Hawthorne finds a means of channeling 
allegorical energies at work in the romance, concretizing and complicating them in the 
process.  If the art objects that the characters study become the staging area for certain 
aesthetic and moral conflicts—between idealism and realism, good and evil—they 
nevertheless refuse simplistic resolutions to these conflicts and, instead, force their 
viewers to recognize how much of human experience lies beyond the comfortable 
boundaries of sanctioned “laws and proprieties.”  In The Marble Faun, aesthetic 
experience offers a pathway to a different way of knowing the world, a mode of 
comprehension that stems from an awareness of complicity, which is “a certain 
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relation to human nature and human life” that, like the art objects that allow 
Hawthorne’s characters to see the complex bonds that make them responsible to and 
for one another, can only be “implicitly and insensibly acknowledged.”  
 236 
CHAPTER 6.  
“As from the hand of a Great Master”:  “The Art of Culture” in Henry James’s 
The Portrait of a Lady 
Early Criticism and a Late Preface:  James’s Critical Framing of The Portrait of 
a Lady 
From its title onwards, Henry James’s The Portrait of a Lady (1880-81) 
encourages a reading that focuses on moments of aesthetic encounter.  Certainly 
Victorian art culture and the fin-de-siècle aesthetes who were its cleverest and perhaps 
most willful children inspired this early novel in ways that have been thoroughly 
documented.148  It is also a text that bears witness to its young author’s burgeoning 
awareness of the novel as a unique artistic form, capable of conveying elements of 
human experience never so well captured in any other medium, and for this reason, the 
narrative representation of acts of perception therein is of a stamp and significance 
quite different from what is found in the novels and pieces of short fiction of Brontë, 
Eliot, Pater, and Hawthorne, all writers to whom James knew himself indebted.  James 
himself addresses this matter in the 1908 Preface to his novel, but as illuminating as is 
the famous “house of fiction” section from that text to his novel, it is perhaps just as 
important to go backwards, to before James emerged as a novelist in his own right, 
when he was still making his name as a critic of the art that was to so profoundly 
influence his fiction.  
In 1877, roughly three years before The Portrait of a Lady, Henry James 
reviewed an exhibition of artwork including paintings by the Pre-Raphaelite Edward 
Burne-Jones.  Though James is quick to identify himself as a “spectator not at all in 
                                                 
148 Two books that best exemplify this type of criticism are Adeline Tintner’s The Museum World of 
Henry James (Ann Arbor, MI: U.M.I. Research Press, 1986) and Viola Winner’s Henry James and the 
Visual Arts (Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 1970). 
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sympathy with that school of art,” one “not at all inclined to look at things after the 
morbidly ingenious fashion which seems . . . the sign of this school,” he nevertheless 
praises Burne-Jones’s canvasses in terms that presage the composition of his own 
Portrait.  Asserting that Burne-Jones’s “productions” can be enjoyed “only with a 
dozen abatements,” James still argues that these artworks should be enjoyed, as they 
are characteristic of  
the art of culture, of reflection, of intellectual luxury, of aesthetic refinement, 
of people who look at the world and at life not directly, as it were, and in all its 
accidental reality, but in the reflection and ornamental portrait of it furnished 
by art itself in other manifestations; furnished by literature, by poetry, by 
history, by erudition.149 
In this surprisingly generous assessment, James acknowledges that Pre-Raphaelite 
artistry—which, even today, is too often dismissed as navel-gazing and escapist—is 
itself a response to the culture it is helping to create.  His account links the material 
and immaterial markers of aestheticism (for example, its heady intellectualism along 
with its penchant for sumptuousness) in a way that seems designed to evoke the 
complex social milieu out of which it emerged.  This milieu, he further intimates, is 
the product of “people who look at the world” in a deliberate and particular fashion, 
choosing to see beyond its “accidental reality” to the patterns and pictures that can be 
structured out of the chaos.  While he acknowledges Burne-Jones’s stunning technical 
ability, James primarily values the painter for his artistic expression of this 
perspective.  Not the direct gaze of a realist, Burne-Jones’s perspective is that of the 
aesthete, heavily mediated, the world seen through various artistic frames and 
intellectual filters.  For an audience schooled by Ruskin to see art as culture (serving 
the didactic function of acculturating the viewer), James here is asking them to 
recognize in Burne-Jones’s paintings the art of culture.  What is artful, so to speak, in 
                                                 
149 Henry James, Henry James: Essays on Art and Drama, ed. Peter Rawlings (Aldershot, Hants, 
England: Scolar Press, 1996) 257. 
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Burne-Jones’s art is its ability to pictorially suggest the perspective of the already 
cultured viewer, the individual most capable of appreciating it.  Thus, in a weird way, 
James implies that what is to be enjoyed in Burne-Jones (and what can be enjoyed 
only by a select group) is the perspective of the viewer himself, as that perspective is 
reflected back at him by the art object.150 
Of course, to appreciate an art object solely for its confirmation of one’s 
cultural superiority smacks of intellectual onanism, and James is too savvy to ignore 
the chance to distinguish himself from those who would undertake or unabashedly 
celebrate such an enterprise.  In addition to his cryptic mention of the “abatements” 
necessary to enjoy Burne-Jones, his review also makes a point of both praising and 
critiquing Burne-Jones for his reflectiveness, for the way in which his body of “work 
holds a perpetual revel of its own” to the degree that every artwork seems just another 
expression of the claustrophobic interior of the artist’s imagination.  James develops 
this idea perhaps most ingeniously through two allusions to Tennyson, the first of 
which is couched in the quotation above.  Though James’s description of Burne-
Jones’s perspective on the world as “in the reflection and ornamental portrait 
furnished by art itself” could be read as referencing one of the artist’s paintings (The 
Mirror of Venus) on display at the Grosvenor Gallery exhibition he was reviewing, the 
strange double distancing from reality conveyed by James’s pairing of the mirror (or 
“reflection”) with the “ornamental frame” also evokes Tennyson’s The Lady of 
Shalott.  A poem now widely read as an allegory of the artist’s relation to the public, it 
tells the story of a doomed Arthurian heroine who, owing to a curse, can only look at 
the world through her turret-window as that framed view is itself reflected in a mirror.  
What she sees in that mirror she weaves into beautiful tapestries, until the fateful day 
                                                 
150 I use the masculine gender deliberately here, as I will later argue that in choosing a female 
protagonist in Portrait James is deliberately tinkering with the gendered aesthetic formulations he 
earlier endorsed. 
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that Lancelot rides by, causing her to look directly down on Camelot, setting into 
motion a series of events leading to her death.   
The other allusion to Tennyson comes at the review’s conclusion, when James 
asserts, “[i]n the palace of art there are many chambers, and that of which Mr. Burne-
Jones holds the key is a wondrous museum.  His imagination, his fertility of invention, 
his exquisiteness of work, his remarkable gifts as a colorist . . . all these things 
constitute a brilliant distinction.”  “The Palace of Art” is the title of another Tennyson 
poem, similarly involving a female protagonist—this time the beauty-loving “soul” of 
the speaker—who dwells within the “lordly pleasure-house” of the Imagination, until 
“loathing of her solitude,” she leaves her palace for “a cottage in the vale,” where she 
must do a form of penance for the solipsistic vanity of her previous mode of existence.  
Both of these poems imagine grim fates for those involved in artistic pursuits, but, 
more importantly, they also conceive of the mind of the artist as an enclosed space, a 
cabinet of curiosities filled with choice impressions taken from the outside world from 
which the individual is cut off. For all of Tennyson’s ambivalence regarding the 
artistic process, these two poems leave unchallenged the aestheticist idea of the artist-
figure as occupying a private, aristocratic, feminine sphere, far removed from the 
influences of public opinion and the marketplace.  James, though, no sooner alludes to 
this idea than he begins to subtly unsettle it, first and foremost by referring to it in the 
midst of a magazine review.  He reminds the reader that if Burne-Jones is, indeed, like 
the Lady of Shalott, weaving his magic sites at a double remove from the world, this 
aesthetic distance is itself the product of culture.  And, if he dwells within the Palace 
of Art, he is not the chatelaine of the palace but rather the cicerone of one room, itself 
a museum of which his responsibility is to show the viewer a collection that has in 
some way been bought and paid for.  James’s review thus strives to complicate the 
notion of the art object as a direct pathway into the privileged interiority of the artist 
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by suggesting how that interiority is itself situated within a larger social structure, 
existing not just for itself but for the pleasure of its benefactors and the public whose 
lives it catches and reflects in its artistic productions.   
Just as Tennyson’s “lordly pleasure-house” seems a deliberate Victorian 
remodeling of the “stately-pleasure dome” of Coleridge’s “Kubla-Khan,” so the 
“house of fiction” of James’s 1908 Preface might be read as an attempt to 
reconceptualize artistic perception in terms of architectural space.  Juxtaposing these 
three structures, the metaphor steadily decreases in size and grandeur, perhaps affected 
by the loss of faith in the transformative powers of the imagination and in an 
increasing sense of distinction between the sister arts.  What Coleridge envisions as a 
vast compound for an emperor is, by the time James gets to it, a house, and a crowded 
one at that: 
The house of fiction has in short not one window, but a million—a number of 
possible windows not to be reckoned; every one of which has been pierced, or 
is still pierceable, in its vast front, by the need of an individual vision and by 
the pressure of the individual will.  The apertures, of dissimilar shape and size, 
hang so, all together over the human scene that we might have expected of 
them a greater sameness of report than we find.  They are but windows at best, 
mere holes in a dead wall, disconnected, perched aloft; they are not hinged 
doors opening straight upon life.  But they have this mark of their own that at 
each of them stands a figure with a pair of eyes, or at least a field-glass, which 
forms, again and again, for observation, a unique instrument, insuring to the 
person making use of it an impression distinct from every other . . . The 
spreading field, the human scene, is the ‘choice of subject’; the pierced 
aperture, either broad or balconied or slit-like and low-browed, is the ‘literary 
form’; but they are, singly or together, as nothing without the posted presence 
of the watcher—without, in other words, the consciousness of the artist.  Tell 
me what the artist is, and I will tell you of what he has been conscious.  
Thereby I shall express to you at once his boundless freedom and his ‘moral’ 
reference.151  
                                                 
151 Henry James, The Portrait of a Lady, ed. Robert D. Bamberg, 2nd ed. (New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company, 1995) 7. All subsequent citations are to this edition. 
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The Preface to The Portrait of a Lady is one of the eighteen James wrote for the New 
York edition of his novels, and thus, this extended metaphor functions as part of a 
larger retrospective glance at his novel from the distance of roughly thirty years.  That 
he invokes “the house of fiction” in relation to this particular novel gives the reader a 
better sense of just how the idea of “the portrait of a lady” influenced James’s 
understanding of his own craft.  As many critics have remarked, the title of this novel 
acts to frame the story and to establish a parallel between James’s Bildungsroman and 
the art object.  However, considering James’s formative experiences as an art and 
drama critic, one can assume that he would not say ut pictura poeisis lightly or 
unselfconsciously.  Millicent Bell has made the argument that “the title [The Portrait 
of a Lady] simply declares the novel’s subject is an effort to achieve such a portrait, 
such a single view, and it asks to the last, ‘Who is Isabel, what is she?’”152  Bell’s 
assessment astutely draws attention to the fundamental ambiguity and elusiveness 
attributed to Isabel’s character by virtue of an indefinite article, but her interpretation 
of the “the” before “portrait” as simply an indicator of the desire of others to define 
her is problematic in a few respects.  For one thing, it assumes that James is 
presupposing the failure of such aesthetic labors and that he is distinguishing his own 
project from the efforts of his characters, his narrators, even his reader.  It also implies 
that the title is meant to be understood as semi-parodic, as a coy reference to the 
fallacy of those would-be aesthetes who would reduce Isabel to a character type—“a 
lady”—in their attempt to take her likeness.  But another way of interpreting the title, 
especially the curious deployment of the definite and indefinite articles in The Portrait 
of a Lady, is to read it as James reminding the reader that all that we can know about 
“a lady” (or anyone else for that matter) is what can be gleaned from her adoption of 
or deviation from certain accepted forms.  Although we are informed by the title that 
                                                 
152 Millicent Bell, “Isabel Archer and the Affronting of Plot” in The Portrait of a Lady, ed. Robert D. 
Bamberg (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1995) 752. 
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we do not know the subject of the novel, it is intimated that we are somehow already 
familiar with the portrait itself, its narrative structure, its distinguishing features, 
perhaps even the identity of its creator.  Thus, like aestheticism, this novel from the 
beginning presumes, but does not explicitly acknowledge, the existence of a like-
minded reader, someone who is “in the know.” 
Also, looking again at James’s description of the house of fiction, one notices a 
certain similarity between the image of the author as posted at a uniquely shaped 
window and that of a portrait.  Both show the individual within the shaping and 
separating outline of a frame, the obvious difference being that the watcher at the 
window is looking out while the subject in a portrait is being looked at.  But, perhaps 
it is precisely this difference that James is attempting to trouble, and, maybe, we can 
use the similarity between these two images to expand our understanding of the 
ambiguity in the novel’s title.  While, as Bell argues, James’s novel is filled with 
characters trying to make sense of Isabel Archer, the novel’s central preoccupation is 
Isabel as she attempts to make sense of things for herself.  Though the subject of 
James’s narrative portrait, Isabel is also a watcher at a window in her own right, whose 
wish “to look at life for [her]self” is the determining factor behind the many choices 
she makes and the consequences that come of them (475).  Isabel is not an artist, nor is 
she distinguished by overtly aesthetic aspirations or sensibilities.  Indeed, unlike 
James’s earlier novels, The Portrait of a Lady is unique in featuring not one painter, 
sculptor, or copyist among its cast of characters.153  Moreover, there is not a single 
extended meditation on an art object, such as one finds in The Marble Faun or 
Middlemarch.  Yet, the story is still set amidst the art culture of late-nineteenth 
                                                 
153 The one other exception to this is the short novel that James wrote just before Portrait of a Lady: 
Washington Square.  Yet, that short text is so different from the novels of culture that preceded and 
followed it (and James himself, tellingly, left it out of the 1908 New York edition of his novels) that I 
think its existence does not lessen the point I am trying to make here.  In The Beaten Track (Oxford UP 
1993), Jim Buzard has also commented on the fact that James’s early writings, such as the short story 
“The Travelling Companions” (1870), include extensive verbal representations of artworks. 
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century Europe, in private homes filled with ornaments, in museums, in churches, 
even in the excavated ruins at the center of Rome.  James is scrupulous in identifying 
the paintings, prints, sculptures, enamels and china that his characters observe, covet, 
and collect, but, that said, the art object generally remains in the background, insofar 
as the representational space it affords is no longer the primary site for narrativizing 
the character’s coming into consciousness.  Thus, if James retreads ground made 
familiar by Brontë, Eliot, Pater, and, most obviously, Hawthorne, he is doing so with 
an important shift in focus:  instead of structuring the aesthetic encounter around what 
the character sees (putting the art object at the center of moment), James instead 
emphasizes the aesthetic qualities of the character’s act of seeing.   
In The Portrait of a Lady, James takes the idea of perspective as a frame and, 
out of the narrative representation of his title character’s surveying of the “spreading 
field, the human scene,” strives to create a portrait.  However, he positions the reader 
so that rather than looking at a portrait of Isabel Archer, instead one sees out of “the 
aperture” created by “the need of [her] individual vision and by the pressure of [her] 
individual will” (7).  This is different from making the narrative read as though it is 
the direct product of Isabel Archer’s consciousness; even when focusing on Isabel’s 
thoughts, the third-person narration does not provide the sense of intimacy conveyed 
by free indirect discourse.  Instead, James strives to present his heroine’s 
subjectivity—her perceptions, her ideas, her discoveries—as a subject worthy of 
aesthetic contemplation.  In her voyage of self-discovery, which is punctuated by a 
series of encounters with individuals and objects, he attempts to formally represent the 
unique structure that is “her relation with herself” (9).  As is evident from the 1908 
preface, James sees his younger self as doing something quite radical in “the large 
building of The Portrait of a Lady,” and the question we have to ask is how “the 
square and spacious house” of this novel helps James transition from the young 
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aesthete still preoccupied with the “palace of art” to the venerated author comfortably 
ensconced in the “house of fiction.”   
Although a degree of skepticism is always necessary when reading an author’s 
evaluation of his or her own work, James’s preface suggests that the narrative 
placement of his “vivid individual” in this text is a deliberate modification of the novel 
of aesthetic encounter.  James insists that in his imagination Isabel Archer predated the 
narrative which was to frame her.  Initially, she was “at large, not confined by the 
conditions . . . to which we look for much of the impress that constitutes an identity” 
(8).  “Take[n] over straight from life,” her “animated figure” first had  
been placed—placed in the imagination that detains it, preserves, protects, 
enjoys it, conscious of its presence in the dusky, crowded, heterogeneous back-
shop of the mind very much as a wary dealer in precious odds and ends, 
competent to make an “advance” on rare objects confided to him, is conscious 
of the rare little “piece” left in deposit by the reduced mysterious lady of title 
or the speculative amateur, and which is already there to disclose its merit 
afresh as soon as a key shall have clicked in a cupboard-door. (8) 
The mercantile analogy here is only one of several in the preface, and it again works to 
situate artistry (whether in a pictorial or verbal medium) within the consumer culture 
that validates its existence.  That James here presents himself as not the creator or the 
owner but rather the “wary dealer,” capable of noticing the merit in the “rare little 
‘piece,’” gestures back to his earlier claim that an artist is determined by that of which 
“he has been conscious.”  Artistry is, for James, a form of connoisseurship; it is the 
ability to appreciate the “value” of choice objects that their previous owners, for 
whatever reason, needed to convert into currency.  James further specifies what kind 
of “dealer” he was by recalling his “pious desire to place [his] treasure right . . . 
resigned not to ‘realise,’ resigned to keeping the precious object locked up indefinitely 
rather than commit it, not matter at what price, to vulgar hands” (8).  It is tempting to 
read this distinction as an implicit critique of those novelists who came before him, 
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whose desire to “realise” a quick return on their initial investment in art culture led 
them to put complex scenes of aesthetic experience in the service of conventional 
romantic plotlines.  In any case, the placement of a “vivid individual” in anything but 
the most evocative of surroundings seems almost a breach of etiquette to which James 
opposes his own task as a novelist—to be a discriminating critic of what sorts of 
situations would set off that character to its best advantage.   
What does it mean, though, to “place [his] treasure right,” as James says?  
Again discussing his process in terms of space, James describes the “small corner-
stone” of his story as “the conception of a certain young woman affronting her 
destiny” and the composition of the novel as a building “put up round my young 
woman while she stood there in perfect isolation” (8).  Every other aspect of the text, 
then, is relegated to the status of building material, all utilized by James to create “a 
structure reared with an “architectural competence,’” at the “centre” of which is “the 
young woman’s consciousness” (11).  In The Production of Space, Henri Lefebvre 
argues that “(social) space is a (social) product,” a product that emerges out of the 
dynamic exchange between three different relations to spatiality: “the perceived, the 
conceived, and the lived.”154  James, like Lefebvre, does not believe in the idea of the 
“space” of consciousness as truly separate from the world; for him, too, “(social) space 
is a (social) product,” insofar as space is always produced out the individual’s relation 
to the world.  Also, as is clear from the preface, James conceives of narrative space as 
something that emerges out of his characters’ negotiation of these different ways of 
relating to spatiality, of living in the world, conceiving of how they are to live in it, 
and of perceiving the life that surrounds them and in which they participate.   
Additionally, that all space is, for James, social might help to explain all the 
talk of investments and returns, of values and rates of exchange, in the preface.  
                                                 
154 Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991) 
39-40. 
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Through these monetary metaphors, James emphasizes that all social experience is in 
some way determined by the market, not necessarily by money itself but rather by the 
dynamic of exchange which structures most forms of social interaction.  Even the 
relation between the artist and the audience is figured in the preface as an economic 
transaction, with the “living wage” conferred on the artist being “the reader’s grant of 
the least possible quantity of attention required for consciousness of a ‘spell’” (13).  
The “occasional charming ‘tip’ is an act of [the reader’s] intelligence over and beyond 
this,” but this gratuity (like all gratuities) cannot be expected, as we do not live in 
“some Paradise (for art) where the direct appeal to the intelligence might be 
legalized.”  This later James no longer believes in the aestheticist “earthly paradise” of 
the Burne-Jones review, where the audience’s aesthetic experience of the art object 
offers unmediated access into the museum-mind of the artist.  Instead, the art object or 
novel is now figured as a site of exchange, a social space in which the artist must 
convince the viewer/reader of the value of his “rare piece” by his placement of it in a 
context that puts it properly on display.  In The Portrait of a Lady, James “places [his] 
treasure” by shifting the focus of his narrative from his heroine’s “mild adventures” to 
“her sense of them, her sense for them,” this shift facilitating “a mystic conversion by 
that sense, conversion into the stuff of drama or, even more delightful word, of 
‘story’” (14).  It is thus Isabel’s perspective, her sense of things, that becomes the stuff 
of fiction, and the “representation of her motionlessly seeing” offers the purest 
expression of her value as a Subject—not an object—of contemplation. 
This shift in focus signals a more profound shift, one that is representative of a 
changing conception of the role of aesthetics in the novel.  In The Portrait of a Lady, 
James modifies the scene of aesthetic encounter to emphasize not the sociality of 
aesthetics but rather the aesthetics of sociality.  In a novel like The Marble Faun, art 
objects function as symbols in a cultural code, allowing Hawthorne to communicate in 
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a kind of narrative short-hand, using his characters’ perceptual performances in 
regards to suggestive paintings and sculptures to partially unveil hidden aspects of 
personalities, situations, and relations.  In doing so, Hawthorne demystified what 
Kathy Psomiades has called the “central fiction of aestheticism”: that art culture’s 
“code is not a code, that it is actually the result of embodied impressions on the part of 
the cultivated observer.”155  The Portrait of a Lady, though, makes culture an art in 
itself, a complex web of social forms and values that, in special moments, can be 
evaluated as though it were a precious artifact.  Whereas with Hawthorne and, to a 
lesser degree, with the other authors I’ve discussed, the scene of aesthetic encounter is 
made significant and revelatory through the relation of the character’s perceiving 
consciousness to an art object with which a cultured reader would already be familiar 
(whether from first-hand experience or through the services of a Baedeker), James 
moves the art object into the background and allows the entire weight to rest on the 
slender shoulders of “an intelligent but presumptuous girl,” making the scene part of a 
larger “ado” about the consciousness of Isabel Archer (8-9).   
In the preface, James seems amazed at his own daring at attempting such a 
narrative feat, in crafting a story in which “this slight ‘personality’” occupies the 
“center of interest.”  (Mis)quoting a line from Eliot’s Daniel Deronda—that such 
slight female personalities are as “frail vessels” in which “is borne onward through the 
ages the treasure of human affection”--James points out how infrequently Eliot’s 
heroines are “suffered to be sole ministers” of the novel’s appeal, instead “having their 
inadequacy eked out with comic relief and underplots” (9).156  Though conveniently 
                                                 
155 Beauty’s Body 151. 
156 The quote is taken from the very end of Chapter XI: “What in the midst of that mighty drama are 
girls and their blind visions?  They are the Yea or Nay of that good for which men are enduring and 
fighting.  In these delicate vessels is borne onward through the ages the treasure of human affections.”  
As Victoria Coulson points out in Henry James, Women and Realism (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 
2007), by changing Eliot’s “delicate vessels” into “frail vessels,” James stresses their potential break-
ability over their delicacy of organization, effectively recasting them as “fragile containers of 
significance whose vulnerability heightens their meaningfulness” (115). 
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overlooking the fact that Eliot made this statement as part of a larger critique of how 
women are made the symbols for whatever particular “good” in which a culture is 
invested, his observation nevertheless highlights how he distinguishes his own novel 
from its forebears.  While The Portrait of a Lady is also a text that emerges out of the 
art culture of the nineteenth-century, his decision to relegate that culture to the status 
of scenery announces an intention to somehow detach his heroine from the aesthetic 
economy of signs, an economy whose major form of currency is the female body.  
That is not to say, though, that Isabel Archer, within the scope of the narrative, is not 
to be looked at.  She is the object of great attention for almost all the other (mostly 
male) characters in the novel.  But, James largely resists the temptation to focalize the 
narrative through their eyes or their consciousnesses.  What they see when they look at 
Isabel remains fundamentally unexplored, and absent from the novel are those 
moments in which the proximity of the heroine’s body to an art object offers a witness 
the means of reading into Isabel a meaning that is dependent on this relation. 
If we take James’s modification of the aesthetic encounter in The Portrait of a 
Lady to be not anomalous but representative of some larger cultural movement, some 
thought needs to be given to the reasons the author might have felt this change 
necessary. James Buzard in The Beaten Track posits that as the European tour became 
more and more a bourgeois rite-of-passage—one that must be commemorated by the 
bringing home of “relics”—the “experiences garnered through tourism are moulded in 
the cultural marketplace into ‘marketable’ forms (the reified forms of souvenir or 
memorable captured experience in journal entry, letter, sketch or photograph).”157  
Increasingly recognized as a means of affirming one’s status “in the sign-market of 
personal acculturation,” the aesthetic valuation of the art object becomes “a form of 
acquisition rather than sympathetic understanding” and, thus, is bound up with the 
                                                 
157 James Buzard, The Beaten Track: European Tourism, Literature, and the Ways to Culture, 1800-
1918 (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1993) 9. 
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system of social and economic relations it is supposed to transcend.158  James’s 
reluctance to organize pivotal moments in the narrative around specific artworks can 
also be partially explained as a reaction against another consequence of the late-
Victorian “Aesthetic Craze”: the potentially endless proliferation of objects and scenes 
of admiration.  As Jonah Siegel has pointed out in his writings on two of James’s near 
contemporaries, Walter Pater and Oscar Wilde, Rome in the late-nineteenth century 
was seen as a veritable “museum of culture,” in which every space was weighted with 
symbolical significance and every fountain and paperweight in the shape of 
Michelangelo’s David offered the opportunity for rapturous contemplation.  With the 
sheer excess of materials always threatening to overwhelm the senses, the aesthete 
frequently turned his or her attention to smaller, containable symbolic spaces, the 
“fragment” or the “outline.”159 
Although James’s frequently ambivalent attitude towards Pater and often 
hostile attitude towards Wilde require caution in comparing their works, the Paterian 
“outline” does find an echo in James’s fiction in the form of the “frame.”  Jonathan 
Freedman has noted that James shares with Pater “a supple alertness to the 
‘sensations’ created by . . . artworks [and] to the viewer’s alertly contemplative 
response.”160  However, Pater and James share more than a “supple awareness” of the 
sensations created in viewers by artworks.  Their respective literary endeavors—
especially Pater’s Imaginary Portraits and James’s The Portrait of a Lady—both 
attempt to recuperate the meaning and the value, the authenticity, of the aesthetic 
encounter by focusing on the immediate “impression” made in the mind of the 
especially receptive viewer.  Faced with the twin perils of inundation (the 
                                                 
158 Buzard 218, 223. 
159 Jonah Siegel, Desire and Excess: The Nineteenth-Century Culture of Art (Princeton: Princeton UP, 
2000) 232, 227. 
160 Jonathan Freedman, Professions of Taste: Henry James, British Aestheticism, and Commodity 
Culture (Stanford: Stanford UP, 1990) 134. 
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superabundance of art objects) and inculcation (the socially prescripted response 
towards the art object), James, in particular, responds by drawing attention away from 
the content of the perceived image to the frame of the perceiving consciousness.  He 
strips away the vast intertextual and interpictorial framework on which earlier 
novelists relied, revealing the social context in which that framework is situated.  Yet, 
as I mentioned earlier, in doing so, he exchanges one symbolic economy for another, 
substituting concatenations of gestures in aestheticized social spaces for a network of 
real and imaginary art images.  In other words, for James, the frame for the art object 
does not end at the periphery of the painting but includes the entire scene of viewing.  
In the “museum world” of The Portrait of a Lady, the narrative emphasis on how its 
heroine processes visual information transforms many otherwise unremarkable 
incidents into tableaux vivants in which even seemingly unimportant gestures and 
poses have a certain symbolic heft.   
Lefebvre has argued that in “sensory space”—which is “real” space as it is 
experienced by the perceiving subjectivity—the “gestural systems,” the “ritualized and 
codified gestures” “specific to a particular society” are capable of being recognized 
and decoded.161  Given that the men and women James wrote about are, like him, 
products of nineteenth-century art culture, it follows that the gestural systems they 
employ would be both subtle and elaborate.  In the same way that the highly-stylized 
interiors and picturesque exteriors they inhabit all seem designed with a particular 
dramatic “effect” in mind, James invests his characters’ postures and actions with a 
certain self-consciousness that suggests the influence of an aesthetic education in the 
significance of forms.  Ultimately, though, he is less interested in deciphering this 
social code than he is in revealing its intricacy and weird beauty, showing it off like an 
                                                 
161 The Production of Space 210, 212, 213. 
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aesthetic object as it is framed by the receptive and appreciative consciousness of his 
heroine. 
In an 1865 review of Harriet Prescott’s novel Azarian, James concludes a 
critique of the author’s preoccupation with “external signs and accidents of passion” 
with the pronouncement that “in the novel we crave the spectacle of that of which we 
may feel that we know it.”162  This comment helps to explain the complex relations 
between the author, characters, and reader that he sets up in the preface, where he 
repeatedly describes his characters as actors, himself as the beleaguered playwright, 
and the reader as part of a generally inattentive audience.  The task of the author, for 
James, is more than the presentation of a story to the reader.  The author must stage for 
the reader a “spectacle,” a spectacle “of that of which we may feel that we know it.”  
What the reader knows is the province of the realist novel: a familiar social setting, a 
particular value system, a stable of recognizable personalities.  What the reader “may 
feel that [he or she] knows” is more elusive.  It seems to refer to a mode of 
apprehension not strictly limited to objective knowledge of the world but rather to a 
subjective way of knowing that develops out of a feeling or sensation that the reader 
associates with a specific type of experience.  In James’s formulation, the reader, 
through a process of impressionistic identification, comes to recognize in the “fictive 
picture” something with which he or she is already familiar.  However, this 
familiarity—much like the familiarity assumed by the title The Portrait of a Lady—is 
potential, a truth that the reader would be capable of discerning only when it is 
carefully crafted as a spectacle.  It is Isabel Archer’s “sense of [and] for things” that 
converts her adventures into a drama of spectatorship, in which Isabel is both an 
actress and a viewer.  Her increasingly complex understanding of how to look at and 
what to look for in those social encounters that are pivotal moments in the narrative is 
                                                 
162 Henry James.  Notes and Reviews.  ed. Pierre Chaignon Rose (Freeport, NY: Books for Libraries 
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the shaping force that “aestheticizes” those moments, presenting them to the reader 
(pre)arranged and exhibited for public consumption.   
In his study of nineteenth-century conceptions of visuality, Jonathan Crary 
defends his decision to use the term “observer” instead of “spectator” with the claim 
that “spectator” “carries specific connotations, especially in the context of nineteenth-
century culture, that [he] prefer[s] to avoid—namely, of one who is a passive onlooker 
at a spectacle, as at an art gallery or theater.”163  While there is some merit to this 
assertion, I would argue that it is specifically the idea of the spectator’s supposed 
“passivity” that The Portrait of a Lady intends to complicate.  Of course, to view as a 
spectacle a scene in which one is involved is to distance oneself from the moment by 
questioning the relation of self to scene and of temporal and spatial contingencies to 
the event.  But, as the novel and the preface continually suggest, this process of 
dissociation is an action in itself, one with aesthetic as well as social implications.  For 
James, the experience of the spectacle is (or should be) one in which the viewer plays 
the role of both a passive and an active observer, where the spectacle both acts upon 
the viewer and is itself reified by the viewer as she distances herself from it.  One of 
the peculiar charms of James’s novel is the way in which the major “doings” of Isabel 
Archer’s life—her marriage, the birth and death of her child, her decision to return to 
her husband—all happen off-stage, outside of the narrative purview.  The reason for 
this, James tells us in the preface, is that by focusing on what are conventionally 
understood to be the defining events in a woman’s life, the author is not really “doing” 
the character; rather, one is doing “her relation to those surrounding her” (10).  Only 
by organizing the narrative around those moments in which the heroine comes to 
define and to continually redefine “her relation to herself” can the author be said to be 
“really ‘doing’ her” (11).  Only when Isabel is capable of looking at her life and her 
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relation to those around her with an aesthetic detachment akin to that associated with 
the viewing of art objects is she capable of seeing her life as a series of exchanges, of 
understanding hohe has used others and how she has been used by them. 
James isolates two particular passages in his novel as exemplary of the “rare 
chemistry” by which the narrative treatment of his heroine’s “sense” of things 
converts the seemingly quotidian into the quintessence of the significant: the first, an 
early encounter in which Isabel first lays eyes on the mysterious Madame Merle and, 
the second, an “extraordinary meditative vigil . . . of searching criticism” in which 
Isabel “sits up, by her dying fire, far into the night” reflecting on a strange scene she 
has just witnessed (14).  This latter passage—a “representation simply of [Isabel] 
motionlessly seeing”—James deems “obviously the best thing in the book,” “designed 
to have all the vivacity of incident and all the economy of picture” (15, 14).  Both of 
these narrative moments show a solitary Isabel in the midst of an act of “mere still 
lucidity” and what makes these moments, in James’s opinion, “as ‘interesting’ as the 
[conventionally Romantic] surprise of a caravan or the identification of a pirate” is 
that they represent “one of the identifications dear to the novelist, and even 
indispensable to him” (15).  Perhaps not surprisingly, James does not clearly identify 
the identification so dear to him; however, given that in both of these instances Isabel 
is presented with a tableau that causes her to recognize how each person with whom 
she has come in contact has or will “exert some momentous influence on her life,” one 
might assume that James is referring to the identification of the social obligations and 
constraints constantly shaping the individual’s experience of the world (151).  That 
one is only capable of identifying sociality when it is represented spatially, as a scene, 
and that the moment of reflection that this scene inspires is itself presented to the 
reader as a kind of narrative painting, one with “all the vivacity of incident and all the 
economy of picture,” suggests that James sees the recognition of interpersonal 
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dynamics as something that is intrinsically “viewable,” capable of being brought to the 
attention of the viewer and the reader only in the form of an aesthetic object.  More 
generally, it also speaks to James’s reconstruction of the aesthetic encounter in his 
novel, especially his use of the framing perspective of his heroine (at once a window 
and a blank canvas) to expose the network of exchange undergirding a particular 
cultural milieu.  Looking at the two aforementioned passages as well as a few others 
that are similarly emblematic of James’s exploration of the aesthetics of sociality, the 
remainder of this chapter will show how The Portrait of a Lady uses what James in his 
Preface calls the “international light” of nineteenth-century art culture (as it is 
experienced by Isabel Archer) as a background against which the unfolding drama of 
human relations takes place.   
 “Looking at the Truth Together”: The Aesthetic Framing of the Social in 
James’s Portrait 
In a similar fashion to how the preface explains James’s conceptualizing of his 
story—as building a structure around his “young lady”—the novel opens by laying out 
a scene for Isabel Archer to observe.  This introductory setting is the lawn of an 
English country home, Gardencourt, which belongs to Isabel’s American banker 
uncle, Daniel Touchett, and, as its name implies, it is a space in which a rich and 
natural exterior is enclosed within an artificially-imposed set of borders.  It is 
described as a place in which “privacy . . . reigned supreme, and the wide carpet of 
turf that covered the level hill-top seemed but the extension of a luxurious interior” 
(18).  The sense of interiority attached to Gardencourt’s grounds is the same thing that 
gives to the various drawing rooms and salons detailed in the novel the feeling of 
public spaces:  all have been, to some degree, crafted with a particular effect in mind.  
The conscious effort of making a place seem a certain way makes that place an 
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“extension” of the mind of its owner, but, at the same time, it is also an act of 
subterfuge.  The space becomes a reflection of how the owner wishes to be seen, not 
how the owner really is.  The “privacy” that “reigns” in Gardencourt, therefore, wears 
a public face; it is a surface that is intended for visual consumption or, in more rarified 
terms, aesthetic contemplation.   
That this scene is the first that Isabel encounters in the novel signals James’s 
intention to focus his narrative on what his heroine is capable of apprehending.  Rather 
than beginning with the narrative frame on Isabel, here it is Isabel who rather 
unexpectedly enters in on a scene which the narrator has taken some pains to fully 
describe.  Making “her appearance in an ample doorway,” she is the epitome of 
James’s watcher at the window, the frame of the doorway providing the vantage point 
from which she takes in the view “for some moments,” while unnoticed by the persons 
on the lawn (25).  Even when approached by her cousin, Ralph Touchett, her attention 
remains fixed on the picture created by the setting:  “[s]he was looking at everything, 
with an eye that denoted clear perception—at her companion, at the two dogs, at the 
two gentlemen under the trees, at the beautiful scene that surrounded her” (26).  Isabel 
approaches this moment from an aesthetic, rather than social, angle, as can be 
determined from her conversation with Ralph.  Though she is in a new place, meeting 
new people, the encounter is largely interesting to her because of how everything 
looks.  She exclaims that she has “never seen anything so lovely as this place” and, 
when informed that the younger of the two other gentlemen is a Lord Warburton (soon 
to join the ranks of her fervent admirers), she says, “Oh, I hoped there would be a lord; 
it’s just like a novel!” (27).  Isabel’s “clear perception” is thus marked by her tendency 
to assess the reality of a situation in relation to certain preconceived aesthetic models.  
The lovely lawn of an English country home being decorated with a member of the 
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British nobility strikes Isabel as appropriately picturesque, “like a novel” in the 
(overly) fortuitous coming together of contingencies.   
James reinforces his heroine’s aptitude for appreciating such moments of 
aesthetic fitness only a few paragraphs later, again stressing the broad and far-reaching 
nature of her gaze: 
She had been looking all round her again . . . and while engaged in this survey 
she had made room in it for her companions; a comprehensiveness of 
observation easily conceivable on the part of a young woman who was 
evidently both intelligent and excited.  She had seated herself . . . her head was 
erect, her eye lighted, her flexible figure turned itself easily this way and that, 
in sympathy with the alertness with which she evidently caught impressions.  
Her impressions were numerous, and they were all reflected in a clear, still 
smile. (28) 
There is something quite Paterian about this description of Isabel catching 
“impressions,” particularly in the dynamic between the rapidity with which those 
impressions flicker across her consciousness and how those myriad impressions all 
manage to be “reflected in a clear, still smile.”  One is reminded of Pater’s Conclusion 
to The Renaissance, in which he compares the relation between “physical life” and 
“the inward world of thought and feeling” to that of the shoreline and center of a river, 
the former a place “where the water flows down indeed, though in apparent rest” and 
the latter “the race of the mid-stream, a drift of momentary acts of sight and passion 
and thought.”164  Though Pater is not concerned with how one’s “physical life” looks 
to an outside observer, his analogy does offer a means of understanding a point central 
to James’s narrativizing of aesthetic experience.  If, as James suggests, Isabel’s 
“comprehensiveness of observation” makes this moment for her an absolute deluge of 
sensory impressions, the richness and diversity of her reflections make little of an 
outward show. Isabel Archer is not meant to be interesting on the surface; it is in how 
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that “still, calm” surface shows the smallest of ripples that indicates the quick flow of 
thoughts beneath.  Like Gardencourt, which to her seems “a picture made real,” Isabel 
herself is also a space characterized by “the sense of well-ordered privacy in the centre 
of a ‘property’” (57).  Her physical person, to a certain degree, is a property up for 
grabs; she can be “taken up” by her aunt Lydia Touchett, put on display by her cousin 
Ralph, married off to any one of her admirers.165  Yet, it is in the “well-ordered 
privacy” of her consciousness, what Pater calls “the narrow chamber of the individual 
mind,” that James finds a mystery worthy of narrative scrutiny.   
That being said, the fact that Isabel Archer is still a saleable and highly covered 
commodity is a crucial feature of the story of aesthetic awakening that James has set 
out to tell.  For, if she begins the novel an intriguing mystery, even to herself, it is in 
how the other characters attempt to place her that the “privacy” of her consciousness is 
to be narratively breached, largely in those moments of reflection when she is forced 
to recognize how she exists in relation to others.  Early on, the narrator observes that 
Isabel is an alluring “combination of the delicate, desultory, flame-like spirit and the 
eager and personal creature of conditions” (54).  If the first part of this description is, 
again, rather Paterian, it is telling that her “hard, gem-like flame” is both fed and 
tempered by an especial responsiveness to outside circumstances, the determining 
characteristics of the social milieu in which she moves.  Ralph Touchett recognizes 
this aspect of her personality almost immediately, and pronounces the chance to see “a 
real little passionate force . . . at play . . . the finest thing in nature.”  Continuing his 
internal monologue, he calls the sight provided by this “force . . . at play” in the world 
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finer than the finest work of art—than a Greek bas-relief, than a great Titian, 
than a Gothic cathedral.  It’s very pleasant to be so well treated where one had 
least looked for it . . . Suddenly I receive a Titian, by the post, to hang on my 
wall—a Greek bas-relief to stick over my chimney-piece.  The key to a 
beautiful edifice is thrust into my hand, and I’m told to walk in and admire. 
(63) 
For the consumptive Ralph, to whom more active forms of pleasure have been denied, 
the opportunity to watch Isabel transforms his compulsory role of observer into the 
privileged position of aesthete.  But, in his formulation, it is not Isabel’s physical 
beauty (though considerable) that merits her a work of art; that would suggest she is 
merely a lovely object.  It is “what was she going to do with herself” that intrigues 
him, mostly because, he notes, with most women “one had no occasion to ask” that 
question:  “[m]ost women did with themselves nothing at all; they waited, in attitudes 
more or less gracefully passive, for a man to come and furnish them with a destiny” 
(64).  Isabel, though, “gave one the impression of having intentions of her own,” 
making the study of her character less an assessment based on certain accepted 
standards of judgment and more a discernment of the causes behind her particular 
effect.  Isabel promises Ralph the chance to exert more active mode of viewership, the 
challenge of understanding an artwork that strives to create itself.   
Ralph’s withering dismissal of the “gracefully passive” postures that “most 
women” adopt for the benefit of a society that objectifies them might be meant to 
suggest that the character, like the author, is more enlightened when it comes to the 
inequalities in gender roles and in the gendering of the aesthetic relation.  However, 
when Ralph ponders Isabel, he still figures his observation as a form of ownership; she 
is a Titian to hang on his wall, a bas-relief over his mantelpiece, a building the key to 
which has been thrust in his hand.  For all the pleasure he takes in the idea of her 
deciding her own destiny, he nevertheless imagines that destiny as a kind of visual 
spectacle which he is somehow entitled to view.  While he gives Isabel leave to 
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“furnish” the building of her life with her own sense of purpose, his desire to purchase 
the structure so that he might “walk in and admire” it whenever he pleases betrays a 
proprietary instinct not wholly in keeping with his stance of aesthetic detachment.  
The inconsistencies in Ralph’s position are further emphasized when the narrator 
pronounces “the sentiment of these reflexions . . . very just” but questions whether it is 
“exactly true that Ralph Touchett had had a key put into his hand” (63).  Though 
agreeing with Ralph’s assessment that Isabel “would take . . . a good deal of 
knowing,” the narrator throws into doubt whether Ralph himself is capable of the 
depth of perception he seeks.  Ralph’s “attitude with regard to” Isabel is declared to be 
“contemplative and critical [but] . . . not judicial,” the point being, presumably, that in 
spite of the thoughtful attention with which he regards her, he lacks the true 
impartiality necessary to really know her.  Continuing the spatial metaphor, Ralph is 
described as having “surveyed the edifice from the outside and admired it greatly” and 
having “looked in at the windows and received an impression of proportions equally 
fair”; so far, however, he has only seen “glimpses and . . . ha[s] not yet stood 
underneath its roof” (64).  Not a watcher at a window, Ralph is a watcher of windows; 
viewing the exterior structure of Isabel’s public persona, he looks for unguarded 
moments in which he might see the private self that lives within it.  That there is 
something intrusive, even uncomfortably voyeuristic, in his efforts is conveyed by this 
image of Ralph as a sort of Peeping Tom hoping to catch Isabel in some form of 
psychic undress.  That said, it is not an erotic charge that Ralph seeks in these 
attempts.  It is more the intellectual thrill that one gets from glimpsing something that 
the observed person wishes to keep hidden, the thrill of being, privately, in the know. 
Yet, as James makes clear from the novel’s beginning, there is always a price 
to be paid for knowledge, and as there is no character in The Portrait of a Lady who 
wishes to be in the know more than Isabel Archer, one of the primary sources of 
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interest is the question of what she is willing to give up in “her determination to see, to 
try, to know” the world (54).  In two early scenes, Isabel’s “great passion for 
knowledge” is put on display against the picturesque backdrop of an “oaken gallery” 
hung with paintings at Gardencourt (50).  The viewing of art in both cases serves as 
the pretext for a broader meditation on the art of viewership, specifically as a means of 
knowledge-gathering different from the kind derived from experience.  Ralph brings 
Isabel to the private picture gallery her first evening at the estate.  The lighting at that 
time is “insufficient to show the pictures to advantage,” but it does transform the 
gallery itself into a version of the luxurious palace of art described in the Burne-Jones 
review: “it fell upon the vague squares of rich color and on the faded gilding of the 
heavy frames; it made a sheen on the polished floor” (50).  With the paintings reduced 
to “vague squares” in the low light, their richness of color blends into the gold gilding 
of the frames and the jewel-like polish of the floors to create an atmospheric space 
redolent of wealth and culture.  Set off against this background, Isabel uses a candle to 
illuminate those paintings she wants to observe closely, and, rather than following her 
gaze, Ralph finds “himself pausing in the middle of the place and bending his eyes 
much less upon the pictures than on her presence.”  Adds the narrator, “[h]e lost 
nothing, in truth, by these wandering glances, for she was better worth looking at than 
most works of art” (50).   
In spite of the compositionality of this moment, which seems perfectly crafted 
to set up an aesthetic encounter on par with the one involving Will Ladislaw and 
Dorothea Brooke in the Vatican museum in Eliot’s Middlemarch, this scene does not 
develop into a comparative evaluation of Isabel and the painting she observes.  The 
narrative insight given into Ralph’s appreciation of Isabel in a posture of intense 
concentration remains markedly general, and no hint is given regarding the substance 
of the images which have captured her attention.  The artworks in the gallery are not 
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identified, nor is the substance of Isabel’s reverie mentioned.  Instead, the moment 
finishes with Isabel simply remarking, “Well, now I know more than I did when I 
began!” (50)  That the knowledge Isabel has gained from these pictures is not 
elucidated, to her cousin or to the reader, is the culmination of a series of narrative 
evasions that characterize James’s reformation of the aesthetic encounter.  Instead of a 
moment of revelation, in which the characters’ proximity to art objects facilitates an 
exposure of some secret or unconscious motivation (usually through the recognition of 
a similarity between art object and viewer), here we have a reaffirmation of privacy.  
The art objects remain deliberately out-of-focus, and in the place of Isabel and Ralph’s 
impressions of these paintings and each other, the scene itself leaves an impression 
that is all the more suggestive for being vague.  With the aesthetically appealing scene 
of the gallery stimulating the visual faculties of his characters, James creates a picture 
of his characters looking, and in their respective relations to the objects on display, he 
plots out spatially the relation between them.  Isabel looks both ardently and curiously 
at things she has never seen before, and the cultured and cynical Ralph, for whom the 
world has long since ceased to be an interesting puzzle, attempts to recapture a sense 
of interest and novelty by witnessing her encounters.   
In this quick narrative snapshot, the reader is given a glimpse of the 
interpersonal dynamics of Isabel and Ralph that will determine the events that are to 
follow.  It is Ralph’s vicarious pleasure in watching Isabel watch that will soon 
motivate him to encourage his dying father to leave Isabel half of his own inheritance, 
a decision based almost entirely on his desire to “see her going before the breeze” of 
new and exciting experiences.  His father chides him for thinking of Isabel’s future life 
as though “it were for [his] own amusement” and goes on to remark, “[y]oung men are 
very different from what I was . . . [w]hen I cared for a girl—when I was young—I 
wanted to do more than look at her” (161).  This observation speaks to more than a 
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difference between the two Touchetts; arguably, it also points to a generation gap 
created by nineteenth-century art culture.  Mr. Touchett, the staunch old American 
banker, in his “want of imagination and of what is called the historical consciousness” 
is part of an earlier era that James characterizes as both robustly active and somewhat 
unrefined, and he has remained untouched by the cultural preoccupation with 
perception and cultivation that emerged with the Aesthetic Movement.  Ralph, though, 
the product of Harvard and Oxford, has been shaped by the “modern criticism” (e.g.  
The Renaissance) that swept those institutions, and James describes the result as a man 
whose “outward conformity to the manners that surrounded him was none the less the 
mask of a mind that greatly enjoyed its independence, on which nothing long imposed 
itself, and which, naturally inclined to adventure and irony, indulged in a boundless 
liberty of appreciation” (43-44).  In most respects, this portrayal of Ralph seems 
intended to identify him as a disciple of Paterian aestheticism, as a cultured and 
courtly, impressionistic and ironic, historicist and relativist seeker after exquisite 
moments.  This association is only strengthened by recalling James’s famously 
ambiguous eulogy of Pater as “a mask without a face.”166  That Ralph, underneath the 
guise of polite sociability, is similarly “without a face” might be straining the 
comparison a bit, but I would argue that what James meant in his assessment of Pater 
is not that there is nothing under the mask but rather that there is no essential self that 
is hiding behind it.  Usually, to describe someone as wearing a mask is to accuse them 
of duplicity; it is to suggest that there is some real or authentic personality behind an 
outer façade that is deliberately kept concealed, potentially for nefarious reasons.  Yet, 
in Ralph’s case, behind the mask of the worldly-wise gentleman, there is a mind “on 
which nothing long imposed itself,” one focused not on any specific desire or purpose, 
only on restlessly searching for new impressions.  Like the young men of Pater’s 
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Imaginary Portraits, what deprives (if it is a deprivation) Ralph of a stable, 
unchanging face behind his mask is the overwhelming awareness of his own imminent 
death.  His illness forcing him “to give up the idea of distinguishing himself” in the 
world, he commits himself solely to the task of distinguishing for himself its many 
objects of interest, to spending “the interval [he has left] as agreeably” as he can 
through aesthetic experience (46).  It is Ralph’s “sacrifice” of all other forms of 
activity that sharpens his perception, giving him an unusual insight into the possible 
pleasures of viewership.  In the words of the narrator, “with the prospect of losing 
them the simple use of his faculties became an exquisite pleasure; it seemed to him the 
joys of contemplation had never been sounded” (46). 
Still, this depth of visual understanding comes at a steep cost, a fact which 
Ralph attempts to communicate to Isabel at the conclusion of their visit to the picture 
gallery.  After she finishes viewing the paintings, she asks him about another visual 
spectacle that she hopes Gardencourt will show her.  She questions him as to whether 
the estate, like all romantically-situated country homes, has “a ghost . . . a castle-
spectre, a thing that appears” (50).  Though Ralph gently rebukes this fancy, when she 
presses him “to show [her] the ghost,” he replies, “I might show it to you, but you’d 
never see it . . . [y]ou must have suffered first, have suffered greatly, have some 
miserable knowledge” (51-52).  Only “[i]n that way,” he continues, “your eyes are 
opened to it.  I saw it long ago” (52).  Isabel’s desire for a ghost takes us back to an 
earlier observation that she made, when she described the presence of Lord Warburton 
at Gardencourt as “just like a novel” (27).  Here, too, she betrays a tendency to 
categorize her experiences in terms of established narrative models, in this case, that 
of the gothic romance.  Ghosts, as manifestations of the past intruding on the present, 
are part of what Peter Brooks has called the gothic novel’s “epistemology of depths”: 
“it is fascinated by what lies hidden in the dungeon and the sepulcher.  It sounds the 
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depths, bringing to violent light and enactment the forces hidden and trapped there.”167  
Isabel comes to Europe with the same sort of fascination, seeking an education in the 
old world’s “epistemology of depths,” but, though James shares with his heroine an 
interest in gothic trappings, the dungeons and sepulchers that are the privileged sites of 
the gothic have been relocated in his novel from the exterior location of the setting to 
the interior space of consciousness.   
Isabel and Ralph’s elliptical discussion in the gallery announces this 
repositioning of the gothic through a series of subtle clues, the first being Isabel’s 
description of the ghost as a “castle-spectre, a thing that appears.”  As William Veeder 
has pointed out, The Castle Spectre (1797) was the title of a popular dramatic romance 
by Matthew “Monk” Lewis.168  Set in medieval Wales, this gothic tale of innocence 
threatened has for its villain a seductive but murderous aristocrat named Lord 
Osmond.  That James had Lewis’s romance in mind when he decided on “Gilbert 
Osmond” for Isabel’s future husband seems likely, given his penchant for gothic 
mysteries as well as his early apprenticeship as a drama critic.  Yet, if Lord Osmond is 
indeed the model for Isabel’s dangerously refined spouse, James’s buried allusion to 
the play in this early scene, before Gilbert Osmond even enters into the story, suggests 
that James introduces “the spectre” of the gothic novel into his own text as much to 
distinguish it from this earlier narrative form as to announce its continuity with it.  
James’s review of Wilkie Collins’s The Woman in White usefully articulates James’s 
attitude towards the fictional genre that bridges the space between the spectacle of the 
gothic romance and his novel of aesthetic spectacle:  the sensation novel.  Especially 
popular in the three decades preceding James’s Portrait, the sensation novel borrowed 
heavily from the gothic tradition, offering elaborately plotted tales of incest, bigamy, 
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and murder (to name only a few of its favorite vices).  Mostly, though, the sensation 
novel dispensed with the supernatural machinery of the gothic romance, and its typical 
setting was far removed from the Swiss chateaus and Italian prisons common to those 
earlier literary productions, favoring instead more modern and domestic locations.  
James praises Collins for this innovation, arguing that to 
Mr. Collins belongs the credit of having introduced into fiction those most 
mysterious of mysteries, the mysteries which are at our own doors . . . Less 
delicately terrible, perhaps than the vagaries of departed spirits, but to the full 
as interesting, as the modern reader understands the word, are the numberless 
possible forms of human malignity . . . Of course, the nearer the criminal and 
the detective are brought home to the reader, the more lively his “sensation.”169 
To borrow James’s pun, the sensation novel “brings home” the mystery, making it a 
private matter, something that unfolds largely behind closed doors.  The “sensations” 
these stories provoke in the reader are all the more “lively,” James intimates, because 
they are more familiar; their interest has to do with the way in which they present 
social relations as a web of malignant motivations and pernicious plottings.  As James 
says later in the review, the sensation novel reminds us that “society” is “a vast 
magazine of crime and suffering, of enormities, mysteries, and miseries of every 
description, of incidents, in a world.”170  The sensation novel banishes the literal 
ghosts of its gothic predecessors, but in its continued interest in the ways in which the 
present of its characters is constantly being shaped by the actions of the past, it 
remains a haunted genre.  The main difference is that the function of gothic ghost—to 
bring to light the sinning and scheming of the villains—is now taken over by the 
detective.   
Though James’s The Portrait of a Lady shares with Collins’s The Woman in 
White a concern with “the mysteries which are at our own doors,” the doors in his 
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novel are mostly of the figurative variety, leading into the structures of his characters’ 
minds.  And while the “numberless forms of human malignity” feature prominently in 
his novel, James shifts the focus from actions to effects.  The “interest” for James’s 
“modern reader” is to be found not in the wrongs perpetrated by the novel’s villains (if 
such romantic creatures are still to be found in their undiluted glory) but rather in how 
an awareness of evil and cruelty in the world and the propensity for such things in the 
self shapes the perceptions of his characters.  At the novel’s beginning, Isabel is 
described as capable of identifying “the look” of “things that were wrong” when she 
“fixed them hard,” but, having “seen very little of the evil of the world,” her 
knowledge is purely academic (54).  She is “too young, too impatient to live, too 
unacquainted with pain” to do more than “recognize” the sorts of situations that are 
productive of human misery.  The motivations of others, the desires and decisions that 
cause them to injure each other, are, as yet, mysteries to her, and even the idea that she 
herself might “inflict[] a sensible injury upon another person” is a horrific possibility 
that “cause[s] her at moments to hold her breath” (56, 54). 
To return, then, to Gardencourt’s “ghost.” In Isabelle and Ralph’s discussion, 
James signals the distance of his own novel from its literary predecessors by making 
the revelation promised by the literal and figurative ghosts of gothic and sensation 
novels something that is only to be conditionally apprehended.  A highly 
discriminating apparition, Gardencourt’s “thing that appears” only does so to those 
who “have suffered greatly, have gained some miserable knowledge” (52).  That these 
are the conditions deemed necessary for seeing the ghosts that haunt certain spaces, 
certain individuals, suggests that the “innocent eye” of the typical gothic or sensation 
novel heroine will be of little use here in discerning the shadowy mysteries that Isabel 
is so desirous of penetrating.  In this case, perception does not precede knowledge but 
instead follows from it.  This knowledge, too, is of a particular variety—it is 
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knowledge gained through an extensive acquaintance with suffering.  If now virtually 
synonymous with “hurting,” suffering has the connotation of being a more active and 
persistent state-of-being, a connotation perhaps stemming from its earlier meaning as 
simply a form of experience or endurance.  To suffer is to bear up under a burden, to 
withstand a painful situation that has been imposed from without.  In that suffering 
originates “from” something, it is a feeling that emerges out of the experience of being 
in the world.  At the same time, suffering is an ontological state that is associated with 
self-consciousness; to suffer is to submit (either willingly or unwillingly) to pain, an 
action that requires a certain degree of awareness about the situation in which one has 
been placed.  Thus, suffering has a reflective component to it, suggesting that the 
sufferer is at once objectively in pain and subjectively capable of analyzing that pain, 
making it an experience that has a great deal in common with aesthetic contemplation.   
Yet, though Isabel’s quick survey of the paintings in Gardencourt’s gallery 
convinces Ralph that she is “evidently a judge” and has “natural taste,” his conviction 
that she is “not made to suffer” distinguishes between her fitness for judging aesthetic 
and social situations (51, 52).  He argues that she should be content with “happy 
knowledge . . . pleasant knowledge” and concludes, “I hope you’ll never see the 
ghost!” (52).  Isabel takes umbrage at his comments, and while acknowledging herself 
“afraid of suffering” (if not of ghosts), she opines that “people suffer too easily” and 
that “it’s not absolutely necessary to suffer; we were not made for that.”  Ralph uses 
her observation against her to return to his original point, saying, “You were not, 
certainly,” to which she replies, “I’m not speaking of myself.”  At the center of this 
back-and-forth is a crucial difference in how the two characters understand what it 
means to be “made for” suffering.  For Ralph, suffering is a specific category of 
experience, a state of being that is reserved for those whose “miserable knowledge” 
has alienated them from the world in some profound way.  For Isabel, suffering is all a 
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matter of perspective; one can have one’s eyes opened to uncomfortable truths and not 
necessarily suffer from the knowledge.  As she sees it, suffering is not the inevitable 
outcome of certain experiences; it is a choice in how one decides to view things.    
Isabel’s faith in the individual’s ability to avoid suffering without avoiding the 
sorts of situations that give rise to it is the cornerstone of her determination to get “a 
general impression of life” (56).  To Ralph, she seems “presumptuous” in her 
confidence of her own powers of observation, and, indeed, on more than one occasion, 
her commitment to experience seems a deliberate courting of the pain she believes 
herself capable of rising above.  Yet, Ralph’s suggestion that Isabel is ignorant of the 
risk she runs is disproved in a later scene that also takes place in Gardencourt’s picture 
gallery, in which Isabel must explain to Lord Warburton why she has refused his offer 
of marriage.  Only one in a series of such refusals, her explanation, in this instance, 
takes on the shadings of a philosophical disquisition on viewership owing to its 
unfolding in a properly “aesthetic” space.  Again, though, the contemplation of art 
objects is only of secondary importance to the matter at hand, which is the more 
general consideration of how one’s social position determines perspective.  That 
neither character is under any illusions about what they are scrutinizing in the gallery 
is clear from the beginning.  Lord Warburton, desiring to speak to Isabel alone 
regarding his marriage proposal, “propose[s] to Isabel to come into the gallery and 
look at the pictures; and though she knew he had seen the pictures twenty times she 
complied without criticizing this pretext” (117).  Aesthetic contemplation providing 
the necessary social “pretext” for their discussion, the gallery itself also offers the 
necessary context for mapping out the dynamics of their relationship, a picture that 
bears a certain structural similarity to Isabel’s first visit with Ralph.  Once more, 
Isabel looks at the pictures while her admirer looks at her: 
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Isabel walked to the other side of the gallery and stood there showing him her 
charming back, her light slim figure, the length of her white neck as she bent 
her head, and the density of her dark braids.  She stopped in front of a small 
picture as if for the purposes of examining it; and there was something so 
young and free in her movement that her very pliancy seemed to mock at him.  
Her eyes, however, saw nothing; they had suddenly been suffused with tears. 
(118)   
The strange angle from which Lord Warburton observes Isabel is suggestive at once of 
his objectifying gaze and his inability to really “see” her.  Her “light slim figure” 
framed by the picture she seems to be observing, the presented portrait of “her 
charming back” visually reinforces his frustrated awareness of her emotional 
impenetrability.  Though Warburton does not yet know it, this image of Isabel with 
her back turned anticipates the reason that she will give him for refusing his hand:  
that it is not her “fate to give up,” that she knows that she will never “be happy in any 
extraordinary way; not by turning away, by separating [her]self . . . [f]rom life.  From 
the usual chances and dangers, from what most people know and suffer” (119).  
Warburton misunderstands this explanation and criticizes her for being arrogantly 
“bent on being miserable,” a reasonable mistake considering that she essentially is 
arguing that it is not her fate to not be unhappy.  Isabel sees a life with Lord 
Warburton as a turning of one’s back on the world, a sacrifice of freedom and infinite 
possibility out of the cowardly wish to “escape unhappiness.”  To marry him would be 
to “give up other chances,” to give up on chance generally.  Though she is not seeking 
to be unhappy, the possibility that she might be unhappy (as much as she might be 
anything else) is less a worry for her than that she might live a life insulated from 
common concerns and devoid of the excitement of uncertainty.   
In the same way that Warburton uses the gallery as a “pretext” for engaging 
Isabel on more serious matters, James uses the “pre-textual” nature of aesthetic space 
to give what might otherwise be merely a rather prosaic scene of a woman refusing a 
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suitor the weightier subtext of the individual reflecting on her destiny.  As Isabel talks 
to Warburton, the narrator calls the “expression of her eyes strange,” and this 
strangeness is only fully accounted for after her interview with Warburton is 
interrupted by the arrival of Ralph, the American journalist Henrietta Stackpole, and 
Lord Warburton’s sister Miss Molyneux.  The three interlopers, negotiating the 
awkward silence surrounding Isabel and Warburton, start a stilted conversation 
concerning the gallery, with Miss Molyneux first observing to Ralph, “How very 
many pictures you have! . . . I think it’s so nice. I wish we had a gallery at Lockleigh.  
I’m so very fond of pictures . . . They’re so pleasant when it rains” (120).  Ralph, 
tailoring his reply to the “style of reflection . . . acceptable to her,” replies, “Ah yes, 
pictures are very convenient.”  An exchange that on the surface is almost stunning in 
its extreme superficiality, it nevertheless offers an ironic commentary on the 
convenient way in which pictures, both visual and narrative, give substance and clarity 
to emotions and ideas that cannot be put into words.  If Isabel is not capable of 
articulating to Lord Warburton why she will not marry him, the image of her turned 
back pliantly bent to examine a picture eloquently communicates her rejection of the 
life he offers in favor of one of freedom and eager observation.  And, if Isabel herself 
cannot visualize just what it would mean to accept his proposal, she sees “the reflexion 
of everything she had rejected in rejecting Warburton” in the “grey depths” of the 
“quiet eyes” of his sister: “the peace, the kindness, the honour, the possessions, a deep 
security and a great exclusion” (120).  To marry Warburton would mean that she too 
would become “reflective” of all those properties, would become the mirror image of 
a world in which art objects are merely “convenient,” in which—in the words of 
Henrietta Stackpole—one’s social “position” makes it “sufficient for [one] to exist!”   
In the framing space of the gallery, Isabel makes the choice of an active over a 
passive mode of reflection, a choice that is as much social as it is aesthetic.  She 
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decides against a way of life in which experience becomes almost prescripted by the 
weight and preponderance of cultural and economic privileges meant to define and 
distinguish, to set the individual apart.  Lord Warburton’s estate, Lockleigh (a name 
that, like Gardencourt, seems intended to suggest a natural space somehow enclosed or 
contained, a “lea” or meadow locked), and his sister, Miss Molyneux, each present 
Isabel with a concrete image of the social situation she would be choosing by 
marrying him.  The former strikes her as “a noble picture . . . a stout grey pile of the 
softest, deepest, most weather-fretted hue” and the latter as possessing “a smooth nun-
like forehead” and containing within her “such a world of hereditary quiet” (75, 115).  
Each of these aesthetic impressions is coded, punctuated with descriptors that speak to 
the exquisite luxury and the picturesque isolation that characterize the position of the 
nobility.  Isabel’s final rejection of the possibility of occupying this position is 
announced in her rather dramatic response to Miss Molyneux’s invitation to again visit 
Lockleigh: “I’m afraid I can never come again” (120).  The heavy undertone of this 
pronouncement is noticed by both Lord Warburton and Ralph: Warburton, after 
watching “this little passage . . . turn[s] away and stare[s] at a picture” while Ralph 
“leaning against the rail before the picture . . . watch[es] him” (120-121).  That it is 
now Lord Warburton who seeks refuge from scrutiny in the same manner as had 
Isabel—by performatively adopting the guise of intense contemplation—speaks to the 
way in which aesthetic attitudes are themselves social postures, postures that can be 
falsely assumed to protect the individual from the revelation of unguarded expression.  
Yet, Ralph, standing next to the picture and across from Warburton, again 
demonstrates his awareness of this fact, as he observes with interest and sympathy his 
friend’s self-conscious attempt to conceal his disappointment.   
Ultimately, though, as befits Ralph’s role as the reader’s surrogate, his 
sympathy for Warburton is outweighed by his curiosity regarding Isabel’s future, 
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which he persists in viewing as a sort of theatrical performance arranged for his, and 
others’, diversion.  When Isabel later asks him his opinion on her refusal, he 
announces himself “without a wish on the subject” (133).  For a person so professedly 
invested in Isabel, this absence of judgment only makes sense if one considers Ralph’s 
understanding of his own role, which is solely as a disinterested (in the aesthetic sense 
of the word) spectator.  In this light, Isabel’s decision is neither good nor bad; it is 
merely interesting, all the more so because, in turning down Warburton, Isabel has 
“kept the game in [her] hands,” retaining the possibility of doing something 
“unexpected” with her “career” (133).  Isabel, alarmed by Ralph expecting from her 
“grand examples of anything,” claims for herself a much more meager intention.  She 
remarks simply, “But I do want to look around me . . . I only want to see for myself” 
(134).  For Ralph, however, this aim, above anything else, is the “great thing” that 
makes her most deserving of an audience, and, when Isabel again takes issue with his 
praise, he begs her, “Don’t repudiate it. It’s so fine!”  Speaking less like a cousin and 
friend than as a connoisseur, Ralph’s enthusiastic appreciation of Isabel’s desire “to 
see life” objectifies her, not as a woman but as a viewer or, perhaps more specifically, 
as a instrument of viewership.  If he has little interest in her as a beautiful, desirable 
object, he admires the sensitivity and freshness of her perceptual faculties with almost 
the same amount of reverence and ardor that her many suitors lavish on her person.   
Yet, Ralph’s very appreciation for Isabel-as-viewer is at the root of the tragedy 
that unfolds after he encourages his father to give Isabel a fortune capable of satisfying 
her desire to see the world.  Focused solely on Isabel viewing the social scene before 
her, he is curiously blind to the way her vision can be manipulated and put to use.  
Though he is truly aesthetically disinterested—enjoying her impressions of the world 
for their own sake—others are not, and it is with Isabel’s introduction to those 
characters whose aesthetic faculties and postures are always in the service of social 
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ends that James begins the conversion he speaks of in the preface, transforming her 
aesthetic adventures “into the stuff of drama or, even more delightful word still, of 
‘story’” (14).  In the Preface James cites two scenes as exemplary of this narrative 
conversion: one is Isabel’s midnight meditation near the novel’s conclusion and the 
other is her early encounter with the brilliant Madame Merle.  While the former scene 
is quite evidently significant—both to Isabel and the reader—in the moment at which 
it occurs, the latter only becomes important in hindsight.  Isabel has no major 
revelation upon meeting Madame Merle, only a vague awareness that this interesting 
new person will have an impact on her life.  Madame Merle, though, turns out to be 
both Ralph’s foil and his dark double, in secret competition with him as an architect of 
Isabel’s destiny.  As Ralph epitomizes the gentleman-aesthete, Madame Merle, whose 
name also seems an allusion, this time to Laclos’s scheming Marquise de Merteuil, 
embodies the “great lady” of culture, “so cultivated and civilized, so wise and so easy” 
(166).171  “With all society under contribution, and all the arts and graces it practiced,” 
she raises sociality itself to an art form, her mastery of accomplishments (painting, 
music, embroidery, reading) all aiding her ability to create just the right impression on 
her viewers.  In the summation of the narrator, she is “in short the most comfortable, 
profitable, amenable person to live with,” an alluring sight to the curious Isabel (Is-
able) (167, italics mine). 
One thing of note in this description is how the language used to characterize 
Madame Merle says nothing of intrinsic qualities but, rather, has everything to do with 
her relation to others.  She is able to give comfort, able to answer or respond to some 
outside pressure, and, most importantly, able to generate a profit.  The matter of 
Madame Merle’s “profitability” is especially intriguing, because no character (with the 
                                                 
171 That Madame Merle in both name and person bears a startling resemblance to the Marquise de 
Merteuil from Laclos’s Les Liaisons dangereuses (1782) is noted by Elizabeth Jean Sabiston in The 
Prison of Womanhood: Four Provincial Heroines in Nineteenth-Century Fiction (Houndsmill: 
Macmilllan, 1987) 133. 
 274 
notable exception of Osmond) on the surface seems more removed from the public 
sphere of money and the market.  Without a fortune of her own, Madame Merle seems 
to exist almost entirely on the kindness of acquaintances, moving perpetually from 
country home to villa, always visiting one or another of her vast circle of friends.  Yet, 
as Mrs. Touchett points out, to host Madame Merle is hardly a charitable action: “It is 
a favor to me that she stays; she’s putting off a lot of visits at great houses. . . . She has 
her pick of places” (169).  What allows Serena Merle the luxury of choice in this 
regard is her ability to distinguish what action is “most to the convenience” of her 
audience, “which she always inevitably divined” (167).  Possessed with an intuitive 
sense of her company’s predilections, she facilitates social encounters tailored to their 
varying tastes.  It is, in this way, that she turns a profit, both for her interlocutors (who 
have had their sensibilities gratified) and for herself (in their continued desire for her 
presence).   
James describing Madame Merle’s distinguishing personality trait—her “social 
quality”—in both aesthetic and economic terms speaks to his interest in revealing the 
connection between the beautiful form and the marketable function of the social 
relation.  She is at once the epitome of taste and yet inherently cynical in her 
determination to use that taste to serve her ends.  Even Isabel, at first too awestruck by 
the glossy finish of Madame Merle’s public persona to be critical, displays a degree of 
awareness regarding the inauthentic excessiveness of her new friend’s “merits”: 
If for Isabel she had a fault it was that she was not natural . . . Her nature had 
been too much overlaid by custom and her angles too much rubbed away.  She 
had become too flexible, too useful, was too ripe and too final.  She was in a 
word too perfectly the social animal that man and woman are supposed to have 
been intended to be . . . Isabel found it difficult to think of her in any 
detachment or privacy, she existed only in her relations, direct and indirect, 
with her fellow mortals . . . She was deep, and her nature spoke none the less in 
her behavior because it spoke a conventional tongue. (167) 
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A challenge to the familiar conflation of the social with the superficial, Isabel’s 
impression of Madame Merle finds in the latter’s smooth surface perfection the 
intimation of unfathomable depths.  Yet, these depths do not conceal some private, 
authentic self, a self withheld from public display.  Instead, it is suggested, Madame 
Merle’s deepness comes from the fact that she has no private self.  Having customized 
herself to “custom,” even her “nature” is no longer “natural.”  She is purely “a social 
animal,” her personality fragmented and diffused throughout a large network of 
relations.  A deeper form of secrecy than privacy, Madame Merle’s essential sociality 
makes it impossible for Isabel (and for others) to visualize her outside of her 
immediate context.  In always being what a particular situation calls for, her actions 
conform to standards of propriety and, thus, by their very conventionality, resist 
further scrutiny.   
If a mystery to others, Madame Merle’s responsiveness to social dynamics 
makes her especially adept at seeing situationally, of “placing” others within their 
specific contexts.  As she tells Isabel, “[w]hen you’ve lived as long as I you’ll see that 
every human being has his shell and that you must take that shell into account.  By the 
shell I mean the whole envelope of circumstances” (175).  She goes on to declare, 
“[t]here’s no such thing as an isolated man or woman; we’re each of us made up of 
some cluster of appurtenances.”  It is this notion of selfhood (a notion that Isabel 
vehemently disagrees with) that drives Madame Merle’s central action in the novel: to 
arrange Isabel’s marriage to her former lover, Gilbert Osmond.  The adeptness and 
care with which she goes about achieving this feat thoroughly demonstrates her ability 
to take the “shell” of social circumstances “into account,” as she stages Isabel and 
Osmond’s courtship as a director might a play.  Her orchestration of their initial 
meetings strives to create a particular relation between them, one that James takes 
pains to establish as strikingly similar to that of aesthetic viewer to art object.  
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However, since Madame Merle intends for Isabel’s admiration to lead to marriage, she 
is acting not in the capacity of cicerone, but as a dealer, brokering the sale of a 
precious item to a wealthy buyer.   
Traveling to Italy with Mrs. Touchett, Ralph, and Isabel, Madame Merle lays 
the groundwork for this potential sale by first visiting Osmond in his “ancient villa 
crowning an olive-muffled hill outside the Roman gate of Florence” (195).  The 
description of the villa anticipates the description of its owner, which foregrounds the 
fact that, like Gardencourt, a property is always the reflection of its owner.  Osmond’s 
villa, though, is even more “private” than Mr. Touchett’s estate, as it is more than 
merely secluded by its proprietor’s wealth and privilege; it is a space that embodies its 
owner’s carefully cultivated isolation, his obsession with presenting an imposingly 
tasteful façade.  Seen from the outside, the villa has a strangely “incommunicable 
character,” its heavy stone front giving the impression that one is looking at “the 
mask, not the face of the house” (195).  Even its windows resist their ordinary 
function, and instead of acting as a conduit for “communication with the world,” these 
“jealous apertures” seem “to defy the world to look in” (196).  Anthropomorphizing 
the structure, imparting to it a malevolently exclusionary impulse, this narrative 
picture of the villa unsettles precisely because it attributes to the object of scrutiny an 
active and hostile resistance to perceptual penetration.  For a novel whose heroine is 
animated by her desire to see the world for herself, here, it is suggested, she will 
encounter a particular challenge, a setting that is already warily anticipatory of the 
gaze of the prospective viewer.  In this regard, Osmond’s villa offers a significant 
modification of the scene of aesthetic encounter.  Unlike Gardencourt, it is not a social 
space in which there are rooms and galleries carefully designated for acts of aesthetic 
experience.  It is a social space the whole of which demands to be understood as an 
aesthetic object.  Like its exterior, its interior also speaks to its owner’s efforts to 
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create an effect; it is described as “a seat of ease . . . telling of arrangements subtly 
studied and refinements frankly proclaimed” (196).  In its display of precious antique 
artifacts surrounded by comfortable modern furniture chosen to suit the tastes of “a 
lounging generation,” it resembles a museum, the layout of its rooms intended to 
encourage the visitor to sit and observe.   
Yet, the deliberateness with which its many objets d’art have been selected and 
situated (a deliberateness communicated through the narrator’s use of 
demonstratives—“those faded hangings,” “those angular specimens of pictorial art,” 
“those perverse-looking relics of medieval brass and pottery”) implies that it is not the 
objects themselves that are truly on display in Osmond’s villa.  The objects are only 
beautiful manifestations of what is truly meant for observation: their owner’s 
“studied” subtlety and “pronounced” refinement.  Enshrining Osmond’s “adorable 
taste,” the aesthetic quality of his villa ultimately is meant to serve a social function, 
which explains Madame Merle’s desire to bring Isabel to his home, because, as she 
says to him, “as cicerone of your museum you appear to particular advantage” (209).  
Osmond’s “rooms,” in her opinion, “are perfect” in that they demonstrate that Osmond 
“understand[s] this sort of thing as nobody anywhere does” (208).  Though she does 
not get any more specific than that, Madame Merle’s comment might be taken to mean 
that no one else is as capable as Osmond of using his space to set himself off, of using 
all of his chosen curios to put himself on display in a tasteful manner.  But, if Osmond 
is a genius of aesthetic effect, Madame Merle displays an equal amount of genius in 
social arrangements.  When Osmond asks her what she plans to do with him and 
Isabel, she replies, “What you see.  Put her in your way” (207).  Osmond asking, more 
philosophically than sympathetically, if Isabel is not “meant for something better than 
that,” the answer she gives reveals the amoral relativism that underwrites her mastery 
of interpersonal relations:  “I don’t pretend to know what people are meant for . . . I 
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only know what I can do with them.”  While there is nothing melodramatically 
villainous about Madame Merle’s plans, her worldview is Machiavellian, to say the 
least.  Having no regard for the concept of individual sovereignty, she approaches all 
interactions strategically, with an eye towards how a particular alignment of 
circumstances might best produce the desired result.  In this way, she is not so very 
different from Osmond.  Only their chosen spheres of influence distinguish them, 
spheres of influence that, as the novel repeatedly reminds us, are less comfortingly 
separate than they might appear. 
Indeed, with Madame Merle and Osmond’s extended campaign for Isabel’s 
fortune, the success of this social venture depends entirely on their ability to engage 
Isabel’s aesthetic sensibilities, to direct her desire to develop her perceptual faculties 
into a particular channel.  As throughout the novel, the setting is a crucial factor in this 
process.  After all, Isabel has come to Italy to be initiated into “the mystery” of 
culture, and, in Florence, both Ralph and Madame Merle are the “priests” she has 
chosen to help with her initiation (211).  That they contribute in very different ways to 
Isabel’s aesthetic education is not surprising, as they have in mind very different 
outcomes.  With Ralph, Isabel visits the great repositories of art, where she finds 
herself “in no want indeed of aesthetic illumination”: “she performed all those acts of 
mental prostration in which, on the first visit to Italy, youth and enthusiasm for 
frequently indulge; she felt her heart beat in the presence of immortal genius and knew 
the sweetness of rising tears to which faded fresco and darkened marble grew dim” 
(211, 212).  Madame Merle, who tellingly “remained at home” for those visits, offers 
her another kind of aesthetic experience in arranging her first meeting with Gilbert 
Osmond.  That James intends these two, seemingly disparate encounters to be 
understood as related might be assumed from (among other things) the similarities in 
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Isabel’s responses to them.172  Though not quite in a state of “mental prostration,” 
Isabel‘s reaction to Osmond’s presence is marked by the same intensity of scrutiny; 
reduced almost to muteness, she sits “there as if she had been at a play and had paid 
even a large sum for her place” (212).  Of course, the scripted quality of Osmond’s 
conversation that Isabel is so captivated by, the “rich readiness” that seems almost to 
“have come from rehearsal,” is, in fact, rehearsed; Madame Merle has told Osmond of 
Isabel precisely so that he has time to prepare his lines.   
Still, Isabel, in her own way, also contributes to the success of his performance 
by willingly assuming the role that has been laid out for her.  Deciding it most 
“important she should get an impression of him,” she makes of herself an attentive 
audience, allowing “the effect of brilliancy” created by his wit and erudition to 
“check[] her and h[o]ld her in suspense.”  She responds to this social spectacle crafted 
for her benefit as she responded to certain choice art objects on display in the 
museums and galleries of Florence: she gives herself wholly over to the emotional and 
sensory aspects of appreciation.  But, in the same way that her rapturous tears at the 
sight of “faded fresco and darkened marble” causes her vision to literally “gr[o]w 
dim,” here, her responsiveness to a display of conversational mastery creates a 
corresponding intellectual dimness.  She accepts unquestioningly the arrangement of 
this scene for her visual consumption, and, detecting in Osmond’s talk a cultivation 
and craftedness that seems intentional, she assesses it on aesthetic rather than social 
terms.   
Isabel’s assessment of him demonstrates her active, if unconscious, 
engagement with Madame Merle and Osmond’s dramatic, highly aestheticized 
enactment of polite sociality.  The perceptible note of affectation that clings to 
Osmond pleases Isabel (rather than sets her on her guard) because she currently is 
                                                 
172 Also, the fact that Isabel’s trip to the galleries is followed immediately by her introduction to 
Osmond has the effect of blending one scene of introspection seamlessly into the other. 
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looking at the world as though it should be delivering her precious items for 
observation.  Her impression of Osmond confirms this perspectival orientation.  She is 
charmed by Osmond’s “well-bred air of expecting nothing,” as it conforms to the 
aestheticist conception of the art object, as something that (to again rely on Pater) 
“comes to you proposing frankly to give nothing but the highest quality to your 
moments as they pass, and simply for those moments’ sake.”173  In Osmond, Isabel 
detects this elevating quality, and though she admits that “he [i]s not handsome,” she 
is convinced that “he [i]s fine, as fine as one of the drawings in the long gallery above 
the bridge of the Uffizi” (213).  Perhaps no word that she might have chosen is more 
revealing of the effect of Isabel’s aesthetic education than “fine.”  The same word that 
Ralph once used to describe her, it says less about the object itself than the perspective 
of the person who employs it.  Connoting quality, purity, delicacy, and polish, the term 
gestures towards the individual’s ability to judge something on aesthetic terms.  That 
Gilbert Osmond is to Isabel somehow consummate, as perfect a specimen as a 
painting in the Uffizi, suggests that she has already situated him within an internal 
gallery of other such objects.  As she describes him to herself later, he is “a specimen 
apart,” “an original,” the first person that she has met “of so fine a grain” (224).  In all 
of these characterizations of Osmond, one sees the increasing success of Isabel’s 
inculcation in the aestheticization of the social. 
The strange triangulation between Isabel, Osmond and Madame Merle has a 
precedent in the novel, even if that precedent is only created retrospectively by 
James’s insertion of the 1908 preface.  James’s analogy in the preface of the author to 
an art dealer provides an invaluable model for understanding the social and aesthetic 
dynamics at play in Madame Merle’s plot to marry Isabel to Osmond.  When in the 
Preface James portrays himself as a dealer “in precious odds and ends,” he invites the 
                                                 
173 The Renaissance 190. 
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reader to notice the mercantile aspect of aesthetic appreciation.  If Isabel Archer has 
“been placed” in “the dusky, crowded, heterogeneous backdrop of the mind,” this 
placement is only temporary.  The dealer makes his living by placing those objects in 
his nominal possession in the hands of buyers, buyers who he must convince of the 
value of what he has to sell.  The difficulty with this process, though, is that aesthetic 
“value” is not (and, it might be argued, cannot be) reducible to economic terms.  The 
cachet of the art object is that its value is somehow extra-monetary; to buy art is to 
exchange real money for cultural currency, to invest in a market with largely social 
dividends and returns.   
While Isabel does not yet know it, Madame Merle is brokering a similar sort of 
deal, with Isabel as the prospective buyer and Osmond as the “rare little piece” that 
can be purchased by the hard currency provided by her inheritance.  Again, though, 
because of the application of aesthetic forms onto social situations that characterizes 
most of the interpersonal relations of this novel, the matter of money is what must be 
obscured, lest it sully what on both sides must be seen as a romantic, as opposed to an 
economic, transaction.  Thus, Osmond, like the art object, is always presented as 
somehow outside the realm of social exchange.  When Madame Merle first describes 
him to Isabel, she underscores the fact that he has “no career, no name, no position, no 
fortune, no past, no future, no anything,” but for all that, he is still “a man made to be 
distinguished” (172, 171).  In even this first mention of Osmond, Madame Merle 
proves herself the uncontested “mistress of the social art,” by placing in Isabel’s head 
the embryo of the idea that Osmond, being “made to be distinguished,” is in need of 
someone to accomplish for him that feat.  Madame Merle’s perspicacity in this 
instance can be attributed to her thorough knowledge of her audience.  Though 
initially unnerved by her unexpected inheritance, Isabel has since reconciled herself to 
her good luck by imaginatively translating the dollars and cents she has been given 
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into what that money might purchase; she has already “lost herself in a maze of 
visions; the fine things to be done by a rich, independent, generous girl who took a 
large human view of occasions and obligations” (193).  Madame Merle simply gives 
those visions an object, introducing Isabel to a particular social relation that serves her 
requirement of exciting aesthetic admiration.  What finer thing can be done than to 
marry what she later admits is “the finest—in the sense of being the subtlest—manly 
organism she had every known” (358)?  Appealing directly to Isabel’s desire to prove 
herself a connoisseur, Madame Merle—like the curio dealer—provides her with the 
opportunity to put her fortune to good use, by making Gilbert Osmond her “property” 
and, thus, a reflection of her taste and discretion.    
On Osmond’s side, the chance to be acquired by Isabel meets a corresponding 
need.  As the narrator describes it, 
If an anonymous drawing on a museum wall had been conscious and watchful 
it might have known this peculiar pleasure of being at last and all of a sudden 
identified—as from the hand of a great master—by the so high and so 
unnoticed fact of style.  His “style” is what the girl had discovered with a little 
help; and now, besides herself enjoying it, she should publish it to the world 
without his having any of the trouble. (260) 
Osmond tells Isabel at one point that the individual “ought to make one’s life a work 
of art,” and, to the extent that his “style” is the only means by which he can be 
properly “identified,” he has succeeded (261).  What is curious about this analogy, 
though, is that it leaves open the possibility that whoever has attributed to Osmond the 
mark of a master is incorrect, as “style” is something that can be emulated.  Taking 
this idea a bit further, the very anonymity of Osmond-as-drawing uneasily resonates 
with the narrator’s earlier description of him as a man strangely scrubbed free of all 
defining characteristics that would allow others to divine his origins, suggesting that, 
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as a work of art, there is a strong chance that he might be a counterfeit.174  Of course, 
the success of any counterfeit depends on a number of factors, not least among them 
there being a market for such goods.  Moreover, there have to be established standards 
of judgment and widely-accepted practices for authentication in order for the 
counterfeit to pass itself off as “real.”  By manipulating those standards and practices, 
the counterfeit calls into question the validity of these means of ascribing value and, to 
a certain extent, jeopardizes the integrity of the whole process by which such items are 
judged.  In some ways, this is just what Osmond’s deception does to the scene of 
aesthetic encounter in James’s novel.  Appropriating those aesthetic objects and 
images to shore up his own personal “style,” he empties out the vast symbolic 
economy created by those things.  Instead of situating him within a wider network of 
value, the various paintings, drawings, curios, and other assorted bric-a-brac he 
collects serve to reify the “finish” or “fineness” of his public persona.  No longer can 
any single aesthetic object be used to interpret him, to open him up to scrutiny through 
his relation to it.  All the objects he selects become iterations of the same formula, 
proving again and again the existence of his own “style.”  And Isabel, the viewer 
deemed most capable of publishing these findings far and wide, is meant to expedite 
the process, as her “quick, fanciful mind . . . saved one repetitions and reflected one’s 
thought on a polished, elegant surface” (296).  Like “a silver plate . . . he could tap 
with his knuckles and make . . . ring,” Isabel is useful to Osmond as a reflective 
surface in which he can enjoy the totality of the impression he has worked so hard to 
create; her perception is transformed from a window into a mirror, from a 
consciousness that sees through to an instrument that one sees oneself in. 
                                                 
174 In this earlier description, the narrator says, “You would have been at a loss to determine his original 
clime and country; he had none of the superficial signs that usually render the answer to this question an 
insipidly easy one” (197). 
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Given that Osmond triumphs in his efforts to ensnare Isabel and to use her 
faculties and fortune to announce his value “to the world,” do we understand that 
triumph to signify that James himself finds the form of the aesthetic relation to have 
become meaningless?  Is his novel a testament to the author’s belief that the aesthetic 
encounter is now an empty social ritual now devoid of the belief system that (through 
earlier novels) brought it into being?  If the novel concluded with Isabel in the same 
benighted state that led to her entrapment, those questions might be answered in the 
affirmative.  However, Isabel still has one more social scene to view, one that brings 
with it a painful revelation on her part that both exposes the heavy cost associated with 
looking at the world from a purely aesthetic angle and yet also offers a certain hope 
for rescuing the aesthetic encounter from those whose use of it has made it a powerful 
weapon in the arsenal of social manipulation.  This scene occurs after Isabel and 
Osmond have settled into being politely but unhappily married, after Isabel has begun 
to realize that, contrary to her earlier impression, her husband is hardly as disinterested 
in the world as he previously appeared.  Still at a loss to explain to herself the 
discontent she feels with her situation, she happens to covertly witness her husband 
and Madame Merle in an unguarded moment:  
Just beyond the threshold of the drawing-room, she stopped short, the reason 
for her doing so being that she had just received an impression.  The 
impression had, in strictness, nothing unprecedented; but she felt it as 
something new, and the soundlessness of her step gave her time to take in the 
scene . . . Madame Merle was standing on the rug . . . Osmond was in a deep 
chair . . . What struck Isabel first was that he was sitting while Madame Merle 
stood; there was an anomaly in this that arrested her. Then she perceived that 
they . . . were musing face to face, with the freedom of old friends . . . There 
was nothing to shock in this . . . But the thing made an image, lasting only a 
moment, like a sudden flicker of light.  Their relative positions, their absorbed 
mutual gaze, struck her as something detected. (343) 
Early in the novel, Isabel is described as the sort of person who “evidently caught 
impressions,” but here, the impression is not something she catches but “receive[s]” 
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(28, 343).  The notable use of the passive voice in this instance suggests that this 
impression (as opposed to others previously encountered) intrudes upon Isabel’s 
consciousness wholly unexpectedly, which, on the most basic level, accounts for her 
feeling of surprise.  Not expecting to come upon her husband and Madame Merle, she 
is “stopped short” by her immediate and involuntary response to this sight.  Yet, her 
immediate sensorial reaction is only a small part of the “reason” that this moment 
makes such an impact on her.  The real force behind the impression lies in her 
recognition that this sight, which contains “nothing unprecedented,” nevertheless feels 
like “something new.”  Though she has seen her friend and husband together many 
times previously, their relation to each other here is lifted out of the familiar flow of 
everyday sociality and is momentarily frozen into a static image, a picture framed by 
the “threshold” of the doorway beyond which Isabel is standing.  Moreover, this image 
is arresting precisely because its various components are not (to use a painting term) 
“in keeping.”  For Madame Merle to be standing while Osmond sits is inconsistent 
with the bourgeois standards of deportment towards the opposite sex to which they 
usually so rigorously, even performatively, adhere.  Viewed as a tableau, the setting, 
the two figures, their mutually-absorbed gazes, their respective postures and their 
spatial relation do not add up to a coherent, unremarkable, harmonious whole, and a 
picture that Isabel concedes should feel familiar instead produces a sense of the 
uncanny.   
To strike an impression is to make a literal or figurative indentation on the 
surface of something by applying pressure to it.  In Isabel’s case, the impression on 
her consciousness of the picture of her husband and Madame Merle is made with two 
strikes.  The first strike is her sudden awareness of the anomalousness of their 
“relative positions,” and the second is the realization that in this anomaly there is 
“something [to be] detected.”  Isabel has yet to realize what this “something” is, but 
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her impression of the pair is significant in that it gives aesthetic form to the true social 
relation between them.  Up until this point, Isabel has only seen Osmond and Madame 
Merle as they have wanted to be seen; she has been an appreciative but ultimately 
uncomprehending audience of the spectacle that they have staged for her benefit.  In 
this instance, though, she has caught the pair vis-à-vis, a position that they usually 
studiously avoid.  Typically, the narrator suggests, “[i]n the manner and tone of these 
two persons . . . especially when they met in the presence of others, was something 
indirect and circumspect, as if they had approached each other obliquely and 
addressed each other by implication” (207).  Masters of misdirection, the pair excels at 
directing the eye of the viewer away from their connection to each other, which is why 
it is only when Isabel happens upon them unawares that she is given a direct view of 
the intimacy of their relation.  Adam Parkes has made the argument that Isabel’s 
impressions are the products of a receptive but untrained sensibility and that The 
Portrait of a Lady can be read as a progress narrative of sorts in which Isabel’s 
“faculty of seeing [comes to be] reinforced by a capacity for judging” and “she 
learn[s] to translate impressions into knowledge.”175  While Parkes is right to stress 
Isabel’s aesthetic education—her acquiring of a refined mode of perception forged out 
a series of disastrous misreadings and out of the suffering they occasion--this 
argument downplays the importance of situation and circumstance, all of the material 
aspects of the viewing experience, in Isabel’s discovery of Osmond and Madame 
Merle’s “plot” by attributing this discovery to the development of her rational 
faculties.  If Isabel has, in fact, become more of a “judge” by the novel’s conclusion, it 
is still the case that the revelatory impression of her husband and friend “familiarly 
associated” is the product of a fortuitous alignment of contingencies.  That she 
“receives” this impression, instead of seeking it out, suggests that it is (at least 
                                                 
175 Adam Parkes, “A Sense of Justice: Whistler, Ruskin, James, Impressionism,” VS 42:4 (Summer 
1999/2000) 619. 
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partially) the form and the framing of the aesthetic encounter that determines the 
viewer’s capacity for detection or judgment.   
That being said, Isabel would not have been as “impressed” by the image of 
Osmond and Madame Merle if she had not already learned how to map aesthetic 
viewing models onto social situations, allowing her to conceive of social conventions 
as formal behaviors that can be analyzed as one might an art object.  It is only because 
she is able to visually compare the picture made by her husband and friend to an ideal 
image of how the picture should look that she is able to grasp the import of its 
deviations from the standard.  In many ways, this moment offers the clearest 
expression of how processes of aesthetic contemplation function on both literal and 
tropological levels in James’s novel, for in the description of Isabel’s impression we 
see how actual sensory content (the substance of what she sees) also operates on a 
symbolic level, creating a visual analogue for feelings and suspicions she was 
previously unable to organize into coherent thought.  To expand on this point by way 
of an example, early in her courtship, Isabel is observing a particular painting in 
Osmond’s home, when he tells her, “[l]et me take down that picture; you want more 
light” (224).  Though Osmond’s comment only concerns the physical conditions of 
viewership—the importance of proper lighting when scrutinizing an art object—this 
statement is given a retrospective resonance when considered in relation to the 
comparison of her later impression to “a sudden flicker of light” (343).  The “light” in 
this latter case is strictly metaphorical.  It refers not to how Isabel sees (with the aid of 
light) but what she sees (light itself, the truth of their relationship).  But, if we consider 
that the language and practices of aesthetic contemplation in The Portrait of a Lady 
function like a cognitive framework that determines the individual’s orientation 
towards the world, we see that the first moment offers a literal model of viewership on 
which the second, more abstract moment is predicated.   
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Indeed, throughout James’s novel, various characters are depicted in attitudes 
of aesthetic observation, yet the art objects and artifacts that they are studying are 
rarely more than glancingly mentioned.  The question, then, is why include those 
moments of aesthetic encounter at all, if not to suggest the pervasiveness of art culture 
and the way in which it sets the terms for all forms of visual encounter?  By largely 
refusing to identify or describe the artworks and curios his characters collect, observe, 
and revere, James strips away the rich tapestry of symbols that in earlier novels served 
to narrativize a character’s individual engagement with culture.  In doing so, he 
exposes the basic structure that underlies all of these engagements, that of the aesthetic 
encounter.  Taken out of its familiar narrative context (the museum or the gallery), the 
aesthetic encounter in James’s novel is “turned” into a literary trope, a figure of 
thought that provides a means of conceptualizing the individual’s relation to the 
world.176   
Isabel’s aesthetic encounter with the image of Osmond and Madame Merle 
becomes, for her, just such a trope.  Her impression of the pair serves as a kind of 
specular instrument, half-filter and half-screen, that temporarily illuminates for her the 
vast and complicated history between the two of which she has been thus far 
deliberately kept in the dark.  Directly preceding what James himself calls his “young 
woman’s extraordinary midnight vigil”—the extended “representation simply of her 
motionlessly seeing”—her impression of Osmond and Madame Merle provides the 
visual “pretext” on which this vigil is grounded (14-15).  Taking place in the drawing-
room, the same room in which she glimpsed the pair in an unsettling, charged 
                                                 
176 In this way, James’s understanding of the aesthetic relation and the language of aesthetics more 
generally might be seen to function in much the same way as what Kenneth Burke has called “the 
terministic screen” in Language as Symbolic Action (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966):  
“Not only does the nature of our terms affect the nature of our observations, in the sense that the terms 
direct the attention to one field rather than another.  Also, many of the ‘observations’ are but 
implications of the particular terminology in terms of which the observations are made” (46).   
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proximity, her meditation is figured as a kind of terrifying if rapturous retreat into the 
confusing darkness of her mind: 
Her soul was haunted with terrors which crowded to the foreground of thought 
as quickly as a place was made for them.  What had suddenly set them into 
livelier motion she hardly knew, unless it were the strange impression she had 
received in the afternoon of her husband’s being in more direct communication 
with Madame Merle than she had suspected. (355) 
Coming “back to her from time to time” throughout her meditation, this “strange 
impression” of her husband and Madame Merle in “direct communication” creates a 
mental space for reflection, offering a concrete image that allows her to scrutinize the 
surprising depth and intimacy of their connection.  She also uses this image to 
compare the relation between her husband and her friend to her own relation to 
Osmond, and, thinking about her married life in spatial terms, she is capable of 
recognizing the insurmountable divide between them, a divide founded largely on 
conflict between the ways in which she and Osmond “look at life” (359).  In the case 
of Osmond, his critical, aestheticizing gaze perpetuates and reinforces the social 
conventions against which he measures his own conduct.  Though the world appears 
to him mostly as “base, ignoble,” it nevertheless “afford[s] a standard,” from which 
one can “extract . . . some recognition of one’s own superiority” (360).  The act of 
perception, as it is used by Osmond, is a ritual of self-worship, demonstrating what 
Bachelard has called the “spectacle complex in which pride of seeing is the core of the 
consciousness of a being in contemplation.”177  For this reason, Osmond’s is not 
simply a failure of vision; it is a foreclosure of it.  The aesthetic posture, the life of the 
aristocratic observer, for him is “altogether a thing of forms, a conscious, calculated 
attitude” constructed mostly for the appreciation of other viewers (361).  When 
captivated by Osmond, Isabel’s impression of him is merely a reflection of how he 
                                                 
177 Gaston Bachelard, The Poetics of Space, trans. Maria Jolas (Boston: Beacon Press, 1994) 190. 
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sees himself, an impression that is confined to a vague admiration for his appearance, 
the “indefinable beauty about him—in his situation, in his mind, in his face” (357).   
Isabel’s latest impression, by contrast, goes deeper and, thus, opens up the 
narrative, providing a glimpse of what lies behind the cold, concrete surface of social 
forms: the web of overlapping, conflicting, and conjoining motivations that bind 
people together, the interpersonal and intersubjective relations that are obscured by 
their adherence to accepted conventions of behavior.  The anomalous image of 
Osmond and Madame Merle sets into motion for Isabel a series of connected 
reflections, all of which pertain to pivotal moments in her courtship and married life.  
Surveying these moments now “in the light of deepening experience,” she is able to 
detect the implications in various social interactions, to see the craftedness of others’ 
actions and the reasons for them.  Fittingly, it is with her development of this mode of 
perception that Isabel finally becomes acquainted with suffering, which, she realizes, 
is “an active condition . . . not a chill, a stupor, a despair” but “a passion of thought, of 
speculation, of response to every pressure” (356).  With her impression casting “a livid 
light” upon her recent past, Isabel locates a new aesthetic disposition, one rooted in the 
painful awareness of the potential treachery of forms both artistic and social, of the 
danger they present to the viewer unable to recognize how their arrangement can be 
manipulated to present a particular image and evoke a particular response.  Even 
Isabel’s own past behavior is less of a mystery to her now.  She realizes that her 
decision to marry Osmond, though rooted in aesthetic admiration, was also motivated 
by a desire to relieve herself of the “burden” of her fortune by “transfer[ing] the 
weight of it to some other conscience, to some more prepared receptacle” (358).  If 
Osmond used her, she also, on some level, used Osmond, if only as a means of “doing 
something appreciable with her money.”  That there is no purely unselfconscious 
gesture and that all relations are motivated by the principle of social and economic 
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exchange are only two specific incarnations of the truth of which she becomes 
conscious over the course of her late-night vigil.  What she comes to see through the 
image of “her husband and Madame Merle unconsciously and familiarly 
associated”—an image that pivotally opens and closes her meditation—is that all 
individual acts of perception and evaluation are contained within, perhaps even 
predestined by, the framework of sociality.  Elevated to the level of a trope, a concrete 
expression of relationality, Isabel’s impression is no longer just a light to see by, but 
its own flicker of light, her vision no longer just a means of assessing what is before 
her eyes but a more profound way of understanding being in the world.   
Having grasped this truth, Isabel is given one final social encounter that takes 
on the most exquisite of aesthetic forms.  Visiting her cousin Ralph on his deathbed, 
she shares with him the substance of her revelation, and examining with him the 
“architectural vastness” of the social and aesthetic structures that have determined 
their existence, they attain the bittersweet reward of such endeavors, the “only 
knowledge that was not anguish—the knowledge that they were looking at the truth 
together” (478).  With this image, James offers the possibility of redeeming the 
aesthetic encounter from the solipsistic machinations of viewers like Osmond and 
Madame Merle.  If Isabel cannot be saved or even released from “suffering” (this 
release is only given to Ralph with his death), she at least has attained the intimacy 
that she formerly sought with Osmond, an intimacy based on a shared regard “for truth 
and knowledge” and the “belie[f] that two intelligent people ought to look for them 
together” (359).  Isabel achieves (if only momentarily) this intimate, shared vision 
through her somber tête-à-tête with Ralph in the gloomy sickroom of Gardencourt.  
Not face-to-face like Osmond and Madame Merle in the drawing room, she and Ralph 
are head-to-head, leaning close together as they “look” not at but with each other.  
Throughout The Portrait of a Lady, relations between people have been figured in 
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terms of mutual observation, a meeting of eyes that frequently only reinforces the 
distance between the perspectives of the viewers.  Here, though, instead of studying 
the facades of each other’s public personas, Ralph and Isabel instead survey the vast 
edifice of circumstances that brought them to this point, their joint perspective also 
shared by the reader.  The object of their observation remains largely undescribed, 
which underscores the fact that what is important in this intensely private moment is 
not what they see but that they are seeing it together.  Though fleeting, their shared 
aesthetic encounter with the social structure that brought them into such close 
emotional and perceptual contact is given a kind of narrative after-life, when Isabel 
awakes the morning of Ralph’s death to see “a vague, hovering figure in the vagueness 
of the room.  She stared for a moment; she saw his white face—his kind eyes; then she 
saw there was nothing” (479).  Apparently having “filled the necessary condition” of 
having “live[d] to suffer enough,” she finally has encountered “the ghost with which 
the old house was duly provided”: Ralph himself.  A final gesture towards the specters 
of the gothic novel and the novel of aesthetic experience in his own text, James, by 
making Ralph the “thing that appears” to Isabel, exemplifies the point that he made in 
his review of Wilkie Collins: having undergone the trial of an aesthetic education in 
social forms, the individual can only hope for the deeper sort of perception that allows 
one to recognize that “most mysterious of mysteries, the mysteries which are at our 
own doors.” 
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